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Abstract 
This thesis is the first comprehensive exercise in comparing UK labour protection 
standards with the requirements of the labour and employment rights treaties 
ratified by the government since 1945. 
The early chapters of the thesis (1-4) set out a historical and philosophical 
understanding of the development of collective and individual labour rights in UK.  
The broad dichotomy of collective and individual rights is placed within the 
context of international standards set out in European (the European Union and 
the Council of Europe) and United Nations (including the International Labour 
Organisation) fora.  In latter chapters (5-7), the thesis sets out in empirical detail 
the labour protections necessary to ensure UK compliance with the standards 
required by the most influential of these rights instruments across three 
‘benchmarking’ chapters.  These benchmarking chapters cover the fields of 
collective labour law, the ordinary terms and conditions of employment, and 
workplace equality.  The empirical analysis in those chapters shows that full 
freedom of association has been denied, and continues to be denied working 
people in the UK on the artificial premise that individual rights enjoy a primacy 
over those which are exercised collectively.  
This thesis concludes by reprising the principal steps necessary to secure such 
compliance, as well as the extent of UK breaches in relation to freedom of 
association, and by showing what could be done by a future government, within 
the limits of international and regional obligation, to extend and entrench 
protection for full freedom of association, and for the raft of individual 
employment rights that the government is bound to guarantee. 
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BENCHMARKING WORKPLACE RIGHTS 
Introduction 
 
 The Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the modern 
title of the minister who in past years would have had charge of the Ministry of 
Labour, tells us that workers ‘enjoy a wide range of protections to pay and 
conditions, above and beyond the minimums provided by European law,’ and that 
he and his colleagues in government are ‘proud of this record,’ proud of 
‘successfully balancing fairness and security for the majority of working people in 
the UK.’1 But those are bold claims. How can he be sure of the compliance he 
boasts of? Moreover, there are numerous very comprehensive treaty obligations 
relating to labour protection as equally binding upon the government as those 
based on the EU treaties intended to secure the successful compromise between 
the interests of workers and employers to which the minister refers. Do UK 
standards surpass those demanded by those instruments?  
 
This dissertation seeks to supply the answers to those questions. Taking 
inspiration from the work of Stuart Weir, David Beetham, Stuart Wilks-Heeg et al, 
which culminated with the benchmarking Democratic Audit of 2012,2 and from KD 
Ewing’s less rigidly structured, more discursive and polemical Britain and the ILO, 
first published in 1989, and revised in 1994,3 it is the first comprehensive exercise 
in comparing UK labour protection standards with the requirements of the labour 
and employment rights treaties ratified by the government since 1945. The 
Cambridge Dictionary defines benchmarking as ‘[t]he act of measuring the quality 
of something by comparing it with something else of an accepted standard,’ and 
that has been the basis of my approach. The dictionary also describes 
benchmarking as the ‘use of something as a standard in order to improve your 
                                               
1From the foreword of Good Work, A response to the Taylor Review of Modern Working Practices,February 2018, 
by the Rt.Hon. Greg Clark MP. 
2 The UK Democratic Audit project was under the direction of Stuart Weir of the University of Essex during 1991 – 
2008 and Stuart Wilks-Heeg during 2009-2014. See, for example, S.Weir and D. Beetham, Political Power and 
Democratic Control in Britain, 1999, and particularly, S. Wilks-Heeg, A.Blick and S. Crone, How Democratic is the 
UK? The 2012 Audit, Liverpool University www.democraticaudit.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/auditing-the-
uk-democracy-the-framework.pdf. There is a 2018 audit: P. Dunleavy, a Park and R Taylor, The UK’s Changing 
Democracy, The 2018 Democratic Audit, (London LSE 2018). 
3 2nd Edition, London, IER, 1994. 
2 
 
own work, products or processes,’ and my intention is to make a contribution 
towards securing for British workers the requisite standards of protection – to 
improve, where necessary, labour and employment rights.  I compare the key 
areas of labour law and practice in the UK with the international and regional  
standards enshrined in ‘law making treaties’ that have been accepted by the 
government as those necessary to maintain and advance industrial relations in 
the United Kingdom, 4standards to which the government is bound to adhere.  
This is not an exercise in comparative law. My interest other jurisdictions extends 
only as far as occasionally applying the decisions, rulings and conclusions which 
the supervisory bodies entrusted with the interpretation and application of the 
standards demanded have made in relation to other states bound by the 
instruments in question. Jean-Michel Servais acknowledged both the close 
relationship, and the distinction, between comparative law and benchmarking 
when, in the preface to his book International Labour Law,5 he stated: 
‘international labour standards are invaluable benchmarks in comparative 
law. Indeed, when texts from several countries are compared, especially 
when those countries are dissimilar in nature, international labour 
standards are both useful instruments of analysis and excellent yardsticks 
for identifying common denominators. They even serve to gauge the 
degree to which a given body of law conforms to universally accepted 
general principles.’6 
                                               
4 See EA Landy, The Effectiveness of International Supervision: Thirty Years of ILO Experience, (London, Stevens, 
1966), p1. Landy cites JL Brierly, who in The Law of Nations 6
th
 edition (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963) so 
categorised ‘the class of treaties which....a large number of states have concluded for the purpose of declaring 
their understanding of what the law is on a particular subject, or of laying down a new general rule for future 
conduct, or for creating some international institution’ (p58). 
5 (Netherlands, Kluwer, 4th Edition 2014). 
6  Ibid p17. However, any survey of comparative law will reveal that international or regional standards, while often 
mentioned, are rarely used by academics. See, for example the numerous contributions to R Blainpain, 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrialised Market Economies, (Netherlands Kluwer 2010). 
In contrast – as will become apparent to the reader - comparative law, although rarely mentioned, is at the heart 
of the work of the ILO’s supervisory bodies, the European Committee of Social Rights and the UN Committee of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In the 21
st
 Century the identification of accepted regional and international 
norms become central to the integrated approach adopted by the ECtHR with regard to the interpretation of 
article ECHR. 
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Servais’ book is, however, essentially an account of the content of the ‘up to date’ 
ILO conventions, protocols and recommendations. Only very occasionally does he 
refer to the UN covenants, while regional instruments are beyond the scope of his 
work. My interest, in contrast, is in all instruments ratified by the UK, and the 
influence of those have not been ratified, along with the non-binding ILO 
recommendations (either adopted by the UK or not) which augment and guide 
the interpretation of the provisions of the instruments by which the UK is bound. 
 Servais states that the interpretations placed upon those instruments by the ILO 
Committee of Experts are ‘not binding’ upon member states, and describes the 
interpretations of ‘the expert committees, usually made up of lawyers, whose 
weight comes from the moral and professional authority of their members,’ as 
‘not, however, authoritative.’7  Very likely this accounts for the extreme scarcity 
of direct references to the interpretations of the CEACR, or to the findings of the 
Committee on Freedom of Association in his book. However, while, strictly 
speaking, only interpretations of the conventions and protocols endorsed by the 
International Court of Justice are binding upon governments, the work of the 
supervisory bodies has produced the bulk of what is recognised and referred to as 
the ‘ILO jurisprudence,’ and it has long been established that it is the role of the 
CEACR to make the authoritative determinations on the interpretations of the 
conventions.8 Only once in modern times has a referral to the ICJ been made.9   
  
 In adopting this approach Servais arguably gives tacit support to the arguments 
advanced since the 2012 International Labour Conference by the ILO employers’ 
group to justify their gradual post Cold War conversion to a belief that the ILO 
jurisprudence does not confer a right to strike,10 as well as to the British 
government in its long standing apparent (if subdued and rarely directly 
                                               
7 Servais 2014, op cit, para 147. 
8 See the forthcoming book by J Vogt, J Bellace, L Compa, K Ewing, J Hendy, K Lorcher, T Novitz, The Right to Strike 
in International Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2019) in relation to the role of the supervisory bodies (p23 et seq of 
the draft I ‘formatted’): ‘A Rebuttal: On the Question of Mandates…ILO Committee of Experts has a mandate to 
‘interpret’ ILO Conventions, not the Constituents.’ In that section of the book the authors make it very clear that: 
‘While it is true that only the ICJ may issue binding interpretations…the observations of the Committee of Experts 
must be viewed as authoritative if the system is to function, unless and until the ICJ rules to the contrary’ 
(emphasis supplied). See also Chapter Three below and the comments of the ECtHR on the authority of the ILO and 
European Social Charter supervisory bodies in RMT v UK [2014]. 
9 Ibid, p16. On which see F Maupain, ‘Is the ILO Effective in Upholding Workers’ Rights? Reflections on the 
Myanmar Experience,’  in P Alston (ed), Labour Rights as Human Rights (Oxford, OUP, 2005) 
10 See ibid: ‘The Ill-Founded Challenge to the Right to Strike in 2012,’ p17 et seq. 
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expressed) belief that its own interpretations of the conventions, the European 
Social Charter and the UNICESCR can be favoured over those of the relevant 
supervisory bodies.11  Servais fails to declare any interest, but it is notable, for 
example, that he devotes only five paragraphs of the 1140 odd paragraphs that 
comprise his book to collective bargaining, and only another seven in the short 
section devoted to ‘Strikes,’ 12 and, that in the 2011 edition of his book, he 
referred to the ‘right to strike’ in the ILO jurisprudence only in the most grudging 
and guarded terms.13 
 
It is not possible to have a neutral voice in analyses of labour law.  There is always 
a conflict of interests between the workers and the employers, and any anaylsis 
of the subject matter of this thesis cannot claim to be wholly impartial. Labour 
rights are a political matter.  Labour law exists for the purpose of imposing social 
justice and preserving peace,14 to mediate in this conflict, and my interest as a 
trade unionist is in ensuring that it upholds the rights of workers to act collectively 
to promote their interests.   I therefore do not avoid what social scientists call 
‘value issues’.  Taking sides in such a research project is unavoidable,15 partiality 
must be declared, and, as a trade unionist, I make no apology for my ‘conscious 
partiality,’ or ‘partisan objectivity.’16  A prime example of an approach that 
declares it is on the side of workers is LJB Hayes’, Stories of Care:  A Labour of 
Law.17  
My intention, through the use of benchmarking, is to help secure the effective 
labour protections that the government is required by international law to 
provide, and, as a trade unionist, to affect disinterest and adherence to a 
                                               
11 See chapter three below. 
12
 Paras 272-276 and 280-286 respectively. The ‘Strikes’ section begins: ‘In any society there are those who wish to 
pick a fight – no matter how or when – and those who don’t.’ 
13 Para 278. In the 2014 edition the paragraph has been rewritten (it is now 282) and the strike section extended 
from five to seven paragraphs. The section is less obviously sceptical about the right to strike. 
14  See Brian Langille, ‘What is International Labor Law For?’ (2009)  3(1) Law & Ethics of Human Rights. 
15 See Barry MacDonald ‘A Political Classification of the Evaluation Studies in Education’ in Martyn Hammersley 
(ed), Social Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice, (London Sage 1993).  
16 See Steve Tombs and David Whyte: ‘Unmasking the Crimes of the Powerful,’ (2002) 11 Critical Criminology 217, 
particularly pp229-233 ‘Beyond Value-Freedom, for Partisan Objectivity.’ See also the cautious endorsement of AW 
Gouldner in ‘The Sociologist as Partisan: Sociology and the Welfare State,’ (1968) 3(2) The American Sociologist 
103.  
17 (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). 
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positivist quantitative research methodology would be pointless as well as 
dishonest.18  
This is a vast and complex subject with few clearly defined external or internal 
boundaries, but there is one clear starting point, one obvious core to the subject, 
and that is the collective right to freedom of association. The ‘golden thread,’ 
which runs through labour and employment law, and through this dissertation, is 
the necessity for workers to enjoy the freedom to bargain collectively, and the 
obligation on government to protect, promote, and facilitate the exercise that 
freedom. My primary focus is therefore on the obligations incumbent upon the 
government to guarantee freedom of association – obligations which are 
grounded in the ILO jurisprudence. As will become apparent, all labour and 
employment protection, along with much else besides, ultimately depends upon 
workers being able to bargain collectively with their employer. Individual 
employment rights should provide minimum standards, providing a ‘safety net’ 
for workers who, for whatever reason, do not enjoy the protection of union 
membership, and ‘a floor’ on which collective bargaining may build. 19  
 Consequently the entire ‘spectrum’ of rights and freedoms must be viewed from 
a collective standpoint.  
 
This requires that considerable attention be paid to the restrictions on freedom of 
association which followed the post 1979 adoption by successive UK governments 
of so called ‘neoliberal’ policies which sought successfully to discourage and 
prevent workers from negotiating with employers on a collective basis. 
Neoliberalism comes in many guises, but arguably common to all variations is an 
antipathy for collectivism, especially trade unionism, and an enthusiasm for 
promoting the rights of the individual, particular hallmarks of the British brand of 
neoliberalism outlined in subsequent chapters. 20  
  
While so called ‘individualistic employment rights’ have sometimes – as I shall 
show- been deployed by governments to undermine freedom of 
                                               
18  See Maria Mies, ‘Towards a Methodology for Feminist Research’ (‘A Political Classification…’n.9 above). 
19As Lord Wedderburn so famously described the raft of individual rights conferred by the employment Protection 
Act 1975 (see chapter 2). 
20 See David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford, OUP, 2005) p22-3; 59-63 on the characteristics of 
Thatcherism, and chapter 3 ‘The Neoliberal State,’ on the characteristics of neoliberalism more generally. On the 
latter see also Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time:The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism [Trans. Patrick Camiller] 
(London, Verso, 2014) pp26-31. See chapter two below for a general discussion of neoliberalism, and chapter four 
below  for Barbara Havelková’s very valuable description of Czech neoliberalism. 
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association,21legal rights perhaps better regarded as employers’ rather than 
workers’ rights, the vast majority of individual rights can either be seen to have 
been implemented into workers’ contracts of employment as a result of collective 
bargaining, or to have been conferred by government (albeit after 1979 as part of 
the price of membership of the EU) as rights on which collective bargaining may 
build. These statutory rights may also be said to be a response to the exercise by 
workers of their freedom of association - the first of such rights, conferred in 1963 
and 1965,22 were unequivocally intended reduce the incidence of strike action. 
They may be intended to promote and facilitate collective bargaining – as were a 
handful of the many individual rights introduced by the Employment Protection 
Act 1975.23 Such is the relationship of the two broad categories of rights that the 
binary divide can often seem artificial and unsatisfactory, but more importantly, 
as I show in subsequent chapters, without protection for freedom of association 
the fabric of labour and employment rights protection, however the rights that 
comprise that fabric are categorised, will be compromised. 
 
So my approach has been to first establish the nature of freedom of association, 
and of the supranational and domestic protections for that freedom rolled out in 
the post war era. In the first chapter I examine the justification for this demand 
for full freedom of association, and the individualistic arguments relied on to deny 
working people that freedom.  
 
The law, and the nature of the obligation imposed by the various rights 
instruments considered, cannot be understood without close reference to 
political and economic history. Therefore, to support the arguments offered in the 
first chapter it was then necessary to show in chapter two that that conflict, 
compromise, and the abandonment of that compromise by the ruling classes, has 
been the established pattern in the UK over the last one hundred and fifty years, 
and that at the root of this conflict is the reluctance of the ruling classes to permit 
workers the freedom to bargain with them on equal, or near equal, terms. I show 
that only been for comparatively brief periods in the late 19th, and the very early 
and mid 20th Century, have workers in the United Kingdom enjoyed full freedom 
to organise, to communicate their collective demands to employers, to negotiate, 
and, if need be, to lawfully withdraw their labour in support of their demands, 
without disproportionate interference – full freedom of association. Shorter still 
                                               
21See chapter two and chapter five on the legislation of the Thatcher, Major and Cameron governments. 
22 Terms and Conditions of Employment Act 1963, and the Redundancies Act 1965. 
23See chapter two. 
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have been the intervals during which workers have been permitted freedom to 
take action to make their voice heard on matters beyond the terms and 
conditions of employment, and to influence government economic and social 
policy. 
 
The historical and political overview of this continuing ‘tug of war’ serves as an 
introduction to, and as context for, the examination of rights conferred indirectly 
on workers by the various labour rights treaties examined in subsequent 
chapters.24 
 
In chapters three and four I describe the nature of the obligations imposed by the 
Council of Europe, United Nations, International Labour Organisation and 
European Union treaties, and examine the relationship of the UK with the bodies 
which monitor and supervise state compliance with those instruments. 
Those attitudes govern the approach taken in chapters five, six and seven in 
respect to the selection of the instruments from which the benchmarks are 
derived. Of course, different treaties embrace, or specialise in different aspects of 
employment relations, and the supervisory bodies gravitate towards particular 
matters as a result of the cases, complaints or reports received, thereby 
governing that choice, but there is also a ‘rights hierarchy’ to take into account. 
 
While all treaty obligations require by international law the compliance of the 
government - pacta sunt servanda - and the ministerial code similarly binds 
individual ministers, in practice a scale of obligation has evolved over time. As in 
many instances I am effectively making a case for the charge of a breach of 
international law this hierarchy governs the instruments chosen to make that 
case; demands take precedence, while recommendations, advice and soft law, are 
only occasionally relevant,. 
 
The immediacy of a particular obligation is dependent on the terms of the 
instrument, the interpretation of those terms by the particular supervisory body, 
and the consequences for governments which are found to be in breach of those 
terms. Much depends upon the attitude of the supervisory body, the means by 
which breaches are identified, the means by which compliance can be secured, 
the stridency of the demands for compliance issued by the supervisory body, and 
                                               
24
The UK is a ‘monist’ state. Were it a ‘dualist’ state then workers would be able to rely directly on the rights 
conferred by the treaties in much the same way as EU Regulations are directly applicable and EU Directives, in 
certain circumstances, are ‘directly effective’ (see chapter 4). 
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the publicity such demands attract. Much also depends on the attitudes of other 
states to non-compliance - the loss of international prestige can be said to be a 
very severe sanction in itself. 
 
 For example, for the UK, in relation to freedom of association, despite the similar 
obligations in the texts of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and 
the United Nations International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
(UNICCPR) the requirements of the latter have effectively been eclipsed by the 
former, and by the fundamental ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 (C87 &C98),25 as 
interpreted by the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA).26 Trade 
unions can present complaints to the European Court of Human Rights at 
Strasbourg (ECtHR) and to the ILO Governing body (and on to the CFA), while the 
UN Human Rights Committee (the UK has not signed up to the UNICCPR 
complaints protocol) supervises a reporting cycle, and has taken little interest in 
the protection for freedom of association accorded British workers. 
 
In contrast, the wide ranging employment and labour rights demands of the 
European Social Charter, supervised by the dogged, unfailingly diplomatic, 
European Committee on Social Rights (ECSR), and the UN International Covenant 
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, supervised by the eponymous UN 
Committee (UN CttESCR),27 have arguably transcended their limited powers of 
enforcement to ‘punch above their weight,’ to fill in much of the detail on the 
whole spectrum of labour and employment rights that the government is 
required to ‘guarantee.’ 
 
The prestige of the European Social Charter’s ECSR has been much enhanced by 
the respect accorded it (and the ILO supervisory bodies) in the 21st Century by the 
ECtHR, and by the European Commission (EU Commission) and the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ).28 While on the periphery of this loop of mutual support, and 
consequently less invigorated by this ‘integrated’ approach to supranational 
labour obligation, the strident and confrontational UN Committee (established in 
1985), through its vigorous supervision of the reporting cycle, and its insistence 
                                               
25Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention,1948 (No.87) and Right to Organise 
and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No.98). 
26See chapter 3. 
27The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Commentary, Cases and Materials by B Saul, 
D Kinley and J Mowbray was of a particular value in identifying the pertinent observations of the committee. 
28One of the three courts which comprise the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). 
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that, after forty odd years, ‘progressive realisation’ has been superseded by a 
requirement that the UK implement the protections required by the Covenant 
into black letter law, is emerging as a major arbiter of labour and employment 
protection. 
 
 The old perception that the requirements of the civil and political rights 
instruments (ECHR and UNICCPR) demand immediate compliance, while the 
economic and civil instruments (European Social Charter and UNICESCR) set only 
aims of policy, has arguably become irrelevant with the passage of time. That 
distinction was  never even initially true of the 1961 Charter, which sets out the 
non negotiable broad rights it requires states to protect in part I as ‘aims of 
policy,’ while the more specific aspects of those rights which states can choose 
either to pledge to protect immediately or leave as longer term aims are placed in 
Part II.29 
 
Now, 54 years after the Charter came into force, even those aims of policy in the 
Charter arguably must be seen, like the rights in the UN Covenant, to have 
crystallised into immediate requirements. As for the demands of the ILO 
instruments, as interpreted by the Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) and the CFA, the British government 
has never been in any real doubt about their mandatory nature.30  When, in 2014 
the Cameron government sought to claim at the ECtHR (the rulings of which have 
bound the government since the acceptance of Article 46 ‘compulsory 
jurisdiction’ in 1966) that the determinations of the two ILO supervisory bodies 
did not bind them, the court corrected it. 
 
In chapters five, six and seven, I examine the substantive obligations these 
treaties impose on the UK Government - the ‘benchmarks’ which British labour 
protections must either match or surpass in order to accord with international 
law.  
 
In chapter five I test the extent to which British workers are permitted the 
freedom of association supranational obligation demands.  
 
                                               
29See chapter 3. 
30See for instance the Churchill government’s attitude to C98 in the Thomson case  and the Attlee government’s 
initial belief that, such was the legal obligation imposed by the ILO constitution that they were obliged to ratify 
C100 (chapter 3). 
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In chapter six, I examine the obligations incumbent upon the government to 
ensure safety at work, limits on working time, to guarantee workers paid holidays, 
fair wages, and protection on the termination of employment, and consider the 
adequacy of the existing protections.  
 
In chapter seven I consider the protections afforded workers against arbitrary 
workplace discrimination, paying particular attention to domestic servitude, the 
rights afforded workers with family responsibilities and to the related safeguards 
for those on part time, zero hour or restricted hours, fixed term, and agency 
contracts against less favourable treatment than that enjoyed by workers 
engaged in conventional, ‘typical’ full time employment. 
 
In chapter eight I draw my conclusions, and make proposals for addressing the 
shortfall between what is required by international law, and what is provided by 
UK law and practice.  
 
Methodology 
 
I approach this subject from a critical trade unionist perspective that will elucidate 
through a critique of neoliberalism a power shift from collective to individual 
rights. For this reason the benchmarking exercise was structured around the 
dualism of collective and individual rights. Whilst there is always a connection 
between the two, this critical trade union perspective informed both the selection 
of the international and regional rights instruments and the structuring of the 
dissertation. 
  
Taking the hierarchy of rights instrument outlined above into account, the 
principal instruments I use for benchmarking are the ILO Conventions, the ECHR, 
UNICESCR, the European Social Charter, and the EU treaties and directives 
(augmented by what I argue is the interpretative EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights). 
 
Each of the chapters that report empirical findings of the ‘benchmarking’ exercise 
(chapters five, six and seven) follow the same basic format.  The beginning of each 
chapter includes a précis of the UK’s obligations under international law that is 
based upon my detailed reading of the instruments and their subsequent 
interpretation in case law and practice.  Having established in previous chapters 
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that UK labour law obligation is based upon the sister Conventions Nos. 87 and 
98, and taking into account the fragility of the protection for the full freedom of 
association demanded by those instruments in English law, particularly since the 
‘enhancement’ of the procedural trips and hurdles imposed by the Trade Union 
Act 2016, the steps that had to be taken were obvious.  The précis at the 
beginning of each chapter are listed below.  The obligations related to ‘collective 
rights’ set out in chapter five are: 
 
1) The Procedural Obstacles to Industrial Action [p.236]  
2) Quorums and Majorities [p.243] 
3) Essential Services [p.251] 
4) Secondary Action and Political Strikes [p.259] 
5) Picketing [p.267] 
6) Liability for Engaging in Industrial Action [p.275] 
7) The Right to Bargain Collectively[p.280] 
8) The Right to Recognition [p.292] 
 
Moving on to ‘individual’ rights in chapter six, occupational safety and health 
rights, with their strong collective element, were tackled first, followed by those 
matters traditionally left to collective negotiation but which, with the withdrawal 
of collective agreement coverage, and the increase in statutory intervention, are 
now more usually left either to state supervision, or to the individual worker to 
enforce by means of a tribunal claim.  The précis are included at the following 
pages: 
 
1) The Right to Health and Safety at Work [p.303] 
2) Working Time [p322] 
3) Wages [p343] 
4) Rights on the Termination of Employment [p.359] 
 
In chapter seven, on equal treatment in the workplace, the opening section gives 
an overview of supranational equality obligation before focusing on what I 
identify as the principal gaps in UK law and practice – the comparative absence of 
‘positive discrimination’ initiatives, the failure to tackle  domestic servitude, and 
arbitrary discrimination related to social origin, and political opinion. Subsequent 
sections cover largely family related ‘flexible working’ rights, starting with those 
specifically intended to address gender inequality, then moving on into rights for 
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workers on ‘atypical’ contracts less closely associated with the exploitation of 
workers with family responsibilities:  
 
1) Equality [p.371] 
2) Family Friendly Rights: Maternity, Paternity and Parental Leave, and 
Flexible Working Arrangements [p.395 
3) Rights for Workers with ‘Atypical’ Working Arrangements: Part Time, Zero 
Hours Contracts Fixed Term, and Agency Contracts [p.409]. 
 
The précis were drawn up from the analysis that follows. That analysis was led by 
the doctrinal and empirical work in chapters two and three. I applied the 
jurisprudence of the supervisory bodies to existing UK law and practice outlined in 
previous chapters, to determine what is required of the UK government, and at 
the end of each section I set out those requirements. 
 
While cases, complaints, reports, determinations, rulings and decisions relating 
specifically to the United Kingdom are of primary importance value in determining 
the extent of UK compliance with these regional and international obligations, 
much of UK law and practice remains unchallenged. As a consequence 
considerable reliance has been placed upon the case law relating to other states, 
and on the various statements of interpretation and ‘general comments’ which 
comprises the wider jurisprudence of the supervisory bodies, and, in many 
instances it has been necessary to argue a case. Such is the nature of supra 
national supervision, however, that even where the situation in the UK has been 
specifically addressed, the question of whether the government is compliant or 
not remains open – and a case has to be made. 
 
In terms of the areas of the law examined in this manner, I have, of necessity, 
tended to focus on areas of non compliance.  I could have written tens of 
thousands of words on minor inconsistencies between UK equality protections 
and the demands of the EU, but the UK is broadly compliant with the acquis in 
relation to anti-discrimination protections – and, as I show, broad compliance is 
all that the Commission requires.  
 
With regret, I decided to exclude protections for migrant workers on the grounds 
that, important as they are, they are more to do with the law on immigration than 
labour or employment law. I have included a section in chapter seven on 
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domestic servitude, persuaded by the need to illustrate the importance of the EU 
in forcing governments to act to protect workers, and the effect of gaps in the 
acquis, as well as by the fact that victims are not necessarily migrants. I also 
sought to point out that this shameful phenomena, based as it is on isolation and 
exploitation (something of a metaphor what has occurred to workers more 
generally as union power and membership has declined in the UK), has to be 
addressed by collective state intervention in the form of a programme of labour 
inspection, bespoke legislation, and by the prohibition of discrimination related to 
social class or social origin. 
 
I also ‘drew the line at’ consideration of the delineation the outer reaches of 
labour and employment law, and the closely related matter of ‘bogus self 
employment,’ subjects touched upon at the end of chapter seven. Although I have 
researched and written about these matters while working on this dissertation, 
and for previous projects, they are literally on the periphery of my brief. 
Consequently I provide what is little more than a reference to them in relation to 
the couriers who have sought recognition of ‘worker’ status, and the judicial 
review of the CAC Deliveroo trade union recognition case. 
 
Questions of ‘access to justice,’ were set aside for similar reasons, although my 
research did result in the publication of a booklet for the Institute of Employment 
Rights – Access to Justice: Exposing the Myths in 2016.  
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Chapter One: FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
 I turn first to the jurisprudential, philosophical and economic arguments which 
underpin the claims of working people to full freedom to bargain collectively, and 
the labour protection obligations in the international and regional rights 
instruments which must govern and guide UK Government’s approach to 
industrial relations.  
Particular attention is paid in this chapter to the supposed clash between the 
interests of the individual and the interests of the collective when workers 
combine, and the differing consequences of interpreting freedom of association 
as a right of both the individual and the collective, or as a wholly individual right.  
The fundamental labour rights are the rights to organise, to bargain collectively 
and to strike. Through the exercise of these rights workers are able to begin to 
redress the imbalance in bargaining power between the individual worker and the 
employer and negotiate the terms and conditions of their employment.  These 
are the foundations of justice in the workplace, and they are bound up with, and 
grounded in, the concept of freedom of association. Workers combine in order to 
bargain collectively. Only when permitted to take lawful industrial action were 
workers able to bargain effectively and protect their interests by securing genuine 
representation for the protection of those interests in Parliament.  
The significance of freedom of association to collective labour, and the extent to 
which the term is seen as synonymous with the right of workers to organise and 
to bargain collectively is made plain by the wording of Article 11(1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Article 22 (1) of the United Nations 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Both combine, almost word for word, 
Articles 20 (1) and 23(4) of that most fundamental and influential of rights 
instruments, the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Article 20(1): ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association.’ 
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Article 23(4): ‘Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests.’31 
The Article 11 and Article 22 guarantees are expressed in individualistic terms,32 
and the rights protected are, uniquely among civil and political rights, exercisable 
only collectively. There is, of course, no reason why this should make them any 
the less vital. The right to freedom of association is as fundamental a human right 
as the right to life, or the right to a fair trial, arguably more so, because the 
exercise of that freedom secures those rights. Freedom of conscience and speech 
is of limited value without the full freedom of assembly and association which 
permits workers to bargain collectively. 
 
 Article 22 UNICCPR33   explicitly incorporates the 1948 International Labour 
Organisation Convention No.87 on freedom of association and the right to 
organise as a ‘floor’ to the protection it confers.34 Better known as the basis of the 
right to strike, 35 Convention 87 also guarantees the right to bargain collectively,36  
although since 1950 the more specific anti discrimination provisions of its 1949 
sister instrument Convention 98 on the right to organise and bargain collectively 
have more usually been cited as the basis of the right to bargain collectively in the 
ILO jurisprudence.  
 
 Convention 87 played a similar although less overt role in ‘fleshing out’ Article 11 
ECHR. The Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts on Human Rights, tasked 
                                               
31Emphasis supplied. 
32As are the equivalent provisions of the UNICESCR, which are almost identical to the terms of the Article 11 ECHR, 
Article 22 UNICCPR, and of course, the UN Declaration. It is noticeable that the provisions of this instrument which 
go beyond its civil and political instrument to confer rights on trade unions do not include an express right to 
bargain collectively, only ‘The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the 
particular country’ (Article 8(d)). 
33
  As does Article 8 of the UNICCPR’s sister economic and social rights instrument the UNICESCR.  Article 8 is 
essentially a more comprehensive version of Article 22 UNICCPR. 
34
The ILO is an agency of the UN. 
35  See Articles 3, 10 and 11 of Convention 87. The ILO 1994 General Survey gives a good account of the evolution 
of the recognition by the Committee of Experts (CEACR), and the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA), of 
the right to strike implicit in C87 as does Claire La Hovary in ‘Showdown at the ILO: A Historical Perspective on the 
Employers’ Group 2012 Challenge to the Right to Strike’, 42 Industrial Law Journal, December 2013. 
36Article 3 of Convention 87 “has always been considered by the Committee [established in 1951] to embrace the 
right of trade unions to engage in collective bargaining on behalf of its members.” So stated the Committee on 
Freedom of Association in 1981 on the withdrawal of the British Government from collective bargaining 
arrangements with civil servants (Case No.1038 211
th
 Report, para 33). Cited by Breen Creighton in ‘The ILO and 
Freedom of Association in the United Kingdom’ in Human Rights and Labour Law Essays for Paul O’Higgins (Eds: 
Ewing, Gearty and Hepple) p8. Of course, an instrument which guarantees the right to strike must necessarily 
guarantee the right to bargain collectively – the former is an essential element of the latter. 
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with drafting Article 11, were directed by the Council of Ministers to consider the 
UN approach to the protection of freedom of association – ‘due attention should 
be paid to the progress which had been achieved in this matter by the competent 
organs of the United Nations.’37 
 
 The Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts had to ensure that Article 11 
conformed to what was then a single ‘draft International Covenant on Human 
Rights’ - the regional instrument could not confer less protection than the 
international instrument. There had to be consistency. The draft supplied for that 
purpose by the UN Secretariat General included essentially what became Article 
22 UNCCPR in Article 19, and Article 19(3) stated: ‘National legislation shall 
neither prejudice, nor be applied in such a manner as to prejudice, the guarantees 
provided for in the International Convention on Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise, in so far as States parties to that convention 
are concerned.’38 
Thus the freedom ‘to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his 
interests’ guaranteed by Article 11 can be said to have always been intended to 
protect the freedom to bargain collectively and to strike.39 Moreover, common 
sense dictates that workers combine to protect their interests by bargaining 
collectively, and, if need be, by withdrawing their labour. The forming and joining 
of trade unions cannot reasonably be separated from their purpose.  
Yet, extraordinarily, largely as a consequence of the prominence of labour rights 
in the Council of Europe’s 1961 European Social Charter and the rights legacy of 
the English common law, the European Court of Human Rights were to do exactly 
that in what became known as the Belgian Police Trilogy of cases. 
                                               
37European Commission of Human Rights Preparatory Work on Article 11 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights,,p.3 – from an ‘Information Document’ prepared by the Secretariat of the Commission Council of Europe, 
Strasbourg, 16 August, 1956(ECHRTraveux-Art11-DH(56)16-EN1693924.PDF). 
38Ibid  p4. Articles 22(3) UNICCPR and 8(2) UNICESCR are very similarly worded. 
39There is a sense that the use of Convention 87 as a floor of rights only where the state concerned had ratified the 
Convention lent an ‘economic and social’ aspect to a civil and political freedom – only when the state was ready (in 
Europe Germany and Italy were not, and on the international plane less developed states were not) could full 
freedom of association could be guaranteed. After 1998 the UN, the ILO, and after 2008, the ECtHR, held that 
whether Conventions 87 and 98 have been ratified or not member states are bound by their provisions. 
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The ECHR Belgian Police Trilogy 
Until 1974 no breaches of Article 11 by a member state had been the subject of a 
complaint to the European Commission of Human Rights.40 However, following a 
complaint by a union representing members of the Belgian police the Commission 
was obliged to consider the breadth of the protection afforded freedom of 
association. Unsurprisingly it interpreted Article 11 in the light of the relevant ILO 
Conventions and the European Social Charter,41 taking the view that that Article 
11 protected the freedom (in fact the Commission arguably saw it as a right rather 
than as a right to the freedom) to bargain collectively and to strike – full freedom 
of association.  Nevertheless, the Belgian government refused to compromise, 
and the Commission referred the case to the Court, along with two Swedish cases 
submitted to the Commission in 1975 which turned on similar facts.  
Subsequently, in National Union of Belgian Police v Belgium [1975], the 
Strasbourg Court held that Article 11 did not require the government to consult 
with the union over employment matters. This was confirmed the following year 
in Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union v Sweden, when the court held that Article 11 
did not protect a right to bargain collectively. In Schmidt and Dahlstrom v Sweden 
the court ruled that Article 11 did not protect the right to freedom to strike.42 
 
The Strasbourg Court was by no means hostile to collective bargaining, yet it had 
held that the Convention protected only the individual right of workers to 
organise and ‘to be heard.’ The trade unionists were directed to the provisions of 
the European Social Charter, which, extraordinarily, were cited to support the 
view that Article 11 ECHR did not compel a State to engage in collective 
bargaining, nor, in the context of the Belgian Police Case, did it require a union to 
be consulted by the Belgian Ministry of Interior over employment matters.43 It 
was stated that: 
                                               
40Until 1998 complaints were made to the Commission which ruled on admissibility and, if the case was considered 
admissible it issued a report on the application of the Convention with the intention of encouraging amicable 
settlement. The Commission was abolished in 1998.  
41  Ed Bates, The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights, (Oxford, OUP,2010), p302 
42Known as the Belgian Police Trilogy: National Union of Belgian Police v Belgium [1975] ECHR 27; The Swedish 
Engine Drivers’ Union v Sweden, [1976] ECHR 2; Schmidt and Dahlstrom v Sweden [1976 ECHR 6. 
43
 Belgian Police Case (ibid) para 38. This has been called ‘negative textual inferentialism’ or ‘the ceiling effect’ - the 
use of another legal instrument ‘to limit the meaning, and thus the scope of protection given to a right in that 
institution’s own instrument’ (Craig Scott ‘Reaching Beyond (Without Abandoning) The Category of ‘Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights’ (1999) European Human Rights Law Review 582. 
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‘The Court notes that while Article 11(1) presents trade union freedom as 
one form or a special aspect of freedom of association, the Article does not 
guarantee any particular treatment of trade unions...trade union matters 
are dealt with in detail in another convention also drawn up within the 
framework of the Council of Europe, namely the Social Charter of 18 
October 1961. Article 6 (1) of the Charter binds the Contracting States: “to 
promote joint consultation between workers and employers.” The 
prudence of the terms used shows that the Charter does not provide for a 
real right to consultation. Besides, Article 20 permits a ratifying State not to 
accept the undertaking in Article 6 (1). Thus it cannot be supposed that 
such a right derives by implication from Article 11 (1) of the 1950 
Convention, which, incidentally would amount to admitting that the 1961 
Charter took a retrograde step in this domain.’ 
 
The Court was evidently unaware of the influence of ILO Convention 87 on the 
drafting of Article 11, and its effective incorporation as a floor to the protection 
for freedom of association. It was seemingly blind to the fact that state respect 
for the freedom of workers to bargain collectively does not eclipse the need for 
the promotion of joint consultation, and collective bargaining mechanisms - the 
Charter requires states to undertake such promotion as a means of ‘ensuring the 
effective exercise of the right to bargain collectively.’44 
Freedom of association had, in Lord Wedderburn’s inelegant but nevertheless 
memorable phrase, been ‘divided like a butchered Siamese twin’ by the 
Strasbourg judges.45 
 
Despite the uncomplicated wording of Article 11 the Court had adhered to the 
legacy of a pernicious and flawed human rights paradigm derived from the 
English common law. The Strasbourg judges found themselves bedfellows with 
the likes of the libertarian 19th and early 20th Century British constitutional law 
scholar AV Dicey.  
 
Dicey, whose work has been hugely influential in shaping the individualistic 
arguments on which the political representatives of capital were subsequently to 
                                               
44
Article 6. 
45 Lord Wedderburn, ‘Freedom of association or right to organise?’ (1987) 18 Industrial Relations Journal 244. 
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rely as they abandoned the ‘post war compromise,’46 took the view that the 
common law freedom for the individual to assemble and associate with others 
protected participation in politics and trade, but emphatically not what he saw as 
the popular tyranny of collective bargaining.  Under the common law individuals 
have a right to liberty – they are free to associate and they are free to bargain.  
But, having exercised their right to combine workers, have no right to freedom to 
bargain collectively, and no right to force their employer to the bargaining table 
by withdrawing their labour.47 However, by the denial of the collective aspect of 
freedom of association, workers are arguably stripped of their individual right to 
liberty.48 Unable to bargain they are obliged to enter into wage slavery, reduced 
to the status of ‘one who is bringing his own hide to market and has nothing to 
expect but – a hiding.’49 
 
 It is remarkable that as recently as 1996 a minority of judges at the ECtHR were 
relying on this obviously flawed paradigm, arguing that: 
 
‘The Convention purports to lay down fundamental rights of the individual 
and to furnish the individual an effective protection against interferences.’ 
Accordingly, when weighing up the competing claims of an employer who 
refused to engage in collective bargaining, the union concerned, and the 
                                               
46 See, for example, Brian Langille’s individualistic interpretation of freedom of association in ‘The Freedom of 
Association Mess: How we got into it and How we Can Get Out of it’(2009) 54 McGill L.J. 177, which was essentially 
an attempt to persuade the Canadian Supreme Court that there was no basis for a right to bargain collectively. See 
also Bogg and Ewing’s very convincing counter arguments in ‘A (Muted) Voice at Work? Collective Bargaining in the 
Supreme Court of Canada’(2012) 33 Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal, 379. This confrontation was closely 
related to the ‘employer’s rebellion’ at the ILO – see, for example, S Regenbogen, ‘The International Labour 
Organisation and Freedom of Association: Does Freedom of Association Include the Right to Strike?’ (2012) 16 
Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal 385. 
 
47
  Other than by individually giving notice (rather than conspiring between themselves to each hand in their 
notice) and withdrawing their labour at the end of the contractual notice period – a tactic perhaps better known as 
‘resigning’.  Remarkably this is starting to be regarded in certain right wing circles as the future of individualised 
industrial action (see the Policy Exchange paper discussed in relation to the Trade Union Act 2016 in Chapter Two). 
48‘...labour exists in a zone of indistinction between formal right and economic force’ David Whyte, ‘Naked Labour: 
Putting Agamben to Work’, The Australian Feminist Law Journal, 2009, Vol 31 57, p60, see especially pp59-62. 
49Marx, Capital, 1887,p119 (Wordsworth Classic Literature edition 1987). Marx noted that the capitalists of the 18th 
and 19th Century were not above working their employees to death: ‘Capital is reckless of the health or length of 
life of the labourer, unless under compulsion from society” (p186). Marx wrote of ‘candidates for death in the 
London bakeries’, and cited an 1863 speech in the House of Commons: ‘The  cotton trade has existed for 90 
years...it has existed for three generations of the English race, and I believe I may safely say that during that period 
it has destroyed nine generations of factory operatives’ (p185). 
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nation as a whole, then - all other things being equal – the judges claimed 
that the individual freedom of the employer should prevail.  This, they 
argued, reflects “the human rights ideal that the individual must in principle 
be free to act according to his convictions and, accordingly, be protected 
against having to go against those convictions as a result of constraining 
collective action by one or more trade unions...’ 50  
 
However, the tide was turning, and the court held otherwise, accepting, inter alia, 
the Swedish Government’s argument that the Swedish model of industrial 
relations - in excess of 90% of Swedish workers are party to collective agreements 
– was one of the key reasons for the state’s prosperity.  
 
Extraordinarily, the two dissenting judges had been prepared to risk the loss of 
that prosperity for the sake of a human rights ideal designed to permit the 
bourgeoisie to exploit the workforce.  The central pillar of Swedish industrial 
relations would, if the two judges had prevailed, have been undermined for the 
sake of one politically motivated restaurant owner who refused to pay his staff 
the ‘going rate’ for the job.51 
 
The forgotten rights of the citizen 
This sacrifice of the collective interest in favour of the individual interest was 
identified by Marx in his seminal 1843 essay On the Jewish Question. The damage 
wreaked as a consequence of the primacy afforded the individual in the 
industrialised nations was, of course, what set Marx on to the road to Capital and 
to the Communist Party Manifesto. 
 
 Marx focused on France, Pennsylvania and New Hampshire in North America,52 
and on the rights instruments adopted in these new political states following the 
Bourgeoisie revolutions of the late 18th Century.53 These instruments replaced the 
divine right of the monarch with what has been described of as ‘an equally 
                                               
50Gustafsson v Sweden [1996] ECHR 20. Dissenting opinion of Judge Martens, joined by Judge Matcher, para 8. 
51This was the issue which had triggered union intervention and the requirement that the restaurant owner 
bargain with the union, although, like most Article 11 cases, the case was a political ‘Trojan horse’ (see chapter 3). 
52
  ‘Democratic’ states which had escaped the clutches of a divinely appointed monarch. 
53
England underwent its own rather more gradual Bourgeoisie Revolution during 1648-1689 cumulating in the Bill 
of Rights. 
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absolute but non-theological formulation of inherent natural rights,’54 an 
adoption by the French and American mercantile classes of the individualistic 
English common law model to allow them to accumulate wealth with the 
minimum of interference from the state or their servants.55 Thus, as in Britain, the 
individual was protected not only from the tyranny of the state, and the tyranny 
of the mob, but also against trade unionists seeking to bargain collectively with 
employers.  
 
Marx recognised that in these states the base material life of the Bourgeoisie 
trading in civil society was wholly distinct from the collective species life of the 
politically emancipated citizen –‘life in the political community, in which he 
considers himself a communal being,’56 and where the citizen is equal with his 
fellow citizen. The individual rights of man - human rights - conflicted with 
communal or political life.  While there was an individual right to vote, to 
assemble and associate, the wider community was essentially cast as an 
oppressor, arguably a contradictory fiction which undermined an otherwise 
plausible approach:  
 
‘None of the so-called rights of man...go beyond egotistic man, beyond man 
as a member of civil society – that is, an individual withdrawn into himself, 
into the confines of his private interests, and private caprice, and separated 
from the community. In the rights of man, he is far from being conceived as 
a species-being; on the contrary, species like itself, society, appears as a 
framework external to the individuals, as a restriction of their original 
independence. The sole bond holding them together is natural necessity, 
                                               
54
From the Enquiry into the Philosophical Basis of the Rights of Man: Memorandum and Questionnaire issued by 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 1947 as part of the consultation in preparation 
for the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (National Archive [‘TNA’] file HO 45/25465). See Marx 
and Engels’ more partial description of these early rights instruments in the highlighted sentence in footnote 
below. 
55Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, 1848, Chapter One: ‘The bourgeoisie, historically, has 
played a most revolutionary part. The Bourgeoisie, whenever it has got the upper hand... has left remaining no 
other nexus between man and man than naked self interest, than callous ‘cash payment’....in place of numberless 
indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that naked single, unconscionable freedom – Free Trade. In one word, 
for exploitation veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal 
exploitation.’ www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf 
56
 Marx,On the Jewish Question 1844 (Proofed and corrected by Andy Blunden, Matthew Grant and Matthew 
Carmody in 2008 - 2009, and by Mark Harris in 2010), p6 (www.marxists.org/archive).  
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need and private interest, the preservation of their property and their 
egotistic selves.’57 
While the separation of the individual and the community was artificial, the 
overweening self interest identified by Marx was nevertheless real enough, and 
evident in Dicey’s hostile response to the collective legal rights that were 
conceded in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, as the common law gave way 
to the needs of the newly enfranchised working classes. 
 
 Dicey believed that the high point of individual liberty had been reached in the 
final Palmerstone administration, a ‘golden age’ when  
 
‘the ideal Chancellor of the Exchequer was the man who, after providing for 
the absolutely necessary expenditure of the State, so framed his Budget as 
to leave the largest amount possible to ‘fructify’, as the expression then 
went, “in the pockets of the people.”’ 58 
 
Dicey objected to old age pensions, and to free elementary education, or rather 
he objected to the tax increases infringing his liberty - his right to property - which 
paid for those entitlements. State intervention in industrial relations appeared to 
infuriate him, and, hilariously, he considered the Coal Mines Regulation Act 1908 
to be an interference with ‘the right of a workman of full age to labour for any 
number of hours agreed upon between him and his employer.’59 The concern of 
the libertarian for the supposed freedom of the working man was as wholly 
unconvincing then as it is today. Needless to say Dicey had a similar opinion of the 
Trade Boards Act 1909,60 and the ‘Acts fixing a Minimum Rate of Wages.’ 61 
                                               
57
Ibid, p13. This brings to mind Margaret Thatcher’s claim that there is ‘no such thing as society, only individuals 
and families.’ 
58  AV  Dicey, Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England During the Nineteenth Century, 
(London, Macmillan 1917), P. xxx 
59‘...socialism and protection have one feature in common: they both rest on the belief that the power of the State 
may be beneficially extended even though it conflicts with the contractual freedom of individual citizens.’ (Ibid, p. 
Lxiv ) 
60He considered the National Insurance Act 1911 to, in principle, have conceded ‘the droit au travail for the sake of 
which the socialists died behind the barricades of June 1848.’ 
61
Ibid, xxxviii – xxxix.  By this Dicey presumably meant the legal minimum wages established by nine Trade Boards 
before the war intervened, in ‘sweated’ trades which relied heavily on women home workers. These included 
tailoring, paper and cardboard box making, chain making, lace and net manufacturing and mending, shirt making 
and tin box manufacture (see FJ Bayliss, British Wages Councils, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1962) pp9-12). Bayliss cited 
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 Dicey was more hostile still to the Acts of Parliament which held the common law 
in abeyance to permit collective bargaining.62 Yet he was an enthusiastic advocate 
for free trade,63 and he had acknowledged that master and servant did not meet 
in the market place on equal terms;  
‘an individual artisan or labourer does not bargain on fair terms; he seems 
powerless against a wealthy manufacturer...The sale of labour...is felt to be 
unlike the sale of goods. A shopkeeper can keep back his wares until the 
market rises, whilst a factory hand, if he refuses low wages, runs the risk of 
pauperism or of starvation.’64 
One might then argue that he should have welcomed these minimalist ‘negative’ 
rights which excluded judicial interference and permitted a semblance of freedom 
of contract – restoring the worker’s individual liberty. But he did not. His belief in 
the primacy of the individual was, of course, inextricably intertwined with the 
protection of the economic interests of the ruling classes, interests he believed 
best served by a denial of the fundamental labour rights.65 As Otto Kahn- Freund 
explained: 
‘”Collectivism” (and that word was for Dicey synonymous with “socialism”) 
denoted not only State intervention, but also what he called “Preference 
for Collective Action.” All legislation designed to strengthen trade unionism 
was ‘collectivist’ in this sense, and, even if consisting in the withdrawal of 
State intervention, contrary to his conception of “individualism.” 
                                                                                                                                                       
Churchill’s statement to the Commons on the necessity for intervention ‘to foster organisation in trades which, by 
reason of the prevalence of exceptionally evil conditions, no organisation has yet taken root, and which in 
consequence, no parity of bargaining power can be said to exist’ (Bayliss, footnote p.9). 
62  Dicey, Ibid, xliv-xiv.  These were, of course, the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875 and the Trade 
Disputes Act 1906. 
63Ibid, xxxii. 
64
Ibid, p188. 
65 Ivor Jennings had taken the view that Dicey’s concept of the rule of law was based largely on his political 
prejudices (WI Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, 1959, p56). Where industrial relations were concerned 
Dicey was so far to the right of the political spectrum that he excused the ‘panic stricken High Tories’ their 
outstandingly oppressive Combinations Act of 1800 and considered the legal position that pertained between 
Combination of Workmen Act 1825 and the early 1870s to be a reasonable enough limit to the extent to which 
workers could be permitted to organise and bargain collectively. 
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“Individualism” and “collectivism” were clear opposites...The greater the 
power of the unions, the greater, under a democratic franchise, the 
pressure for state intervention.’66 
As it became subject to jurisprudential analysis, blatant partiality was rationalised 
on the grounds that the freedom of the individual is paramount, and that the 
individual requires protection from the ‘tyranny of the majority.’ A ‘guarantee’ of 
freedom of association for the individual by the state thus requires no more than 
the individual be permitted to bargain, and do business, and does not extend 
requiring that individuals be permitted to combine and bargain as a collective.  
While arguments based on the ‘tyranny of the majority’ are plausible enough 
when we talk of the persecution of minorities by the state, in the context of 
labour relations they are spurious. This individualism has served merely to 
disguise the imposition of effective servitude on the majority by that small section 
of the population which seized control of the state’s wealth. Passed off, when 
justification became required, first as divine right, then, as the possession of 
wealth became less dependent upon belonging to the aristocracy, as an inherent 
natural privilege accorded in theory to all, but in practice only to individual 
members of the ruling classes.  
The freedom of the worker to bargain individually was, and remains, largely 
illusory. Employers have generally considered it to be in their best interests, to, 
where possible, isolate workers by ensuring that discussion of remuneration is 
discouraged, and that any dissatisfaction with the terms and conditions of 
employment be dealt with on an individual basis behind closed doors. Moreover, 
if the individual is a worker, in a dependent employment relationship, and not a 
sub contractor in business on his or her own account, genuinely dealing with the 
employer as a client or customer, it is rare that any negotiation takes place.67 
 
                                               
66O. Kahn-Freund, Selected Writings, 1978, p5, originally ‘Labour Law’ in M Ginsburg (ed)Law and Opinion in 
England in the 20th Century, 1959. 
67 For instance, W Brown, S Deakin, D Nash, and S Oxenbridge in ‘The Employment Contract: From Collective 
Procedures to Individual Rights’ (2000) 38 British Journal of Industrial Relations 611, examined the results of the 
1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey. They noted that since 1980 ‘despite a widespread rhetoric of 
‘”Individualisation,” in most organisations there has been a general trend towards greater standardisation of the 
employment contract [p619]…Substantive individualisation – the differentiation of contractual terms within the 
organisation – has not generally been realised’ [p627]. 
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 Arguably, other than under conditions of full employment, ‘individual 
negotiation’ will, in the overwhelming majority of cases, amount to little more 
than the employer telling the worker that he or she can choose to accept what is 
offered, or to look for employment elsewhere. That was the experience of aircrew 
employed by Ryanair and Virgin,68and unskilled and semi skilled workers with 
little or no ‘added value’ with which to bargain, are generally given still shorter 
shrift than airline pilots. Where numbers of workers perform the same, or broadly 
similar roles, treating workers differently for the purposes of remuneration is 
divisive, time consuming, likely to push wages up if genuinely encouraged, and 
unnecessary, in the sense that employers do not have to it. So they don’t do it.  
 
It is also the case that in all but the smallest of businesses, the individual 
negotiation of remuneration, other than for a coterie of sales people, senior 
managers and directors who will be expected to press their cases for bonuses and 
salary increases, is wholly impractical. For example, in an open letter to his staff in 
1966 recommending that they join ‘the appropriate trade union,’ the chairman of 
the British Railways Board – the collective bargaining arrangements of British Rail, 
and the watershed ECHR case of Young James and Webster [1981], will be 
returned to in subsequent chapters - confessed that: 
 
‘the only way in which we can negotiate with individual members is 
through the agency of the Trade Union.’ 69 
 
Of course, the status of the employer as an individual is also almost always a 
fiction. The employer will, in the overwhelming majority of instances, be in reality, 
a collective of shareholders and directors ‘hiding’ behind the corporate veil and 
the device of legal personality, or a partnership, and so called ‘individual, or one 
to one’ bargaining almost invariably – if it occurs at all - undertaken between an 
individual worker and the representative of a collective of owners of capital.  
 
 
 
                                               
68In the face of employer resistance the Ryanair aircrew ultimately obliged their employer to recognise BALPA for 
the purposes of collective bargaining, and the Virgin aircrew formed their own union. Airline generally pilots have 
to find £140,000 to pay for training which has to undertaken within a 5 year period. Then they have to find a job. 
There is a shortage of pilots. Yet still Ryanair and Virgin did not want to engage in either (genuine) individual or 
collective bargaining (information supplied by BALPA member and Easyjet pilot William Middleton). 
69‘A Message from the Chairman,’ 15th September 1966, TNA AN 192/429. 
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Towards a reconciliation of labour and capital   
 
Dicey’s final diatribe against collectivism was published in 1917 – the year of the 
Soviet Bolshevik Revolutions. The First World War ended in November 1918, and 
within a matter of months the Treaty of Versailles had concluded the post war 
settlement. The preamble incorporated two propositions – effectively collective 
demands - which have since been cited as encapsulating the key reasons for the 
need for international and domestic Labour Law:70 
 
‘Whereas the League of Nations has for its object the establishment of 
universal peace and such a peace can only be established if it is based upon 
social Justice; and whereas conditions of labour exist involving such 
injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce 
unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled; 
and an improvement of those conditions is urgently required...Whereas 
also the failure of any country to adopt humane conditions of labour is an 
obstacle in the way of other nations which to desire to improve the 
conditions in their countries.’71 
The treaty established the International Labour Organisation. The victorious 
‘Great Powers had acknowledged that it was necessary to regulate labour 
relations on an international scale. If Dicey’s arguments had seemed anachronistic 
in 1913, by 1919 they appeared to belong to a different world. In the UK, 
following the report of the Whitley Committee in 1918 the Trade Boards that had, 
to Dicey’s dismay, been established prior to the Great War were extended beyond 
the ‘sweated’ sectors into industries merely considered to be ‘poorly organised’ 
to boost the post war reconstruction of the economy,72 while Joint Industrial 
Councils – the name and the concept perhaps deliberately redolent of Bolshevism 
- comprised of employers’ associations and trade unions, were established in 
sectors where trade unions had enjoyed more success.  
 
                                               
70 The emphasis is placed on the words cited by Brian Langille 2009, op cit, pp61-62. Langille made the 
uncontroversial observation that labour standards were required for social justice and for peace, and that 
international labour standards were required to prevent an international ‘race to the bottom.’ 
71
 From the preamble to Part XIII of the Treaty of Peace of Versailles (International Labour Office Official Bulletin, 
vol 1, April 1919 – August 1920). 
72Following the Trade Boards Act 1918 
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International relations and the Red Menace aside, society and industry were 
changing fast, and employment practices had to adapt. Production line 
technology had evolved rapidly during the war years, and the 1920s saw the 
emergence of what Gramsci termed ‘Fordism’,73 with the relatively high wages 
paid to those mass producing consumer goods feeding back into a ‘virtuous circle’ 
of demand and supply – ‘the principle of an articulation between process of 
production and mode of consumption,’74 and ‘the recognition by big business as 
well as the state of the legitimacy of responsible trade unionism and collective 
bargaining; and by responsible trade unions (or, at least, trade union leaders) of 
management’s right to manage.’ 75 
 
The work of John Maynard Keynes confirmed that economic growth depended on 
this mutually reinforcing relationship, and in the US - a nation wedded to 
principles of economic laissez faire - as a response to the Great Depression of the 
late 1920s and early 1930s, widespread legislative interventions were made into 
labour relations in an attempt revive the moribund economy.  Compulsory union 
recognition procedures and collective bargaining mechanisms were imposed in 
the face of opposition from the likes of the ‘American Liberty League’, and in case 
after case the US Supreme Court, struck out the legislation as unconstitutional. 
The supposed liberty of the individual, however, succumbed to political will, and 
the Supreme Court was ultimately compelled to accept these labour rights. 
 
Events in the USA, and the success of the ILO helped emphasise the singular and 
vital nature of collective labour rights.76 Labour rights were essentially the first 
                                               
73Antonio Gramsci, ‘Americanism and Fordism’ p 279 in The Prison Notebooks (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 
1971). Gramsci, however, saw the high wages as temporary phenomena reflecting the arduous nature of the work 
‘which cannot fail before long to have serious consequences for the physical and psychic health of the workers.’ 
He argued that when such work became seen as normal the wages would fall (pp 310-313).  
74M Aglietta A Theory of Capitalist Regulation The US Experience, 1976 [translated 1979] (London Verso 2015), 
p117 For a very comprehensive examination of Fordism, see chapters 1&2. 
75B Jessop in ‘The Future of the Capitalist State’ (2002), discussing Atlantic Fordism ‘as a mode of economic 
regulation’ and ‘as a general pattern of social organisation’ in the ‘Keynsian Welfare National State’, p57 -8. 
76The USA, although an enthusiastic supporter of the ILO has always however, been very reluctant to ratify its 
Conventions (see ME Imber, The USA, ILO,UNESCO and IAEA (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1989) chapter four ‘The Case 
of the International Labour Organisation’), or to commit itself to the provisions of even UN rights instruments (see 
S Grant, ‘The United States and the international human rights treaty system: For export only?’ - Chapter 14 in P 
Alston and J Crawford (Eds,) The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring (Cambridge, CUP, 2000;  pp3-5 of P 
Alston, ‘Labour Rights as Human rights; The Not So Happy State of the Art’ in Alston (ed) Labour rights as Human 
Rights (Oxford, OUP,2005).  The remarkable ‘New Deal’ (or, more accurately, the series of ‘New Deals’) had little to 
do with the ILO.  
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human rights to have been recognised in an international instrument, and their de 
facto recognition in Roosevelt’s New Deal was extraordinarily influential.77 The 
USA was advertising the fact that collective bargaining promoted economic 
growth. They did not ‘upset the equilibrium’ of the capitalist market, but were an 
essential element of that market.  The Americans had come to understand that 
capitalism ‘is intrinsically a creator and a destroyer,’ and ‘can only achieve 
progress for society if sets of mediation mechanisms, forming a mode of 
regulation, establish coherence among the imbalances inherent in the capitalist 
system.’ 
 
These words encapsulate Michael Aglietta’s ‘regulation approach’ to the analysis 
of labour relations – a theory of transition. The French economist argues that the 
provision of rights serves to provide stabilisation and restraint in a time of crisis: 
‘The cumulative effect of this coherence, once it has been achieved, is the 
establishment of a regime of growth.’78 
 
The regulation approach can be used to explain the provision of labour rights that 
so appalled Dicey, and the formation of the ILO in 1919. They were responses to 
crises triggered by the ‘blind force’ of capitalism, similar, but by no means 
identical to, the back swing of ‘Polyani’s pendulum.’79 
Dicey might well have seen them as ‘clear opposites’ but far from being 
irreconcilable, the interests of the employer and the collective demands of 
workforce - the ‘contradictory and conflictual dynamic’ on which the capitalist 
market depends -  are better seen as mutually reinforcing.80 Aglietta emphasises 
that 
                                               
77
It has, however, been argued that the impact of these early advances served to separate labour rights from the 
embrace of the post WWII human rights initiatives. Sarah Joseph, citing Bob Hepple at pp 21-23 in Labour Laws 
and Global Trade (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005), argued that ‘The ILO...significantly predates most other 
international human rights machinery, which generally emerged after WWII. It is perhaps because international 
labour rights movements started earlier than other human rights movements that labour rights tend to have been 
separated, and arguably even marginalised, within the mainstream human rights bodies at the global level’ (C 
Fenwick and T Novitz  (Eds) Human Rights at Work (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010), Ch 11, ‘UN Covenants and 
Labour Rights’, p331). 
78  M Aglietta, ‘Capitalism at the Turn of the Century: Regulation Theory and the Challenge of Social Change’, New 
Left Review I/232, November-December 1998, 41,pp 50-51 
79
See K. Polyanyi , The Great Transformation, (New York, Farrar & Rinehart, 1944). The regulation school do not 
regard the provision of labour rights to inevitable. 
80 See Jessop, 2002, op.cit. 
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‘agreements between organizations representing interests that are both 
mutually opposed and mutually dependent, has always been party to the 
creation of the major social mediation mechanisms...’  
He described what he saw, disregarding neo-classical economic theory and the 
supposed integrity of the market,81 to recognise that the  
‘reciprocal commitment of the individual and society,’82 gave ‘a collective 
purpose to the pursuit of interests, thereby legitimising both parts of the 
dichotomy between individual goals and membership of society...the 
modes of regulation in the wage society are legitimate to the extent that 
they permit social progress.’83 
In the UK political attempts to blunt the worst effects of unrestrained capitalism 
in the Depression were sectoral rather than enterprise level interventions. 
Between 1921 and 1931 no new Trade Boards were established,84 but in 1931 ‘as 
the economy dragged itself out of the greatest depths of the Depression wage 
regulation came back into favour,’ and by 1939 one and a half million workers had 
minimum wages – and a minimum of one week paid holiday – set by the boards.85 
The Post War Fordist Consensus 
Economic recovery in the industrialised nations was interrupted – although, in the 
US, arguably secured -- by the tragedy of the Second World War, but with victory 
in sight, and the emergence of the Soviet Union as a world ‘superpower’ having 
helped focus the attention of the owners of capital on the interests of the wider 
community, the ‘Great Powers’ set about building a new world order which was 
to deliver 30 years of unparalleled prosperity. The International Labour 
Organisation’s 1944 Treaty of Philadelphia reaffirmed the fundamental principles 
                                               
81See ‘Introduction: The Need for a Theory of Capitalist Regulation, in Aglietta, 1976, op.cit. According to Aglietta 
neo-classical economic theory ‘reduces and excludes from its ambit economic phenomena identified from 
observation of real practices as ‘imperfections’ rather than as dialectically transforming its concepts by 
incorporating a more concrete content into them’ (p10).  
82
 Ibid,p87 
83
Ibid, p54 
84
FJ Bayliss,1962, op cit, p25. 
85Ibid,P43 
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laid down 25 years earlier, and that year the allied powers met at Bretton Woods 
for the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, determined to impose 
peace and stability on the post war world and to engineer a compromise between 
the interests of capital and labour.86 
The collective interest demanded consensus, and this was recognised across the 
political spectrum. 1944 to 1948 saw an unprecedented period of international 
co-operation. Mainstream politics in the western democracies shifted markedly to 
the left after the horrors of the war had hammered home the missed 
opportunities of the 1920s and 1930s. In Britain the Attlee government, having 
told the people in 1945 that their choice at the polls – ‘the fundamental issue 
which has to be settled’ - was between the Tory Party ‘standing for the protection 
of the rights of private economic interest, and the Labour Party, allied with the 
great Trade union and co-operative movements,’87 passed the Wages Council Acts 
of 1945 and 1948 to build upon the foundations provided by pre war Trade 
Boards to promote collective bargaining. Once again it appeared to be 
understood that ‘lasting peace can be established only if it is based on social 
justice.’88 
It was this drive for reconciliation, both economic and ideological, which led to 
the successful negotiation of the hugely influential UN Universal Declaration in 
1948, which gave labour rights equal prominence with other human rights, 
economic and social, as well as civil and political. As we have seen, in that same 
year the UN Human Rights Committee started on the long haul towards a UN Bill 
of Rights, and the ILO produced Convention 87, which was followed by 
Convention 98 in 1949.89 
                                               
86
 For near contemporary comprehensive coverage of the arguments behind the drive for a compromise see 
Robert A Dahl and Charles E Lindblom Politics, Economy and Welfare: Planning and Politico – Economic Systems 
resolved into Basic Social Processes, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1953). 
87Labour Party Manifesto 1945: Let Us Face the Future: A Declaration of Labour Policy for the Consideration of the 
Nation. 
88 From Article II of the Declaration of Philadelphia 1944: ‘Declaration concerning the aims and purposes of the 
international Labour Organisation.’ 
89As we shall see they tend to dominate any consideration of freedom of association in the context of labour 
relations. Freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining are the first of 
the four core principles the ILO Declaration of 1998, which all ILO “members, even if they have not ratified the 
Conventions in question have an obligation arising from the very fact of membership to in the Organisation to 
respect, to promote and to realise...” (Para 2 ILO Declaration on fundamental Principles and Rights at Work). 
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These instruments appeared both to secure the position of labour rights as 
fundamental human rights, and to confirm their separate, special status. The 
pioneering British sociologist TH Marshall lent his support to this view at this 
pivotal time. In series of lectures delivered in 1949, and published as an essay in 
1950, Marshall90characterised collective labour rights as a category of civil rights 
conferring ‘industrial citizenship.’91  He argued that political rights had cleared 
‘the way for the growth of trade unionism by enabling workers to use their civil 
rights collectively’ to demand social rights.92 
 
For Marshall collective bargaining was the ‘extension of civil rights in the 
economic sphere...93These civil rights became for the workers, an instrument for 
raising their social and economic status, that is to say, for establishing the claim 
that they, as citizens were entitled to certain social rights.’94 
 
This concept of ‘industrial citizenship’,95 moving citizenship from the civil and 
political into the sphere of economic and social rights via collective bargaining 
meshed admirably with the effective industrial democracy promoted by 
voluntarism, and with the British post war cross party and pan-European 
consensus on the value of collective bargaining.   
 
Arguably, in 1950 this consensus enabled the representatives of the states of the 
Council of Europe negotiating the European Convention on Human Rights to 
agree on the conceptual and practical accommodation of individual liberty with 
the collective interest upon which post war British industrial relations was to 
depend for the next 30 years. The 1956 Council of Europe Travaux Preparatoires 
document on the drafting of Article 11 referred to above records the decision of 
the Conference of Senior Officials which secured the compromise necessary for 
the industrial relations systems starting to become prevalent in the UK and 
already long established in Denmark and Sweden: 
 
                                               
90TH Marshall, ‘Citizenship and Social Class’ (1950) in TH Marshall and Tom Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class, 
(London, Pluto Press, 1992).  
91Ibid, p8.  
92Ibid, p40. Essentially what Karl Polyanyi characterised as the counter movement to the emergence of the market 
economy. Polyani’s views were very influential in the immediate post war years. 
93Ibid,p26. The sentence concludes: ‘...without formal responsibility while the individual responsibility of the 
workers in relation to the contract is largely unenforceable.’ 
94
Ibid  
95
See Guy Mundlak, ‘Industrial Citizenship, Social Citizenship, Corporate Citizenship: I Just Want My Wages’ (2007) 
8(8)Theoretical Inquiries in Law. 
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‘On account of the difficulties raised by the ‘closed shop system’ in certain 
countries, the Conference in this connection considered that it was 
undesirable to introduce into the Convention a rule under which ‘no one 
may be compelled to belong to an association’ which features in [Article 20 
(2) ] the United Nations Universal Declaration.’96 
The same approach was taken by the UN Human Rights Committee, which 
rejected protecting a negative freedom of association:   
 
‘It was recognized that this sentence, taken from Article 20 of the Universal 
Declaration, stressed an important aspect of freedom of association, but 
the opinion was expressed that its application might not always be in the 
interests of trade unions.’97 
 
 The various ILO reporting bodies, and later, the European Social Charter’s Social 
Rights Committee, took a similar stance, holding that domestic arrangements for 
union membership agreements were strictly matters for individual states.98 
 
 When this was challenged in 1980 by certain of the jurists on the European 
Commission of Human Rights, and then by six of the twenty one judges at the 
European Court of Human Rights who heard Young, James and Webster v The UK 
in 1981,99it appeared to be interpreted by the first Thatcher administration as a 
signal from Strasbourg that a wholesale attack on the British trade union 
movement would be permissible. I would argue that moment was the ‘beginning 
of the end’ for the post war reconciliation of labour and capital in the UK.100 
 
                                               
96 Report 19 June 1950 by the Conference of Senior Officials (op cit) The decision is recorded the The Collected  
Edition of the ‘Travaux Preparatoires’, vol IV, p 262 (cited in Young, James &Webster  v UK, 4 EHRR 38, at para 51). 
97
 An ‘extract from the Annotation on draft Covenants, prepared by the Secretary General of the United Nations in 
1955…’ from the 1956 European Commission on Human Rights document (n.17 above). 
98See Chapter Three. 
99 [1981] ECHR 4. 
100  The UK strict closed shop was a rarity. One aspect of British industrial relations during 1945 – 1980 that cannot 
be over emphasized is that while union membership agreements flourished the overwhelming majority 
accommodated non-members, and the numbers of dismissals on account of UMA was miniscule (see Dunn and 
Gennard, The Closed Shop in British Industry, (London, Macmillan,1984), pp124-137). Most UMAs in practice 
resulted in the ‘agency shops’ which the Heath government had permitted when it had outlawed the closed shop 
in 1971-1974. Even in strict closed shops the right to ‘opt out’ of the political fund arguably ensured that freedom 
of conscience and expression was not infringed.  
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The case followed three dismissals made in 1976 under the strict British Rail 
closed shop, and had initially been defended by the Callaghan government. The 
conduct of the case fell, of course, into the hands of the Tories following their 
1979 election victory, and the Tories had passed the Employment Act in 1980, 
which had, inter alia, addressed the supposed ‘mischief’ the railway men had 
complained of. Non members with a principled objection to membership could 
not now be obliged to join a union as a condition of continued employment.  
 
The case should have been settled in 1980 following the report by the European 
Commission of Human Rights.101 However, Young, James and Webster’s case was 
being ‘bankrolled’, and directed, by a right wing organization, the Freedom 
Association.  Its leaders were in close contact with Thatcher’s ‘inner circle.’102 
 
The FA and the Tory ‘high command’ wanted to draw the court into ruling on 
whether Article 11 protected a right not to be obliged to join a union, and 
although six of the twenty one judges did take the view that there was a negative 
element to Article 11, the court did not consider it necessary to address the 
matter. It focused instead on the role of freedom of conscience and expression in 
the exercise of freedom of association to hold that workers already employed 
could not subsequently be obliged to join a particular trade union but must be 
free to join and to form trade unions of their own choice.103 
 
Three weeks after the judgment was handed down, Jim Prior, who had been 
Secretary of State for Employment since June 1979, a ‘One Nation Tory,’ was 
replaced by the rather less conciliatory Norman Tebbit. Prior had been a leading 
member of Heath’s cabinet throughout the Tory ministry of 1970-74,104 and his 
appointment had to some extent reassured the unions that the government 
sought only limited labour law reform.  
                                               
101
Shortly before the court handed down its judgement libertarian economist Charles Hanson, who had been in 
contact with the upper echelons of the FA, stated that ‘It would be very surprising if the Court came to a decision 
which differed widely from that of the Commission’ (C Hanson, S Jackson, D Miller The Closed Shop, A Comparative 
Study in Public Policy and Trade Union Security in Britain, the USA and West Germany, (Aldershot, Gower, 1982), 
p101). In the event no one was surprised, except perhaps Messrs. Young, James and Webster when they found 
that they were obliged to pay the extra costs the FA had incurred on their behalf. After the case Webster had to 
sell his house (see his self published book,When Britain Waived the Rules...and Sampled Anarchy: The Battle Won 
for Freedom Loving Britons, 2000). 
102
See chapter 3. 
103
 Membership of a particular union as condition of employment was not held to be a breach of the Convention 
obligations. 
104 As Minister of Agriculture 1970-72 and thereafter as Lord President and Leader of the House of Commons. 
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Tebbit set to work overseeing the drafting of the Bill which became the 
Employment Act 1982, and which marked the start of the assault on collective 
bargaining which has characterised British industrial relations ever since.  
 
A new era of individualism opened, and Diceyian arguments were dusted off and 
put to service. The ‘very lively solicitude for the non-unionist and his “liberty” to 
contract to serve for the lowest wages,’105 became a staple justification for the 
withdrawal of collective bargaining arrangements and the imposition of the 
‘individual contract of employment.’  The Thatcherites’ high priest of economics, 
FA Hayek provided the old arguments with a fresh veneer of academic 
respectability. Like Dicey, Hayek saw the middle years of the 19th Century as a 
‘golden age’,106 and saw collective bargaining as tyranny, claiming in 1984 that:  
 
‘the unions are destroying the free market through their legalised use of 
coercion...workers...are deterred by the threat of violence from offering 
their labour on their own terms.’107 
_____________________________________ 
 
In this chapter I have shown that the right for workers to enjoy full freedom of 
association is a fundamental human right for which effective recognition has been 
denied by the pernicious influence of the English common law.108 
Analysing the arguments of arch libertarian AV Dicey, and aspects of the work of 
the father of collectivism, Karl Marx, I have shown show that it was by effectively 
dividing freedom of association in two - by separating the right of the individual to 
organise from the collectively exercisable elements of that freedom - that the 
ruling classes in Britain were able to justify the denial of workers the liberty to 
bargain on equal terms with their masters. Subsequently enshrined in early rights 
instruments the primacy afforded the individual and the denial of the communal 
                                               
105  By DN Pritt and Richard Freeman The Law Versus the Trade Unions, (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1958), 
p.34. 
106See FA Hayek, 1980s Unemployment and the Unions, the Distortion of Relative Prices by Monopoly in the Labour 
Market, (London, Institute of Economic Affairs,1984), p 41. Hayek referred to the ‘second half of the 19th Century’ 
but he must have meant Dicey’s ‘golden age’ which ran from 1825 until 1869. Hayek’s less well informed analysis 
appears to have taken the Trade Disputes Act 1906 as the end of the ‘good old days’ (see chapter 2 for an account 
of the industrial relations milestones of the 19
th
 Century).  
107
Ibid, p55 & p61. 
108
Rather than a ‘wide’ as opposed to a ‘narrow interpretation,’ emphasising that freedom of association in the 
context of industrial relations undoubtedly embraces the rights to bargain collectively and to strike. 
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interest came to establish a flawed individualistic human rights paradigm which 
continues to protect the perceived interests of capital.  
I cited the experience of the reconciliation of labour and capital in the twentieth 
century to show that the fundamental labour rights are an essential element of 
the capitalist market, and that the interests of capital lie with compromise rather 
than confrontation.   
In the next chapter I give an overview of the history of labour rights in the UK, 
necessary both to provide the context for the benchmarking exercise in later 
chapters, and to support my arguments on freedom of association offered in this 
chapter. I show the clash of the individual and the collective to be essentially no 
more than a simple denial by the ruling classes of freedom of association justified 
by spurious philosophical arguments of the primacy of individual rights, and a 
manipulation of the law. I show too that after the early years of the 19th Century, 
until the post World War Two reconciliation of labour and capital, the story was 
one of crisis and compromise, of the ruling classes reluctantly conceding to 
workers freedom of association before reneging once more - and ultimately 
provoking another crisis. 
That last compromise was based on cross party acknowledgement of the 
necessity for full freedom of association, a consensus grounded in treaty 
obligations entered into by both the major political parties, and by respect for the 
rule of law. That it was abandoned after 1979 by politicians reprising the old 
discredited arguments about the primacy of the individual, prepared and able to 
break international law (as I show in chapters two three and five) in order to 
undermine and attack freedom of association provides for workers the political 
ammunition to secure the fresh broad political consensus necessary to win back 
full freedom of association. It also guides us towards the means by which that 
freedom can best be protected after that freedom has been won back to make 
the withdrawal of full freedom of association as unthinkable to politicians in the 
21st Century politicians as it was to those who held high office during 1945 – 1979. 
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Chapter Two:The development of labour rights in the 
United Kingdom 
Since the Fourteenth Century the ruling classes, the owners of capital, the 
employers – epithets that can be used interchangeably - have used the law to 
prevent workers from bargaining effectively.  
 
‘Laws against combinations’ passed by Parliament, and enforced in concert with 
the common law by magistrates and judges concerned to defend themselves 
against the demands of their servants, ensured until the second half of the 19th 
Century that workers  attempting to negotiate with their employer were likely to 
be punished.  
 
The Ordinance of Labourers 1349,109passed after plague had killed a large 
proportion of the population,110made Justices of the Peace responsible for 
ensuring that  wages did not rise beyond the sums employers had been prepared 
to pay when labour had been less scarce. Unburdened by any need to disguise 
their partiality, the ruling classes were careful to ensure that it was the workers, 
rather than their masters, who were liable to sanction if they were found to have 
been paid what were considered to have been excessive wages. 
 
The Freemason’s Act of 1425,111 was similarly unequivocal about denying freedom 
of association and assembly. That Act made it a felony, punishable by death, ‘to 
cause congregations or chapiters of Freemasons to congregate or assemble.’ 
Employers enjoyed a monopoly of power. They wanted to deny skilled working 
men the bargaining power to demand improved wages and working conditions, 
so they threatened to kill them if they did. 
 
Over subsequent centuries successive statutes were passed variously prohibiting 
combinations, and setting the terms of employment for labourers and skilled 
                                               
109See the instrument at www.brittannia.com/history/docs/history/docs/laborer.html 
110
 The Black Death is estimated to have killed between one half and one third of the population of London during 
1348-49. Parliament was prorogued in January 1349 because of the danger (see Black Death, by Mike Ibeji, BBC 
History, 2011).  
111 3 Hen.6th,cap.1. 
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workers.  Often very complex and comprehensive, the immediate value of these 
laws to employers tended to diminish over time, becoming impliedly part 
repealed by fresh legislation, and rendered increasingly obsolete by societal and 
industrial developments.112 Nevertheless, as they fell into desuetude these 
statutes would, I argue, have ‘fed into’ the common law, helping the judiciary to 
shape less prescriptive but more general, more enduring, and more effective, 
common law protection for the interests of the ruling classes, the guiding 
principal of which could be said to be that workers must not be permitted to 
bargain collectively. 
 
The common law offences of conspiracy and unlawful assembly, used against 
trade unionists as recently as the 1970s, betray the fact that the law was designed 
by the few to keep control of the masses. Trade unionist Des Warren, one of the 
‘Shrewsbury Two,’ on being sentenced in 1973 to three years imprisonment for 
unlawful assembly, affray, and conspiracy to intimidate, declared himself from the 
dock to have be a victim of a ‘conspiracy of the ruling classes.’113 Warren had 
made a shrewd assessment of the calculated nature of the manipulation of the 
law by employers. 
 
All a conviction for unlawful assembly required was for it to be found that more 
than two people were gathered with a common purpose in circumstances where 
a reasonable person might believe that the gathering was likely to result in a 
breach of the peace. Any agreement to do anything deemed by the justices to be 
in restraint of trade was sufficient to secure a conviction of criminal conspiracy.114  
 
Yet employers were free to associate, to bargain, and to do business without 
interference, and similarly liable only in theory to prosecution for combining, they 
were able in practice to agree amongst themselves the wages they were prepared 
to pay. After all: 
 
                                               
112 See JV Orth, Combination and Conspiracy: A Legal History of Trade Unionism, 1721-1906, (Oxford, OUP, 1991), 
p4. See A Bogg, KD Ewing and A Moretta in ‘The Persistence of Criminal Law and Police in Collective Labour 
Relations’ in A Bogg, J Collins M. Freedland J Herring (eds) Criminality at Work  (Oxford, OUP, 2019) [forthcoming]. 
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See The Picket and the Law, Chris Ralph, 1977, p15. 
114 See JV Orth 1991, op cit, Chapter Three: ‘Conspiracy: Criminal Law.’ 
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‘Who would charge them other than the workers, and how could they find 
the money to launch the prosecution except by combining, and for that 
they would be themselves be charged and sentenced?’115 
The right to bargain was thus exercisable only by the individual. The individual 
worker was, of course, theoretically entitled to bargain over the terms and 
conditions of employment, provided that any deal struck did not exceed any cap 
on wages imposed by statute or by the justices. However, to do so not only 
invited detriment  or dismissal, for few employers would have wished to 
encourage workers to feel that they could ask for more money with impunity, it 
invited the accusation that the individual was attempting to negotiate on behalf 
of an unlawful combination of workers. 
The French Revolution, however, made the potential consequences of the 
exploitation of the working classes plain to the British ruling classes, and the crisis 
across the channel in the late 18th and early 19th Centuries was followed by rioting 
in industrial cities, and the rise of the Chartist movement and the formation of 
trade unions.116 The first stirrings of political compromise were the consequence, 
and George White, a clerk of committees in the Commons, in a pamphlet issued 
with the Combination of Workmen Repeal Bill in 1824117, introduced to the House 
by Peter Moore, Member of Parliament for Coventry, described the problem the 
legislation sought to address: 
‘The magistrates acting, as they believed, in unison with the views of the 
legislature, to check and keep down wages and combinations, have 
regarded in almost every instance every attempt on the part of the artisan 
to ameliorate his situation, or support his station in society, as a species of 
sedition and resistance of the government.’ 
                                               
115 Francis Place’s evidence to the Committee on Artisans and Machinery in 1824, quoted by Pritt and Freeman, 
1958, op cit. p32. 
116 See JV Orth 1991, op cit, Chapter Four: ‘Combination: 1799-1824.’ 
117
 Hansard indicates that the pamphlet had been first issued in 1823, when the Bill was introduced, but the 
pamphlet I have seen was dated 1824 – very likely a revised version - when the Bill passed into law. The Bill has 
generally been credited as the work of Joseph Hume MP. 
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Yet the employers continued to deny workers freedom of association, and even in 
the second half of the 19th Century it was unexceptional for workers who sought 
to bargain collectively to be convicted of criminal conspiracy,118 and the ‘Master 
and Servant’ laws continued to be invoked against those who dared take 
industrial action.  
 
Ewing reports that: ‘In the years 1858-75 there was an average of 10,000 
prosecutions per annum in England and Wales,’119 brought against individual 
workers for breach of contract. Very many of these cases will have been brought 
by employers against workers taking strike action without having given sufficient 
notice of what was recognised by the law only as a resignation. Workers who 
breached the contract of employment were liable to criminal sanctions, while 
employers who reneged on their side of the bargain faced only the theoretical 
prospect of civil action.120 
 
The immunity to legal liability afforded to members and directors by the Limited 
Liabilities Act 1855 and the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856,121 made it still more 
apparent that very many employers were not individuals at all, but  were 
themselves acting in combination behind the ‘corporate veil’ as shareholders, well 
remunerated senior managers, and directors, and the injustice of penalising those 
workers who sought to bargain collectively must have been obvious to all but the 
most blinkered or biased.  
 
Small wonder then that the 1850s saw the start of an adjustment in the attitude 
of the ruling classes towards trade unionism. 
 
 A subtle campaign ‘of reasoned and well informed advocacy backed by 
unchallengeable personal respectability,’ was conducted during the 1850s and 
1860s, by leading trade unionists, and this was said to have led to general public 
acceptance of the need to permit workers the opportunity to engage in collective 
                                               
118 See Pritt and Freeman, 1958, op cit, pp 38-43. The authors describe two cases relating to a very unremarkable 
strike in a tin plate works in Wolverhampton, resulting in convictions for conspiracy for the union officials and 
other activists and the conviction of a number of employees for conspiracy to intimidate: Reg v Duffield and Others 
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119 K.D. Ewing, Trade Unions, The Labour Party and the Law: A Study of the Trade Union Act 1913, (Edinburgh, 
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120 See Bogg, Ewing and Moretta in A Bogg, J Collins M. Freedland J Herring (eds) 2019, op cit. 
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See Peter Muchlinski, ‘Limited liability and multinational enterprises: a case for reform?’ (2010) 34 Cambridge 
Journal of Economics 915, pp 916-917 for the Acts of 1855 and 1856.  
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bargaining.122 Parliament was petitioned, and trade unions lent their support to 
sympathetic prospective Members of Parliament.   
 
Workers, allied with sympathetic Members of Parliament, were now pitched 
against reactionary opposition at Westminster, and in the press. Their most 
determined opponents, however, were to be found in the ranks of the judiciary. 
Answerable to only the Lord Chancellor, steeped in the traditions of the common 
law, and consequently almost to a man convinced that their role was to protect 
individual members of the ruling classes from the collective tyranny of trade 
unionism, the judiciary continued to do what it could to stop the working classes 
from taking advantage of their potential collective economic power. 
 
The intended effect of the Molestation of Workmen Act 1859, an attempt by 
Parliament to permit peaceful picketing, was blunted by hostile judicial 
interpretation, 123 but the Master and Servant Act 1867, passed by a minority Tory 
government over which Benjamin Disraeli had considerable influence (he became 
prime minister for the first time in 1868) successfully obliged the judges to 
substitute fines for terms of imprisonment as penalties for workers convicted of 
breach of contract.124 
 
The ‘breakthrough’ was arguably driven by the Representation of the People Act 
1867, which provided working men with the power to change the law. Male 
householders were given the Borough franchise.125 The electorate was essentially 
doubled, from approximately one million to two million,126  and the 
Representation of the People Act 1884, extending ‘a uniform household franchise 
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 See A Giant’s Strength, (London, Inns of Court Conservative and Unionist Society,1958), a Tory polemic arguing 
for restraint to be placed on freedom of association. Geoffrey Howe is usually, and mistakenly, credited as the 
chief author of the pamphlet (which was a powerful influence on the Industrial Relations Act 1971), but I have it on 
good authority that the main author was the future head of the short lived National Industrial Relations Court and 
Master of the Rolls, John Donaldson. 
123 See Lord Wedderburn, The Worker and The Law, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1986) pp518-19. 
124 See Ewing 1982, op cit. Chapter One ‘The Emergence of the Labour Party’ provides a good account of these 
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 The property qualification did not exclude those who were renting. ‘Lodgers’ who paid in excess of £10 a year 
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  See Robert Wilkinson, The Representation of the People Act 1867, (London, 1868) (Reprint: Oxford, Andecite 
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at elections to all counties and boroughs throughout the United Kingdom,’ added 
approximately two million more.127 
Economic power goes hand in glove with political power, and arguably the 
extension of the franchise meant that the working classes had to be permitted to 
bargain collectively. One could not be ceded without the other, and the 
restrictions on freedom of association fell away within a comparatively short 
time.128 
 
A Royal Commission had been appointed in 1867 to examine and report on trade 
union activities, and the recommendations of the Minority Report of the Royal 
Commission led to the Trade Union Act 1871,129 passed by a Liberal Government 
headed by William Gladstone, which recognised trade unions as individual legal 
entities.130 It seems that it had been thought that this would make it impossible to 
present the actions of members, officers or officials as criminal conspiracies, but 
further legislation was required to stay the hand of the judges, and the Conspiracy 
and Protection of Property Act 1875, passed by a Tory government led by Disraeli, 
explicitly ensured that it was no longer possible for a civil wrong to provide the 
basis of charge of criminal conspiracy. By Section 3: 
 
‘An agreement or combination by two or more persons to do or procure to 
be done any act in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute 
between employers and workmen shall not be indictable as a conspiracy if 
such act committed by one person would not be punishable as a crime.’ 
131The 1867 Act had extinguished criminal liability for breach of contract, 
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 W. Cunningham Glen, The Representation of the People Act, 1884, (London, 1885) (Reprint: Victoria, Leopold 
Classic Library, 2015) p1 & pp 6-7. For an overview of franchise reform in the development of the trade unions see 
Ewing 982, op cit ,pp7-11. 
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 Members were no longer held to be in restraint of trade by virtue of their membership, nor were all 
agreements entered into by a union void because the purposed of the union were held to be in restraint of trade. 
See Pritt & Freeman 1958, op cit, pp 47-50. 
128Wedderburn however argued that in Britain ‘the extension of the franchise in 1867 and 1884 long before the 
birth of a political wing to the labour movement’ meant that ‘the movement itself never espoused the ideological 
programme common among European movements where political organisation matched or ante-dated the 
industrial’ (‘Labour Law and Labour Relations in Britain’ (1972) 10 British Journal of Industrial Relations, 272. 
 
130 Unions had been recognised as unincorporated associations.  
131
 The Criminal Law Amendment Act 1871 had come into force on the same day as the Trade Union Act, ostensibly 
to relax common law restrictions on strikes and picketing, but in R v Bunn and Others [1872] (12 Cox’s Criminal 
Cases, p. 316), strikers were imprisoned for a ‘criminal conspiracy to coerce the employers to carry on their 
business contrary to their will’ (cited in Pritt & Freeman, 1958, op cit). 
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and the 1871 and 1875 Acts lifted the remaining threat of criminal liability 
for those engaging in peaceful industrial action.’132 
 
Nevertheless, the legality of industrial action continued to be challenged, and 
employers and the judiciary continued to undermine the attempts of tradesmen 
to bargain collectively. The law of tort, and civil conspiracy, became the principal 
legal tools relied upon by employers and the judiciary to curb their power. 
 
During the 1890s, certain senior judges started to make their antipathy to the 
collective power now wielded by their social inferiors very obvious indeed in a 
series of cases which appeared almost to invite further legislative intervention. 
Lord Halsbury, the Lord Chancellor, made very little effort to hide his distaste for 
the trade union movement, and the freedom to take industrial action workers 
had enjoyed in the years after the 1875 Act. 
 
The House of Lords, in Mogul Steamship Co. V McGregor Gow & Co [1892]133, had 
been thought to have set a protective precedent for the unions when it held that 
the injury inflicted on the plaintiff company by the defendant firms had been 
merely incidental to a lawful bid to extend and protect their own trading, rather 
than a tortious conspiracy to cause commercial injury. Although Halsbury had 
delivered the judgment in that case, he did not consider that the same could be 
said to hold true of trade unionists taking action to defend their interests. 
In Allen v Flood [1895 -1898]134, a case heard by the House of Lords in 1895, and, 
largely at Halsbury’s insistence, once again in 1897, Halsbury employed tactics 
which were essentially an abuse of process in a failed attempt to maneuver the 
House into finding a trade union official liable in damages for tortious 
interference.135 Despite the Lord Chancellor’s best efforts the Lords, however, 
ruled that, like the Cartel in the Mogul Steamship case, Mr Allen’s threat to call a 
strike if certain non-members were not dismissed was a justified attempt to 
                                               
132 S4 did however reserve penal provisions for actions likely to disrupt the supply of gas or water. See also below 
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 An excellent account of Halsbury’s manoeuvrings can be found in pp 39-54 ‘The Belfast Butchers: Quinn v 
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further the interests of his members. The case is a classic example of a union 
lawfully enforcing solidarity. The workers sought to enforce a ‘closed shop’ 
against the wishes of the employer and a minority of non unionists, a situation 
guaranteed to provoke the ire of disciples of the common law anxious to defend 
the interests of the employer.  
 Lord Halsbury returned to the fray as the century turned, and two very famous 
cases, Quinn v Leathem,136 and Taff Vale Railway Co v ASRS,137 were heard by the 
House of Lords in 1901. 
In the first of these, another classic ‘solidarity’ case, this time involving the threat 
of secondary or sympathy action, members and officials of the Belfast 
Journeymen Butchers’ and Assistants’ Association, in seeking to persuade an 
employer, Mr Leathem, to dismiss those in his workforce who were not members 
of the union, had threatened an important customer with a strike unless he 
stopped trading with Leathem. The Lords, by a narrow majority, ruled that the 
actions of the Belfast butchers amounted to a civil ‘conspiracy to injure’, 
overturning the precedent set by the Mogul Steamship case, and confirmed in 
Allen v Flood. Halsbury was one of the four Law Lords who upheld the decision of 
the High Court, and of the Irish Court of Appeal, to award damages against the 
members and officials of the union.138 
In the Taff Vale case officials of the Associated Society of Railway Servants were 
found to have induced the rail company’s employees to breach their contracts. 
On this occasion, Lord MacNaughten and Lord Halsbury carried all of their 
colleagues with them, and the Lords held that the union was vicariously liable for 
the actions of the officials, leaving the union’s funds vulnerable to a very large 
claim for damages - £23,000.  
Since the 1871 Act had been passed it had not been thought possible to recover 
damages from a union, an unincorporated association, and the rulings were a 
crushing blow. Unless Parliament was prepared to change the law unions would, 
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 AC 497. 
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in most circumstances, be unable to take industrial action without risking financial 
disaster.139  However, during the Quinn v Leatham and Taff Vale litigation the 
unions had established the Labour Representation Committee to represent the 
interests of their interests in Parliament. The LRC was the Labour Party in all but 
name. The numbers of trade union members affiliated to the LRC rose from 
353,070 in 1901 to close to 1 million in 1904.140  The pressure for change was 
building, and the Lords appeared almost to be inviting a political intervention, 
although the Tory dominated coalition Government headed by Arthur Balfour 
declined to legislate. 
Subsequently presented with the opportunity to make a dignified retreat from 
what was becoming a very obviously untenable position, the Law Lords instead 
chose to press on with an attack on the trade unions that had little public or 
political support. In South Wales Miners’ Federation v Glamorgan Coal Co 
[1905]141, they held the Miners’ Federation liable for the damages sought by the 
mine owners. The arguments that had served to protect the cartel in the Mogul 
Steamship case were again rejected, and it was confirmed that “in the context of 
both conspiracy and inducing breach of contract it was to prove impossible for 
trade unionists to provide a lawful excuse or justification for their conduct: they 
stood naked and unprotected at the alter of the common law.”142 
Those three decisions were widely condemned. There was an election at the end 
of that year, and the display of overt law making by unelected yet unashamedly 
politically motivated judges – the tyranny of the judiciary - provoked a hostile 
response. During the 1905 campaign ‘…very many Liberal candidates and even a 
few Tories, had given express pledges at the election to submit legislation to 
reverse the Taff Vale decision.’143 
The new Liberal government, elected in December 1905, passed the Trades 
Disputes Act 1906, removing civil liability both for conspiracy and inducing breach 
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of contract for workers in the course of a trade dispute, and conferring near 
complete tortious immunity for trade unions. Unions could no longer be held to 
be vicariously liable for the torts of their members or officials.144 The judges had 
been resolutely slapped down.145  
Section 1 of the Act provided that:  
‘An act done in pursuance of an agreement or combination by two or more 
persons shall, if done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, 
not be actionable unless the act, if done without any such agreement or 
combination, would be actionable.’ 
 This paragraph, modeled on section 3 of the 1875 Act,146 appeared to remove any 
potential liability for civil conspiracy in a trade dispute. The new Act specifically 
addressed the torts employed in recent cases and sought to inhibit future judicial 
creativity. Under section 3 of the 1906 Act, inducing “some other person to break 
a contract of employment,” or interfering ‘with the trade, business, or 
employment of some other person, or with the right of some other person to 
dispose of his capital or his labour as he wills,’ could not be causes for action if 
undertaken in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute. 
The effectiveness of these provisions, of course, depended on the definition of a 
trade dispute, and the Act provided a satisfactorily wide definition. A trade 
dispute was said to be one “between employers and workmen or between 
workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-
employment, or the terms of employment, or with the conditions of labour, of 
any person.”147 Solidarity, sympathy or secondary action can therefore be said to 
have specifically been protected by the new Act – unsurprising given the 
circumstances of Allen v Flood and Quinn v Leathem – and was arguably seen by 
Parliament as the essence of trade unionism. In the absence of formal collective 
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bargaining systems enforced by legal rights and duties, organizing, or combining, 
requires recalcitrant colleagues to be persuaded to join the union, and employers 
to be persuaded to hire workers on the condition that they join the union. 
Solidarity was crucial to effective collective bargaining, and the power to call on 
trade unionists working for other employers to threaten or engage in industrial 
action in support was similarly essential.  
However, as carefully drafted as these provisions of the 1906 Act were, they did 
not bring an end to legal action against workers taking industrial action. No 
positive right to strike had been conferred. Instead a circumscribed freedom to 
strike had been permitted by suspending certain legal rights that had previously 
been used to make industrial action impossible. If action fell outside of the limits 
within which this ‘statutory immunity’ applied then the position was much as it 
had been following the Quinn v Leathem and Taff Valley cases.148 
Injunctions, sought in the courts by employers to restrain members and 
officials,149  now became the new legal weapons brought to bear against the trade 
unions. The unions themselves enjoyed almost complete immunity, and there was 
little point in an employer pursuing a claim against their own workforce.150 An 
injunction can be obtained within hours, without any necessity for a subsequent 
claim for damages, and it will stop any industrial action in its tracks. To breach the 
terms of an injunction is to commit a criminal offence, and to this day most cases 
which feature a consideration whether the statutory immunities apply are 
applications for interim relief. The courts, in effect, pre-judge the outcome of a 
hypothetical claim for damages,151 although only very rarely in recent years have 
the economic torts themselves been considered.152 The laws against strikes laid 
down since 1979 are now the focus of these cases, and the parties, and the 
courts, almost invariably confine themselves to merely considering whether the 
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immunities apply or not - because employers rely on the procedural ‘trips and 
hurdles’ to lawful industrial action when they seek an injunction.153 
Criminal liability for industrial action was not, however, wholly extinguished by 
the legislation passed during 1867-1906, and for most of the period between 
1906 and 1951 judicial antipathy to trade unionism can arguably be said to have 
been eclipsed by Parliamentary sanction of withdrawals of the freedom to take 
lawful industrial action, justified by national emergency,154 and by the threat to 
the ruling classes posed by Bolshevism.  
 
Much of the freedom to bargain seemingly secured in 1906 was withdrawn after 
just seven years when the Munitions of War Act 1915 imposed ‘compulsory 
arbitration’ to handle disputes in industries considered vital to the war effort. 
‘Munitions work’ was given a very wide interpretation, and workers found 
themselves sent to prison for breach of contract or fined for offences like ‘not 
working diligently during ordinary working hours,’ and ‘refusing to obey a lawful 
order,’ after hearings at specially convened Munitions Tribunals.  
 
Although such prosecutions were far from everyday occurrences, and strikes took 
place, even in munitions factories, the legislation and its occasional invocation 
arguably merely serving to discourage industrial action, it nevertheless stayed the 
hands of workers, giving employers the “freedom to indulge in all sorts of 
provocations on which at other times they would not venture.”155 
 
The Munitions Acts were repealed in 1919.156 As we saw in the previous chapter, 
the ILO was established in that year, and there were hopes that labour relations 
were entering a new era. However, the Emergency Powers Act followed in 1920,  
giving Parliament very wide powers when a ‘state of emergency’ had been 
declared to make regulations, breaches of which could be permitted to attract 
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prison sentences, to ensure that the supply of food, water, fuel, light or  were not 
disrupted.157 
 
 Although the application 1906 Act was unaffected,158 and the Act explicitly 
forbade “compulsory military service or industrial conscription,” it sent the 
message to trade unionists that the military would ‘step into the breach’ to 
replace workers who took industrial action which interfered with “the essentials 
of life.”159 Very likely the Act served to deter unions from testing the limits of the 
immunities, and arguably it can be seen as both a replacement for the Munitions 
Acts, and as a response to the recent Bolshevik Workers’ Revolution in Russia. 
 
 In the newly established Soviet Union the working classes had gone rather 
further than merely obliging their masters to permit them the freedom to bargain 
with on a collective basis. Such was the alarm of the Lloyd George’s Liberal 
Government that armed forces were dispatched to Russia where they fought the 
Bolsheviks in an unsuccessful counter revolutionary war during 1918 - 1920.160 
 
The primary inter war adjustment was, however, the Trade Disputes and Trades 
Unions Act 1927, passed by Parliament following the General Strike of 1926. 
Employers had been given a taste of the collective power wielded by workers, and 
the Act, introduced by Stanley Baldwin’s second Tory administration,161 
prohibited industrial action taken by or against third parties in support of a 
primary trade or political dispute. Those who instigated such secondary or 
solidarity actions were liable to substantial fines, or to terms of imprisonment, an 
unequivocal withdrawal of much of the freedom conferred by the 1906 Act.162 
 
Although the Labour Party, assisted by the near universal suffrage ceded by the 
Representation of the People Act 1918,163 had become a major political force, its 
support having surpassed that of the Liberals, there were only two Labour 
administrations in office between the wars, the brief minority Ramsay Macdonald 
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administrations of 1924, and 1929. During 1929 the economy hit its lowest ebb – 
the Great Depression was at its worst - and the weakness of the Labour 
Government meant that even if it had wished to permit workers the opportunity 
to reprise the General Strike it could not have repealed the 1927 Act before it was 
replaced by a ‘National Government’ cross party coalition also under Macdonald. 
After 1935 this Coalition continued under Conservative leadership. In 1940 
Churchill took over as premier, and the Labour leader Clement Attlee, as gifted an 
administrator as Churchill was an orator, became deputy prime minister. 
 
The war saw the discrete approach in cases of civil conspiracy brought against 
working people following the Mogul Steamships case (p35 above) abandoned by 
the House of Lords in Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co. Ltd v Veitch,164the 
case in which Lord Wright famously stated that:  
 
‘The right of workmen to strike is an essential element in the principle of 
collective bargaining…’  
 
Like the lawful bid to extend and protect their own trading made by the cartel in 
Mogul, the ‘blacking’ by T&GWU dockers on the Isle of Lewis of  imports of cheap 
yarn,165was held not to be a tortious conspiracy to cause commercial injury. The 
economic harm inflicted was incidental to the predominant aim of the trade 
unionists to oblige the firm to stick to minimum prices and safeguard the wages of 
members engaged in the manufacture of Harris Tweed. 
 
Presciently Wright stated that rather than two groups with conflicting interests:  
 
‘….employers and workmen have a common interest in the prosperity of 
their industry, though the interest of one side may be in profits and the 
other in wages… a wider and truer view is that there is a community of 
interest.’166 
 
This reflected the cross party and cross class consensus discussed in the previous 
chapter – the ‘tug of war’ had to stop. 
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The Post War Compromise 
As we saw in chapter one, the key adjustment followed the catastrophic crisis 
that was World War Two. For the first time a socialist government had a working 
majority, and a fresh compromise was hammered out under the direction of 
Clement Attlee’s cabinet. The Trade Disputes and Trades Unions Act 1927 was 
repealed, and the first of the Wages Councils Acts was passed, further 
strengthening sectoral bargaining.167 With the adoption by Parliament of the Fair 
Wages Resolution, obliging firms contracting with public authorities to adhere to 
minimum terms and conditions of employment, and come to collective 
agreement with their employees,168 a minimalist mechanism facilitating free 
voluntary collective bargaining might be said to have been put in place during 
1946.169 
 However, the wartime Order 1305, which had imposed compulsory arbitration in 
1940 under the Emergency Regulations, remained in force, and while the 
statutory immunities were in place, they were largely eclipsed by the criminal 
liability imposed by ‘1305’ on those who took industrial action that had not been 
sanctioned by the Ministry of Labour. Strikes were lawful only if the particular 
dispute had been reported to the Ministry, and the Ministry had not, after three 
weeks had elapsed, referred the dispute to arbitration. 170 
Yet the Attlee government’s greatest achievement in terms of labour law was 
arguably its key role in revitalising the ILO, drafting the ILO’s new constitution and 
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the fundamental Conventions, No.87 on Freedom of Association and the Right to 
Organise, and No.98, the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention. 
This is not the paradox it might appear. Continued retention of 1305 was 
supported by the TUC, and the order cannot therefore realistically be said to have 
restricted freedom of association. Arguably, after the war the order can best be 
seen not as a law against strikes, but the statutory basis of the compulsory 
arbitration mechanism. The Attlee administrations governed in collaboration with 
the trade unions, and 1305 was retained on the proviso that the TUC could at any 
time take a collective decision to require the government to rescind it. The matter 
was regularly put to vote at Congress.171 The Attlee Government was 
unquestionably the political wing of the trade union movement, and the 
Government and the TUC were in partnership to a degree which would arguably 
have been alien even to the Wilson and Callaghan Governments.172  
While individual unions very rarely risked taking action in breach of the order, 
unofficial action became increasingly common as ‘austerity Britain’ continued into 
the late 1940s and early 1950s. The cabinet brought only two prosecutions 
invoking the penal provisions of the order, in October 1950 and in April 1951. 
173These were ill judged responses to the increasing number of unofficial 
challenges to the ‘wages freeze,’ and reflected the impatience of the cabinet with 
the failure of the unions to control their members,  as well as the baseless belief 
by some members of the cabinet that unofficial actions were being orchestrated 
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their Dockers’ Charter, Jim Phillips, in The Great Alliance: Economic Recovery and the Problems of Power, (London, 
Pluto Press, 1994)  tells us that: ‘Among Labour’s strongest supporters, the TGWU felt that industrial disruption 
threatened the the immense economic and social benefits which the government had brought to its 
members...Meanwhile beyond the docks, Attlee and his Ministers, supported by the TUC General Council were 
increasingly occupied by central problems of domestic – and European – economic recovery’ (p27 and p49).  
173On the prosecutions see Nina Fishman 1999, op cit, pp57-71. 
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from behind the Iron Curtain.174 The trials generated considerable publicity, 
arguably further eroding the support in the country which had delivered the 
narrow working majority the Government had to rely on since the February 1950 
General election.  
 Order 1305 was rescinded in the summer of 1951, replaced by Industrial Disputes 
Order 1376, which imposed compulsory arbitration without the backing of penal 
provisions. Thereafter, until 1958 when the order was revoked, either party could 
refer the dispute to an Industrial Disputes Tribunal. The decision of the tribunal 
was then incorporated into the contract of employment, which meant that in 
practice only workers could enforce the decision. The unions, however, almost 
always abided by the ruling of the Tribunal,175 1376 also, of course, having the 
effect of obliging recalcitrant employers to bargain with their workers.176 
Workers enjoyed full freedom of association. Every worker had the benefit of 
collective bargaining to some degree, with workers able to take lawful industrial 
action in the pursuit of improved terms and conditions of employment, even if 
such action could be perceived of as having a broader, perhaps tangentially 
political aim, and whether or not the immediately affected employer could be 
said to be a party to the dispute. Individual contractual rights were negotiated 
through voluntary collective bargaining. In poorly organised sectors minimum 
terms and conditions negotiated by tri-partite Wages Councils had to be 
respected, and in industries with relatively good collective agreement coverage, 
establishment level bargaining was frequently augmented by voluntarily 
established Joint Industrial Councils,177 the members of which were required to 
                                               
174 See Phillips 1994, op cit, Chapter Four, ‘Communist Conspiracies? The Allegations and the Reality.’ See also 
Chapter Four ‘Surveillance Targets’ in the forthcoming KD Ewing, J Mahoney and A Moretta MI5, Cold War and the 
Rule of Law  (Oxford, OUP, 2019).  
175 See Pritt, 1970,op cit, p.96, and Pritt and Freeman,op cit, 1958, p105. 
176 See Pritt (ibid) and also A Flanders ‘Collective Bargaining’ in Flanders and Clegg 1954, op cit, p288. Flanders saw 
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the Terms and Conditions of Employment Act 1959. 
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respect similar sectoral minima. Employers who refused to bargain collectively 
with their staff either had to comply with Wage Council standards, or were 
obliged by market forces (or by Order 1305/1376 compulsory arbitration or Fair 
Wages clauses) to keep pace with Joint Industrial Council minima.178 
Paradoxically, the post war compromise can be said to have been secured by the 
attitudes of subsequent Tory administrations. The Tories won the October 1951 
election. The Churchill, Eden, Macmillan and Douglas-Home Governments that 
followed the Attlee government respected its achievements and also respected 
the rule of law: Conventions 87 and 98 would not permit them to roll back full 
freedom of association, and denunciation was inconceivable, even if the domestic 
political situation, and the strength of the socialist vote, had allowed it - the 
United Kingdom could not be seen to renege on treaty obligations, even lawfully. 
The Tories had been forced to acknowledge the value of trade unions to a liberal 
democracy. To have denied workers full freedom of association, or to have 
attempted to dismantle the welfare state at a time when the Soviet Union was 
making great strides in science and in living standards, would have made 
Communism, the indisputable bête noir of the ruling classes, still more attractive, 
as well as driving many of those who might otherwise have voted Conservative to 
support the Labour Party. It was arguably by compromising with socialism that 
the Tories were able to remain in power for the following 13 years, and the seal 
was set on the post war consensus when the Macmillan government in 1962 
signed the European Social Charter further binding subsequent governments to 
protecting and promoting the right of workers to bargain collectively.179 
                                                                                                                                                       
after 1945, mechanisms by which employers were able to ensure that they were not subject to compulsory Wages 
Council minima. 
178 An excellent overview of this period is given in A Campbell, N Fishman and J McIlroy ‘The Post – War 
Compromise: Mapping Industrial Politics, 1945-64’ in the book they edited, The Post War Compromise: British 
Trade Unions and Industrial Politics 1945-64.(Monmouth, Merlin Press, 1999). They argue that during 1945-51: 
‘Measured against the economic background, Labour’s achievements were major and enduring’ (p75). 
179 See Chapter Three, ‘The Search for Conciliation 1945-1964’ in P. Dorey, The Conservative Party and the Trade 
Unions (London, Routledge, 1995). 
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In 1945 there had been an estimated 7.9 million trade union members, 9.3 million 
in 1950, 9.8 million in 1960, 10.1 million in 1966, and 11.2 million in 1970.180 
The failed compromise 
Despite the increasing numbers of union members, by the mid 1960s voluntarism 
was perceived to be faltering, and a fresh crisis loomed. Both the major political 
parties acknowledged that a new adjustment required. 
 Very high levels of unofficial industrial action were perceived of as fuelling wage 
inflation. The first statutory individual rights had been introduced to rein in the 
incidence of strike action;181 in 1963 the Contracts of Employment Act introduced 
the right to statement of the written particulars of employment, and to notice 
prior to dismissal, and the Redundancies Act 1965 introduced statutory payments 
to soften the blow of a termination. 
Productivity and growth were considered to be poor in comparison with states 
like Germany, Japan and the USA. Whether this amounted to a financial crisis is 
debatable, although at the time that is how it was perceived by the politicians. In 
the introduction to the Tory industrial relations policy document, Fair Deal at 
Work, published in April 1968 Edward Heath cited ‘the difficulty of reconciling the 
concepts of full employment and free collective bargaining, the menace of rising 
prices and the inflationary scramble that ensues,’ as the barriers to what he 
described as ‘economic breakthrough.’ 182Fair Deal at Work was effectively a 
rejection of voluntarism, and although it was by no means a rejection of the post 
war compromise - the Tories remained committed to the promotion of collective 
bargaining - the report claimed that it advocated ‘not a “trade union policy,” but a 
new approach to industrial relations as a whole.’183 
                                               
180 Estimates drawn variously from Price and Gain, ‘Union Growth Revisited: 1948-1974 in Perspective’ British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, vol XIV (3) November 1976,, the Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions 
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181 See, for example, ATaylor, ‘The Conservative Party and the Trade Unions,’ p152 in McIlroy, Fishman, and 
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At the same time the courts were once again on the offensive. The judiciary had 
abandoned the largely non interventionist stance evinced in the landmark Court 
of Appeal case Thomson v Deakin [1952],184and labour injunctions were being 
increasingly granted by the courts.185 In Rookes v Barnard [1964], Stratford V 
Lindley [1965], and Torquay Hotels v Cousins [1969],186 the higher courts had 
confected fresh tortious liability, ‘side stepping’ the statutory immunities, 
permitting the judges to grant the employers injunctions to halt official industrial 
action which would previously have been seen as lawful. Although the Wilson 
Government had passed the Trade Disputes Act 1965 to extend the immunities to 
cover the new tort of threatening to take industrial action identified in Rookes 
and Stratford, Denning in Torquay Hotels had held that there had been tortious 
‘interference in a commercial contract’, and had upheld an injunction to halt 
action which would not have breached that contract. Further legislation was 
required.187 
 During the same period a Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations, better known as the Donovan Committee, had been gathering 
evidence on the problems of post war industrial relations and on possible 
solutions. The Donovan Report was published in June 1968,188 two months after 
Fair Deal at Work. The Labour government published its response to Donovan, 
the white paper In Place of Strife, in January 1969.189 The three documents had 
much in common. 
However, it was for the Labour Government to adjust the post war compromise, 
and in its 1969 Industrial Relations Bill it attempted to introduce the more 
structured, interventionist industrial relations system proposed in the White 
Paper, with compulsory recognition, registration and strike procedures overseen 
                                               
184 See chapter three 
185Wedderburn saw the judiciary as having ‘applied the common law in a spirit of ‘non intervention’ from the early 
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by a tri-partite Industrial Board, advised by a Commission on Industrial Relations. 
The Commission would also advise workers, trade unions and employers and 
oversee conciliation talks. Unofficial strike leaders were to be liable in some 
circumstances to fines, and ‘cooling off’ periods could be imposed withdrawing 
the immunities for up to 28 days when strikes likely to be injurious to the national 
interest had been called in breach of procedure or without giving a reasonable 
opportunity for conciliation. In some circumstances unions would be required to 
ballot members for any subsequent action to be lawful. 
 The proposals were, however, rejected by the unions; the political and industrial 
wings of the labour movement had clashed, and the politicians had backed down. 
The Bill was abandoned in June 1969. 
 A year later Labour were defeated at the polls, and the new Tory Government 
took up the cudgel of industrial relations reform. Under the premiership of 
Edward Heath the Tories implemented much of what had been aired in Fair Deal 
at Work as the Industrial Relations Act 1971. 
Although the received wisdom is that the 1971 Act was a legislative disaster,190 
much of it was compatible with the Donovan recommendations, and with 
Labour’s abortive Industrial Relations Bill. There was arguably a lot in the Act to 
commend. 
 
Voluntarism was supplanted by collective legal rights, by rights that could be 
relied upon by employers and trade unions, and by a right of the individual 
worker not to be unfairly dismissed, which included a right not to be dismissed on 
grounds of membership or non membership of a trade union, the first legal 
protection for members. This, of course, made strict closed shops – subject to 
certain very restricted exceptions - unworkable, although agency shop 
agreements delivering very high levels of membership were expressly permitted 
by the Act. 
 
Collective agreements were presumed to be enforceable, and the legal status of 
unions changed to permit them to sue and be sued in both tort and contract. A 
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specialist labour court, the National Industrial Relations Court was established to 
handle labour injunctions and complaints brought by employers and trade unions 
about the use of ‘Unfair Industrial Practices,’ where the disputes were considered 
to be of national significance, with provincial Industrial Courts handling the more 
parochial or easily determined cases. The NIRC also heard appeals from the 
Industrial Courts and from the Industrial Tribunals which handled individual 
claims for redundancy payments and claims brought to enforce the newly created 
right not to be unfairly dismissed.191 
 
The Tories had contemplated reintroducing Order 1376 (which with the change in 
legal status would have meant unions were as bound as the employers had been 
by arbitration rulings during 1951- 1958),192 but had instead given the Minister of 
Employment the power to establish a Board of Inquiry in disputes of national 
importance. Acting on the findings of the Board the Minister then had the option 
of referring the dispute to the NIRC for arbitration. While the ruling would not be 
compulsory, if it was not accepted, then, following applications by the Minister, 
and an Order from the court, the union could be required to respect a 60 day 
‘cooling off’ period when industrial action deemed to have the potential to 
endanger the national interest was stayed, to allow a ballot of the members.  
 
Wedderburn saw these measures as having been included in defiance of Donovan 
in order to pander to ‘middle class opinion,’193and he was more dismissive still of 
what he regarded as the clumsy application of ‘doctrines of individual rights, 
often without regard to the shop floor problems of collective bargaining…found 
throughout the statute.’  
 
Agency shops could be overturned following the demand of one employee for a 
ballot,194 but the very fact of the agency or union shop offended him - the ‘ 
agency shop is not a compromise solution; it is a victory for the individual over the 
majority since it takes for granted as paramount the right to disassociate.’195 
 
                                               
191 See RW Rideout’s contemporaneous overview, ‘The Industrial Relations Act 1971,’ (1971) 34 The Modern Law 
Review 655. 
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Section 65 conferred on the individual the right to challenge a refusal of trade 
union membership, and any allegedly ‘unfair or unreasonable’ disciplinary action, 
as ‘unfair industrial practices.’ Section 5 gave the individual worker right not to be 
obliged to join a union. Wedderburn saw s.5 as a manifestation of ‘extreme 
individualism’ aimed at limiting ‘the countervailing power of organised 
workpeople,’196and compared the protection for non-unionists, and the 
prohibition of secondary action with the position in US ‘right to work states.”197 
 
A recognition procedure, overseen by the Commission on Industrial Relations 
Commission(established by the Wilson Government in 1969), permitted 
applications for recognition to be made by ‘groups of employees’ to the Ministry, 
which could then make an application to the Industrial Court. If the application 
was referred to the Commission by the court, and the Commission was satisfied 
that “recognition as sole bargaining agent for that bargaining unit would be in 
accordance with the general wishes of the employees, ”then the CIR would 
recommend that the Industrial Court make an order defining the bargaining unit 
and “specifying the employer or employers and the trade union or joint 
negotiating panel,” as well as the matters to be the subject of collective 
negotiation, and the duration of the order. A ballot to determine majority support 
could be requested by the court or the Commission should either the employer or 
the grouping of workers make an application for such a ballot following a 
recommendation.198 
 
Strongly influenced by the US approach, particularly in relation to ‘unfair 
industrial practices,’ but also tempered by the collectivist German and 
Scandinavian mechanisms, the new regime brought the UK closer to more formal, 
structured, north European models.199 Of course, the UK joined the EEC on 1st 
January 1973. 
 
In political terms the Act was a massive miscalculation. The Tories had arguably 
restricted freedom of association far more than had been necessary to impose its 
new bargaining structure, and  crucially, while it had conceded some points as the 
Bill made its way through Parliament, principally in response to the 
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representations of employers, it had resolutely refused to compromise with the 
labour movement.200  
 
The Act came into force in two stages, and after February 1972 there was no 
longer near ‘blanket’ immunity in tort for trade unions, and no immunity for 
secondary action, or for unofficial strike action. The 1906 Act had been repealed. 
Only unions which had their financial and democratic probity investigated and 
approved by the Chief Registrar could be registered as a union and enjoy 
immunity within the now narrower bounds of what could be defined as a trade 
dispute.  
 
There had been widespread protests against the Bill, and after the Act had been 
passed there were protest strikes, and a campaign of non-co-operation instigated 
at the TUC by the Associated Union of Engineering Workers served to undermine 
the new regime.  Faced with open defiance the judiciary, and the government, 
backed down. 
 
The dramatic events of 1972-3 are detailed in Michael Moran’s 1977 book on the 
1971 Act The Politics of Industrial Relations. Moran argued that if only the 
Government had consulted with the unions over the Act, had engaged at least to 
some extent in the by then customary ‘negotiation and compromise’ then 
 
‘the final Act would still have been denounced by the TUC, but there is 
good reason to suppose that after the initial protests it would have become 
an accepted part of the industrial relations scene.’ 201 
 
I would argue that the crucial matter was the withdrawal of immunity for 
secondary or sympathy action. Solidarity is the very essence of trade unionism; 
secondary action is crucial to trade union recognition, and to the promotion of 
collective bargaining, and statutory recognition procedures (although the 
untested 1971 procedures were arguably vastly superior to New Labour’s 1999 
procedures) are not an effective substitute for the threat of sympathy action. Had 
the Tories made a show of consulting with the unions, and subsequently 
amended the Bill to permit secondary action, then very likely there would have 
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been no 1974 election. There would have been an end to voluntarism. Industrial 
relations in the UK would have entered a new era, a fresh compromise having 
been reached. In retrospect the Heath government had arguably largely proffered 
an acceptable compromise between the collective and the individual interest. 
 
Moran was puzzled by the Government’s uncompromising attitude, and by its 
insistence on sticking so closely to a two and a half year old policy document 
despite opposition from both the CBI and the TUC – ‘a totally un-Tory aberration,’ 
wholly at odds with its post war pragmatism.202 However, he did detect the 
influence of what he called ‘market liberalism’ on the party, and indeed, this can 
arguably be seen as the first tilt at the trade unions by the neoliberals in the Tory 
party. 
 
 Two of the principal architects of both Fair Deal at Work and the Bill were 
Geoffrey Howe, and Keith Joseph. A third, Robert Carr, took over as Tory 
employment spokesman from Joseph in 1967, and was Secretary of State for 
Employment during 1970-1972. Carr was very far from a ‘One Nation’ Tory. In 
1972 he was appointed Home Secretary, and he oversaw the infamous 
prosecution of the Shrewsbury pickets, when, in the last case in which workers 
engaged in a trade dispute were convicted of  criminal conspiracy, 23 building 
workers were convicted of affray, unlawful assembly and conspiracy to 
intimidate. Taking advantage of a drafting mistake in section seven of the 
Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875, the judge sentenced Eric ‘Ricky’ 
Tomlinson to two years imprisonment, and Des Warren to three years, merely for 
visiting various building sites in the company of the police to peacefully persuade 
workers to withdraw their labour.203 
 
It fell to the Labour Party to respond to the debacle of 1972 – 1973, and after the 
Tories had narrowly lost the February 1974 election, and had been unable to form 
a Government, voluntarism was restored by the minority Labour administration’s 
Trade Union and Labour Relations Act of 1974.  
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 Moran 1977,  op cit, p89. 
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The interventionist polices proposed in In Place of Strife had been abandoned, 
and replaced with the so called ‘Social Contract,’ essentially the agreement that 
the two sides of labour movement had arrived at in June 1969. The Government, 
in return for the ‘solemn and binding’ pledge made by the unions to tackle 
unofficial industrial action and for support for the Government’s prices and 
incomes policy, forbear from legislative  intrusions into industrial relations other 
than to expand and consolidate trade union power.204 
 After the Government had secured a narrow working majority in the October 
1974 election, it passed the Employment Protection Act 1975, which introduced a 
raft of individual rights, a floor on which the unions could build, a handful of 
individual rights intended to promote and facilitate collective bargaining,205 and a 
number of collective rights intended to do the same, notably by requiring 
employers to provide information on their policies and the aims of those policies, 
to make negotiation less blindly adversarial.  
The consultation requirements of the Collective Redundancies Directive 1975,206 
and fresh recognition procedures augmented the individual provisions of the Act, 
and the following year the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1976 the swing 
back towards collectivism continued when ‘closed shop’ provisions were 
tightened to permit the imposition of UMAs which did not permit political 
conscientious objectors to ‘opt out.’ 207The right for workers not to be dismissed 
on grounds of trade union membership was not ‘balanced’ by a right not to be 
dismissed for non membership, and this, incidentally, resulted in the amendment 
by British Rail of its UMA, the dismissals of the closed shop martyrs, Young, James 
and Webster,208 and the beginning of the case which helped usher in the new age 
of individualism which was to dawn just three years later. 
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The Labour government was also instrumental in improving equality protections, 
albeit by making the existing approach to the exercise of the new rights more 
individualistic. The Race Relations Act 1968 had prohibited racial discrimination in 
the workplace, but cases were handled by not by industrial tribunals,209 but heard 
‘where appropriate, by suitable industrial machinery approved by the Secretary of 
State for Employment,’210 usually in the workplace. Conciliation and 
recommendation, rather than compensation, were the aims of these quasi judicial 
interventions, which depended to a considerable extent on the participation of 
trade unions. While there is a dearth of information on these workplace 
outcomes, it is notable that cases that had not been handled with ‘collective 
input,’ having been referred back to the Race Relations Board by the Secretary of 
State due to an absence of ‘suitable voluntary machinery,’ rarely resulted in a 
finding of unlawful discrimination.211 It is notable too that many of the problems 
of the post 1968 regime were said by Anthony Lester and Geoffery Bindman 
(writing in 1972), to be ‘inherent in a system of enforcement which depends so 
heavily upon the making of individual complaints.’212  
 
By the mid 1970s, the post 1968 procedures had become ‘commonly regarded as 
wholly inadequate’ and inappropriate for use in tackling sex discrimination:213 ‘In 
view of the inadequacy of the enforcement procedures under the [1968] Race 
Relations Act it is neither surprising nor inappropriate that the Sex Discrimination 
Act should adopt a radically different approach to enforcement.’214  
A White Paper on racial discrimination was published in September 1975,215 
presenting evidence that ‘despite the Race Relations Acts, substantial 
discrimination continues to occur at work.’ The government proposed that cases 
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of discrimination on the grounds of race, nationality and colour, be brought by 
the individual and heard at tribunal,216 and subsequently industrial tribunals 
became the forum both for complaints relating to racial and sexual discrimination 
in the workplace.  
After the new RRA had been passed it was noted that it had been ‘framed where 
possible in the same manner’ as the SDA,217 with new provisions to deal with the 
particular difficulties of proof, so that:218  
  
‘The onus will be on the individual claimant to establish the prime facts of 
discrimination and to pursue a complaint of discrimination to an industrial 
tribunal.’219 
 
With it by now necessary to implement the Equal Pay Directive of 1975, and with 
the Equal Treatment Directive of 1976 then in the process of being finalised, it 
was argued that ‘it is insufficient for the law to deal with only overt 
discrimination. It should also prohibit practices which are fair in a formal sense 
but discriminatory in their operation and effect.’220 Thus the concept of indirect 
discrimination,221along with the power for tribunals to award compensation for 
injury to feelings, were implemented into both the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 
and the Race Relations Act 1976. 
The Abandonment of the Post War Compromise 
When the Tories returned to office in 1979, this time led by Margaret Thatcher,222 
with Howe and Joseph arguably her closest and most influential allies in cabinet, 
they adopted a ‘step by step,’ war of attrition on freedom of association. As was 
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the case with the Heath government there was no consultation with the trade 
unions, but Thatcher’s New Tories were more cautious – and far more radical.223 
The theories of FA Hayek’s Mont Pelerin Society, ‘neoliberal’ economists who 
regarded themselves as the heirs of the classical liberal economists of the 18th and 
19th Centuries, had started to take root in the UK with the founding in 1955 of the 
Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA). Hayek and his colleagues, like Dicey, 
championed the cause of the individual over the collective. Contrary to the 
Keynesian theories which delivered so much for Europe in the immediate post 
war years, they believed that an absence of state economic intervention, state 
ownership, and undistorted free markets, unaffected by the influence of trade 
unions - which they saw only as groupings of individual ‘economic actors’ 
privileged by immunities not extended to others - would deliver prosperity.224  
 
As the post war compromise appeared to falter in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
various right wing think tanks and pressure groups took the opportunity to lobby 
and convert political leaders receptive to neoliberal ideas,225 and a number of 
Tory MPs, informally known as the ‘Selsdon Group,’ took an interest.226 A pivotal 
event was the establishment in 1974 of The Centre for Policy Studies by Keith 
Joseph, and Alfred Sherman in the wake of the February 1974 election. The CPS 
was the result of Joseph’s conversion to Hayekian theory when he had worked 
with the Institute of Economic Affairs in the early 1970s – one of the names 
considered for the new ‘think tank’ was the ‘Hayek Foundation.’227 The CPS cost 
around £150,000 a year to run (the equivalent of £1.5 million today), money 
provided by ‘private donors.’ 228 Joseph appointed Margaret Thatcher vice chair of 
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Order? (London, Zed Books, 2013).Miller lists the Economic League; Aims of Industry; the Institute for the Study of 
Conflict; the Freedom Association, the Adam Smith Institute and the Social Affairs Unit as among the organisations 
responsible for promoting neoliberal policies in the UK during the 1960s and 1970s.  
226 See Dorey 1995, op cit, p103. 
227
 Margaret Thatcher Foundation, ‘Thatcher, Hayek and Friedman’, 
www.margeretthatcherfoundation.org/archive/Hayel.asp 
228
 See Brendan Montague, ‘How the Neoliberal Dream became the Reality of Thatcherism’ www.desmog.co.uk, 
2014. Montague suggests that the big tobacco companies made substantial contributions. 
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the CPS, and it was in that role that she ‘renewed’ her reading of Hayek,229 was 
introduced to the leading lights of the IEA, and was ‘converted’ to monetarism.230 
However, the anonymous author of the well informed, if uncritical, Thatcher, 
Hayek and Friedman to be found in the Margaret Thatcher Foundation archive 
holds that she ‘was not in plain fact a Hayekian, and certainly never a slavish 
follower of any thinker.’231 But, as Stuart Hall has put it, ‘[n]eoliberalism is not one 
thing. It evolves and diversifies.’232 The new cult was Thatcherism, and the 
question she asked of those around her was whether or not they were ‘one of us’ 
– whether or not they were ‘a believer.’233 
 
 In the UK I would argue that Thatcherism initially had the features both of a 
theoretical project, of the imposition an ideology, as well as those of a scheme to 
restore the fortunes of the ruling classes. Keith Joseph was, for example, 
unquestionably an ideologue, while few would dispute that it is unlikely that 
many of the very wealthy private donors who supported (and continue to 
support) the CPS will have been motivated by ideological considerations. 
 
David Harvey in A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 234cites the data based analysis of 
Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy and their conclusion that “neoliberalism was 
from the very beginning a project to achieve the restoration of class 
power.”235However, of the British experience Harvey writes that ‘the whole 
programme, particularly in her [Thatcher’s] first administration was far more 
ideologically driven (thanks to Keith Joseph) than was ever the case in the US.’236 
 
                                               
229 Hugo Young, in One of Us: A Biography of Margaret Thatcher, (London, Macmillan,1989), noted that Sherman 
was of the opinion that Thatcher had not read any Hayek before 1974 (p22 Pan edition, 1990). 
230
 See Margaret Thatcher Foundation, ‘Thatcher, Hayek and Friedman’, 
www.margeretthatcherfoundation.org/archive/Hayel.asp  
231
 Ibid 
232
 p16, ‘The Neoliberal Revolution’ in Sally Davison and Katherine Harris (Eds) The Neo-Liberal Crisis, (London, 
Lawrence and Wishart, 2015). Hall argued that ‘neoliberalism’s principal target in the UK has been the reformist 
social democratic welfare state.’ However the unions had to be dealt with first. 
233 Hence the title of Hugo Young’s biography. 
234 (Oxford, OUP,2005). 
235 Harvey 2005, op cit, p16. Duménil and Lévy, Capital Resurgent: Roots of the Neoliberal Revolution [trans. D 
Jeffers] (Cambridge Mass, Harvard University Press 2004). To back the argument that neoliberalism can best be 
characterised as the restoration of the power and money lost by the ruling classes Harvey also cites: ‘The 
Economics of US Imperialism at the Turn of the 21st Century,’(2004)11 Review of International Political Economy 
657; ‘Neoliberal Dynamics, Towards a New Phase?’ in K van der Pijl, L Assassi and D Wigans (eds), Global 
regulation: Managing Crises after the Imperial Turn (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) 41-63; and ‘Neoliberal 
Income Trends: Wealth, Class and Ownership in the USA’ (2004) 30 New Left Review 105.   
236 Harvey 2005, op cit, p62 
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 German economist Wolfgang Streeck argues that neoliberalism was one of the 
means by which the crisis of capitalism of the late ‘60s and 1970s, as economic 
growth slowed, was ‘kicked down the road,’ with the capital accumulation model 
of the post war era artificially and temporarily revived by privatisation and 
deregulation.237 However, Streeck also endorses Tali Kristal’s view of  
neoliberalism as ‘an attempt to restore the capitalist class’s share of income to its 
pre World War Two levels,’238 through, among other means, the ‘erosion of rights 
to job security, the division of labour markets into core and periphery areas with 
different degrees of protection, the authorisation of low pay employment, the 
acceptance of high structural unemployment, the privatisation of public services 
and a cutback of public employment, and if possible the elimination of trade 
unions from the wage formation process.”239  
 
Early proposals for Thatcher’s industrial relations policy, and neoliberal thought 
on the role of the unions and on collective bargaining, were revealed in Norman 
Strauss and John Hoskyns’  ‘Stepping Stones’ briefing presented to the Tory leader 
in November 1977.240 Strauss was a marketing expert who had worked at 
Unilever, and Hoskyns was a multi-millionaire described by Hugo Young as ‘an 
archetypal Thatcherite,’ whose own ideas ‘gave great prominence to an assault 
on trade union power.’ Apparently Hoskyns had volunteered his services to 
Joseph to ‘gather the multiple strands of political thinking and weld them 
together into a coherent plan of action.’ Thatcher was said to have been 
‘tremendously excited by what she read…it put into words many of the 
subterranean impulses of hard-right Conservatism…’241 It was arguably no less 
than the blueprint for British neoliberalism imposed during 1979-1997. 
 
The paper makes it apparent that Thatcher’s inner circle were planning to 
expedite the shift in the UK economy from manufacturing to the provision of 
services,242 and were considering the implementation of a raft of complementary 
                                               
237 Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism, London & New York, 2014.  
238 T Kristal, ‘Good Times, Bad Times: Postwar Labor’s Share’ (2010) 75 American Sociological Review 729. Streek 
cites Kristal in his explanation of a chart showing the ‘Evolution of income inequality: Gini coefficients, seven 
countries,’ between 1985 and 2005. The Gini coefficient indicates the degree to which income distribution is 
unequal, and the UK and USA are seen to lead the field, followed by Italy, France, Japan, and Germany, with 
Sweden having the least inequality (Streeck [ibid]p30, note 55 and figure I.3). 
239 Streeck, ibid, p29 
240
 Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive, THCR 2/6/1/248. 
241 Young, 1989, op cit, p113-115 
242 A Hayekian ambition, knowledge of which, and support for, like much else in the document (including the 
perception of free collective bargaining as a bad thing), the authors assume. The UK economy had been shifting 
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‘standard’ neoliberal policies, including a privatisation programme, substantial 
cuts in government spending, income and corporation tax, and increased indirect 
taxation. The authors’ primary concern, however, was the perceived need to 
bring about ‘a radical change in the union movement’s political and economic 
role.’243 It was not merely that it was understood that the trade unions would 
oppose the imposition of these policies. These ‘New Tories’ not only did not share 
the views of their post war Conservative forebears that collective bargaining was 
an essential element in a liberal democracy, the paper makes it very clear that 
Thatcher’s inner circle had long believed that ‘collective bargaining is totally 
destructive.’244  
 
British trade unionism was antithetical to Thatcherite neoliberalism,245 and the 
economic obstacles presented by collectivised labour were overlaid by the 
political obstacles presented by the close relationship of the Labour Party and the 
trade unions. The Tories had, of course, first to persuade ‘floating voters’, and 
voters who habitually voted Labour, particularly trade union members, to support 
Tory policies,246 in order to get them into office with an overall majority. 
Thereafter they had to dissuade trade unionists from taking significant industrial 
action against their neoliberal policies and Strauss and Hoskyns recognised that 
‘neoliberalism would have to fundamentally restructure the collective subjectivity 
of the trade union movement.’247 
 
The ‘crushing’ of the unions was not, however, considered.248 Instead they argued 
that ‘somehow the trades union role must be changed to one of positive 
partnership,’249 through a ‘union behaviour change strategy.’250 The union 
                                                                                                                                                       
from a manufacturing ‘base’ towards services since 1955 (see Chris Howell, Trade Unions and the State: The 
Construction of Industrial Relations Institutions in Britain 1890-2000 (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2005, 
pp96-7 & 138). 
243 Section 2.3 
244 Section 6.2.2 ‘ in the long run.’ 
245   See Robert Knox ‘Law, neoliberalism and the constitution of political subjectivity: The case of organised 
labour’ in Honor Brabazon, Neoliberal Legality, Understanding the Role of Law in the Neoliberal Project (Abingdon, 
Routledge, 2017): ‘…the unions represented a form of organization intrinsically opposed to neoliberalism’ (p105). 
 
246 Although it was not mentioned in the paper, opinion polls in during the Heath government had indicated that 
numbers of trade union members supported proposals to rein in trade union power (see Moran 1977, op cit, p 
154-5). 
247
 Knox 2017, op cit, p.102. 
248 This may well have been due to their evident ignorance of what trade unions do, and of trade union law, rather 
than a belief that such a step would be politically impossible – or any concern for civil liberties. 
249 Section 4.3.1 
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leadership was to be discredited in the eyes of members to change the climate of 
opinion,251 and members were to be persuaded to abandon their class loyalty to 
the labour movement.252 The ‘special link’ between the unions, the Labour Party 
and working class voters had both to be exploited for electoral gain and 
subsequently broken.253 Members were to be encouraged to ‘use their votes to 
tell their leaders to read up their economics and stick to their job of looking after 
their members interests. If they want to go into politics let them stand as Labour 
or Communist Party candidates.’254 
 
Yet, all this had ‘to be done in such a way that union members in particular have 
their existing values and attitudes modified rather than challenged, and thus 
strengthened.’255  It was stressed that the electorate ‘must be reassured’ that the 
Tories ‘are not ideologues,’256  and that a vote for the Conservatives is not a vote 
for ‘revolution or jungle laissez faire.”257  
 
Tory politicians and their allies in the press used the marketing strategies and 
tactics outlined in their paper to discredit union leaders and question the value of 
membership during from 1977 onwards.258 So called ‘closed shop martyrs,’ the 
furore over the use of secondary ‘boycotting’ action by the printing union SLADE 
to secure new members and persuade employers to sign up to union membership 
agreements, 259  and, in particular, the ‘winter of discontent,’260 provided much 
                                                                                                                                                       
250 See ‘Appendix- The Union Problem.’ Proposals were included for, if necessary, neutralising troublesome union 
leaders by giving them ‘a role in a reformed second chamber, or a guaranteed legislated, non-majority role on the 
board of a company, or a shareholding role for union members, or a controlling role in a local authority etc. 
Alternatively we can bring union leaders into a reformed House of Commons. They are, after all, some of the very 
few leaders of today that have had industrial experience...There will be no loss of face involved on either side.’ 
251 See ‘Appendix- The Union Problem.’ 
252
 See Section 4.2.3.2 and Section 6.2. ‘Drag every skeleton out of the union cupboard’ (Section 4.2) 
253 Section 6.2 and ‘Appendix- The Union Problem.’ 
254 Section 6.2.2. Knox, 2017, op cit: ‘As Marxists have noted, one of capitalisms defining tendencies is the formal 
separation between politics and economics’ (p.101). 
255 Section 6.2.3 
256 Section 6.2.2 
257 Section 6.2.3. The paragraph finishes ‘...simply to overcome an entrenched apparatus which has resolutely 
refused to allow Britain to follow the policies which have been so enormously successful in other countries. (This 
could be linked too, to the real significance of the Left wing efforts to keep the country out of the Common 
Market, out of the capitalists’ club).’ 
258 Section 4.3 to the conclusion (section 6.5) are essentially about the Tory ‘communication strategy.’ 
259
 On SLADE, see chapter five. 
260
 Given this early use of ‘spin’ and marketing techniques it is strikig that in retrospect the events of 1978-79 have 
been seen by some to have been exaggerated by politicians and the media– see Dave Lyddon ‘Striking Facts about 
the “Winter of Discontent”’ (2015) 36 Historical Studies in Industrial Relations 205. 
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useful material for Tory propagandists to use against the unions and the Labour 
party.  
 
Strauss and Hoskyns had argued that the Tories should fight the election on the 
specific mandate of ‘root and branch’ trade union reform. However, in the 1979 
Tory manifesto, Mrs. Thatcher (in the introduction) claimed that their policies 
were ‘based not on dogma,’ and no so such bold declaration was made. Instead, 
picketing was to be restricted to the worker’s own place of work,261and  the 
imposition of closed shop union membership agreements were to require a ballot 
and the sanction of ‘an overwhelming majority of the workers involved.’ Arbitrary 
exclusion or expulsion from a union was to become challengeable at tribunal, 
with ‘ample compensation’ given those who refuse to join a union and lose their 
job as a consequence. However, careful reading reveals the admission that the 
Tories might be obliged to make further adjustments, an ‘immediate review’ of 
the statutory immunities,262 along with ‘an enquiry into the activities of the SLADE 
union,’ were promised, and significantly the Tories stated that: ‘Labour claim that 
industrial relations cannot be improved by changing the law. We disagree.’263 
 
In the event, class loyalties to trade unionism and to the Labour Party were 
arguably most effectively challenged by changing the law.  The restrictions on the 
freedom to take industrial action, and the consequent restriction of the 
representative and regulatory roles of trade unions,264 imposed neoliberal 
‘rationality’ on individuals and collectivised labour, ‘reconstituting the political 
                                               
261 Although it is notable that in the Miners’ Strike the police (they had benefited from pay rises of up to 45% in 
May 1979) and the magistrates invoked the criminal law to prevent and stop secondary picketing which was 
prohibited only by civil law (see Bogg, Ewing and Moretta in Bogg, Collins Freedland & Herring (eds), 2019 op cit.). 
262
 Which resulted in the January 1981 Green paper Trade Union Immunities (Cmnd. 8128) presented to Parliament 
by James Prior, a paper to be noted for its eminently reasonable, almost disinterested approach. At one point it 
recalls that is has been suggested that the then present regime was over complex and as a consequence provided 
too much scope for judicial intervention (para 100), and one chapter airs proposals for ‘An Alternative System of 
Positive Rights.’ 
263 1979 Conservative Party Manifesto. See Knox 2017, op cit, pp109-114 on the effectiveness of changing the law 
to shape political subjectivity. 
264 See Knox 2017, op cit, pp100-101.  See also KD Ewing ‘The Function of Trade Unions’ (2005) 34 ILJ 1. Ewing 
identified  service and individual workplace representative functions (which are broadly compatible with at least 
New Labour’s particular brand of neoliberalism). The functions Ewing identified which are essentially incompatible 
with British neoliberalism are the collective representation function – collective bargaining in the workplace – and 
regulatory function, sectoral collective bargaining, and governmental and public administration regulatory 
functions, promoting the economic and social interests of members, and, incidentally, the interests of the 
members’ social classes. The freedom for unions to exercise these functions were, of course, drastically curtailed 
during 1979-93. 
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subjectivity of organised labour into a form that was compliant with 
neoliberalism.’265 
 
 Membership became much less attractive when unions were less able to provide 
effective employment protection that they had previously, and the ‘symbiotic’ 
relationship between the Labour Party and the unions was disrupted by both the 
propaganda campaign and by restrictions on freedom of association. 266 The 
Labour Party and the trade unions were distanced from each other, upsetting that 
symbiosis and weakening both.  
 
 With union power very much reduced the concept of the Labour Party as the 
political wing of the labour movement was supplanted by that of a New Labour 
party with neoliberal policies which were not overtly hostile to organised labour, 
with a more distant relationship with the trade unions. Although New Labour 
continued to receive funding from the trade union movement the party could no 
longer rely on industrial muscle for support, and, in turn, the unions could only 
depend on New Labour to maintain the post Thatcherite status quo. Thus unions 
became ‘Hayekian subjects.’267  Strauss and Hoskyns had told Thatcher that the 
‘trades union role must be changed to one of positive partnership,’268 and that 
phrase, redolent as it is of New Labour, is perhaps one that Blair and Brown might 
themselves have chosen to characterise the relationship of their party with the 
unions. 
 
An incremental approach to legislating had arguably been a necessity. The 
announcement of the intention to mount a concerted attack on trade unionism in 
the 1979 manifesto, or an immediate ‘one hit’ clamp down on freedom of 
association in 1980 would have reinforced class loyalty and resistance.269 As Knox 
put it, history had shown that a general ban on trade union activity had 
encouraged radical trade unionism, while ‘carving out a sphere of ‘legitimate’ 
                                               
265 Knox 2017, op cit, p94 
266 ‘Symbiotic’ is Knox’s term -‘the Labour Party enabled collective bargaining to take place, and in exchange 
received funding, party activists and was – to some degree – able to rely on industrial support for its policies. 
Accordingly the political balance was a delicate one, with neither definitively having the upper hand’ (ibid, p101). 
267 Ibid, p107. 
268 See above. 
269 Very many Tories, including Thatcher were unhappy with the 1980 Employment Act (and with Prior), 
considering it to be too weak (see Dorey, 1995, op cit, pp158-164). 
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economic-corporate union activity has been much more effective at blunting the 
collective subjectivity represented by trade unions in the neoliberal period.’270 
 
But it was slow, incremental process, arguably helped along to a very 
considerable extent by the Falklands War, as well as by much more minor (but 
perhaps often overstated) factors, like the sale of council houses, and by 
encouraging workers to buy shares in newly privatised public utilities. Prior to the 
Falklands war, Thatcher, according to Alan Clark, who became one of her junior 
ministers of employment, opinion polls ‘showed that she was more unpopular 
than any previous prime minister. Scarcely one person in her cabinet had a good 
word to say of her.’271 However, in the general election held almost a year to the 
day after Port Stanley had been recaptured, the ideological battle with floating 
voters and with those who habitually voted Labour, but might be persuaded to 
vote Tory, had apparently been won.272 The Tories secured a genuine ‘landslide’ 
victory.  
 
While the Tories of 1970 – 1974 had sought an adjustment of the post war 
compromise, Thatcher’s inner circle celebrated the rights of the individual, 
loathed collectivism, and wished to abandon that compromise. They sought, as 
far as was possible, to withdraw the opportunity for workers to bargain 
collectively. Workers were again to be isolated for the purposes of determining 
the terms and conditions of employment. The new Tory approach however, the 
1984 – 85 Miners’ Strike aside, failed to provoke the reaction that the 1971 Act 
had generated. 
The economic theories of Friedman and Hayek provided the philosophical veneer 
of Thatcherism. Macroeconomic policy was based largely on Friedman’s 
monetarist theories, but Hayek, who had been in contact with the upper echelons 
of the Tory party since 1974, was a powerful influence on the Tory attacks on the 
unions. Hayek pressed his case for legislative action against organised labour as a 
first step towards a fundamental transformation of the economy in informal 
                                               
270 Knox 2017, op cit, pp106-7. 
271 A Clark, The Tories, Conservatives and the Nation State 1922-1997 (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998), 
pages 472 and 476. 
272 See Harvey 2005, op cit. pages 79 and 86 on the Falklands War as the turning point in the fortunes of the 
Thatcherites, and p 60-61 on the sale of Council Houses and the Public Utilities. 
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meetings with influential Tories, and in a series of articles and letters in The 
Times, and The Economist. Hayek believed he had identified the statutory 
immunities conferred on the unions by the Trade Disputes Act 1906 as ‘the chief 
source of Britain’s economic decline...That fatal mistake must be undone if Britain 
is to recover. No movement can pull the country out of the mire unless it obtains 
at the elections an explicit mandate to revoke the unique privileges which the 
trade unions have enjoyed too long.’273 
In 1979 Hayek had suggested to Thatcher that a decision to revoke the statutory 
immunities was ‘one of such decisive importance as to justify the now 
constitutional recourse to a referendum.’274 According to Hayek, the unions, with 
their ‘special and unique privileges’275 distorted the market. For the Tories, the 
unions were an obstacle to reform. They were, however - as we have established - 
dealt with on a step by step basis. Whether, however, there was any serious 
planning behind the legislative steps, or whether the Tories simply attacked 
anything that smacked of collectivism when the opportunity arose is open to 
question,276although arguably, looking back on events, the latter view seems the 
more likely.    
The 1975 statutory recognition procedure, and the CAC’s schedule 11 powers to 
impose changes on employment contract (the Employment Protection Act 1975 
had replaced the 1959 Terms and Conditions of Employment Act procedure by 
which an application to the Secretary of State could see the standard collectively 
agreed terms of employment in a sector not covered by a Works Council be 
imposed on an individual employer) were repealed in 1980.277 The first attacks on 
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 The Times 21
st
 July 1977. Hayek wrote a series of letters and articles in the paper emphasising this argument. 
274
 Letter to Thatcher 28
th
 August 1979. ‘Now constitutional’ refers to the 1975 EEC referendum. Hayek MSS 
(Hoover Institution) Box 101(Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive). 
275Ibid,Letter from Hayek to William Rees-Mogg Editor of The Times 14 July 1977. 
276 For example, Peter Dorey in the Conservative Party and the Trade Unions (London, Longman, 1995) argued that 
it was only in hindsight that the Tory attacks on trade unionism were regarded as a ‘coherent strategy meticulously 
prepared and implemented,’ and that, in reality, it was pragmatically ‘developed in a rather ad hoc manner.’ Yet in 
‘Weakening the Trade Unions, One Step at a Time: The Thatcher Governments’ Strategy for the Reform of Trade 
Union Law 1979-1984’ (2016) 37 HSIR 169, he suggests that Thatcher’s inner circle planned a ‘succession of 
statutes, with each new measure widening and deepening the curbs of its predecessor...such an approach would 
avoid the fatal error of the 1971 Industrial Relations Act’ (p174). 
277 See Bercusson 1978, op cit, Chapter 20, ‘The New Fair Wages Policy: Schedule 11 to the Employment Protection 
Act 1975.’ 
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the ‘closed shop’ were made in the Employment Acts of 1980 and 1982, broad 
protection against dismissal for non-membership was restored, with exceptions 
carved out where a ‘union membership agreement’ was in place, but balloting 
requirements with thresholds which made new agreements difficult, if not quite 
impossible to conclude were imposed.278 After the 1982 Act all existing UMAs had 
to been approved by a ballot if for a dismissal for non membership to be upheld 
as fair by a tribunal.279 
The closed shop was essentially attacked by conferring individualistic statutory 
rights on workers to challenge exclusion and expulsion from a union at tribunal, 
(previously such cases had been the provenance of the TUC Independent Review 
Committee),280 and to challenge dismissals for non membership under the terms 
of  improperly imposed UMAs. Subsequently solidarity was further undermined 
by more individualistic rights not to be ‘unjustly’ disciplined, or excluded or 
expelled from a union,281 the coup de grace being administered to the post entry 
closed shop by conferring the right for workers not to be dismissed under any 
circumstances for non membership of a trade union.282 Individual rights have 
always been treated with some suspicion by trade unionists as instruments with 
the potential to usurp unions, (a matter related to, but separate from, the 
‘traditional’ wariness of judicial interference in industrial relations), but 
individualistic employment rights are arguably invariably antithetical to the 
collective interest.  We saw, for example, Wedderburn’s hostility to the 
                                               
278 See chapter 8, ‘The Closed Shop in 1980s: Conclusions and Prospects’ in  S Dunn and J Gennard, The Closed Shop 
in British Industry (London, Macmillan, 1984). 
279
Any dismissal made for non membership which might previously have been potentially fair as made under a 
valid UMA would be automatically unfair if the UMA had not been approved by a ballot within 5 years of the 
dismissal. 
280 A change which can in itself be seen as an instance of individual legal rights undermining organised labour. 
Arbitrary expulsions could be challenged via the common law, alleging a breach of the union’s rules or a breach of 
the principles of natural justice (see P Elias and KD Ewing Trade Union Democracy; Members’ Rights and the Law 
(London, Mansell, 1987), chapters four and six), but until the statutory right to tribunal claim was conferred 
workers were understandably rarely inclined to litigate over such matters. Excluded workers had more of a 
problem than expelled workers because membership is seen by the law as a privilege rather than a right, and non 
members can seldom be said to have a contractual relationship with the union. However, theoretically at least, 
tortious remedies are available at common law, and cases like Nagle v Fielding [1966] 2 QB 633 and Edwards v 
SOGAT [1964] Ch.354, established a limited principle of ‘a right to work’ (ibid, chapter three). 
281 Which became s174 TULR(C)A 1992, subsequently tempered by New Labour following ASLEF V UK[2007] ECHR 
184 when ASLEF expelled a BNP activist : see  KD Ewing, ‘The Implications of the ASLEF Case’ (2007) 36 ILJ 425 and 
KD Ewing, ‘Employment Act 2008: Implementing the ASLEF Decision –A Victory for the BNP?’ (2009) ILJ 50 (see also 
Chapters Three and Five below). 
282 See Chapter Five. 
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individualistic aspects of the Industrial relations act 1971, but we have also seen 
his emphatic endorsement of many raft of individual rights conferred by Wilson’s 
post October 1974 administration in the Employment Protection Act 1975 as ‘a 
floor’ on which collective bargaining would build – these were individual rights, 
statutory rights specifically tailored to support to trade unions. They were not 
individualistic rights.283  
 
Individual rights which do not adequately accommodate collective ‘input’ will 
arguably almost invariably tend to undermine collective bargaining and promote 
the influence of managerial prerogative over the setting of the terms and 
conditions of employment.284 A prime example is the erosion of the collective 
elements of the Equal Pay Act.  In addition to the individual ‘tribunal route,’ 
overtly discriminatory collective agreements could, by s3, be referred to the 
Industrial Court/CAC by unions, employers or the Secretary of State. The result 
was (largely without it being necessary to make such referrals) that there was a 
rapid increase in womens’ wages after the Act came into force in 1975.285 
Unfortunately, in 1979, the CAC’s wings were severely clipped by the High 
Court,286effectively putting an end to its work amending collective agreements.287 
While the Callaghan government would very likely have legislated to restore the 
role of the CAC, there was little chance of the Thatcher government intervening, 
and seven years later, in accord with the seeming Tory policy of ‘scattering’ 
                                               
283 On that distinction see Alan Bogg, ’”Individualism” and “Collectivism” in Collective Labour Law,’ (2017) 46 ILJ 72, 
p77. Bogg effectively points out that individualistic rights need not be wholly antithetical to the collective interest 
–  ‘the right to exit a trade union provides a strong foundation for the trade union to assert its autonomy against 
state regulation.’ He cites Kahn-Freund’s view that the individualism of the common law was, at a time when 
workers enjoyed full freedom of association [Kahn-Freund was writing in 1959], ‘an almost necessary corollary of 
the growing policy of non-intervention...and especially with the operation of 100% union and closed shop 
practices’ (p80 citing Labour Law (London, Stevens & Sons, 1978), p.37). 
284 See LJB Hayes, ‘Women’s Voice’ and Equal Pay: Judicial regard for the Gendering of Collective Bargaining,’ in 
Voices at Work, Bogg and Novitz (eds) Oxford OUP 2014 , p35. See also M O’Sullivan, T Turner, M Kennedy and J 
Wallace, ‘Is Individual Employment Law Displacing the Role of Trade Unions?’ (2015) 44 ILJ 222, which essentially 
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‘[m]ost disputes are handled directly through bilateral negotiations between the union and the employer until the 
dispute reaches the Labour Court as a court of last resort’ (p244). 
285 ‘...more significantly, in fact, than it had done at any other time before; and more significantly than it has done 
since,’ A Mccolgan, Just Wages for Women, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997) p92 (see the table on that page). On 
the importance of the collective mechanism to that process, see pp 108-9. 
286 In R v CAC, ex.p Hy –Mac Ltd, [1979] IRLR 461. See Hayes 2014, op cit, pp 39-40, on the judicial hostility evinced 
at judicial review towards the collective interest when CAC decisions were ‘appealed’ by employers. 
287 McColgan 1997, op cit, pp 110-112. She reports that from 1976-79 the CAC had ruled on around 50 equal pay 
cases, while none at all were heard during 1981-1986, with one last ‘two fingered salute’ made when the CAC 
ruled on its last collective agreement in 1987 shortly before its S3 powers were withdrawn (p111). 
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individual rights with the potential to undermine the collective interest, and, 
wherever possible, withdrawing or restricting collective rights and mechanisms 
which engaged the unions,288 the second Thatcher government repealed the S.3 
referral mechanisms.289  
 
The absence of a collective element to the EPA (the restrictions on freedom of 
association since 1979 had, of course, further limited the ability of the unions to 
impose equality) ultimately had very damaging (if unenvisaged) results for 
workers and for trade unions. The individual rights subsequently became 
individualistic rights serving to further undermine trade unions, with members 
bringing discrimination claims against their own union following collective 
agreement with employers intended to tackle instances of pay inequality, and 
unions themselves increasingly obliged to deal with instances of unequal pay 
through the courts. 290  
 
 While some individualising initiatives, like those introduced to attack the closed 
shop were carefully targeted, others, like the repeal of s3, were arguably akin to a 
spanner randomly thrown into the collective bargaining machinery in the hope of 
causing a malfunction. The rights accorded individual members to call their unions 
to account over various matters by TULRA 1993, were, for example, hostile 
individualising initiatives which proved completely ineffective – ‘spanners’ thrown 
by the Major government which were ejected by the machinery (see chapter 
five).   
 
These tactics can be seen as a discrete element of the broader phenomena, often 
referred to as individualisation, which saw, during 1979-1993, trade unions, 
weakened by the restrictions on freedom of association, increasingly 
                                               
288  Howell, 2005, op cit, comes close to acknowledging this ‘scatttergun’ individualisation policy on p146 when he 
refers to the the Tory practice of applying layers of legislative ‘cement.’ 
289 The repeal of s3 was, of course, initially relatively inconsequential, because referrals had almost ceased (see 
McColgan 1997, op cit, p112).  
290 See Hayes 2014, op cit, pp42-45: Hayes explains that after lawyers had been permitted to use ‘no win no fee’ 
arrangements (arguably a direct consequence of the withdrawal of legal aid one of the pillars of the post 1945 
‘settlement’), they found multiple individual public sector equal pay claims very lucrative. While unions preferred 
to negotiate with employers to resolve instances of unequal pay with an eye to the long term collective gain for 
their members, the lawyers were interested only in securing as much money for themselves, and for the individual 
client, through EPA claims – whatever the consequences. The lawyers occasionally turned their attentions to 
allegedly discriminatory terms in collective agreements reached by the unions, and there was a chaotic clash of 
interests as the individual and collective approaches, and the EPA and sex discrimination law failed to ‘mesh,’ 
leading to trade unions increasingly resorting to equal pay tribunal claims, and to calls for a single equality act. 
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derecognised by employers, permitting supposedly ‘individual’ standard contracts 
to be unilaterally imposed. Even where a union was still purportedly recognised, 
managerial prerogative was largely given way to over matters like recruitment, 
overtime, the delineation of workers’ responsibilities and the introduction of new 
technology with, often at best, negotiation being supplanted by consultation.291  
To return, however, to the particular measures taken by the first Thatcher 
administration, significant early steps in this process were the restriction of lawful 
secondary industrial action to that taken against immediate suppliers or 
customers of the employer party to the dispute (s 17 of the 1980 Act), as the 
definition of a trade dispute was narrowed, and, although perhaps seen more as a 
symbolic rather than practical measure at the time,292the blanket ban on the 
tortious liability of the unions, was again lifted, this time by the Employment Act 
1982.293Questions on the reach of the immunities now went beyond theoretical 
questions of liability raised in cases about applications for injunctions intended to 
restrain union officials. Now, if the immunities did not apply, it was conceivable 
that that an employer could recover damage to compensate for any loss.  
Individual rights were also adjusted to disadvantage the worker. The qualifying 
period for unfair dismissal was increased from six months to one year, and, while 
the burden of proof in unfair dismissal cases was shifted to favour the 
respondent, and the level of awards reduced,294 unlawful dismissals made to 
                                               
291 See Brown, Deakin, Nash, and Oxenbridge 2000, op cit, which compared the position indicated by the results of 
the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey with the position in previous years, in particular that set out by 
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey  1980.  
292  The focus on the injunction in previous decades had perhaps convinced many that claims for damages would 
not be pursued post 1982.  
293 Repealing s14 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974. Liability for trade unions for injunctions and 
damages is now dependent largely on what  action has been ‘authorised or endorsed’ by officers, officials or 
committees (sections 20 and 21 TULRCA 1992).  What would have at one time been regarded as unofficial action 
can now be seen to be ‘authorised or endorsed’ when just one official takes part (See Gate Gourmet v TGWU). 
[2005] IRLR 881 (QB)). Unions seeking to avoid liability may find themselves forced to ‘repudiate’ industrial action 
(See s 21(3) TULRCA 1992). 
294
 The burden of establishing fairness was eased(s.6 EA 1980) The qualification period was increased to two years 
for firms 20 or less employees (s8 EA 1980); reductions in awards (s9 and s10 EA1980)  
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enforce closed shop agreements attracted punitive ‘enhanced’ compensatory 
awards enforceable against both employer and the union involved.295 
During this first term a number of cases had been heard in the higher courts 
turning on questions of whether secondary or ‘solidarity’ action, and disputes 
about broader political issues, were ‘trade disputes’. Lord Denning, Master of the 
Rolls, champion of individual freedom, and an implacable enemy of trade 
unionism, had returned to the fray in three cases: NWL Ltd v Woods [1979], 
Express Newspapers v Macshane [1979], and Duport Steels v Sirs [1980].296 
In all of these cases the Court of Appeal found against the unions, holding that the 
disputes at issue were not trade disputes, despite the very clear legislation 
pointing to the contrary. 297Although these decisions were subsequently reversed 
by the House of Lords, they provided very timely and effective support for 
legislative action by the new Conservative government to narrow the definition of 
a trade dispute.298 100 years on, the Court of Appeal had chosen a key moment to 
reprise the politically motivated refusal of the judges to acknowledge the plain 
and ordinary meaning of the legislation with which Parliament had sought to 
permit workers freedom of association. 
If an employer was able to show that it had good cause to argue that the 
immunities were not likely to afford protection in any, largely theoretical, 
subsequent claim for damages, and that the ‘balance of convenience’299 lay with 
the employer – that is that the employer would suffer greater hardship if an 
injunction was not granted than the union would if it were not granted - then the 
                                               
295 S4 EA 1980 gave grounds for tribunal claim for unreasonable exclusion or expulsion from a trade union and s5 
provided for punitive awards to compensate the worker for his or her loss. 
296
3 All ER 614; 1 All ER 614; 1 All ER 259. 
297 See Wedderburn 1986, op cit, pp568-570. 
298
 Two famous cases in the same period concerned industrial action brought for political reasons, and can be seen 
as a narrowing of what could be considered as connected with a trade dispute:  BBC v Hearn [1977] ICR 686 (CA) 
and Express Newspapers Ltd v Keys [1980] IRLR 247 (QBD). The injunction applied for in the Express case was 
granted. In the former case the injunction was not granted at first instance, but the appeal was presided over by 
Lord Denning, and was subsequently granted. 
299
American Cynamid Co.(No.1) v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 (HL). Even where it appeared likely that the proposed 
industrial action appeared to be covered by the immunities the House of Lords has acknowledged that public 
interest considerations might well tip the balance in favour of an injunction. 
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employer would be granted an injunction. These ex parte interlocutory 
applications were weighted heavily in favour of the employer, an advantage 
compounded, paradoxically, prior to the Employment Act 1982, by the blanket 
immunity conferred by S14 of TULRA 1974. This immunity had meant that any 
damages awarded in any subsequent claim could only be sought against the 
applicant’s employees, and union officials, not the union, and consequently there 
was no likelihood of the applicant being compensated adequately for any loss 
suffered as a direct result of the industrial action even if it were found that there 
had not been a trade dispute within the meaning then afforded to the term in 
TULRA 1974. As a consequence injunctions were less likely to be granted after the 
1982 Act had come into force. 
Not only did the 1982 Act repeal s13(2) and (3) and s 14 of the 1974 Act, to 
radically reduce the reach of the immunities, but it further narrowed the 
definition of a trade dispute. As we have seen in relation to secondary action, a 
number of cases in the late 1970s and the early 1980s challenged the definition of 
a trade dispute. Then, the parties to the dispute could, on one side be either 
workers or a union, and on the other any employer, or other workers or other 
unions. The dispute had merely to be ‘connected with’ one or other of the aspects 
of the employment relationship listed in the Act. The post 1982 provisions are to 
be found now in TULRCA 1992 S244 (1). Protected acts must now be made in 
contemplation or furtherance of ‘... a dispute between workers and their 
employer300 which relates wholly or mainly’ to the listed employment matters. 
The 1982 Act also provided that disputes over an employer’s use of non-union 
labour were no longer deemed to be trade disputes, and prevented workers 
taking industrial action to coerce an employer trading with their own employer to 
recognise a union.301 
                                               
300
 This caused particular difficulties where the actual employer was a separate entity from the notional employer 
– action against the holding company fell outside the definition of a trade dispute, which restricted action to the 
subsidiary company. See Dimbleby and Sons Ltd v NUJ [1984] 1 WLR. 
301 Sections 12-14 Employment Act 1982. 
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Following the 1983 election, balloting was made a pre-requisite for the protection 
of the immunities by the Trade Unions Act 1984.302Each member ‘who it is 
reasonable at the time of the ballot for the union to believe will be’ induced to 
take part’ in the industrial action were required to be given entitlement to vote. 
Ballots were to be conducted in secret, on paper, and with straight forward 
questions on whether the employee favoured taking strike action, or industrial 
action short of a strike, with ‘yes or no’ answers.303  
 
Originally enforceable only by the employer (in connection, of course, with the 
use of the injunction to stop industrial action), the right to hold a union to these 
procedural requirements was extended to individual members in 1988, and Part 1 
of the Employment Act 1988 was drafted so as to be clearly seen to be giving 
rights to individual union members against the union. Schedule 1 to the Act 
detailed the appointment and powers of a Commissioner for the Rights of Trade 
Union Members.  
 
The Act extended the balloting provisions to require the union to ballot each of 
the workplaces affected, and provide the employer with the number, and 
categories of employees to be balloted at each workplace. Unions were stopped 
from using funds to indemnify trade unionists fined for unlawful conduct, and a 
right for members to inspect the union’s accounts was conferred. Union 
membership could no longer be enforced by action against the employer, and the 
unfair dismissal exceptions for UMAs were removed, employers were prohibited 
from enforcing trade union membership. Post entry ‘closed shops’ became 
unworkable.304 
 
The assault on mechanisms to enforce solidarity was completed by the section 3 
individual right of members not to be ‘unjustifiable disciplined’ – action against a 
member for not taking or supporting industrial action was the first of the grounds 
listed.  
 
The 1990 Employment Act made pre-entry closed shops unlawful, and further 
tightened the balloting and strike procedure rules. Secondary action was 
unequivocally prohibited, and all unofficial action became extremely hazardous. 
                                               
302
  Part I introduced balloting for certain positions within a union, and Part III balloting for the maintenance of a 
political fund. 
303 Section 11 Trade Union Act 1984. 
304 Sections 10 and 11 Employment Act  1998. 
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An employee taking such action was ‘denied the right to complain of unfair 
dismissal,’ and any workers taking official action in support of those dismissed for 
unofficial action could also be dismissed with impunity.305 
 
However, after a decade during which the trade unions had been stripped of 
power, and the ‘wild cat’ unofficial strikes which had been seen as so 
troublesome in the late 1960s and 1970s long virtually eliminated, it now 
appeared that it had not been collective bargaining which had been fuelling 
inflation.  
 
One time junior minister for employment, Thatcher loyalist Alan Clark, recorded 
in his diary in May 1990, as the Tories started to consider ousting Thatcher, that 
he and two of his colleagues had discussed what they could ‘do to succor the 
Lady? Do we even want to? We were stuck with the same inflation rate as when 
we came into power in 1979.’306 
 
Thatcher was obliged to resign in November 1990. John Major had the misfortune 
to take over the leadership of the Tory party, and the premiership, as the neo-
liberal revolution, and the ‘Lawson Boom’ crashed the economy into deep 
recession.307 
 
Almost as troubling for the new Prime Minister, the European Community 
member states were concluding the radical Social Policy Agreement of 1991, and 
the Commission and the ECJ were catching up with UK failures to implement 
workplace anti discrimination protections adequately. Two particular traits of the 
libertarian right, a reluctance to be seen to be legislating in response to supra 
national obligation, and a disdain for employment protection, combined to cause 
the Tories chronic embarrassment. 
 
The 1991 Social Policy Agreement was the basis of the ‘Social Protocol’ which was 
appended to the 1993 Maastricht Treaty. Better known as the ‘Social Chapter,’ 
this was a raft of proposals for employment protection directives which, instead 
                                               
305 Sections 1-3 on ‘Access to employment’; s4 on ‘Secondary action,’ and s9 on ‘Dismissal of those taking part in 
unofficial action.’ 
306
Alan Clark, Diaries, (London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1993), entry for 1 May 1990. His colleagues were Ian Gow 
and Jonathan Aitken.  
307 See David Cobham, ‘The Lawson boom: excessive depreciation versus financial liberalisation’ (1997) 4 Financial 
History Review 69. 
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of unanimous support, would require only a qualified majority in the Council of 
Ministers to secure their adoption.308 This manifestation of the new ‘Social 
Europe’ was the subject of the famous UK ‘opt out’ which was incorporated into 
the Protocol,309 which, as Neil Kinnock, then Leader of the Opposition, put it, 
betrayed Tory ambitions to reduce the UK the status of ‘an off-shore sweatshop.’ 
310 
 
Despite the ‘opt out,’ the Major administrations were to prove much less adept at 
the political sleight of hand which had allowed the Thatcher governments to 
maintain a facade of ferocious anti-Europeanism while implementing socially 
progressive directives into domestic legislation, and legislating in response to 
decisions of the ECJ.311 
 
The watershed ECJ ruling in Defrenne [1976] had seen gender equality 
acknowledged as a fundamental principle of EEC law,312 one that is ‘directly 
effective,’ narrowing the scope for the Government and domestic courts to tailor 
the application of Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome prohibiting gender 
discrimination, and the 1975 and 1976 discrimination directives to the UK. As a 
consequence the government was obliged to rectify the right to equal pay for 
equal work in UK legislation to guarantee for workers the wider entitlement to 
equal pay for work of equal value. 
 
Since Defrenne workers had, in theory at least, been able to rely on Article 119, as 
interpreted by the directives, in UK courts against both public authorities and 
private parties since the judgment had been handed down, so the dilution of the 
terms of the EU protections would eventually have ended up being the subject of 
a referral to the Luxembourg Court, even if the Commission had not brought 
infringement proceedings. Yet instead of simply changing the law following the 
initial approaches made by the Commission under the terms of the infringement 
                                               
308 See, Julia Lourie, Business & Transport Section, House of Commons Library: The Social Chapter, Research Paper 
97/102, 2 September 1997. 
309 Ibid 
310Ibid. 
311 See , for example, Clark, 1998, op cit. In  the chapter on the accession of Major, ‘The Beginning of the End,’ 
Clark is very critical Major’s handling of Maastricht - ‘The Maastricht time bomb detonates’ (p499) - and he notes 
that in other areas Major’s government managed to look as ‘harsh’ as Thatcher’s ‘though markedly less 
competent’ (p507). 
312 ECJ C- 43/75, ECR 455. 
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procedure, the first Thatcher government elected instead to defend the 
inadequate implementation of the directive at the ECJ. 
 
The predictable defeat in 1982 was the first helping of a diet of progressive 
gender equality rulings force fed the UK government by Luxembourg, the brunt of 
which were borne by John Major. Any list of these cases which, in a period when 
the Maastricht Treaty and the European Regulatory Mechanism crisis had 
inflamed Tory ‘Euroscepticism,’ 313 exacerbating divisions over Europe within the 
Conservative Party, would have to include the following key decisions: 
 
Dekker [1990],314 in which it was ruled that unfavourable treatment because of 
pregnancy amounts to direct sex discrimination without any necessity for a 
comparator, obliging UK courts and tribunals to cease comparing pregnant and 
nursing mothers absent from work with equivalent male employees on sick leave.  
 
Danfoss [1989],315which initiated a line of cases which saw the ECJ ease the 
implicit evidential burden of claimants in discrimination cases by requiring only 
that they present a prima facie case of discrimination. The onus then shifts to the 
employer to show that the behavior alleged was not discriminatory. The 
                                               
313 For example, shortly after the Equal Opportunities Commission had referred the UK government to the 
European Commission with a view to triggering infringement proceedings for failure to implement adequately 
European equality legislation, and the TUC had done the same in respect of the abolition of the Wages Councils  
(see ‘Equality watchdog seeks EC decision’, The Times, 24 September 1993). Clare Short as Shadow Minister for 
Women subsequently told the Commons that the government ‘refuses to make the changes that are needed in our 
sex discrimination and equal pay laws…When forced by the European Union they do so grudgingly and with bad 
grace’ (Hansard, 10 March 1994, vol 239,col 426-7). She cited ‘equal pay for work of equal value’ as an example, 
and noted ‘the jeers and cat calls from hon. Members on the Tory benches’ when it was announced that the failure 
of the government to fully implement European equality legislation was to be the subject of debate (col 423). 
During the debate Bernard Jenkin asked her ‘does she think that it would be democratic if her policies were 
imposed on us by court rulings and arbitrary judgments of the European Court?’(col 431). Iain Duncan Smith 
(making much of what he saw as the impact on ‘British competitiveness’) commented that the recent ruling on 
indirect discrimination resulting and part time employment (R v Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Equal 
Opportunities Commission [1994]1 AER) had been imposed ‘through the back door by means of a ruling based on 
European law…the decision was based wholly on the European treaties and directives, not on any British 
legislation….avoiding our social chapter opt out’ (col 475). Short asked Duncan-Smith whether he wanted the UK to 
leave the EU (col 476), and Jenkin, until reined in by the speaker, then went on to complain about loss of 
sovereignty and the ‘outrage and uproar’ it should provoke (col 481- 482). A Labour MP subsequently commented 
that ‘I think that we have just heard a speech in favour of sexual discrimination’ (col 484-5). 
314
 ECJ C-177/88, ECR 3941. 
315ECJ C-109/88, ECR 3199.  
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principles established were consolidated in a 1997 Directive,316 S136 Equality Act 
2010 implements the procedure into domestic law, and the primary domestic 
authority for the application of the procedure is the Court of Appeal case Ayodele 
v City Link [2017].317 This so called ‘reversed burden of proof,’ as it has become 
widely, if inaccurately, known in the UK, is also required by the European Social 
Charter: In a 2008 statement of interpretation the ECSR held that in cases of 
discrimination engaging ‘matters covered by the Charter, the burden of proof 
should not rest with the complainant, but should be the subject of an appropriate 
adjustment,’ while in the 2008 Digest of Decisions the term used is ‘shifted.’318 In 
an earlier statement of interpretation it was held that ‘An alleviation of the 
burden of proof in cases of alleged gender discrimination is also required,’ with 
claimants required only to ‘establish…facts from which discrimination may be 
presumed’ before ‘the respondent is required to prove that the apparent 
discrimination is due to objective factors unrelated to discrimination based on 
sex…’319 
Similarly, in Enderby v Frenchay Health authority and Secretary of State for Health 
[1993]320 the ECJ held that in multiple pay claims where a prima facie case of a 
significant disparity of pay for work of equal value between one male dominated 
group and a female dominated group is made out then it is for the employer to 
show that there are objective and proportionate ‘genuine material factors’ for 
that disparity. 321 That the disparities arose as a result of separate long standing, 
                                               
316 Directive 97/80/EC on the shift in the burden of proof in sex discrimination cases (now incorporated into Recast 
Directive 2006/54/EC by Article 19) was incorporated into Directive 2000/43/EC prohibiting discrimination on 
grounds of race of ethnic origin (Article 8) and Directive 2000/78/EC prohibiting discrimination on grounds of 
religion or belief, age or sexual orientation (by Article 10). It had long been the case in UK courts and tribunals that 
an inference that discrimination had taken place could be drawn if the claimant had shown that the circumstances 
were such that less favourable treatment on grounds of unlawful discrimination was indicated (see Chattopadhyay 
v Headmaster of Holloway School [1982] ICR 132), but the European legislation shifted the weight of the burden 
further towards the respondent. See David Renton, Struck Out, Why Employment Tribunals Fail Workers and What 
Can be Done, (London, Pluto Press, 2012, pp73-83).    
317EWCA Civ 1913 
318
 Conclusions XIX-1 2008, and Digest of the Case Law of the European Committee of Social Rights, p139. The 
Digest refers to Conclusions XVII-1 2004, Romania. 
319 Conclusions XII-5 1994-1995, statement of Interpretation of Article 1-2 and 4-3 and Article 1 of the Additional 
Protocol. While this more explicit explanation of the obligations relating to the burden of proof was ostensibly 
related to Article 1 of the AP in the statement, it does appear to apply to the provisions of the 1961 Charter too. 
320
 ECJC-127/92, ECR I-5535 
321 Section 69 of the Equality Act gives the legislative detail, while Asda v Brierly [2017] EWCA civ 566 provides the 
up to date domestic precedent for the handling of such cases.   
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‘entrenched’ collectively negotiated pay structures rather than a specific PCP 
previously regarded by the UK courts as non discriminatory was irrelevant – such 
structures may well be serving to hide discrimination.322 
 
In Marshall v Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Authority 
(No.2 ) [1993],323the court ruled that  the cap the on the equal pay award Mrs. 
Marshall and her colleagues had won (relying on the directly effective Article 119)  
was unlawful. The Government was obliged to remove the cap. It was established 
that limiting awards in discrimination cases was unlawful per se, and the following 
year, 1994, the Tories removed the cap on race discrimination claims.  
 
The so called ‘reversed burden of proof,’ and the removal of the discrimination 
cap, along with the Working Time Directive (forced on the Major government by 
the EU as a health and safety initiative but implemented by New Labour), 
continue to be held out by many on the right of the political spectrum as the 
principal ‘wrongs’ inflicted on the UK by the EU. Indeed, they might plausibly be 
said to have sowed the seed of the particular variety of ‘euro scepticism’ that 
ultimately blossomed into the EU Referendum of 2016. 324  
 
Major was, however, arguably more overtly an anti-collectivist than his 
predecessor. The Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993, 
introduced as a Bill shortly after Major’s surprise win in the 1992 election, was an 
unexpected, and unequivocal attack on the unions. As if to compensate for the 
                                               
322 See Hayes, 2014, op cit, p42 & 48, and McColgan, 1997, op cit p150-51. 
323ECJ C-271/91, ECR I-4367. 
324 Resistance to the EU played well within the party and with the party’s core supporters in the country. 
Opposition to the WTD (Tory Party policy in the form of the social chapter opt out, and the government’s 
insistence that it was a social measure), and dissatisfaction with the shift in the burden of proof in discrimination 
cases, and with the occasional award of very large sums to claimants in discrimination cases, was not only voiced 
by Eurosceptical Tories but by many Europhiles too – and by the Tory press.  The imposition of the WTD had been 
a serious humiliation for the Tories, and professing a distaste for  EU employment law arguably permitted the Tory 
leadership to please both the nationalist and business wings of the Tory party, but in the long term this ‘Aunt Sally’ 
arguably fueled euroscepticism at Westminster and in the country. For example, in the Commons debate on what 
became the ‘Burden of Proof’ Directive 97/80/EC (Hansard, 9 May 1994, cols 99-122), the Secretary of State for 
Employment made much of having avoided the WTD (it was another two years before the ECJ were to rule that the 
UK was bound by the directive), and the government were  implacable in their opposition to the directive being 
debated, and implacable too in ignoring opposition reminders that it had previously assured the Commission that 
UK law did indeed require a shift of the burden of proof in discrimination cases and was thus already compliant. 
With regard to the anti discrimination directive, The Guardian, 19 May 2000 ran a ‘special report’ on the Tories in 
opposition: ‘Tories oppose anti-racism directive.’ The ‘controversial’ supposed reversal of the burden of proof in 
the directive was said by Tory MEPs to undermine a principle which had ‘formed one of the foundations of UK law 
for centuries’. The Daily Telegraph on the same day ran an article with the title ‘Firms forced to prove that they are 
not racist.’   
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improved employment rights in Part II (TUPE, redundancy consultation, 
maternity, protection for Health and Safety representatives, and an extension of 
the right to a statement of employment particulars for all working over 8 hours a 
week) forced upon a reluctant government by Brussels, the remaining provisions 
appear to comprise of either an attack on the pre 1980 order, or of further 
restrictions on the freedom of trade unions.  
 
The last of the Wages Councils were abolished.325 The duties of ACAS were recast, 
and the duty to promote collective bargaining abandoned. Fees could now be 
charged for those in receipt of help from the Service. Financial assistance for 
union balloting was withdrawn, along with the obligation for employers to allow 
unions to use their premises for balloting purposes was removed. ‘Rights in 
relation to union membership’ – restrictions on union autonomy imposed as 
individual rights not to be excluded or expelled, or unjustifiably disciplined were 
expanded, and numerous, and complex additional procedural requirements 
added to the already onerous union balloting provisions for both internal 
elections, and for industrial action. 
 
The Act extended considerably the role of the ‘scrutineer.’ A minimum of seven 
day’s notice, to be given to the employer, of the intention to hold a ballot was 
now required. Postal ballots became mandatory, and a copy of the ballot paper 
had to be given to the employer in advance of the ballot,326and the names of 
those workers to be balloted.327Notice of the result had to be communicated ‘as 
soon as reasonably practicable’ to members and employer. Notice of any 
proposed industrial action had to be communicated to the employer identifying 
‘the affected employees,’ along with other numerous details. Failure to furnish 
any of these details accurately, in the correct form and at the correct time, would 
almost invariably invalidate the ballot and the statutory immunities would not 
apply to any subsequent industrial action. As a consequence injunctions to 
prevent industrial action became considerably easier for employers to obtain.  
 
In 1997 the replacement of the Tories by the incoming ‘New Labour’ 
administration heralded a thirteen year period when the legislative attacks of 
1980 - 1993 were, to the disappointment of very many in the Labour Movement 
                                               
325
 With exception of the Agricultural Wages Board. 
326
  To be given to the employer no later than 3 days prior to the ballot. 
327
 Following Blackpool and Fylde College v NATFHE [1994] ICR 648 the law was amended so as not to reveal the 
identities of those who were to be balloted. 
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merely stayed, rather than reversed. The individual contract of employment was, 
as it turned out, as important to New Labour as it was to the Tories, and it fell to 
the union recognition procedures promised by Blair to the trade unions in return 
for their support,328 proposals for a minimum wage, and to the swathe of largely 
individual rights which were to be incorporated into domestic law following the 
abandonment of John Major’s  EU Social Protocol ‘opt out,’ and the reinstatement 
of the right for the workers at GCHQ to form and join trade unions to provide 
what passed for ‘clear blue water’ between New Labour and Tory industrial 
relations policy. 329With the ‘dirty work’ having been already been done by the 
Thatcher and Major administrations, all that New Labour had to do was to fail to 
reverse the anti trade union legislation of the previous 18 years in order to be 
complicit in the Tory assault on freedom of association. UK industrial relations 
entered a period of comparative stasis, what was arguably at best, a post 
neoliberal revolution plateau. Collectivism was still infra dig. 
‘Partnership’ was the then current ‘buzzword,’ and writing in 2002, Tonia Novitz, 
cautioned that  
 
‘the ‘partnership’ that New Labour seeks to encourage within the 
employment relationship is fundamentally individualistic. The ‘partners’ 
would seem to be the individual employer and the individual worker. This is 
not a relationship that necessarily involves trade unions.’330 
 
After the 1997 election manifesto promises were honoured in the form of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 and the Employment Relations Act 1999. 
However, the ECtHR, had at that time relatively little to say on labour rights, other 
than to rule that Article 11 did not protect the right to the freedom to bargain 
collectively or to strike,331 and moreover, the UK courts had previously appeared 
to give relatively little weight to the Convention rights despite being required ‘to 
                                               
328 To be found in Schedule 1 A of the Employment Relations Act 1999. 
329 See Howell, 2005, op cit, pp174-184. 
330
 Tonia Novitz, ‘A Revised Role for Trade Unions as Designed by New Labour: ‘The Representation Pyramid and 
‘Partnership’, Journal of Law and Society, vol. 29 (3) 2002, 487, p.492. Novitz characterised New Labour’s concept 
of partnership as ‘individualistic, proceduralistic and unitaristic’ (p495). 
331  K.D. Ewing,The Human Rights Act and Labour Law (1998) 27 ILJ 275, p 292. 
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have regard for the Convention in deciding any question to which it may be 
relevant.’332 
 
Nevertheless, section 2 HRA requires UK courts to ‘take into account’ Strasbourg 
judgments, opinions and decisions where questions about the Convention rights 
are raised and s 3(1) states: ‘So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation 
and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is 
compatible with Convention rights.’ If that is not possible then, by section 4, 
courts are given the option of making a declaration of incompatibility, which the 
government is at liberty to ignore. 
 
This has served as a conduit of sorts for the Strasbourg jurisprudence and 
ultimately sections 2 and 3 saw the wide post 2008 concept of freedom of 
association (see chapters one, three and four) leading the domestic courts to 
eventually accept that there is limited right to strike in UK law right.333The 
principal effects of the HRA have, however, arguably been to influence the law in 
relation to discrimination and privacy at work through the ECHR rights to 
conscience, expression, and religion, to private and family life, and to influence 
what might be said to be procedural aspects of individual employment law, 
through the influence of Article 6 ECHR.  
 
Sections 6 and 7 HRA confine the direct application of the Act to the public sector, 
and it was not until X v Y and Pay,334 unfair dismissal cases brought in 2004 by 
workers who had been employed in the public sector, that the judiciary started to 
acknowledge that an interference with an applicant’s Convention rights could 
influence the consideration of the question of the fairness of a dismissal to make 
‘harsh but fair’ dismissals harder to justify, and to see Article 6 as engaged in 
internal disciplinary proceedings.335 
 
                                               
332 Justice Griffiths in Express Newspapers v Keys [1980] IRLR 247. The case saw the paper seeking an injunction 
against a ‘day of action,’ and after considering Article 11, and Lord Denning’s dismissal of it in UK Association of 
Professional Engineers v Acas [1978] ICR 303, as no more than a restatement of a basic principle of English law, an 
injunction was granted. 
333See below 
334X v Y [2004] IRLR 625 CA and Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2004] IRLR 129 EAT. See V Mantouvalou, 
‘Human rights and Unfair Dismissal: Private Acts in Public Spaces’ 71 Modern Law Review 912; V Mantouvalou and 
H Collins, ‘Private Life and Dismissal: Pay v UK Application No 32792/05, [2009] IRLR (ECtHR)’ (2009) 38 ILJ 133. 
335
 See Kuklarni v Milton Keynes hospital Trust [2009] 109 BMLR 133 and R.(on the application of G) v School 
Governors [2011] UKSC 30. 
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While the HRA (which didn’t come into force until 2000) was something of a ‘slow 
burner’, ERA 1999 provided the Schedule A1 recognition procedures,336 replacing 
the 1975 procedures the first Thatcher administration had abolished in 1980, and 
gave union representatives, in certain circumstances, access to company facilities, 
and, by s10, workers an entitlement to be ‘accompanied’337 by an officer or 
official of an unrecognised trade union at a disciplinary or grievance hearing, a 
right which was seen as a means of entry for the unions into the many, often 
small, non-unionised service industry firms that had appeared over the previous 
20 years.338 
Protection from dismissal for participating in official industrial action was 
provided,339 inserted into the TULRCA 1992 as S238A, providing, initially, an 8 
week protected period, later extended to 12 weeks by the Employment Relations 
Act 2004.340 TULRA 1974,341the Act that provided the first legislative protection 
for participants in industrial action, had allowed an employer to dismiss all of a 
striking workforce, individual workers having the right to bring a claim for unfair 
dismissal only if it could be shown that there had been selective dismissals or 
selective re-engagement. This ‘all or nothing’ approach was relaxed for employers 
by the Employment Act 1982,342 which had permitted re-engagement after 3 
months without triggering the right for dismissed workers to make a complaint of 
unfair dismissal. Between 1974 and 1990 there had been no distinction made 
between official and unofficial action. The Employment Act 1990, as we have 
                                               
336
See chapter 5. 
337
 As opposed to ‘represented.’ The right was rather undermined by a maximum sanction of 2 weeks’ wages, a 
claim that has to be brought by the employee. Nevertheless, despite the apparent efforts of the New Labour 
drafting team to render it ‘business friendly’, this right has been relied on many thousands of times by individual 
members in workplaces where unions are unrecognised, and many employers appear to allow visiting union 
officials to argue the employee’s case. 
338 See Novitz 2002, op cit, p 488 & 494-495, and KD Ewing, ‘Trade Union Recognition – A Framework for 
Discussion’ (1990), 19 ILJ 209 p212. Novitz observed that ‘...the failure of the employer to allow a union 
representative to be present will not overturn the employer’s decision on the grievance or reverse any disciplinary 
measures taken...the rationale for the introduction of this provision would appear to be a reduction of conflict 
rather than the protection of the workers’ interests.’ See also T Novitz & P Skidmore Fairness at Work: A critical 
analysis of the ERA 1999, and its Treatment of Collective Rights, (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2001) p 168. 
339 The common law, of course, permits summary dismissal for industrial action. 
340
Following a series of Conclusions by the European Social Charter’s European Committee of Social Rights holding 
8 weeks to be insufficient. 
341
 Schedule 1, paragraph 8. 
342 Section 9. 
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seen, had withdrawn the right for those dismissed during unofficial action to 
claim for unfair dismissal, a situation unrelieved by New Labour, the 1999 
provisions restricting protection to employees induced to commit an act 
protected by the statutory immunities.343 
There was an increase the unfair dismissal compensatory award cap from £12,000 
to £50,000. In retrospect this step can be seen to have signaled New Labour’s 
commitment substituting individual employment rights for collective 
representation, rather than to reflect any particular sympathy for the financial 
plight of those who had been arbitrarily dismissed. In opposition the party had 
contemplated the introduction of potentially unlimited awards. The Minimum 
Wage Act, condemned by the Major government as an unaffordable luxury, likely 
to cost jobs – was passed that same year, and the Public Interest Disclosure Act 
1998, an anti-discrimination measure protecting work place ‘whistle blowers,’ 
also broke new ground.  
The first of the EU ‘Social Chapter’ legislation, the Maternity and Parental Leave 
Regulations were implemented in 1999,344 and the Part Time Workers Regulations 
were introduced in 2000. The Fixed Term Workers Regulations followed in 2002. 
Following the 2001 election the second Blair administration improved the 
provision of maternity leave, introduced Scandinavian style paternity and 
adoption leave, and the right to request flexible working timetabling were the 
central provisions of the Employment Act 2002. Similarly, in 2006, the Work and 
Families Act, passed in the wake of the 2005 election, extended maternity and 
paternity rights, and introducing the right for those caring for the disabled and 
the elderly to request flexible working arrangements. These are examined in 
detail in chapter seven. 
                                               
343 For the remarkable events surrounding the unreported 2001 case of Davis v Friction Dynamics which saw an 
entire workforce sacked, see Bryan Davies, The right to strike: Has the law moved on since the Friction Dynamics 
dispute?  (2012)at www.ier.org.uk 
344
 The Working Time Regulations, passed in 1998, were perhaps the first in European terms, but for the UK, with 
the 1991 ‘opt out’, the Major government’s resistance to the imposition of the WTD as an OSH initiative, and New 
Labour’s 1997 policy commitment to the ‘Social Chapter’ as the defining episodes, this was the first of the SPA 
directives implemented for the UK. The Parental Leave Regulations were updated in 2002. 
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The Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations of 2004 were a 
grudging implementation of the Information and Consultation Directive of 2002. 
New Labour had opposed the Directive almost from the start and the regulations 
were severely compromised. These feature in chapter four. 
The Employment Relations Act 2004 legislated for the amendments made 
necessary by two ECtHR decisions, the Wilson and Palmer and ASLEF cases, which 
feature in chapter three. 
A recast Acquired Rights Directive saw new TUPE Regulations implemented in 
2006. The long running transfer of undertakings saga is covered below, in 
chapters four and chapter six, but of interest here as a rare instance of the 
government going beyond what was required in the directive, to ‘gold plate’ the 
new regulations. 
New Labour were replaced in office in 2010 by the Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat Coalition Government. The Coalition government oversaw the passing 
of the Equality Act 2010.345 The Bill had been introduced by the Gordon Brown led 
New Labour administration of 2007-2010. The new Act was a consolidation and 
revision of the discrimination legislation of the previous 40 years, and that it 
should have been required so soon after the 2006 Equality Act is a measure of the 
pace of progress in that sphere set largely by the EU - aspects of the 2006 and 
2010 Act are discussed in chapter seven. However, the attitude of the new 
government to the Bill, and the Act, is instructive in terms of the differing 
approaches of the Tory, Lib Dem and New Labour ‘brands’ of neoliberalism to 
equality and anti-discrimination protections, in particular the antipathy of the 
Coalition to anything that smacked of collectivism. The new Home Secretary was 
unimpressed by what she called ‘Harman’s Law’ - section one, requiring public 
authorities to have regard to socio economic inequalities ‘when making decisions 
of a strategic nature’ (see chapter seven). The Guardian reported that ‘Theresa 
May scraps legal requirement to reduce inequality’ - the Government failed to 
implement section one into law.346  
                                               
345 The Temporary Agency Work Directive345 was adopted in 2008. 345 The UK Regulations came into force in 2011 
under the Coalition government, but they were drafted by New Labour,
345
 and they are discussed below in chapter 
seven.  
346 17 November 2010. The paper reported that she had said that it was ‘ridiculous.’ 
91 
 
 
 Labour, she argued, had ‘stopped treating people like individuals and instead 
viewed them as part of some amorphous herd...we need to move beyond 
defining people simply by their membership of a particular group.’347  
 
In reality the 2010 Act ‘maintains a generally individualistic approach to the 
systematic problem of discrimination,’348  and arguably only sections one and 149 
saw New Labour adopting the systematic or collective approaches capable of 
beginning to tackle the ‘structural,’ and ‘entrenched,’349 inequality of the labour 
market. The Tories and Liberal Democrats were unhappy with both sections. 
 
The new government also failed to implement section 14 on ‘combined 
discrimination,’ which allowed for claims based on less favourable treatment 
rooted in the ‘intersection’ between two protected characteristics. While it did 
implement section 40 (2),(3) and (4) which permitted employees to bring a claim 
against an employer for permitting ‘3rd party harassment’ it announced a 
consultation on the extension of the anti-harassment measures and ultimately 
repealed those subsections.350 Arguably these can be seen as political gestures 
intended to reflect the Coalition deregulatory campaign, traditional Tory 
scepticism for anti discrimination measures, and to at least make it appear to 
Eurosceptical elements in the Tory party and the electorate that the 
government’s hands were not entirely tied by membership of the European 
Union. 
 
 Scepticism was similarly broadcast by the publication of The Public Sector 
Equality Duty: Reducing Bureaucracy. S149 of the 2010 Act revised the PSED and 
extended it beyond sex, race and disability to require public authorities to have 
regard to ensure equality in the spheres of sexual orientation, pregnancy, 
maternity, gender reassignment, religion, belief and age.  
 
                                               
347 From the text of a speech given by May on 17 November 2010. In it she used the word ‘individual’ and 
‘indvidualistic’ multiple times. www.gov.uk/government/speeches/theresa-mays-equlity-strategy-speech 
348
 A Mccolgan, Equality Act 2010, Liverpool, 2012, p50. 
349
 ibid 
350 By s65 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013. 
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The new government announced a consultation and review of the duty,351 but 
despite the comparatively collective nature of the duty s149 was retained. 
 
Swingeing cuts were made to the funding of the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission. The Commission noted in its 2012 report on the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Bill 2012-13,352 that the Bill aimed to repeal s3 of the Equality 
Act 2006 which set out the general duty of the Commission, and the s10 duty for 
it to ‘promote good relations between different groups,’ along with many of the 
powers which enabled it to fulfill that duty, and that the intention of the 
government was to half the funding of the Commission during 2010-15.353 The 
Commission also reported that the Bill sought to withdraw the ‘discrimination 
questionnaires,’ what it called the ‘question and answer procedures,’ introduced 
by the 2010 Act.354 
 
The right to the use of discrimination questionnaires was ultimately withdrawn by 
the repeal of s138 Equality Act by s.66 of the 2013 Act. This denied tribunal 
claimants the right to present a list of searching questions to the respondent 
before the hearing, an initiative in accord with the requirements both of EU law 
and the European Social Charter for states to take measures to address the 
inherent difficulties in presenting a discrimination claim, one closely related to the 
‘reverse burden of proof.’  A failure to provide a satisfactory reply had the 
potential to severely compromise the employer’s defence. This, and a subsequent 
proposal to repeal of s.124 of the 2010 Act, which gave tribunals the power to 
make general recommendations to the employer following a successful 
discrimination claim, drew the attention of the ILO’s Committee of Experts, who, 
‘Recalling that the burden of proof can be significant obstacle to justice,’ 
requested further information.355  
                                               
351 Little came of this. See ‘The Independent Steering Group’s report of the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) 
review and government response’, 6 September 2013, and the TUC ‘Touchstone’ blog ‘The good the bad and the 
ugly of the Equality Duty Review’, by Ben Moxham, 11 September 2011. 
352 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill 2012-13, Report Stage and Third 
Reading Briefing, House of Commons, October 2012. 
353
 McColgan 2012, op cit,  p4 and note 2 on p4. 
354
 Ibid, p12-14. 
355
  Observation (CEACR) adopted 2014, published 104
th
 ILC Session 2015, on Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation) Convention, 1958, (No.111). 
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Nevertheless, section 2 of the Deregulation Act 2015 subsequently amended 
s.124 to restrict permissible recommendations to those made ‘for the purpose of 
obviating or reducing the adverse effect on the claimant of any matter to which 
the proceedings relate.’ Now exercise of the power is restricted to cases where 
the claimant remains an employee, and to matters pertinent to the claim which 
will benefit the claimant, which might plausibly be said to reflect the hostility of 
Cameron’s Tories to treating the right to non-discrimination as anything other 
than an exclusively individual right. 
Despite the embedding of individualism by successive governments since 1979 
the Tories, assisted by their ‘Orange Book’ Liberal Democrat partners,356 
apparently considered it necessary to renew the ‘scattergun’ approach of the 
Thatcher and Major governments and set about amending and neutralising 
anything which smacked of collectivism. Labour market deregulation enjoyed a 
renaissance too, and the ambitions and attitudes of many of those on the right of 
the Conservative Party in relation to employment protection law were given 
expression in the unambiguously neoliberal Beecroft Report on employment law 
reform, leaked in October 2011 to The Daily Telegraph. The Coalition partners 
appeared to find common ground in their commitment to deregulation,357 
claiming that their intention was to encourage employers to recruit, despite the 
absence of any persuasive evidence that employment protection law discourages 
employers from taking staff on, and compelling evidence indicating that 
employment protection has no negative effect on recruitment.  
In terms of substantive law, these reforms amounted to little more than political 
gestures. The principal change was to the collective right to a minimum period 
within which a consultation with workers must take place where an employer 
proposes to make 100 or more employees redundant. This was cut from 90 days 
down to 45 days, the period during which previously consultation had to be made 
when between 20 and 99 workers were threatened by redundancy. Those coming 
                                               
356 P Marshall and D Laws (eds), The Orange Book; Reclaiming Liberalism (Exmouth, Profile Books, 2004) is 
essentially a collection of articles on neoliberal policies written by some of the then leading Lib Dems – hence the 
term ‘Orange Book Liberals.’ 
357
 Although it could be argued that the Beecroft report facilitated compromise by giving the Liberal Democrats the 
opportunity to appear to restrain their Coalition partners, and allowed the Tories to indicate to the more extreme 
of their supporters what they perhaps might have pressed for with a majority in the House. 
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to the end of fixed term contracts were excluded from the consultation regime,358  
and the TUPE regulations were tinkered with in line with recent ‘business friendly’ 
decisions made by the CJEU in the wake of the Euro Zone financial disaster.359 
 
Essentially the Coalition went far as it felt it could to stamp its authority on 
effectively entrenched EU legislation without provoking the interest of the 
Commission. The impact assessment on what was to become the Collective 
Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings Regulations 2014 made the rather 
feeble claim that the reform ‘seeks to remove unnecessary gold-plating, allowing 
parties to concentrate on the key issues, and discouraging delay or avoidance of 
consultation.’360 
 
While the deregulation, such as it was, appeared motivated by ideology, the 
employment tribunal procedural reforms appeared initially to have been made in 
order to reduce expenditure and to discourage employment claims, and the by 
now traditional ‘new broom’ adjustment to the qualifying period for unfair 
dismissal was said to have been aimed at encouraging recruitment and lifting 
spirits in the business world.361 However, doubling the qualifying period to two 
years saved businesses only a paltry £4.7 million in the year following the change, 
and a BIS report from March 2013, found that the small businesses they surveyed 
in the four months after the qualifying period had been raised were unaware of 
the Coalition’s efforts on their behalf.362 
The legislative centre piece of the Coalition’s employment programme was the 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, referred to above. This wide ranging 
Act also abolished the Agricultural Wages Board – the last of the Wage Councils -  
                                               
358 Following University of Stirling v UCU [2012] IRLR 266. However, the High Court ruled in USDAW v Ethel Austin 
Ltd [2013] IRLR 686, that redundancies can no longer be spread over a number of different ‘establishments’ to 
avoid the s188-s199 rules (21 or more redundancies proposed by one employer serve to trigger the consulting 
requirements). 
359 See chapter six. 
360 BIS Collective Redundancy Consultation: Government Response 1st December 2013.  
361 The Unfair Dismissal and Statement of Reasons for Dismissal (Variation of Qualifying Period) Order 2012 
amended the Employment Rights Act 1996.  
362
 Department for Business Innovation & Skills, Jordan, Thomas, Kitching and Blackburn, Employment Relations 
Research Series 123, Employment Regulation Part A: Employer perceptions and the impact of employment 
regulation March 2013, p.29. Of course, the two year period applied only to those employed after 6th April 2012. 
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and is perhaps most notorious for shifting the burden of proof back on to the 
employee in accident at work claims.363 
The Act deprived employees relying on the disclosure of information not 
considered to be matters of public interest in employment claims of ‘whistle 
blower’ status. It introduced ‘no fault’ settlement agreements to replace the 
‘compromise agreements’ previously commonly used to ease the departure of 
unwanted employees who could not easily be dismissed on a pretext, as well as 
the much trailed but quickly forgotten concept of the ‘employee shareholder’, 
allowing existing employees to sign away rights to redundancy payments, unfair 
dismissal,364the right to request flexible working and certain maternity rights, in 
return for a shares. The Act reduced the existing maximum unfair dismissal for the 
lower paid by limiting the compensatory award to the equivalent of 12 months’ 
gross wages for those earning less than the then existing cap of £74,200.  
 
The Coalition were however able, at a stroke, to remove most of the burden they 
professed to see imposed upon employers by employment protection law, and 
reduce considerably the cost of the tribunals system by a procedural step 
implemented by statutory instrument - the introduction of tribunal fees.  
The fees regime, introduced in July 2013 under the power conferred by 42(1) of 
the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, required claimants pay an initial 
issuing fee of either £160 or £250, followed – if the claim was not settled or 
withdrawn – by a hearing fee of £250 or £950.  
 
So, ‘Type B’ claims now cost £310, and ‘Type A’ £1,200. There was a much 
criticised fees remission scheme, which denied all but the very poorest of 
claimants assistance,365 and the fees were introduced as it was becoming 
understood that very many workers who had succeeded at tribunal were not 
receiving the sums they had been awarded. The result was that the number of 
tribunal claims plummeted, with, broadly speaking, in excess of 70% fewer claims 
being made overall. Equal pay, discrimination claims and claims for unpaid wages 
                                               
363See chapter six on OSH protections. 
364
 Not automatically unfair dismissals or discriminatory dismissals.  
365 See E Rose, L Wood and E Kirk, The Price of Justice: The Impact of Employment Tribunal Fees on CAB Clients in 
Scotland  (University of Strathclyde and Citizens Advice Scotland, March 2015). The Remissions scheme is discussed 
and set out at pp9-14. 
96 
 
and for written statements of terms and conditions were affected most, but 
essentially there was a massive and sudden ‘across the board’ reduction.366 
 
Remarkably it appears that the fees regime was not anticipated to have much 
effect on the numbers of employment claims received by the HMCTS,367 and for 
the Tories the subsequent ‘cliff edge’ drop in employment claims was arguably a 
happy accident. For the Liberal Democrats, and Business Secretary Vince Cable in 
particular, it was a political catastrophe. The effect was to make them complicit in 
a fresh paring back of what remained of the post war compromise. 
Not only the right not to be unfairly dismissed, but anti-discrimination and equal 
pay rights, far more politically sensitive than unfair dismissal, and, of course, 
effectively entrenched by virtue of Britain’s membership of the EU 
membership,368 were effectively withdrawn from the very many now no longer in 
a position to afford to bring a claim. Wage claims were made uneconomic for the 
lower paid; a £130 issuing fee, and a £250 hearing fee for a claim which even if 
successful might well not be paid meant that such claims all but dried up. 
Nevertheless, the Tories won a working majority in the 2015 general election, 
369and the new Cameron administration’s Trade Union Act 2016 further tightened 
the ‘blue tape’ that has been steadily stifling freedom of association since the 
early 1980s in the time served ‘stepping stones’ fashion. The new Act also cast the 
traditional attrition aside to deliver an unprecedented legislative attack on trade 
union freedom in the form of the new balloting thresholds. 
                                               
366
 See Andrew Moretta Access to Justice: Exposing the Myths, IER, 2016 for a basic description of the fees regime 
and criticism of the justification for it, and Abi Adams and Jeremias Prassl, ‘Vexatious Claims: Challenging the Case 
for Employment Tribunal Fees’ (2017) 80  Modern Law Review 42 for a highly regarded critique of the regime. Prof. 
Michael Ford QC was Counsel for the Equality and Human Rights Commission in the UNISON case and his article in 
the Industrial Law Journal, ‘Employment Tribunal Fees and the Rule of Law: R (Unison) v Lord Chancellor in the 
Supreme Court’ is of special interest (2018),47 ILJ 1. 
367 See the government impact assessment Introducing a Fee Charging Regime in the employment Tribunals and 
Employment Appeal Tribunal 30 May 2012 at 4.12 (and thanks to Michael Ford’s talk at the IER, 8 February 2017). 
368
 As well as the less immediately pressing requirements of the European Council, ILO and UN membership, and 
associated supranational instruments. 
369
 The Lib Dems secured so few seats they would have been of little assistance to the Tories even if they had been 
inclined – or required - to form another alliance with the Tories. 
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The Policy Exchange ‘research note’, Modernising Industrial Relations,370 provided 
the basis of the Bill which became the Trade Union Act 2016.371 The authors of 
this badly informed yet highly influential paper argue that increased mobility of 
labour, and modern competition law, has made collective bargaining redundant, 
and that strike action should be permitted only in very restricted circumstances. It 
introduced the novel concept of the individual strike,372 reminiscent of what was 
permitted – after due notice had been given - when the Master and Servant and 
Combination Acts were in force. The paper claims that: 
‘Voting for changes to employment law, internal grievance procedures and 
appeals to industrial tribunals allow individuals to protect their (or others’) 
employment conditions. Going to one’s employer with a job offer from 
another firm is a more effective individual expression of discontent than an 
individual strike.’  
The term ‘freedom of association’ was never once mentioned.  
The Act this paper inspired arguably was, and remains, the most egregious attack 
on freedom of association in modern times.  The principal effect of the Act is to 
make it difficult or impossible for workers to engage in lawful industrial action.  
The 2016 Act, has turned what had previously been described as ‘trips and 
hurdles’ into barriers. Under the Act a minimum of 50% of those entitled to vote 
must take part in the ballot. In ‘important public services’ at least 40% of those 
entitled to vote must vote in support of the action. A simple majority of those 
who vote will no longer suffice. I discuss the illegality of these measures in 
chapter five, but a brief examination of the Welsh Assembly’s response to the 
2016 Act (and the abolition of last of the Wages Councils) is appropriate at this 
point in my narrative: The Labour majority in the Assembly has resisted the 
                                               
370
 September 2010, by Ed Holmes, Andrew Lilico, and Tom Flanagan. 
371
Professor Alan Bogg of Bristol University spotted the connection: see ‘Beyond Neo-Liberalism: The Trade Union 
Act 2016 and the Authoritarian State’ (2016) 45 ILJ 299, pp301-2. 
372 To be contrasted with the ‘individual right to strike’ conferred by some states. 
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imposition of the Act,373 a bold stance which serves to highlight the extreme 
nature of this attack on collectivism. 
The Trade Union (Wales) Act 2017 excluded Welsh public authorities from the 
provisions in the 2016 Act which placed conditions on the use of the ‘check off’ to 
pay union subscriptions straight out of workers’ wages,374 required the 
publication of details of union ‘facility time’ granted officials to undertake union 
business,375 and gave ministers the power to issue regulations limiting facility 
time.376 Most significantly, however, the Welsh Act excludes the balloting 
thresholds, and expressly prohibits public authorities from hiring agency workers 
to replace strikers.377  
 
This ‘slap in the face’ for the Tories came shortly after the Agricultural Sector 
(Wales) Bill, providing for an Agricultural Advisory Panel to replace the AWB 
abolished by the Cameron government, had been subject to a failed challenge by 
the Attorney General at the Supreme Court under the dispute resolution 
mechanisms provided by the Government of Wales Act 2006. The Attorney 
General ’s office had argued that the Assembly’s competence did not extend to 
industrial relations, an area which the GWA neither expressly reserved for 
Westminster as an ‘exception,’ nor expressly devolved, while the Assembly had 
taken the view that the Bill ‘related to’ agriculture, an expressly devolved matter 
under the terms of the 2006 Act.  The Supreme Court ruled in favour of the 
Assembly, and the Agricultural Sector (Wales) Act became law in 2014.378  
 The 2017 Act was expressly intended to preserve the Welsh ‘social partnership’ 
approach to the provision of public services, and the view of the Assembly’s 
                                               
373
 ACL Davies, ‘Legislative Comment: The Trade Union (Wales) Act 2017’ 47 Industrial Law Journal 2018 135. 
374 116B TULR(C)A 1992. 
375 172A TULR(C)A 1992. 
376 A power exercisable subject to certain provisos 3 years after the provision came into force (s14 TU Act inserting 
new 172A in TULR(C)A 1992). 
377 Regulation 7 of the Conduct of Employment Agencies and Employment Businesses Regulations 2003 continues 
to forbid the use of agency workers to break strikes, but the government had announced plans to abolish what it 
described as a ‘nonsensical’ prohibition when introduced the Bill which became the Trade Union Act 2016 in 2015. 
378
 AG v Counsel General for Wales [2014] UKSC 43 [2014] 1 WLR. The position is that if a Bill has two or more 
purposes, none of which are ‘excepted,’ but one of which relates to a devolved matter then it is within the 
competence of the Assembly. If, however, one relates to an expressly reserved matter then it is not, unless that 
relationship is merely ‘consequential’ and unrelated to the purpose of that Bill (See Davies pp. 145-146). 
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Presiding Officer had been that the Bill was, therefore, within the competence of 
the Assembly. Had it been solely said to have been concerned with industrial 
relations then it would not have been within that competence. The provision of 
public services in Wales, however, embraces a number of expressly devolved 
matters and therefore the TU Wales Act, in preserving the way public services are 
delivered, can be said to relate to a devolved matter. 
This did not ‘go down well’ at Westminster, with the Secretary of State for Wales 
indicating that the Act would be challenged after the Wales Act 2017 had come 
into force. When it does, employment and industrial relations will have become 
an expressly reserved matter, solely within the competence of Westminster.379 
The provisions of the Wales Act are not retrospective, but while the TU Wales Act 
cannot be challenged in the courts the Secretary of State for Wales appears 
prepared to use the ‘clarification’ provided by the Wales Act to justify fresh 
primary legislation repealing the TU Wales Act, a step likely to increase support in 
Wales for Plaid Cymru, and for independence, as well as for the Labour Party.  
 
However, whether the Tory Government is prepared to commit any further acts 
of self harm is questionable, for the furore over the Trade Union Act 2016 along 
with all else in the political arena, has been to a considerable extent eclipsed by 
the unexpected result of the June 2016 EU referendum, by that of the June 2017 
general election and by the disastrous handling of ‘Brexit.’ Cameron had 
attempted to patch over the long standing rift in the Tory Party with the promise 
of a referendum on membership of the European Union. The intention had been, 
once the nation’s support for continued membership had been established, to re-
negotiate some of the obligations of membership, with particular emphasis 
placed on ‘repatriating’ employment law.380 Cameron meant, in effect, to seek the 
                                               
379 By contrast, while the Scottish Government stated it was ‘strongly opposed to the UK Government’s Trade 
Union Bill,’ under the terms of the Scotland Act 1998 all it was able to do was ‘guarantee that it would not employ 
agency staff to cover strike action’ (pp19-20 of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Scottish Government Response to List of Issues March 2016). Employment law is explicitly reserved to the UK 
government (see, for example, House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee ‘The future of working practices in 
Scotland,’ Second Report of Session 2017-19, 4 March 2018, p3). 
380 Prior to 2016 the referendum was to follow a negotiated deal: ‘We will negotiate a new settlement for Britain in 
the EU. And then we will ask the British people whether they want to stay on this basis or leave...’ (2015 Tory 
election manifesto). The European Parliament’s Policy Department paper on the ‘United Kingdom’s Renegotiation 
of its Constitutional Relationship with the EU: Agenda, Priorities and Risks ‘(2015) by B. De Witte, C. Grant and J 
Piris noted that Cameron planned to renegotiate during 2015, taking the view that negotiations would probably 
‘spill over’ into 2016 with an in/out referendum in the light of the deal taking place in the autumn of 2016. The 
authors took a very sceptical view of what could be achieved. Changes to the treaties were considered to be 
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permission of the EU to repeal, or substantially amend legislation long resented 
by the right wing of his party, like the Working Time,381 and the Collective 
Redundancies Regulations, restore the cap on discrimination claims, and abandon 
‘reversed burden of proof’ in discrimination cases,382 with the supposed purpose 
of making the UK ‘more competitive.’383 There was arguably never any realistic 
prospect of any such repatriation,384 but that was what he told his party and the 
electorate.385  
                                                                                                                                                       
unlikely in the long term, and, of course, almost impossible in the short term. As for the prospects for changing the 
law, and what was referred to as the ‘big issue’ of the Working Time Directive, it was noted that there had been 
previous unsuccessful attempts at reforming the WTD: ‘There is no reason to believe that the current Parliament 
would be much more open to changing the WTD than its predecessors, so Cameron would be well advised not to 
make a priority of this directive.’ Unsurprisingly, although talks took place, Cameron ultimately chose to pledge to 
agree a deal after the referendum.  
381The WTR provoked a private members Bill, The Working Time Directive (Limitation) Bill 2015-16. The authors of 
the Bill, seemingly unaware of the very weak nature of the WTRs, essentially sought to permit all workers the 
liberty to opt out of the regulations. Arguably the Bill can be seen as political posturing by ‘Eurosecptic’ Tory MPs, 
but also symptomatic of the view of the WTDs as ‘wrongs’ inflicted on the Tories and the UK. 
382 See, for example, Dominc Raab, Centre for Policy Studies, ‘Escaping the Strait Jacket’ November 2011, a 
document which displays the usual unconvincing neoliberal concern for the interests of worker: TUPE ‘can have 
negative consequences for jobs...The Government should push for a change to the Directive at the EU level’; 
‘abolish the Working Time and Agency Workers Regulations’ – all in order to ‘promote jobs and respect worker 
choice.’ 
 
383 As Michael Ford recalled in 2016, prominent ‘Brexiteers’ like Boris Johnson, Michael Gove and Priti Patel 
professed prior to the referendum to see further ‘deregulation’ of the labour market ‘as one of the major benefits 
of Brexit,’ with Patel, as Minister for Employment, going so far as to call for the UK to halve the ‘burdens’ of social 
and employment legislation after Brexit. These leavers drew on what Ford calls ‘dubious’ evidence that, for 
example, the combined cost of the Working Time Directive and the Temporary Agency Work Directive was £6.3 
billion each year (‘The Effect of Brexit on Workers’ Rights,’ (2016) 27(3) King’s Law Journal 398 p 399). 
384  The task was, arguably, at best, ‘not impossible’ which is no doubt why the referendum preceded the 
negotiations: “...[R]epatriation of EU competences on social and employment policy” would require the 
government “to persuade other Member States to unravel the acquis and hand British companies competitive 
advantage....difficult indeed, but not impossible’ [emphasis added] Phillip Lynch, University of Leicester, Briefing 
Paper No.1: ‘The Conservative Party and Europe: Options after Lisbon’, 27 October 2009, issued part of the Lynch’s 
project undertaken in collaboration with Richard Whitaker and Gemma Loomes on ‘Competing on the Centre 
Right: An Examination of Party Strategy in Britiain’). Even the ‘non partisan and independent,’ but arguably very 
obviously eurosceptic ‘think tank’ Open Europe was happy to broadcast that  ‘substantial repatriation’ was ‘a huge 
challenge,’ although one which ‘would not be impossible’ (Open Europe: ‘Repatriating EU Social Policy: The best 
choice for jobs and growth?’ November 2011, By S Booth, M Persson and V Scarpetta, emphasis added. This paper 
cited the ‘dubious’ statistics referred to by Michael Ford [above]). 
 
385 See, for example, ‘Conservative Party European Election Manifesto 2009:‘…EU legislation has too often 
disregarded the particular needs and practices of the British workplace...That is why Conservatives believe that 
these laws are best decided at the national level and why the restoration of British control of social and 
employment legislation will be a major goal for the next Conservative Government (p 13, emphasis supplied); 
Tory 2010 Manifesto “A Conservative government will negotiate for three specific guarantees – on the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, on criminal justice and on social and employment legislation – with our European partners to 
return powers that we believe should reside with the UK, not the EU. We seek a mandate to negotiate the return 
of these powers from the EU to the UK.’ [p114] The references to the Criminal law and Charter related to 
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However, 51.89 % of those who voted in the referendum favoured leaving the 
European Union.386The political landscape, already considerably altered by the 
election by the Labour Party of a socialist, Jeremy Corbyn, as leader of the 
opposition, literally changed overnight. Cameron resigned and was succeeded by 
Theresa May. 
Portraying the Labour Party as an unelectable ‘busted flush,’ the Prime Minister 
made clumsy overtures to Labour’s core supporters, claiming that the Tories were 
now the Party representing the interests of working families. On 1 October 2016 
May appointed Matthew Taylor, to head what became known as the Taylor 
review on modern employment practices.387 Taylor had formerly worked for Tony 
Blair. 
While this was a distinct shift away from the Thatcherite approach of the 
Cameron cabinet, the Government showed no sign of backing down to any 
significant degree on employment tribunal fees, a move which might well have 
added much needed substance to May’s claims to be championing the interests of 
working people. The government’s Review of the introduction of fees in the 
Employment Tribunals, published in January 2017, ignored the injustice implicit in 
the de facto withdrawal of individual employment rights from those with more 
than £3,000 worth of property which could conceivably be sold to finance a claim 
to find that: 
‘While there is clear evidence that ET fees have discouraged people from 
bringing claims, there is no conclusive evidence that they have been 
prevented from doing so.’388 
                                                                                                                                                       
European Arrest Warrants, proposals for European Public Prosecutor’s Office, and to the supposed fear that the 
Charter might confer fresh social and employment rights (see chapter four). 
 
38648.11% voted to remain in the EU. The ‘turnout’ was 72.21%. Arguably the result was akin to tossing a coin. Had 
the ballot been held a month later, or a week earlier then remain votes might have been in the majority - by an 
equally narrow margin. Moreover, if 16-18 year olds, the 3.3 million people from EU states resident in the UK, and 
the 700,000 British ‘ex pats’ had been given a vote then very likely remain would have won the day. See B. Davies, 
‘The EU Referendum: Who were the British People?’ (2016) 27(3) King’s Law Journal 323. 
387
 See gov.uk/government/news/taylor-review-on-modern-employment-practices-launches 
388The Review of the introduction of fees in the Employment Tribunals, Cmnd. 9373, Executve Summary, para 8.  
102 
 
In April 2017, the Prime Minister called an election with what was acknowledged 
to be the intention of strengthening her hand in the House of Commons, and in 
negotiating the terms of withdrawal at Brussels.  
This, however, was a second failed gamble. In the June 2017 election, the Tories 
lost their overall majority in the House.389By contrast the standing of the Labour 
Party, which had pledged to restore full freedom of association, introduce 
sectoral collective bargaining mechanisms, and, of course, abolish tribunal fees, 
was enhanced considerably. 
 
May sought the support of the Northern Irish Democratic Unionist Party, and 
following the conclusion of a ‘confidence and supply’ agreement, she was able to 
form a Government.390 With the support of the DUP the Government now has an 
effective working majority of two in the House of Commons. 
 
In July 2017 the Supreme Court ruled tribunal fees to be unlawful restoring the 
individual rights effectively withdrawn in 2013.391 Much as the government had 
been held six months earlier in Miller to be unable to rely on prerogative power to 
exercise Article 50 TEU to exit the European Union, 392  the court ruled that 
Ministers could not use their powers under the Tribunals, Courts and 
Enforcement Act 2007 to emasculate the rights conferred by Parliament.  393 
 
The case can plausibly be seen as a clash of individual interest, of Diceyian 
concerns for taxation, public spending and the liberty of the employer, 394 pitched 
against what can best be described as the collective good. The Law Lords took the 
collectivist side, finding that there had been a  
                                               
389The Liberal Democrats gained 4 seats and now have 12 seats in the Commons. This still a far cry from the 57 
seats they had before the 2015 election. The SNP lost 21 seats at Westminster, its 56 seat reduced to 35. 
390  The DUP have 10 seats in the Commons.  
391 R (on the application of UNISON) (Appellant) v Lord Chancellor (Respondent) [2017] UKSC 51. 
392 R ( on the application of Miller and Dos Santos) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 
5. The UK entered the Common market on the basis of a Commons vote in 1972 on the European Communities Bill 
– passed by a majority of 112. 
393
 The Added Tribunals (Employment Tribunals and Employment Appeal Tribunal) Order 2013, SI 2013/1892 and 
Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order 2013, SI 2013/1893. 
394
 Only the former was considered by the court. That Tribunal Fees delivered Beecroft Plus has never been 
officially acknowledged (see above chapter*). 
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‘failure in setting the fees, to consider the public benefits flowing from the 
enforcement of rights which Parliament had conferred, either by direct 
enactment, or indirectly via the European Communities Act 1972...’395  
 
The court noted that Article 52(3) of the EU Charter provides that the European 
Convention on Human Rights provides a floor to the acquis, the source of the 
majority of rights which workers seek to enforce at tribunal. Consequently, the 
‘constitutional right of access to the courts…inherent in the rule of law,’396 
considered in the light of the principle of proportionality,397 along with Articles 
6(1) and 13, 398 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which oblige states 
to guarantee access to justice and the effectiveness of Convention rights, 399 led 
the Law Lords to rule that the imposition of the fees regime amounted to an 
unlawful barrier to justice. 400 
 
In a second blow struck for the collective interest it was held, with reference to 
the EU Charter,401 and the Equality Act, that the fees ‘Order is indirectly 
discriminatory with the meaning of the 2010 Act, which is itself based on the 
concept of indirect discrimination in EU law.’402 The Government had unlawfully 
discriminated against those sharing the protected characteristics in the provision 
of a public service by placing discrimination claims in the more expensive of the 
two categories; 
 
‘the higher fees payable, either for Type B claims in general, or for 
discrimination claims in particular are indirectly discriminatory…This has 
put the people who bring such claims at a particular disadvantage. 
Deterring discrimination claims is thus in itself discrimination…’  
 
                                               
395
 Para 102. 
396
 Para 66. 
397 Its recognition as a constitutional principle by the Supreme Court apparently assisted by  the emphasis placed 
on it by the  Strasbourg  and Luxembourg courts (paras 80-89). 
398 Paras 108-115. 
399 In both the Strasbourg and Luxembourg jurisprudence. Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union reflects the EU principle of effectiveness, Article 52(1) its interaction with the principle of 
proprtionality. 
400  The HRA was not relevant, because UNISON was not a ‘victim’,  nor was the Strasbourg jurisprudence merely 
‘taken into account’ as required by S3 HRA – it was used as a guide to the extent to which it was necessary to 
safeguard access to the EU rights, and to the UK constitutional protections for access to justice. 
401
 The Charter arguably effectively being shorthand for the rights of the acquis. (see chapter four). 
402 Para 124. 
104 
 
Given that there was no objective justification for the fees order as a whole, it 
was not open to the government to attempt a justification for the premium; 
 
‘it is accepted that the higher fees generally have a disparate impact and in 
my view it has not been shown that they are justified.’403  
 
It is, however, instructive that the Law Lords were wholly preoccupied by the 
demands of the EU treaties and directives, interpreted with the aid of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, and with the Convention. The Convention’s sister 
instrument, the European Social Charter, ILO Conventions 100 and 111, the UN 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights all featuring very relevant and 
workplace specific anti-discrimination and ‘access to justice,’ obligations 
incumbent upon the Government, and arguably part of the UK constitutional 
‘furniture,’ were ignored. This is explicable. Those rights have been ‘eclipsed.’ The 
ECHR rights to justice are anchored like the EU rights in black letter primary 
legislation (the HRA for the former, and the 1972 and 2010 Acts for the latter), 
and made mutually reinforcing at domestic level by the EU Charter, which takes 
the ECHR as a template to express the fundamental rights of the acquis, and 
which by Articles 52(3) and 53 explicitly cites the ECHR protections as the 
minimum provided by European Union law. In contrast the ILO, UN and European 
Social Charter rights ‘feed into’ domestic anti-discrimination protections only 
indirectly through the conduit of the Strasbourg Court, and they have largely been 
forgotten – forgotten by the electorate and necessarily ignored by successive 
governments with anti-collectivist agendas. 
 
However, if the political hubris that had spawned the Trade Union Act could be 
said to have evaporated with the June 2017 election result, following the result of 
the fees challenge, the proponents of neoliberal industrial relations were now 
definitely ‘on the back foot.’ 
 
The decisions to hold the 2016 referendum, the subsequent 2017 general 
election, and the negotiations with the EU which have resulted in the Withdrawal 
Agreement, set to be the subject, under the terms of the Withdrawal Act, of a 
‘meaningful vote’ in January 2019, have served to divide and weaken both the 
Tory Party, and the Tory government. Britain is said by some to be in the throes of 
                                               
403 Paras 127-134. 
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a ‘constitutional crisis’; others prefer to describe it as the biggest political crisis 
since Suez in 1956. Nationalism and right wing resentment of European 
employment protections have caused the Tories to trigger the likely departure of 
the UK from a free trade agreement the terms of which appear entirely 
compatible with the neoliberal policies of the British governments of the past 40 
years (see chapter four) against the interests (and perhaps, to a lesser extent, the 
wishes) of the majority of their MPs and supporters. Few believe that the current 
administration will survive much longer, and many believe that a general election 
is imminent. 
If, as seems likely, the Tories are unable to form a government following a general 
election, the UK will very likely see, under a Labour government, or Labour 
dominated coalition, the restoration of the collective rights and freedoms 
withdrawn during the last 40 years, and, in effect, a fresh reconciliation between 
capital and labour achieved. 
------------------------------------------------ 
I have shown in this chapter that after hundreds of years of struggle such a 
compromise appeared, by 1875, to have been achieved by then lost due to the 
hostility of the judiciary at the turn of the 20th Century. Having seemingly been 
secured once more by the 1906 Act, it was partially withdrawn by Parliament 
during 1915 –1919 and 1927-1945, then once more restored in the immediate 
aftermath of World War Two. The Attlee government bound it and its successors 
to the maintenance of freedom of association by means of ILO Conventions 87 
and 98, and Article 11 ECHR, while arguably just as crucial was the 
acknowledgement by the Tory administrations of 1951-1964 of the value of 
securing for workers freedom of association, and of the binding nature of the ILO 
obligations. That consensus ultimately manifested itself in the acceptance by the 
Macmillan government of the European Social Charter. 
That entailed, as I explain in detail in the following chapter, the explicit 
recognition by a Tory led UK government of the right to strike, and bound it, and 
its successors, to guarantee for workers the right to bargain collectively. Further 
constitutional entrenchments for the protection of freedom of association and of 
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civil rights in the workplace were to follow - the ratification of the United Nations 
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and the two United 
Nations Human Rights Covenants. The first statutory individual rights were 
conferred to complement collective bargaining, providing what Wedderburn 
recognized as both a ‘floor of rights,’ and the beginnings of a ‘collective right to 
associate’ out of the bricks of certain ‘individual rights,”404  like the right not to be 
dismissed for membership of a union, and the right to time off for trade union 
activities.  
However, as the political consensus unraveled, individual rights came to be used 
to undermine collective bargaining, and to replace the collective protection 
provided by trade unions. The ‘golden thread’ was thus removed from the weave 
on the individual level, and on the collective level. As the freedom to bargain 
collectively, and for workers to lawfully take strike action to protect their 
immediate terms and conditions of employment, and their wider economic and 
social interests, was withdrawn it became no longer necessary for the 
government to maintain the individual rights it had conferred. As a consequence, 
the government was able to effectively withdraw those individual rights for the 
vast majority of workers by imposing, and maintaining the employment tribunal 
fees regime, and to follow that up with the crushing blow to what remained of 
freedom of association that was the Trade union Act 2016.  
An appreciation of the illegality of the catastrophic 1980 - 2016 denial of full 
freedom of association requires an understanding of the legal instruments which 
underpinned the post war compromise. This I provide in chapter 3. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
404Wedderburn, 1976, op cit. 
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Chapter Three: The rights instruments  
In this chapter I set out the nature of these instruments, the nature of the 
obligation they impose, and the attitude the British government has taken 
towards them 
I show that where treaties on industrial relations are concerned, the approach of 
the UK government has arguably always been to try to ‘have its cake and eat it,’ 
to both accede in principle to obligation, yet to shield domestic arrangements 
from outside interference, a policy apparent particularly in relation to ILO 
Conventions. Only rarely, and New Labour’s acceptance of the EU ‘Social Chapter’ 
must be considered a special case,405 has the UK bound itself to respect labour 
standards which do not reflect existing British law and practice. 
As a consequence, rather than submitting to the supervision of a gradual 
improvement in labour standards during 1945-1979, successive administrations 
can instead be said to have made a series of binding commitments to protect the 
full freedom of association which was the basis of the post war reconciliation. 
Where individual rights have been at issue, matters like working hours and 
holidays, voluntarism was usually cited as the reason for declining to bind the 
government. These were said to be matters that the British unions and employers 
preferred to negotiate.  
During the 1980s, as the Thatcher government gradually restricted freedom of 
association, it sought to dispense with those commitments, and, in addition to 
adopting a policy of declining to ratify instruments which could potentially impose 
fresh obligations, was necessary to denounce those which were at odds with its 
new policies. It became apparent, however, that the UK was bound by multiple 
obligations to safeguard full freedom of association and, moreover, that multiple 
denunciations would be likely to cause unacceptable damage to the interests of 
the Government in domestic party political terms, and adversely affect British 
prestige and British interests on the international plane.  
                                               
405
See chapters 2, 4 and 7. 
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Rather than proclaim formally to the world its abandonment of treaty 
commitments, it chose instead to breach those labour relations obligations it 
considered politically inexpedient to renounce, and to ‘ride out’ any subsequent 
condemnation. 
 Called to account, its approach now is to variously ignore, obfuscate, and to 
question, either implicitly or explicitly, the authority of the supervisory body to 
which it is required to answer. Almost argumentative when responding to the 
European Social Charter’s European committee on Social Rights and the UN 
Committee on Economic and Social and Cultural Rights, it is more cautious where 
the ILO’s Committee of Experts is concerned and it is overtly respectful of the 
Committee on Freedom of Association.  Real respect, however, is reserved for the 
Strasbourg Court. It has always – if tardily – changed the law in response to 
adverse rulings by the European Court of Human Rights. Compliance will, 
however, often still be questionable, and the process often overshadows the 
specific issue at hand, accompanied as it often is, with undignified, and usually ill 
informed, threats by members of the Government to either denounce the 
Convention or withdraw from the Council of Europe.    
Unfortunately for the Government, however, since the start of the 21st Century 
where labour rights are concerned, this supra-national jurisprudence has been at 
its most influential. At Strasbourg a new ‘integrated’ approach has invigorated the 
interpretation of Article 11 ECHR,406 and the Court places particular reliance on 
ILO Conventions, the provisions of its sister instrument, the Charter, and the 
interpretation of those rights by the Committee on Freedom of Association, the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
and the European Social Rights Committee. On occasions it refers to the UN 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, to the findings of the UN 
Committee, and to the EU Charter of Fundamental Right and Freedoms. In 
contrast to the use of the European Social Charter in the Belgian Police Trilogy 
                                               
406 The identification of this integrated approach is credited to Virginia Mantouvalou (see ‘Work and Private Life: 
Sidabras and Dziautas v Lithuania’ (2005) 30 European Law Review 573), but Mantouvalou (in ‘Labour rights in the 
European Convention on Human rights: An Intellectual Justification for an integrated approach to interpretation,’ 
Human Rights Law Review, 2013, 529-555), gives credit to  Martin Scheinin (see Scheinin:  ‘Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights as Legal Rights’ in Eide, Krause and Rosas (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2002). 
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(see chapter one) this positive, inclusive, approach, has led the Strasbourg Court 
to interpret Article 11 as protecting the right to bargain collectively and its 
corollary, the right to strike. 
During the same period in the UK a new generation of senior judges, more 
conscious than their predecessors of British obligations under international and 
regional treaties, and obliged by the Human Rights Act 1998 to take account of 
the ECtHR jurisprudence, have been moved to provide workers a measure of 
protection against the statutory restrictions that had been imposed on freedom 
of association. While the traditional antipathy of the judiciary for trade unionists 
cannot be said to be a thing of the past, this new approach will perhaps at least 
give those judges less willing to shake off the constraints of the common law, and 
their individualistic prejudices, pause for thought. 
The drafting of Article 11 ECHR 
 
With the benefit of 70 years of hindsight it might seem remarkable that the Attlee 
Government, advised by Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin that it ‘treat with strict 
reserve any schemes for the pooling of sovereignty or for the establishment of 
European supranational machinery,’407passed over the opportunity to enshrine 
explicit protections for the right to bargain collectively in what was to become 
Article 11 of the European Court of Human Rights.  
 
 As one of the leading figures of the British delegation at Strasbourg, David 
Maxwell Fyfe, put it:  
 
‘The Europe of 1950 was avid for British leadership....our position as the 
holders of the conscience of European civilisation in the black years of the 
war gave Britain her fantastic reputation among our European friends.’408 
 
                                               
407 TNA CAB 128-16-19, Cabinet meeting, 27 October 1949, p55. 
408 A Political Adventure, The Memoirs of Viscount Kilmuir, 1964, p186. Maxwell-Fyfe was very critical of the 
attitude of the Attlee cabinet and of senior Conservatives, and considered that Britain had thrown away a great 
opportunity to take a leading role in Europe. For an argument that the Tories at Strasbourg sought to undermine 
UK post war collectivism with individual rights see Marco Duranti, ‘Curbing Labour’s totalitarian temptation: 
European human rights law as a Conservative political project’ (2013) History and Policy. 
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Such was the respect accorded HMG that the Committee of Human Rights Experts 
was invited by the Secretariat General of the Council of Europe to pay particular 
attention to British criticism of the UN draft international Bill of Rights.  
 
Unfortunately the UK preferred to qualify the rights and freedoms in both 
instruments as heavily as possible, and the British delegation’s most significant 
contribution to Article 11 was a negative one. It ensured, in collaboration with the 
other Northern European states which relied on comparatively ‘light touch’  
industrial relations arrangements (and arguably ‘closed shop’ union membership 
agreements are the inevitable and desirable consequence in such 
circumstances),409 that a right not to be required to associate was not included in 
Article 11. This ‘Anglo- Nordic’ alliance, sought to ensure that states could not be 
required to intervene in industrial relations beyond the provision of legislation 
required to guarantee a bare freedom to organise and associate. 
 
The Attlee cabinet had become wary of wording which left undue scope for 
judicial or quasi judicial creativity. In April 1949, after having discussed the 
possible prosecution under Order 1305 of the leaders of the unofficial and official 
strikes then affecting the London docks, believed by some of the cabinet to have 
been triggered by communist ‘agitators’ seeking to undermine both the 
government and the T&GWU,410 ‘some anxiety was expressed’ by Ministers over 
ILO Convention No.87. The instrument had been drafted ‘in very general 
terms,’411and they worried that ‘it might be found that it unduly restricted the 
Government’s freedom of action in dealing with illegal strikes inspired by political, 
rather than industrial objectives.’412 
 
                                               
409
Highly structured systems of industrial relations will ensure through regulation that employers recognise trade 
unions through, for example, statutory recognition procedures or state sponsored sectoral unions. Under 
conditions of ‘collective laissez faire’ workers are left to ensure that recalcitrant employers bargain with them with 
the threat of direct action by their employees and secondary action, often through the ‘blacking of that employer’s 
products by members in firms with which the employer deals. Solidarity may be ensured by obliging such 
employers to employ only union members, as in Quinn v Leathem, op cit). 
410 TNA Cabinet Conclusions CAB 128-15 -27, p155-7. In fact almost all of the industrial action orchestrated by the 
unofficial Port Workers’ Committees after 1945 was undertaken in aid of the very modest improvements in terms 
and conditions demanded by ‘The Dockers’ Charter,’ (see Jim Phillips 1994, op cit) 
411
Principally under the influence of the British delegation (see the Minister of Labour commending C87 to his 
colleagues below). 
412 TNA Cabinet Conclusions CAB 128-15-27, p158. 
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HM Government pressed for obligations under the UN instrument to be 
expressed ‘in clear and precise terms,’ a demand the British representatives on 
the Committee of Experts were to make of the draft Convention.  
 
The Committee of Experts ultimately produced two drafts of what became Article 
11 ECHR, the Anglo-Nordic ‘precise definition’ version based on the heavily 
qualified UK draft of Article 19 of the UN Covenant, and a comparatively simple 
three point article protecting freedom of assembly, association, which included 
the right to form and join trade unions and the right to not be forced to join an 
association.413 The Anglo-Nordic version dispensed with the negative right of 
association, but failed to mention trade unions.414 
 
The Ministers asked a Conference of Senior Officials, to amalgamate the two 
versions.415 The Report of the Senior Officials noted of the final version of Article 
11 ECHR that a compromise had been struck: 
 
‘In this Article, the conference has introduced express reference to the right 
to form trade unions, so as to bring this article into conformity with the 
United Nations Universal Declaration. On account of the difficulties raised 
by the ‘closed shop system’ in certain countries, the Conference in this 
connection considered that it was undesirable to introduce into the 
Convention a rule under which ‘no one may be compelled to belong to an 
association’ which features in the United Nations Universal Declaration.’416 
The British delegation had also opposed the establishment of a court. This too 
resulted in a compromise, the provision of the ‘optional articles,’ Article 25 and 
Article 46. If ratified, Article 25 gave citizens given the right of individual petition, 
and Article 46 saw the state acknowledge the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
court. The Strasbourg Court heard its first cases in 1959, and the UK ratified the 
two optional Articles in 1966. 
 
                                               
413 They produced two versions of the Convention. 
414 To Articles 8 -11 of the ECHR. All of these Articles are subject to the British qualification, although the 
formulation varies slightly between each one. 
415
 Agreed at the Committee of Ministers’ third Session 30 March – 1 April 1950. The Senior Officials convened 8-17 
June 1950.  
416
 Ibid, p11 and the Report of 19 June 1950 of the Conference of Senior Officials,Collected Edition of the Traveux 
Preparatoires’, vol IV, p 262. (the TP was cited in Young, James & Webster, op cit, para 51). 
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The European Social Charter 
 
 For those states which had chosen to accept the jurisdiction of the Court, there 
was a considerable discrepancy between the robust protections afforded the 
Convention rights and the reporting procedures of the Convention’s sister 
instrument, the European Social Charter.  
 
So feeble was the Charter’s monitoring programme that the Foreign Office, in a 
memorandum on the Charter supposedly written by Foreign Secretary,  Alec 
Douglas – Home,417 which was presented to the cabinet in October 1961,418 did 
not trouble Ministers with any details of the supervisory regime.  
It did, however, note with palpable approval that the declaratory Part I of the 
Charter had only  
‘...to be accepted by all Contracting Parties as ‘aims of policy.’ No date is 
mentioned for fulfilment of the aims, and there is no requirement to report 
on them.’   419 
Inconsequential as that seemingly open ended commitment appears to have been 
regarded in 1961 by the Macmillan Government, wedded as it was to the post 
war compromise and to collective bargaining, these aims have arguably been an 
embarrassment to the post 1979 administrations committed to withdrawing full 
freedom of association and isolating the individual worker.  
Since 1965, when the Charter came into force, the Government has been required 
by the first sentence in Part I of the Charter, to ‘accept as the aim of their policy, 
to be pursued by all appropriate means, both national and international in 
character, the attainment of conditions in which the following rights and 
principles may be effectively realised’: 
                                               
417 The Foreign Secretary then had the hereditary title of Lord Home, but as Alec Douglas Home he was Prime 
Minister for a year after Macmillan’s October 1963 resignation. 
418
‘The European Social Charter, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs’,  7 October 1961, para 
2 (TNA CAB 129/107/6).  
419 Annex A ‘Comments on the Provisions of the Charter’, Para 2. 
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1: Everyone shall have the opportunity to earn his living in an occupation freely 
entered upon. 
2: All workers have the right to just conditions of work. 
3: All workers have the right to safe and healthy working conditions. 
4: All workers have the right to a fair remuneration sufficient for a decent standard 
of living for themselves and their families. 
5: All workers and employers have the right to freedom of association in national 
or international organisations for the protection of their economic and social inter-
ests. 
6: All workers and employers have the right to bargain collectively. 
and 
8: Employed women, in case of maternity, and other employed women as 
appropriate, have the right to a special protection in their work.420 
What were mandatory ‘aims of policy’ in 1965 arguably be seen as binding 
obligations in 2019, and a requirement that all workers and employers should 
have the right to bargain collectively would appear unequivocally to oblige the 
government to guarantee any worker the right to have his or her terms and 
conditions of employment negotiated by a trade union.421  
In Part II of the Charter, the 19 aims of policy were expanded upon in 19 articles.  
These did have to be reported upon, although certain of those rights that 
Governments were as yet unable or unwilling to guarantee could be set aside, the 
prospects for their ratification to being subject to review during the reporting 
cycle under the terms of Article 22. A minimum of 10 of the 19 articles had to be 
ratified, but the opportunity for states to choose what they were bound by went 
                                               
420 These are the 8 of the 19 provisions that relate to the workers’ rights considered in this dissertation. 
421 Para 6 of Part I, along with the mandatory Article 6 of Part II, which makes the same demand, which involves 
the fulfilment of paras 6(1) - (4). The ever patient ECSR has yet to take this uncompromising line with ratifying 
states, although, as the first Statement of Interpretation on Article 6 put it: ‘This article seeks to ensure that both 
employers and workers can exercise the right to bargain collectively’ (emphasis supplied, Conclusions I, 01/1/1965-
31/12/1967). 
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further than that - each article comprised of numbered paragraphs which could be 
excluded providing a minimum of 45 numbered paragraphs were accepted in total.  
However, of the accepted articles, at least five had to be selected in their entirety 
from among the seven ‘core’ articles. 
The Articles are immediate obligations, and were treated as such. The UK 
Government adopted its standard approach of committing itself only to those 
provisions with which current UK law or practice could be said to be compliant. 
Having consulted with the Ministry of Labour, the Foreign Secretary was able to 
provide a commentary on which of the substantive Articles could be accepted and 
which could not. He emphasised to his colleagues that what the Foreign Office 
called ‘restrictions’ – equivalent to the Article 8-11 ECHR paragraph 2 
qualifications permitting state infringement of those right in certain 
circumstances – were permitted,422 and that the rights could, in accord with 
voluntarism, be implemented by collective agreement if coverage was such that it 
secured enjoyment of the right for the ‘great majority’ of workers.423 
All the provisions deemed to be in accord with UK law or practice, and therefore 
acceptable, were ultimately ratified. 
 Crucially, however, those paragraphs where compliance was reliant upon the 
existence of collective agreement covering the ‘great majority of workers’ now 
arguably demand either fresh agreement to secure the rights in question in 
practice, or legislation to secure those rights as black letter law. All post 1979 UK 
administrations have been in breach of Article 6 paragraphs 2 & 3, which require 
the government to promote collective bargaining and bargaining machinery.  
Article 1, one of the ‘compulsory’ core Articles, on ‘the right to work,’ includes a 
commitment to ‘the attainment of full employment,’ and the right ‘to earn a living 
in an occupation freely entered upon: 
‘With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to work, the 
Contracting Parties undertake:  
                                               
422
 Under Article 31. 
423Article 33. 
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1) to accept as one of the their primary aims and responsibilities the 
achievement and maintenance of as high and stable a level of employment 
as possible, with a view to the attainment of full employment; 
 2) to protect effectively the right of the worker to earn his living in an 
occupation freely entered upon; 
 3) to establish or maintain free employment services for all workers;  
4) to provide or promote appropriate vocational guidance, training and 
rehabilitation.’ 
 Article 1 was said to be acceptable. No comment was made on the explicitly 
neutral approach to the ‘closed shop’ specified in the Annex to Part II of the 
Charter. 
 Article 2, on ‘the right to just conditions of work’ states that;  
‘With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to just conditions 
of work, the Contracting Parties undertake:  
1) to provide for reasonable daily and weekly working hours, the working 
week to be progressively reduced to the extent that the increase of 
productivity and other relevant factors permit;  
2) to provide for public holidays with pay;  
3) to provide for a minimum of two weeks annual holiday with pay;  
4) to provide for additional paid holidays or reduced working hours for 
workers engaged in dangerous or unhealthy occupations as prescribed;  
5) to ensure a weekly rest period which shall, as far as possible, coincide 
with the day recognised by tradition or custom in the country or region 
concerned as a day of rest.’  
Paragraphs 2, 3 and 5, on the provision of paid holidays and weekly rest were 
considered acceptable. Collective agreement secured these rights for the great 
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majority, and the Working Time Regulations largely serve to secure those rights 
today. Paragraph 1 requiring ‘reasonable hours’ and the progressive reduction of 
the working week, was not deemed suitable for ratification 
‘as it anticipates the course of collective bargaining which is traditionally a 
matter left to Employers and Workers in the United Kingdom.’ 
  Paragraph 4, committing the UK to the provision of extra ‘time off’ for those 
engaged on dangerous or unhealthy work, on which the case for acceptance was 
said to rest ‘on the terms of section 60 of the Factories Act 1937, and the 
limitations on hours in coal mines,’ was ultimately accepted, arguably a mistake 
given that the UK is currently held to be in breach of 2(4) (see chapter 6). 
Article 3 – The right to safe and healthy working conditions:  
‘With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to safe and 
healthy working conditions, the Contracting Parties undertake:  
1) to issue safety and health regulations;  
2) to provide for the enforcement of such regulations by measures of 
supervision;  
3) to consult, as appropriate, employers' and workers' organisations on 
measures intended to improve industrial safety and health.’  
Article 3 was said to ‘present no difficulty for the United Kingdom...The Article 
implies no obligation to issue safety and health regulations for all spheres of 
employment.’ 
 Article 4 – The right to a fair remuneration  
‘With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to a fair 
remuneration, the Contracting Parties undertake:  
1) to recognise the right of workers to a remuneration such as will give 
them and their families a decent standard of living;  
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2) to recognise the right of workers to an increased rate of remuneration 
for overtime work, subject to exceptions in particular cases;  
3) to recognise the right of men and women workers to equal pay for work 
of equal value;  
4) to recognise the right of all workers to a reasonable period of notice for 
termination of employment;  
5) to permit deductions from wages only under conditions and to the 
extent prescribed by national laws or regulations or fixed by collective 
agreements or arbitration awards.  
The exercise of these rights shall be achieved by freely concluded collective 
agreements, by statutory wage fixing machinery, or by other means 
appropriate to national conditions.’ 
Ensuring the right to fair remuneration, which requires the provision of wage 
sufficient for a decent standard of living, increased rates for overtime (para 2), 
and reasonable notice on termination (para 4), was said to pose ‘no problem.’ 
Today, however, again largely by reason of the decline in collective agreement 
coverage in the UK, the UK is held by the European Committee on Social Rights to 
be in breach of 4(2) and 4(4). Although the committee has yet to rule on 4(1), 
pending the provision of more information by the Government, it is clearly also in 
breach that paragraph too (see chapter 6). 
 A commitment by the Government to the ‘equal pay’ demanded by Article 4 (3) 
was considered unacceptable  
‘because there is no Equal Pay among the Government’s own industrial 
employees or among the domestic grades of hospital staff.’  
Paragraph 3 has yet to be ratified, although there can be no doubt that the UK is 
now compliant. The acceptance of Article 4 (5) on wage deductions was said to be 
dependent upon what was decided following the then current review of the Truck 
Acts, but it was ultimately accepted. Today the UK is held by the ECSR to be in 
breach of para 5 (see chapter 6).  
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No comment was made, nor in 1961 was any necessary, on the last, unnumbered 
paragraph in Article 4.  
Article 5 – The right to organise:  
‘With a view to ensuring or promoting the freedom of workers and 
employers to form local, national or international organisations for the 
protection of their economic and social interests and to join those 
organisations, the Contracting Parties undertake that national law shall not 
be such as to impair, nor shall it be so applied as to impair, this freedom. 
The extent to which the guarantees provided for in this article shall apply to 
the police shall be determined by national laws or regulations. The principle 
governing the application to the members of the armed forces of these 
guarantees and the extent to which they shall apply to persons in this 
category shall equally be determined by national laws or regulations.’  
This, the second ‘compulsory’ Article, Article 5 on the right to organise was 
deemed acceptable. HMG is required to ensure or promote the freedom of 
workers to the form of unions and ‘national law shall not be such as to impair, nor 
shall it be so applied to impair this freedom.’ The similarity of the wording to 
Article 8(2) and 9(1) of ILO Convention No. 87 was noted.  
Article 6 – The right to bargain collectively  
‘With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to bargain 
collectively, the Contracting Parties undertake:  
1) to promote joint consultation between workers and employers;  
2) to promote, where necessary and appropriate, machinery for voluntary 
negotiations between employers or employers' organisations and workers' 
organisations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of 
employment by means of collective agreements;  
3) to promote the establishment and use of appropriate machinery for 
conciliation and voluntary arbitration for the settlement of labour disputes; 
and recognise:  
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4) the right of workers and employers to collective action in cases of 
conflicts of interest, including the right to strike, subject to obligations that 
might arise out of collective agreements previously entered into.’ 
This third ‘compulsory’ article was also considered acceptable to HMG. 
Paragraphs 1-3 require the government to promote consultation, collective 
bargaining and bargaining machinery. Clearly UK governments have long 
neglected these obligations. The ECSR, however, is ostensibly currently waiting for 
further information on this matter, having so far received only obfuscatory 
comments from HMG. There can, of course, be no question that the UK is in 
breach of paras 2 and 3.  
Paragraph 4, recognising the right to strike, was said to have given “rise to 
considerable discussion” during the negotiations. The memo noted – inaccurately 
– that ‘[t]he Charter will be the first international instrument adopted to 
recognise this right,’424 and, emphasising that acceptance means only 
‘recognition’ of the right by the Government, and that it is not ‘an unqualified 
right,’ Ministers were assured that: 
‘Our own acceptance of the text rests on the [Article 31] exceptions 
allowed... there would, for example, be no obligation on the Government 
to declare legal strikes called in contravention of collective agreements.’425 
Article 8 – The right of employed women to protection  
‘With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right of employed 
women to protection, the Contracting Parties undertake:  
1) to provide either by paid leave, by adequate social security benefits or by 
benefits from public funds for women to take leave before and after 
childbirth up to a total of at least 12 weeks;  
                                               
424 Convention 87 implicitly acknowledges the right to strike. 
425 Para 10. Recognition by HMG of the right to strike was a considerable step, and this example of illegal strikes in 
breach of collective agreement might be considered odd given that in the UK collective agreements have rarely 
been legally enforceable. This may well, however, have reflected views on policy which manifested themselves in 
the Industrial Relations Act 1971 (the Tories were defeated in the October 1964 election and returned to power in 
June 1970),  which provided for enforceable collective agreements and lifted the statutory immunities when 
strikes were called in breach of such agreement . 
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2) to consider it as unlawful for an employer to give a woman notice of 
dismissal during her absence on maternity leave or to give her notice of 
dismissal at such a time that the notice would expire during such absence;  
3) to provide that mothers who are nursing their infants shall be entitled to 
sufficient time off for this purpose;  
4) (a) to regulate the employment of women workers on night work in 
industrial employment;  
(b) to prohibit the employment of women workers in underground mining, 
and, as appropriate, on all other work which is unsuitable for them by 
reason of its dangerous, unhealthy, or arduous nature.’ 
Of Article 8, only paragraphs 1 & 4, requiring the provision of a minimum of 12 
weeks adequate pre and post natal maternity pay or benefit, and a prohibition on 
women being employed in dangerous or underground work were considered 
acceptable.  Paragraph 4 was denounced in 1986. Paragraph 2, prohibiting those 
on maternity leave being given notice, and paragraph 3, requiring nursing 
mothers to be given time off, were not considered acceptable, on the grounds 
that fresh legislation would be required.  
The Retreat from the European Social Charter commitments 
 
The process of monitoring the respect of states for these substantive rights has 
not changed markedly since the Charter first came into force. Government 
reports on their implementation and exercise are submitted to the European 
Committee on Social Rights (previously known as the Committee of Independent 
Experts), and to the national representatives of workers and employers.426  
Initially these were submitted every two years, but since 2006 an annual report 
has been submitted on one of four ‘thematic areas’.427 After the reports – and any 
accompanying comments that the unions or employers wish to make known to 
the Committee - have been examined by the Committee their Conclusions are 
sent to the Consultative Assembly, and to the Governmental Committee. A sub 
                                               
426
 Article 23 ESC. 
427
 For example, the Conclusions of the committee on the 2015 report on health and safety rights in group 2 were 
thus handed down in December 2017 and will be published in January 2018.  
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committee of the Governmental Committee comprising of a representative from 
each Government, accompanied by representatives from internationally 
accredited domestic trade union and employers’ organisations will then examine 
them. The sub committee then presents its own conclusions, along with those of 
the ECSR, to the Committee of Ministers,428which then considers both sets.  
 
Until 1992 the views expressed by the Consultative Assembly on the ECSR’s 
Conclusions were considered by the Ministers alongside those Conclusions, and 
those of the sub committee.429 The Ministers may then, according to Article 29 of 
the Charter, subject to a two thirds majority being achieved in each particular 
case, hand down “any necessary recommendations” to errant Governments.430 
 
However the Ministers did not, before the amending Turin Protocol of 1991, 
make any such individual recommendations. Such a step required a two thirds 
majority of all Council of Europe states, and it never proved possible to obtain 
that majority. 
 
The protocol sought to remedy this by streamlining the supervisory procedure, to 
give it the modest political bite that had originally been envisaged. The protocol 
also made it clear that the ECSR had sole responsibility for deciding whether 
states were or were not in compliance with the Charter (and therefore the 
interpretation of the provisions), and that the Governmental Committee’s role 
was restricted to suggesting to the Ministers the most effective recommendation 
to be adopted based on the national situation in a particular state.  
 
As an amending protocol it required the ratification of all of the states then bound 
by the Charter. Unfortunately the UK, Germany, Denmark, and Luxembourg have 
so far failed to ratify it, stopping it from entering into force. Despite this, the 
Committee of Ministers has, in collaboration with the Assembly, implemented the 
provisions of the protocol, and the position now is that, with a two thirds majority 
of those states (abstentions no longer being no longer allowed to effectively 
count as a vote against such a step), the Committee can adopt a Resolution at the 
end of each reporting cycle, which may contain Recommendations. If there is no 
satisfactory response then, at the instigation of the Governmental Committee, 
and another two thirds majority being achieved, then an Individual 
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 Article 27 ESC. 
429
 Article 28 ESC. 
430 Article 29 ESC. 
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Recommendation will be handed down to the errant state.431 This unusual 
situation, whereby a protocol ostensibly successfully blocked by four states has 
nevertheless been given effect, has been downplayed by all involved.432 
 
The Turin Protocol had its origins in the negotiations which had commenced in 
very early 1980s, with the intention of revising and revitalising the Charter,433 and 
which also led to the 1988 Additional Protocol (ETS No. 128).  
 
That instrument extended the reach of the 1961 Charter to cover require states to 
guarantee equal treatment in employment on grounds of sex; a right of workers 
to information and consultation, as well as to involvement in the improvement of 
working conditions at establishment level, and to provide social protection to the 
elderly. Negotiated by the UK on the proviso that it would not be obliged to sign 
or ratify the instrument, the official reason for non-ratification was dissatisfaction 
with ‘the precise wording’ of the rights. The Additional Protocol came into force 
when the third ratification was made in 1992. Of our Government’s allies in the 
amending protocol episode, Denmark signed and ratified on the same day in 
1996, and Germany and Luxembourg signed when the instrument opened for 
signature, but have yet to ratify. The UK has neither signed nor ratified the 
protocol. 
 
In contrast to the desire evinced by the Attlee, Churchill and Eden governments 
for precise obligations to be laid down in supra national instruments, it appears 
that the Thatcher and Major governments much preferred the scope for 
obfuscation that the more general obligations in the 1961 Charter provide. This 
was evinced when the comparatively precise obligations of Article 4(1) of the 
Charter caused something of a panic at Whitehall in 1982 before the Thatcher 
government had gauged quite how far it go in breaching the rule of law. 
                                               
431 See Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Resolution ChS(95)2 On the Implementation of the European 
Social Charter During the Period 1991-92 (13th supervision cycle – part II) Adopted by the Committee of Ministers o 
14 December 1995 at the 522nd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies. 
432The official Council of Europe website describes the position thus: “The reporting system is set out in Part IV of 
the 1961 Charter as amended by the 1991 Turin Protocol (ETS No.142), which is applied on the basis of a decision 
taken by the Committee of Ministers.” Council of Europe, Reporting System of European Social Charter 
(www.coe.int). 
433
Reading the civil service files on the early negotiations it is notable that there is an assumption by civil servants 
that a revision of the Charter will be a good thing, and that HMG is in favour of strengthening state obligation and 
the power of the Committee. 
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Then concerns were raised that the withdrawal of certain of the responsibilities of 
the Wages Councils in accord with the government’s ‘stepping stones’ attrition of 
collectivism would breach the European Social Charter obligations. It was noted 
that Article 4(1) requires fair remuneration, and that the government was 
required to ensure that the ‘exercise of this right shall be achieved by freely 
concluded collective agreements, by statutory wage fixing machinery or by other 
means appropriate to national conditions,’ and that the effect of the proposals 
would be to leave overtime rates, equal pay, notice periods and deductions for 
very many workers protected neither by collective agreement, the Wages 
Councils, or any other method.434 
The Ministry also reported that the proposals might result in a breach of ILO 
Convention No 26 on Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery, and that  
‘...views are being sought on the acceptability under IL[O] Convention 26 of 
any move to exclude the groups [from Works Council coverage]. Should the 
answer be in the affirmative we will need to consider quickly whether there 
are any other major international considerations or obstacles to be 
overcome (we have assumed the Social Charter would not have the same 
force as the Convention)...’ 435 
By March 1984 the Department had realised that the ILO would not be amenable 
to changing the Convention to suit the British government, but felt that restricting 
‘the powers of the Councils to the setting of a single minimum rate for 
adults, coupled with provision for preventing minimum rates for young 
people rising above a specified proportion of the adult rate could be 
defended as compatible with IL[O] Convention 26.’436 
Effectively they felt that the government could breach the Convention and bluster 
in response to the Committee of Experts;  
                                               
434Emphasis supplied. See the Department of Employment file ‘Council of Europe European Social Charter Wage 
Councils and international obligations’ in TNA LAB 10/2969 from which this and subsequent passages have been 
taken. 
435
Iibid, Note by JA Dyble 16 February 1982. 
436Ibid, draft memorandum ‘by the Secretary of State’ for Employment. 
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‘there are grounds for thinking that we should be unlikely to incur serious 
criticism....The TUC might well lodge a complaint with the ILO but we would 
have good counter arguments.’437 
 However, the matter was obviously reconsidered, and the Convention was 
denounced in July 1985, while Article 4(1) of the European Social Charter, not 
having ‘the same force as the Convention,’ was simply ignored. 
In 1988 officials at the Department of Employment noted, in relation to the 
proposed abolition of the Wages Councils, that ‘[t]here are no relevant EC 
Directives, and we have denounced the relevant ILO Convention.’ 438The ‘heavy 
hitters’ were out of the way. 
Where the European Social Charter was concerned it was admitted that 
‘I think we might have to concede (privately at any rate) that a finding by 
the Committee of Experts [now the European Committee on Social Rights] 
that by abolishing Wages Councils we were in breach of our obligations 
under Article 4:2 would be well founded. How seriously should it be 
regarded?’ 
 The author stated that the Charter supervisory procedures were very different 
from those of the ILO. It was emphasised that there were no Eastern Bloc 
member states, or worker representatives, able to take the opportunity to 
lambast the Government. Moreover: 
‘The sanctions are the informal ones arising from the embarrassment which 
member states feel at being found in breach of their obligations by a 
European organisation-of which the UK was a founder member and has 
fully supported over the years. Such embarrassment would be felt most 
directly by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, which has lead 
responsibility for our relations with the Council of Europe, particularly as 
HMG takes the general line that we should strictly comply with our 
international obligations.’ Denunciation ‘would certainly not be well 
received in the Council of Europe, and it might be preferable for us to bear 
                                               
437
Ibid. 
438 Convention No.26 on Wage Fixing Machinery of 1928. 
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with the criticism of infringement rather than incur the odium of further 
denunciation.’439   
 
While adverse findings would assist domestic critics of abolition ‘and arguably 
lend force to the charge that the Government is selective in its observance of its 
international obligations,’ it was concluded that a finding of non compliance by 
the supervisory committee would merely be ‘regrettable,’ and that it would be 
appropriate to consult the FCO were it decided to abolish the Works Councils. 
 
Another Department of Employment brief reassured colleagues and the minister 
that the Charter  
‘has no complaints machinery and is not a tripartite body where the trade 
unions can raise complaints. The Council [of Europe] supervisory machinery 
which monitors whether member state[s] are meeting their Charter 
obligations operates on the basis of reports submitted to it by member 
states not in response to complaints.’ 
 The slowness of the reporting cycle was also seen to blunt the repercussions of a 
breach, and it was noted that the Government report mentioning abolition need 
not be submitted until ‘mid or late 1990 and the comments of the Council’s 
Committee of Experts on that report would not be available until late 1991,’ by 
which time they would be very old news. 
The brief also revealed how the lack of political bite had permitted the 
Government to undermine the authority of the Committee. Extraordinarily the 
official admitted that they had found that they were able to rely on their own 
assessment of compliance:  
‘In practice we do not regard the Experts’ views on the application of 
particular Charter provisions as definitive. We examine their findings on 
their merits and normally respond by submitting further arguments to 
support our view that UK law and practice meets the Charter obligation.’ 
                                               
439
 TNA LAB 10/2969. From papers by WRB Robinson Overseas Division Department of Employment 29 January and 
29 February 1988. Articles 8.4(a) European Social Charter on night work and 84(b) on underground work had been 
denounced and it was considered that a “further tranche of denunciations” would be a step too far. 
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 With remarkable cynicism it was stated that: 
‘The Government has only found it necessary to denounce Charter 
provisions where in its own judgement a measure proposed by the UK was 
clearly contrary to Charter requirements... Abolition of Wages Councils 
certainly does not fall into this category in respect of the Charter 
obligations...To set in train the denunciation of the relevant charter 
obligations now on the basis that abolition would involve a breach would 
unnecessarily concede a debating point to the opposition... In general the 
UK pursues a policy of complying fully with its obligations... although there 
are a number of issues of varying importance on which we have not 
accepted the Experts conclusions of non-compliance, it is more difficult for 
us to do so if we are removing a previously cited means of compliance...’440 
 
After 1988 denunciation was employed only on one other occasion. Ultimately, all 
the remaining Wages Councils with the exception of the Agricultural Wages Board 
were abolished in 1993, when notice was given of the denunciation of the two 
industry specific conventions.441  Arguably the Major government had decided to 
minimise the adverse reaction by muddying the waters – the treaty obligations in 
respect of the Wages Councils were breached at the same time as two of the 
more minor related conventions were denounced. This might at least suggest 
some degree of residual respect for the rule of law. The AWB was ultimately 
abolished in 2012. 
 
The UK was able to effectively depart from the evolution of the Charter when the 
Tory government rejected – along with Germany, Denmark, and Luxembourg - the 
Collective Complaints Procedure which was adopted in 1995 and came into force 
in 1998. New Labour evinced no interest in the initiative.442 
 
The Protocol on the Collective Complaints Procedure has been ratified by France, 
Greece, Portugal, Italy, Belguim, Bulgaria, Ireland, Finland, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Croatia, Norway, Slovenia, Cyprus, and the Czech Republic. The Protocol 
                                               
440 TNA LAB 10/2969, WRB Robinson, 8 February 1988.  
441 Convention No.99, Minimum Wage Machinery (Agriculture) 1951, which had been ratified in 1953, and 
Convention No.101, Holidays with Pay (Agriculture) ratified in 1956. 
442The files on the Revised Charter, and the Complaints Procedures, and the Additional Protocol, although released 
to the National Archive and listed by them, have been withheld by the FCO. The FCO refused to release them to me 
when I made a Freedom of information request in 2018 claiming, unconvincingly, that the files contained only the 
instruments in question. 
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can be said to have substituted enforcement for mere monitoring, and the 
reporting procedures have been eclipsed. A decision by Committee of Ministers 
saw, in 2006, a simplified reporting procedure introduced for those states which 
have ratified the Collective Complaints Protocol and thus permit their citizens 
direct access to the Committee. 
 
The revitalised ECSR can now be said to rival the ILO Committee of Experts and 
CFA, the Governmental Committee, and even the Strasburg Court, in the 
provision of authoritative, effectively binding determinations on the protections 
provided by the Charter.  
 
However, the 1961 Charter can also be said to have been eclipsed by the Revised 
Charter. This consolidated the 1988 Protocol and the 1961 Charter, added new 
rights, and made certain amendments. It opened for signature in 1996 and came 
into force after 3 ratifications in 1999.  It has been signed by the four dissenting 
states but has yet to be ratified by them. The revised Charter and the Collective 
Complaints procedure arguably amount, in effect, to a new Council of Europe 
labour and social rights regime which the UK has rejected. 
 
While, the evolving case law of the Complaints procedure and the provisions of 
the revised Charter inevitably influence the interpretation of the 1961 Charter by 
the ESRC, and to an extent the work of the Strasbourg Court, the ILO supervisory 
bodies, and, theoretically at least, that of the ECJ, that influence is indirect. 
 
British workers have, with remarkably little having been said on their behalf in 
Parliament, been denied the opportunity to call the Government directly to 
account for failing to guarantee a raft of rights that they have supposedly had the 
benefit of the past 50 years. 
 
The UN Instruments 
 
The UN Covenants, and the work of the Human Rights Committee and the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, have received considerably 
less publicity in the UK than the ILO and Council of Europe instruments and 
jurisprudence, although the UNICESCR has, since the establishment of the UN 
Committee on Economic and Social Rights in 1985, become a significant force. 
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The early contribution to the negotiations at the UN by the UK was an inglorious 
one. The British saw trade union rights as an associated but separate issue, and by 
January 1950, the UK delegation was arguing that the then current draft Article on 
freedom of association was satisfactory, dealing as it did ‘with the right of 
Association in a manner suitable to the nature of the Covenant.’ That meant that 
it failed to mention trade unions. It was argued that, with the revitalized ILO, and 
Conventions 87 and 98 in place, there was no need.443 
 
Essentially the Attlee government supported the creation of a clearly defined and 
binding, ‘International Covenant designed to ensure the observation of 
fundamental rights within the territories of signatories,’ but wanted to go no 
further than that. It wished to avoid any prospect of being obliged to act or to 
legislate, and it pressed for the incorporation of the widest qualifications to the 
guarantees of freedom of association in both the UN and Council of Europe 
instruments (the ECHR), and the ‘limitation clauses’ in the drafts of both were 
substantially expanded in response to amendments tabled by the UK. 
 
During 1950, however, it became apparent that, in contrast to the European 
Convention, economic and social rights were very likely to feature in the 
proposed Covenant. 
 
Consequently, in March 1951, Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison presented a 
memorandum to the cabinet,444 asking his colleagues 
 
‘whether our attitude during this next session of the Human Rights 
Commission should be one of continued co-operation aimed at obtaining 
the least objectionable draft or whether we should disengage from the 
exercise.’445 
 
The question was considered by the cabinet three weeks later, and Cabinet 
Secretary Norman Brook’s transcript of the discussion gives an extraordinary 
insight into the attitudes of ministers to the UN Covenant, and to the ECHR. 
 
                                               
443 7 January 1950 UK,E/CN.4/353/ Add.2  (The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Travaux Preparatoires Edited by Ben Saul, 2016, p53). 
444
TNA CAB 129-45-7 Cabinet Memorandum  by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 19 March 1951, paras 1 
&2. 
445Ibid, para 5. 
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On the UN Covenant Morrison admitted:  
 
‘I don’t know anything about this – except that we are in a mess. Started as 
anti-Soviet propaganda. As it goes on, it looks as though it will put us on the 
spot-especially re Colonies.’446 
 
The Lord Chancellor, Lord Jowitt described both the Covenant and the European 
Convention as the ‘...Work of cranks. Vague language – formulae by compromise,’ 
but stated that the UK had ratified the ECHR ‘for foreign policy reasons,’ and that 
if necessary he would support the ratification of the Covenant on the same 
grounds. However he was cautious: 
 
‘We have never before thus limited the sovereignty of our Parliament...if 
we go on, let’s look very narrowly at every article.’ 
 
Hugh Dalton [who had been a member of the Strasbourg delegation] reminded 
his colleagues that the UK had not accepted Article 46 of the ECHR: ‘On Council of 
Europe, have we not excluded jurisdiction of [the] court?’ 
 
Jowitt: ‘Yes: but we may be pressed to accept it later.’ 
 
Dalton: ‘In doing so we made it clear that we were satisfied with our law.’ 
 
Jowitt: ‘On UN Covenant: we have proposed some judicial power to pronounce 
whether our legislation is satisfactory [he was referring to the powers of 
enforcement and implementation that the UK favoured]. This therefore is much 
more dangerous than the Council of Europe.’ 
 
Morrison: ‘I am sceptical of foreign policy value. Totalitarian states will ignore it 
anyway [the Soviet Bloc opposed enforcement]. I would have preferred 
manifesto, vice [‘as a substitute for a’] covenant. I would wish to play it slow: get 
it so muddled that nothing will happen.’ 
 
Jowitt: ‘Stay in and make difficulties. Very difficult for us to walk out.’  
 
                                               
446TNA CAB 195-9-5, 12 April 1951 
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It is apparent that the cabinet were united in their opposition to outside 
interference, but that the maintenance of British prestige was of paramount 
importance. It is also apparent that Jowitt was acutely conscious of the potential 
of both the Convention and the Covenant to cause the Government problems in 
the future. 
 
 Later that year, however, a compromise that the British government could work 
with was agreed. At the Human Rights Commission’s Seventh Session, and with 
the help of representatives from the ILO, a draft Covenant on economic, social 
and cultural rights was completed. A report was submitted to the UN Economic 
and Social Council,447and after due consideration, the Council took the view that 
economic, social and cultural rights should be protected in a separate 
Covenant,448 and ultimately the General Assembly formally requested the Council 
to instruct the Commission to set about drafting two covenants.449 
 
Following the October 1951 election the Conservative Party formed a 
government. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden reported to the cabinet on the 
Covenants,450 recommending that the UK should support a civil rights covenant 
with precise obligations. However, like the Attlee cabinet, Eden argued that the 
government should merely ‘go along’ with the negotiation of economic and social 
rights and attempt to guide delegates towards producing some loosely drafted 
non binding instrument.451 
 
British enthusiasm for effective enforcement of the UNICCPR, appears to have 
faded as the provisions of the draft Covenant became more expansive and the 
1950s progressed.452 However, such was the broad nature of the post war 
consensus that by 1954 the UK delegation (under the direction of a Tory 
government) was arguing ‘that failure to mention trade union rights’ in the 
UNICCPR ‘could lead to an erroneous interpretation that these rights were not 
civil rights as well as economic or social rights.’ 
 
                                               
447Report E/1681 (and Corr. 1-4) 
448Resolution 384 (XIII) 29 August 1951. 
449Resolution 543 (VI) 5 February 1952. 
450
 TNA CAB 129-50-22, ‘Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs’, 10 March 1952. 
451
Ibid, para 2. Recommendation (c) was to ‘Continue to oppose the inclusion in either Covenant of an Article on 
‘self-determination of peoples’ as being out of place.’ 
452 See for example, Ibid para 9 
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 It was the recognition of this important principle which carried the day at the 
Human Right Commission, and explicit protection was afforded trade unions in 
the text. 453 Neither the UK delegation, nor the Human Rights Commission, can 
therefore be said to have considered freedom of association to be merely a right 
of the individual. 
 
 Moreover, the right to form or join trade unions ‘for the protection of his 
interests’ rather than the then current UNICESCR formulation ‘for the protection 
of his economic and social interests’ (‘promotion and protection’ was used in the 
final draft of the UNICESCR) was preferred on the grounds ‘that trade union 
organisations must often struggle for the protection of the civil rights as well as 
the economic and social rights of their members,’454 a choice which indicates clear 
support for political strikes. 
 
The inclusion of Convention 87 in the UNICCPR, long championed by the British, 
had been questioned on the grounds that international law forbade states from 
undermining one treaty by reference to another, and that its inclusion was 
therefore without purpose. However:  
 
‘it was emphasised that failure to make the suggested cross-reference 
could be interpreted as an indication that the United Nations overlooked or 
under-estimated the progress achieved in safeguarding trade union rights 
in international law. The proposal was finally adopted...’455  
 
This is particularly interesting because it indicates that Convention 87 was 
ultimately included to link the Article to progress in the sphere of industrial 
relations and international law, therefore to the evolving ILO jurisprudence on 
freedom of association and the right to organise. It will, of course, be recalled that 
the work of the ILO’s CEACR in securing the compliance of member states with 
the Convention was underway by 1948, and the CFA had since 1951 been 
handling complaints brought by trade unionists from states party to the 
fundamental Conventions.  
 
                                               
453
Saul, op cit, para 146.Nowak, (M Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, 2005), 
states that this was a UK motion – E/CN.4/L146;E/CN.4/SR.326,4f.  
454
Ibid, para 147 
455 Nowak 2005, op cit, p290. 
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The texts were released for inspection in 1963. The final drafts were completed in 
1966. The Covenants came into effect in 1976. 
 
Unfortunately, despite the fact that the only concerns of the Wilson Government 
in terms of compliance with either Covenants that I have been able to find in the 
National Archives relate to the possibility of the UK government being prevented 
from prohibiting private education, Britain failed to sign up for the Optional 
Protocol to the UNICCPR (there was then no equivalent economic and social OP), 
adopted by the UN along with the Covenants in 1976. 
In view of the enthusiasm evinced in the 1940s and 1950s by all administrations 
for a binding enforcement procedure it seems very likely that the escalating 
importance and influence of the ECtHR, the evolution of the Convention 
obligations (see below), and, perhaps, the ‘hooded men’ Northern Irish torture 
case Ireland v UK, lodged with the Commission in 1971, persuaded both the Heath 
and Wilson governments that it would not be in their interests, to ratify the 
protocol. 456  
 
Wilson had, of course, been prime minister when the UK submitted to the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the ECtHR, and had given citizens the right to petition 
in 1966. He can arguably be seen as something of a human rights pioneer, having 
presided over the government which first ratified Articles 25 and 46 ECHR, and 
which bound itself, and its successors, to the first specific race equality treaty 
obligations, and introduced the first workplace equality protections into UK law. 
The European Social Charter had, when it came into force in 1965, as we have 
seen, obliged the government to guarantee a right to work (Part I (1), and Part II 
Article 1), the right to just conditions of work (Part I (2) & Part II Article 2) and, in 
the preamble, a requirement that the ‘enjoyment of the rights be without 
discrimination on grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national 
extraction or social origin.’  
However, the Race Relations Act 1965, although aimed largely at public 
manifestations of racial hatred, had not provided workplace protection.  
                                               
456
 [1978] ECHR 1. On these extremely compromising and well documented practices in Northern Ireland, see Ian 
Cobain, Cruel Britannia: A Secret History of Torture (London, Portobello Books, 2012, pp135-203.. 
133 
 
Article 5 of the United Nations International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965was the first explicit supranational obligation 
to tackle workplace inequality. The Wilson government signed the Convention in 
1966. 
That obliges the government to protect the right to work, to equal pay for equal 
work, fair remuneration, just and favourable conditions of work ‘without 
distinction as to race, colour or national or ethnic origin.’457 Article 6 requires  
‘effective protection and remedies, through the competent national 
tribunals...as well as the right to seek from such tribunals, just and 
adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of 
such discrimination.’ 
In retrospect it is remarkable that in the UK, as late as 1968, Bob Hepple, in his 
important book Race Jobs and the Law in Britain, was able to ask:  
‘May a worker bring an action against an employer who refuses him 
employment on racial grounds? The answer is no.’ 458 
 
Legislative action was, however, in train. The Race Relations Act 1968 augmented 
the 1965 Act to make discrimination on racial grounds in employment or trade 
union activities unlawful, and the UK was able to ratify the UN Convention in 
March 1969.459 
However, to return to the UN Covenants, while neither the Heath or Wilson 
governments could reasonably have been said to be in breach of their UNICCPR 
                                               
457 Article 5(d)(i). 
458 (London, Allen Lane/Penguin, 1968) p109.  Hepple argued that workers had no protection against 
discrimination. He dismissed the European Social Charter on grounds that it ‘provides no right of individual 
complaint.’ Concerned both about the refusal of employment, and membership of a trade union where union 
security agreements were in place, Hepple took the view that the only recourse an aggrieved worker would have 
been the common law doctrine of restraint of trade, but that S3 Trade Union Act 1871 immunity would have 
intervened to protect a trade union against any action (p.125). Oddly, he ignored or overlooked the fact that after 
1966 any worker refused membership of a trade union on grounds of race would have had the theoretical option 
of taking the case to the ECtHR to complain of a failure of the government to extend the protection required by 
A11 and A14. 
459 See chapter two. 
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Article 22 obligations in respect of freedom of association, there can be no doubt 
that every administration since the first Thatcher government has been.  
Yet where freedom of association is concerned the UK, in contrast to the robust 
approach adopted by the ILO’s CFA and CEACR, has largely escaped the censure of 
the Human Rights Committee, a remarkable state of affairs when one considers 
the comparatively wide terms of Article 22, and the explicit reliance upon 
Convention 87 as a floor of rights. The UN Human Rights Committee has since 
1977 reviewed the state reports submitted every five years by the UK 
government, and makes ‘Concluding Observations’ which ultimately influence the 
General Comments addressed to all states party to the Covenant.  
Essentially the Covenant, the Committee, and the Optional Protocol have not had 
the impact that had been anticipated in the 1940s and 1950s when a legally 
binding and rigorously enforced – rather than merely ’implemented’ - 
’International Bill of Rights’ had been envisaged, even for those states which have 
accepted the Optional Protocol. 
Under the ‘OP’ individual complaints, euphemistically termed ‘communications,’ 
can be submitted to the HRC when internal avenues have been exhausted. If the 
complaint is found to be admissible, the case is considered, and the opinion of the 
Committee published as a ‘view.’ Breaches may result in a non binding ‘order’ 
from the HRC to rectify the situation, and although it has been rightly 
acknowledged that these cases ‘have created a considerable and important body 
of doctrine related to the ICCPR,’ to be found in both HRC published material like 
the annual reports, and in ‘a handful of scholarly articles and books,’ the practical 
impact of the OP as been slight:  
‘Only occasionally do views figure in a discursive way in judicial opinions of 
state courts…however valuable for the relatively small number of individual 
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beneficiaries” the OP “has not made a significant contribution to the 
development of the human rights movement.’460 
The individual complaints procedure of the UNCESCR might be said to offer rather 
more to those seeking to enforce the extensive labour rights the instrument 
obliges states to guarantee. 
The economic and social rights OP is unarguably a product of the post Cold War 
acknowledgement of the artificiality of the division between the two sets of 
covenant rights.  Ultimately adopted by the UN Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural rights in 2008, the OP had been the subject of negotiation since 
shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall - 1990.461There had been no prospect of 
the Conservatives acceding to the complaints procedure, but, to the surprise of 
some, New Labour was not prepared to sign up to the OP either. 
New Labour did, however, ratify the Optional Protocol to the UN International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in 
2004,462and the OP to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 
2009.463 Progressive as these ratifications might appear, they were not likely to 
impose any politically unacceptable obligations on the government, and, were 
arguably simple media friendly electoral messages, rather than motors of change. 
 
The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women 1979,464was signed by the UK in 1981, and finally ratified in 1986. It 
commits the government to securing ‘equal treatment in respect of equal value, 
as well as equality of treatment in the evaluation of the quality of work.’465 The 
very comprehensive Convention provisions require ‘practical realisation...through 
                                               
460Henry J.Steiner, ‘Individual claims in a world of massive violations: What role for the Human Rights Committee?’ 
(From The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring, Phillip Alston and James Crawford (Eds), (Cambridge CUP 
2000) pp38-39. 
461Adopted by the UN December 2008 it came into force in 2013. 
462‘CEDAW’ – the OP was adopted by the UN in 2000. 
463‘CRPD’ – the Convention and the OP were adopted by the UN in 2009. 
464
 Signed by the UK in 1981 and ratified in 1986. 
465
 Article 11. This is a very wide ranging Article, and its final provision leaves compliance a continuing challenge, 
demanding that ‘Protective legislation relating to matters covered in this article shall be reviewed periodically in 
the light of scientific and technological knowledge and shall be revised, repealed or extended as necessary’ (11(3)). 
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competent national tribunals’ to ensure ‘the effective protection of women 
against any act of discrimination.’466 
However, Sandra Fredman has remarked on its lack of impact:  
‘CEDAW is little known and little used in the UK, even among women 
activists. Although the Government duly goes through the motions of 
preparing reports and responding to questions, it does not regard CEDAW 
as normative, in the sense of shaping policy or providing direction…where 
there is a challenge or a shortfall…it generally finds a means to justify its 
reluctance to change….Instead of CEDAW, of course, it is the EU that has 
been the strongest influence on gender equality law in the UK in recent 
decades.’467 
On only three occasions has the UK been the subject of an individual complaint to 
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. None of the 
cases were related to employment. 
The New Labour Government ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities 2006 in 2009,468 signing up to the OP on the same date. The very 
comprehensive Article 27 ICRPD requires States Parties, inter alia, to:  
‘Prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability with regard to all matters 
concerning all forms of employment...Protect the rights of persons with 
disabilities, on an equal basis with others, to just and favourable condition 
of work, including equal opportunities and equalremuneration for work of 
equal value…Promote the employment of persons with disabilities in the 
private sector through appropriate policies and measures which may 
include affirmative action programmes, incentives and other measures; 
                                               
466 Article 2 and Article 2(c). 
467 CEDAW in the UK, by Sandra Fredman www.edf.org.uk/report-cedaw-in-the-uk//. 
468 It is notable that the International Convention on the Protection of the Right of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families – which has no OP and largely refers to existing obligations in other instruments – 
remains unratified, despite having been adopted by the UN in 2003. However, it I arguable that even in 2003/2004 
(in retrospect a very significant time for immigration into the UK from the EU) ratification of this instrument would 
have not worked to the political advantage of New Labour (witness Blair’s handling of the proclamation of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights in chapter 4). Since 2010, and the return of the Tories, and especially since the EU 
referendum, ratification has arguably been a political impossibility. 
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Ensure that reasonable accommodation is provided for persons with 
disability in the workplace.’   
On only one occasion has the UK been the subject of an individual complaint.469 
British governments have, however, far less to be proud of in relation to the 
protection for full freedom of association required by Article 8 UNCESCR, and to 
the economic and social rights that comparable western European states 
guarantee for their citizens – states which have signed up for the OP to the 
Covenant, and to the individual complaints procedure to the European Social 
Charter. If UK citizens – trade unions and other civil society organizations have 
standing under the OP - were permitted to petition the Committee over 
government failure to meet the obligations under the terms of the Covenant, 
then the government would find itself the subject of numerous complaints. 
 
Although the Committee can do little to enforce the Covenant rights (only around 
30% of governments ‘respond adequately’ to the complaints procedure),470 the 
political damage wreaked – providing an effective opposition is in place - would 
be likely to be considerable.  The Committee, by United Nations standards at 
least, is remarkably demanding. 
 
The ILO does not require ratified Conventions to be implemented into domestic 
law, and the Council of Europe does not require the incorporation of either the 
European Social Charter or the ECHR into the domestic legal framework. 
Compliance is enough, and compliance does not always require legislation. The 
UN Committee on Economic and Social Rights, however, takes a more 
uncompromising line. In its Concluding Observations on the UK 2009 report the 
Committee it demanded  of the British government that the Covenant be ‘given 
full legal effect in its domestic law, that the Covenant rights are made justiciable, 
and that effective remedies are available for victims of all violations of economic, 
social and cultural rights. The Committee reiterates its recommendation that, 
                                               
469 Communication No. 6/2011, submitted by Kenneth McAlpine, [2012].The communication followed an 
unsuccessful domestic tribunal claim for unfair redundancy dismissal and disability discrimination. An application 
to appeal to the EAT had been rejected, as had an application to the ECtHR, and the complaint to the CPRD 
supervisory committee was also found to be inadmissible, the alleged violation having occurred before the UK had 
ratified either the Convention or the OP. 
470
Marco Odello and Francesco Seatzu, The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, The Law, 
process and Practice, (Abingdon, Routledge, 2013), p96. 
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irrespective of the system through which international law is incorporated in the 
domestic legal order (monism or dualism), following ratification of an 
international instrument, the State party is under a legal obligation to comply 
with such an instrument and to give it full effect in its domestic legal order.’471 
That continuing failure was the first matter tackled in the last set of Concluding 
Observations on UK compliance in 2016.472 
Were British failures in regard to UNCESCR obligations to be subject to quasi-
judicial adjudication at the UN then it is quite possible that the determinations of 
the Committee would become as influential as rulings by the ECtHR.473 If a 
particular case gains enough ‘traction’ then, even if the government fails to rectify 
the breach, a change of government will - as we saw in relation to GCHQ - almost 
always be sufficient to secure change. Political will when in government is often 
strengthened by the political capital that was created on a particular matter when 
in opposition. 
It will however, require a change of government to secure British accession to the 
Optional Protocols. Although there have been no specific pledges, it seems likely 
that a Labour government will be at least sympathetic to the argument that 
British citizens be permitted to petition the Human Rights Committee and the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and will, as it is required, 
implement the provisions of the UNICESCR into domestic law. 
The International Labour Organisation 
 
The hostile attitude of the Attlee cabinet to the UN Covenant(s) and the European 
Convention was very different to the almost reverential view it took to the ILO, an 
attitude which permeated the UK political infrastructure to influence the Tory 
Party of the 1970s, before the volte face of the late 1970s. 
                                               
471 Economic and Social Council of UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Consideration of 
Reports Submitted by State Parties, Concluding Observations 2009,E/C.12/GBR/CO/6, 14 July 2016 para 13. See 
also General Comment on Article 7 (2016) para 50, citing CESCR General Comment No.3 (1990) on the nature of 
States parties’ obligations. 
472
Ibid, Concluding Observations 2016, para 5. 
473
Although ECtHR rulings are binding we see that they are not always complied with – the ‘votes for prisoners’ 
saga is the leading example, and in relation to the ILO we have seen the example of the GCHQ case. 
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This is not as surprising as it might at first seem. The ILO was revived after WWII 
by the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation Instrument of 
Amendment, and the Final Articles Revision Convention (No.80) adopted by the 
International Labour Conference in 1946. The memo by Minister of Labour 
George Isaacs which accompanied the subsequent White Paper stated that: 
 
‘The United Kingdom delegation played a leading part in the work of 
constitutional revision culminating in the adoption of the Instrument and 
the Convention, and I think it would be particularly appropriate for His 
Majesty’s Government to effect these ratifications at the earliest possible 
date.’474 
 
 Article 1 of Chapter 1 of the ILO Constitution now read: 
 
‘A permanent organisation is hereby established for the promotion of the 
objects set forth in the Preamble to this constitution and in the Declaration 
concerning the aims and purposes of the International Labour Organisation 
adopted at Philadelphia on 10 May 1944 the text of which is annexed to 
this constitution.’475  
 
The Declaration of Philadelphia, as the White Paper subsequently acknowledged, 
‘thus becomes part of the constitution.’476 The text of the Declaration states that: 
 
‘The Conference recognises the solemn obligation of the International 
Labour Organisation to further among the nations of the world 
programmes which will achieve...(e) the effective recognition of the right of 
collective bargaining, the co-operation of management and labour in the 
continuous improvement of productive efficiency and the collaboration of 
workers and employers in the preparation and application of social and 
economic measures.’ 
 
                                               
474TNA CAB 129-17-22 Memo by Minister of Labour 28 February 1947 
475
Ibid, annex. The Cabinet paper has the old constitution alongside the new, with the additional text underlined. 
476
International Labour Conference Proposed Action By his Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland regarding The Constitution of the International Labour Organisation Instrument of 
amendment 1946 and The Final Articles of Revision 1946, para 6. 
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So even before the key fundamental Conventions were adopted the UK 
government was arguably bound ultimately to provide workers with a right to 
collective bargaining, and for that bargaining to be extended to social and 
economic measures beyond the immediate terms and conditions of 
employment.477 Certainly the Attlee cabinet considered itself bound by the 
commitments it had signed up to – the commitments which its representatives 
had overseen the drafting of – in the constitution. A right of collective bargaining 
had arguably been supplied (or was in the process of being supplied) British 
workers by the lifting of the prohibition on secondary action, by the Wages 
Councils Act providing for extended sectoral bargaining in poorly organised 
sectors, the Fair Wages Resolution, and, paradoxically, by Order 1305 (and, after 
1951, Order 1376), which obliged recalcitrant employers to negotiate with their 
workers, albeit through the medium of compulsory arbitration.478 
 
Cabinet concern over the obligations imposed by the constitution was reserved 
for the ‘recognition of the principle of equal remuneration for work of equal 
value’ in the preamble to the Constitution. They decided that if they were to be 
reminded of their commitment – whether in Geneva or Westminster - it would be 
conceded that: 
 
‘while they accepted the principle of equal pay, current economic 
conditions made it impracticable for them to give effect to that principle at 
the present time.’479 
 
                                               
477
An essential element of collective bargaining is, of course, strike action. 
478 Kahn-Freund might be said to have disagreed. Arguing from the standpoint of one who regarded UK post war 
policy as one of collective laissez faire (despite these state interventions), writing in 1953, he stated that while a 
refusal by a large firm was ‘rare’ (citing the Thomson case, see below), there was ‘no legal duty imposed on 
employers to bargain with the unions,’ and that C87, requiring by Article 1 ‘adequate protection against acts of 
anti-union discrimination,’ ‘has not yet been translated into law’. (Chapter II, ‘Legal Framework,’ Flanders & Clegg 
(eds), The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain; Its History, Law and Institutions, (Oxford, Blackwells, 
1954), p53. It had, however, been translated into practice for the overwhelming majority – as evinced by the 
Thomson case, and despite Kahn-Freund’s claims, in 1953, of 22 million workers in the UK, one and a half million 
were self employed, ‘a small proportion were employed under individual contracts,’ while ‘nearly five million are 
still covered by statutory systems’ – the Wages Councils (p55 and 69 of British Trade Unionism, Five Studies by PEP, 
London, PEP, 1955). While that still left 15 million, given that ‘[t]he conditions of service of the vast majority were 
however decided not between each employee and his employer but on the basis of decisions embracing the whole 
craft of trade concerned, either in the district or nationally’ (ibid, p55), even the most ardent anti trade unionist 
employer would have had to concede that collective bargaining impacted on the terms and conditions of their 
employees.   
479 TNA CAB 128-9-26, Cabinet Conclusions, 6 March 1947.  
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When, in a 1949 memorandum on Convention 87, Isaacs urged ‘speedy 
ratification’ because of the ‘considerable importance in the international field’ of 
the instrument and ‘the leading part played by the United Kingdom delegation in 
securing its adoption,’480 Isaacs was able to reassure his colleagues that 
ratification of the Convention ‘involves no change in UK law.’481 
 
By June 1950 the cabinet records tell us that ministers, still very conscious that 
the equal pay principle was binding upon the Government, felt obliged to respond 
to the then current consultation over equal pay (which led to the adoption of 
Convention 100) by stating that they would ratify any Convention if the economic 
circumstances permitted it, but hoped that the International Labour Conference 
would merely adopt a Recommendation on the matter. Minister of Defence A.V. 
Alexander’s view of the ILO Conventions was that; 
 
‘...we enforce and others don’t.’ Minister of Labour Isaacs told his 
colleagues that a positive decision ‘will be better for our prestige [abroad] 
and for public opinion in the UK.’482 
 
As a measure of the nature of the obligation imposed on government by the ILO 
Constitution and Conventions these early discussions among the ministers who 
oversaw the negotiation of the terms on which those obligations were assumed 
are invaluable.  
 
However, an examination of the Tory government’s handling of the events 
surrounding the famous case D.C. Thomson & Co Ltd v Deakin [1952],483illustrating 
both the nature of the post war reconciliation and the demands of the ILO 
Conventions, is perhaps more instructive still. The well known printing and 
publishing firm D.C. Thomson had dismissed 79 workers on the grounds that they 
were members of a union,484and as a consequence very many trade unions had 
‘blacked’ the firm.  Although Thomson’s had sought injunctions to prevent this 
                                               
480TNA CAB 129-34-11, International Labour Conference, San Francisco, June-July 1948, Freedom of Association 
and Protection of the Right to Organise; Memorandum by the Minister of Labour and National service, 6 April 
1949, para 1. 
481TNA CAB 195-7-27 Cabinet Secretary’s Notebook 2 May 1949.  
482Cabinet Secretary’s Notebook, TNA CAB 195-9-5, 6 June 1950. 
483
 2 All ER 361. However, for an alternative interpretation of the post war reconciliation see H Jones and MD 
Kandiah (eds) The Myth of Consensus: New Views on British History, 1945-64 ( London, Macmillan,1996). 
484
Report of a Court of Inquiry into a dispute between DC Thomson and Company Limited and certain workpeople, 
members of the National Society of Operative Printers and Assistants, Cmnd, 8607. 
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secondary action, which they argued was ‘actionable interference with a 
commercial contract,’ the Court of Appeal had found that the trade unions had 
acted lawfully. This decision was, as I have shown, interpreted by many as judicial 
acceptance of full freedom of association, and of the post war reconciliation of 
labour and capital.485 
 
Although, Thomson’s had acted lawfully when they had sacked the men, it had 
placed the government in breach of its obligations under ILO Convention 98.This 
was pointed out in a briefing sent to Winston Churchill, by the Ministry of 
Labour.486 
 
It was explained that the Attlee government had successfully pressed for the text 
be amended from ‘be accorded adequate protection against acts of anti-union 
discrimination’’ to ‘shall enjoy adequate protection’ in order to avoid any 
suggestion that states be obliged to legislate. It also explained that the 
Government is obliged by virtue of membership of the ILO ‘to bring Conventions 
adopted by the Conference before Parliament ‘for the enactment of legislation or 
other action.’ It is bound, if a decision is taken to ratify a Convention, ‘to take such 
action as may be necessary to make effective the provisions of such 
Convention.’487 
 
Churchill told the TUC, and the press, that at a meeting with the Minister of 
Labour, Thomson’s had been asked to pay close ‘attention to the principles 
embodied in International Labour Convention No.98 of 1949.’488 The firm had 
been presented with the choice of either permitting their staff to organise or 
being obliged to do so by law. 
 
It is arguably evidence of the extreme reluctance of the government to legislate 
that the file shows that the Ministry sought Counsel’s Opinion on ‘whether the 
powers conferred by the Notification of Vacancies Order 1952 may be used in 
such a manner as to prevent a particular firm from obtaining further employees 
until it has consented to reinstate certain workers who left the employment of 
                                               
485See chapter two. 
486 TNA PREM 11/556, ‘Note on the International Labour Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles 
of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively.’ 
487
 Ibid, paras 3 & 4. 
488
 TNA PREM 11/556,an excerpt from a press release of Churchill’s statement to a delegation from the TUC made 
on 8 September 1952. 
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the firm in the course of an industrial dispute.’ However the unnamed barrister 
advised that to use the Order it to compel Thompsons to employ particular 
workers was not authorized by the Supplies and Services Acts which governed its 
operation.489 
 
The sacked men were never reinstated, despite personal efforts by Churchill to 
persuade the firm’s notoriously irascible chairman, but Thomson’s did thereafter 
permit their workers to join trade unions.  
 
The Thomson affair had seen both the judiciary, and a Tory Government 
acknowledge the importance of the fundamental rights the men had fought for. 
More significantly still, it shows the respect and importance attached by that 
administration to its obligations under international law and, that in a clash of 
rights where both sides were acting lawfully, the fundamental right of freedom of 
association was seen, even by a Tory Government, to eclipse the right of DC 
Thomson to run his business as he saw fit.  
 
 The Thomson affair also illustrates the questionable value and nature of 
voluntarism, and its relationship to the non-ratification of Conventions. Given the 
long tradition of judicial hostility to organised labour, the trade unions were 
understandably wary of the prospect of more than minimal judicial intervention 
in industrial relations. The Attlee government’s stance on the wording of 
Convention No. 98 arguably reflected both respect for the trade unions, as well as 
the perhaps peculiarly British reluctance to be required to legislate evidenced in 
the cabinet conversations on the ECHR, UN Covenants and ILO conventions 
recorded above. The Tories, and the likes of D.C. Thomson, on the other hand, 
simply did not want employers to be obliged by domestic black letter law to 
either adhere to collective agreements or to permit workers full freedom of 
association. Nevertheless when it suited the Conservatives they were happy 
enough to intervene in industrial relations. 
 
Respect for voluntarism was routinely cited as an excuse by the Tories for the 
failure to ratify later Conventions. An example was Convention No.111 concerning 
Discrimination in respect of Employment and Occupation (1958). Discrimination 
on grounds of sex and race in the sphere of employment was of course rife, in 
                                               
489
Ibid, ‘Opinion – Notification of Vacancies Order 1952’  given to The Solicitor at the Ministry of Labour and 
National Service 31 October 1952. 
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both the public and private sectors, and the prospect of having to legislate on the 
matter startled the Tories. In 1958 the UK was, of course, enjoying ‘never had it so 
good’ prosperity and post war austerity could not be said to be a barrier to the 
ratification of either C100 or C111.  
 
The Tory Minister of Labour instead warned his colleagues that ratification of 
C111 would ‘raise difficulties,’490 and the accompanying Annex to the Minister’s 
Memorandum seized upon the excuse that it would ‘require the Government to 
intervene in the normal processes of voluntary negotiation and collective 
bargaining.’491 The Macmillan government had balked at providing what then 
would have been termed civil rights, and would now be seen as fundamental 
human rights.  
 
Arguably the Tories have always exhibited a reluctance to intervene to address 
race and sex discrimination. As we have seen, it was the Wilson Labour 
administrations which introduced the Race Relations Acts of 1965, 1968 and 
1976. 
 
Nevertheless, 1958 - 1976 was remarkable period of change when supranational 
obligation and changing social attitudes imposed broad political consensus on civil 
rights. But perhaps more remarkable still is the fact that such was the weight of 
public opinion, and the perceived necessity to abide by international 
commitment, and the Rule of Law, that throughout that period of radical change 
there remained broad political consensus on freedom of association. A denial of 
the right to bargain collectively was as unthinkable in 1958 as it was in 1976 
 
As we saw in chapter two, the Heath government did not question the value of 
collective bargaining, and the restrictions on the right to strike which the 1971 Act 
sought to impose were offset, like the Attlee Government’s retention of Order 
1305, by the provision of formal bargaining structures, and an impressive 
statutory recognition procedure. The ill judged prohibition on secondary action 
aside, after the Industrial Relations Act had come into force, the UK could not be 
said to be in breach of any of its fundamental international obligations on labour 
rights.  
 
                                               
490
  TNA CAB 129-97-37, memo by Minister of Labour 7 May 1959 para 2.  
491 Ibid. 
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The Heath Government had added to those obligations. In 1972 it ratified ILO 
Convention No.135, and Recommendation No. 143, which extended the anti-
trade union discrimination provisions of Convention 98 to trade union 
representatives, commitments which were accepted by the cabinet as a matter of 
course.492 
 
 Considered by the cabinet alongside a Convention and a Recommendation aimed 
at protecting against benzene poisoning in the workplace, these measures, and, 
inter alia, the provision of time off for trade union business, workplace facilities, 
the ‘check off’ for union subscriptions, so recently brought to prominence by the 
passage through Parliament of the Trade Union Act 2016, were not considered in 
any way controversial in the early 1970s.  
 
While it is true that the Minister considered that the law and practice in the UK 
was in accord with the Convention 135 and Recommendation No.143, they were 
ratified at a time when the Government was effectively at war with the unions. A 
refusal could scarcely have made matters worse – these were the days of the ‘3 
day week’ and of power cuts. Had the Government then been contemplating the 
withdrawal of collective bargaining that was implemented during 1980-1993 then 
they would not have decided not to commit themselves to retaining these 
facilities and protections. 
 
The defining feature of the post war cross party British approach to the 
obligations of ILO membership, was that it was a commitment to collective 
bargaining rather than to the improvement of labour standards. While respect for 
voluntarism was usually cited as a reason for not ratifying a treaty, more 
compelling political or economic reasons appear to have been decisive factors. 
For example, in 1958 the Minister of Labour had advised his colleagues to decline 
to ratify Convention No. 106 or accept Recommendation No. 103, concerning 
Weekly Rest in Commerce and Offices on those grounds,493 and the formula was 
adhered to even as the Tories had fought to replace voluntarism with more 
                                               
492 TNA CAB 129-163-16, Note by the Secretary of State for Employment accompanying the White Paper 
‘International Labour Conference. Proposed action by Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland on two Conventions and two Recommendations adopted at the 56
th
 (1971) Session of 
the International Labour Conference’ 21 June 1972. 
493 TNA CAB 129-93-41, para 4 of the Memorandum by the Minister of Labour and National Service 7 July 1958.. 
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formal structures. The 1972 White Paper on the Holidays with Pay Convention No. 
132, (1970) ruled out ratification,494 stating that:  
 
‘The Government believes that employers and unions should be free to 
determine wages, hours, and other similar conditions of work, including 
holidays with pay, without detailed statutory intervention, in the light of 
the different social and economic circumstances of the industry 
concerned.’495 
 
 The three weeks’ holiday (excluding bank holidays) required by the Convention 
was, of course, a minimum rather than a maximum, and the only intrusion into 
collective negotiation that would have been necessary would have been a 
prohibition of payment in lieu of holiday. The implementation of such minima by 
means of individual tribunal claim and collective negotiation backed by a right to 
refer collective agreements to the CAC would arguably have been simple – 
certainly in comparison with the recently enacted EPA 1970. While the unions 
might not have called for legislative intervention they would scarcely have 
objected.496 Arguably, while the entirely justified suspicion of the judiciary should 
not be understated, trade union suspicion of the law can be overstated.497 Arch 
                                               
494 A revision of Convention No.52 1936. This guaranteed adults a minimum of six days paid holiday a year and had 
not been ratified by the UK. 
495 TNA CAB 129-157-17.  An excerpt from the White Paper included in the file. 
496 The unions welcomed the raft of individual rights in the Employment Protection Act 1975; they were intended 
to complement collective bargaining (see CD Baker, ‘Employment Protection: Individual rights,’ (1976) 5 ILJ 65) . 
While they may have been some truth in the Macmillan government’s argument that ratifying and implementing 
C111 would have been objected to by many members of the public in 1959, by 1969 society had changed 
sufficiently to permit the passage of and very widespread support for the Equal Pay Bill, and employers and trade 
unionists were give five years grace to get used to the idea and to amend collective agreements and contracts so 
as not to be obliged to do so by the law. By 1975 those who objected to equal pay and non discrimination were an 
increasingly marginalised minority, and trade unionists who objected to individual rights which complemented 
collective bargaining would arguably have been rarer still (see chapter two for a discussion of the difference 
between individual rights and individualistic rights). 
497 For example, two books published in 1955 and 1957, the workmanlike British Trade Unions, Five Studies by PEP 
(1955 op cit), and VL Allen’s important and comprehensive book on trade unions (the title is misleading) Trade 
Union Leadership (London, Longman, 1957), are essentially all about British voluntarism (though neither use that 
term ,or Kahn-Freund’s preferred term. ‘collective laissez faire’). However, neither book mentions distrust of the 
intervention of the law. Typical is Allen on the ‘two types of trade union political needs’: the need to bring about 
‘structural alterations in society’ to secure ‘social and economic equality,’ and ‘legislation to create changes in 
industries where voluntary negotiation could not effectively be undertaken’ (pp141-2). Similarly, in British Trade 
Unions, the ILO Conventions relevant to the 40 hour week are discussed. While there is no mention of any desire 
on the part of the unions for the UK to ratify the relevant conventions (that the UK had ratified the Sheet Glass 
Convention which imposed a 42 hour week is merely mentioned in passing [see n.511 below], there is a clear 
assumption that the matter would continue to be addressed by collective negotiation under conditions of full 
freedom of association. The authors conclude that: ‘Since the general achievement of the forty-four hour week, 
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voluntarist Bill Wedderburn, for example, in his magisterial The Worker and the 
Law conceded that: 
 
‘The statutory ‘floor of rights’ now extends into many facets of employment 
law and even into the law affecting social discrimination; but it does not 
normally prevent the erection of superior conditions by way of collective 
bargaining. It was meant to be floor not a ceiling.’498  
 
The attitude of most modern trade unionists was arguably summed up by Len 
Mcclusky,499 when he told the Industrial Law Society in March 2015 that ‘progress 
for working people has only ever been attained by the collective self-
empowerment of organised labour and not through the accumulation of 
individual rights alone, however worthy they may be.’500 
 
Even Kahn-Freund, by 1977, was able to acknowledge that a  
 
‘considerable body of labour legislation resulted from the ratification by the 
United Kingdom of ILO Conventions,’501 that the ‘influence of the on the 
Equal Pay Act 1970 of the relevant ILO Convention of 1951 and of the 
European Social Charter are obvious…foreign standards have in their turn 
helped to promote a more positive attitude to regulatory labour legislation 
in this country.’502 
 
It has been said that UK policy has always been to only ratify after domestic law 
and practice was in accordance with the requirements of a particular 
Convention.503 I would argue that a more accurate assessment would be to say 
                                                                                                                                                       
however, there has been no mention by the TUC of further reductions...the reduction in hours for which the trade 
unions are working is a reduction in the annual hours by increasing the length of holidays with pay.’ 
498 3
rd
 edition, fully revised, (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1986), p 6. 
499 General Secretary  of Unite. 
500 L Mcclusky, ‘Can Unions Stay Within the Law Any Longer?’ (2015) 44  ILJ 439. 
501 Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law, 2nd Edition, (London, Stevens, 1977), p42. He cites as examples the 
Employment of Women, Young Persons and Children Act 1920 and the Merchant shipping (International Labour 
Conventions) Act 1924, and Johnston, ‘The Influence of International Labour Standards on Legislation and Practice 
in the United Kingdom,’(1968) 79 International Labour Review, 465. 
502 Ibid, pp42-43. ‘Regulatory legislation’ was a phrase used by Kahn-Freund which embraced laws conferring 
collective rights like the Wages Council Acts as well as individual employment rights. 
503
 Breen Creighton, ‘The ILO and Freedom of Association in the UK,’ in Human Rights and Labour Law, Essays for 
Paul O’Higgins, Ewing Gearty and Hepple (Eds), 1994, p3. See for a detailed examination of the British approach to 
ratification and implementation chapter 4 in KD Ewing, Britain and the ILO, 1994. 
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that if the terms of a convention were not in accord with the Government’s 
intentions in relation to UK law and practice then the convention would not be 
ratified and any accompanying Recommendations not accepted. Such are the 
options open to ratifying states in terms of reservations and ‘lead in’ periods that 
laws and mechanisms did not have to be in place before ratification took place. 
 For example, the Equal Pay Act 1970 was passed ‘with a view to securing that 
employers give equal treatment as regards terms and conditions of employment 
to men and women...employed on like work...of equal value.’504 
The key terms of the Act were derived from ILO Convention 100, and a Cabinet 
memorandum of 22nd September 1969 on equal pay,505 written by the Minister of 
Employment, Barbara Castle, noted that that the Cabinet had agreed that 
legislation on equal pay should be introduced in the next session of Parliament.506 
She stated that: 
 
‘Legislation on the lines I have suggested would enable us to ratify ILO 
Convention 100 and we should do so when the legislation was passed. The 
introduction of equal pay on these lines would bring us into line with the 
developing practice in the European Economic Community countries.’  
Convention No.100 was adopted in 1971, the active support of the Heath 
Government arguably owing more to the need to align the UK with the acquis 
than any enthusiasm for social justice. The UK, of course, became a member of 
the EEC on 1 January 1973. 
However, the Act did not come into force until 29th December 1975, shortly after 
the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 had become law. Employers and trade unions 
were thus permitted a long ‘lead in’ period to adjust to the new requirements, to 
‘secure orderly progress before the commencement of this Act towards equal 
                                               
504 (S1(1), S1(1)(a) and s1(5). However, in practice claimants were only permitted to exercise the right to equal pay 
for equal work, and the matter became subject to infringement proceedings brought by the Commission (see 
chapter 7). 
505
 TNA CAB/129/144. 
506
Ibid, Agreement in CC(69) 42
nd
 Conclusions, Minute 3, basis of legislation c(69)113 by Secretary of State for 
Employment and Productivity. 
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treatment,’507 an atypical approach which demonstrates that the Government had 
no real difficulty in acceding to international obligation prior to domestic law and 
practice becoming compliant (law which is on the statute book, but which is not in 
force, does not amount to compliance),508 nor any difficulty in persuading the 
unions that individual rights, implemented so as to complement collective 
negotiation, can further the interests of unions and their members. 
The Retreat from the ILO obligations 
After 1979 the government’s relationship with the ILO changed markedly. A 
merchant shipping Convention aside,509 the only ratification in the Thatcher years, 
after the Labour Administration Convention 1978 (No.158), and the Labour 
Relations (Public Service) Convention 1978 (No.151) in 1979 and 1980, which had 
been set in train by the Callaghan government, was the uncontroversial Labour 
Statistics Convention, 1985 (No.160). 
 
In 1980, Jim Prior, one of the remnants of the Heath Cabinet, and Thatcher’s 
Secretary of State for Employment, had been asked by Keith Joseph and Geoffrey 
Howe to set about denouncing Convention No.94.510 This was literally 
unprecedented.511 
                                               
507 S9(2) EPA. See Daphne Romney, Equal Pay-Law and Practice (Oxford, OUP, 2018) pp18-19. 
508
Although I argue that this is the unexpressed attitude taken by the EU Commission in relation to compliance 
with employment law (see chapters 4, 6 & 7). 
509Unavoidable - merchant vessels ‘flagged’ in the UK would be unable to operate without such ratifications.  
510 Both Howe and Joseph wished to see the end of CAC schedule 11 and Fair Wage Rulings, steps which would 
have breach government obligations under the Labour Clauses (Public contracts) Convention, 1949 (No.94). The 
Employment Protection Act 1975 had repealed section 8 of the Terms and Conditions of Employment Act 1959 to 
permit the CAC to extend accepted industry terms to those employed by ‘rogue’ employers (see chapter 2), and 
FWRs in relation to public service contractors (grounded in the Fair Wages Resolution 1946) obliged contractors to 
pay industry minimums when they negotiated with local authorities and the government. These were seen by 
Howe and Joseph to impede competition, to artificially inflate wages and unnecessarily drain the resources of local 
government and the Exchequer. Schedule 11 was repealed by the Employment Act 1980 – two years before the 
Convention was denounced, but FWRs continued until 1983. 
511  Denunciations were rare, and had never previously been made for political or policy reasons. The Attlee 
government denounced two night work Conventions from 1934 and 1919 relating to women and young persons in 
1947 in anticipation of the 1948 revisions. The Macmillan government denounced the Sheet Glass Work 
Convention 1933 (No.43) for  technical industrial reasons – new processes invented in the UK meant that special 
protection for working time was no longer necessary in the industry. The Heath Government denounced 
the Employment Service Convention 1948 (No.88) because it proposed to charge employers for the services 
covered by the convention, but stated that it considered itself bound by all other aspects of the Convention, and 
would continue to report on it (the Heath case is from an article by Kelvin Widdows, ‘The Denunciation of 
International Labour Conventions,’ International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol 33, issue 4, October 1984, 
1055-1063). 
150 
 
Prior protested that  
 
‘we cannot lightly set aside our international obligations. These are quite 
clear. ILO Convention No 94 provides that denunciation can take place only 
at 10 year intervals following the Convention’s [sic] being brought into 
force… Short of simply disregarding our international commitments there is 
no way we can improve on that timetable.’512  
 
It is apparent that Prior’s was unhappy about the fact of denunciation, and not 
merely informing his colleagues of the procedures. Convention No.94 was 
denounced in September 1982, a year after Prior had been ‘exiled’ by the 
Thatcherites – he was appointed Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.  
 
The first big break with tradition in terms of ratifications was the Tory refusal to 
ratify the Collective Bargaining Convention 1981(No.154) in 1982. There can be 
little doubt that Heath’s Cabinet would have nodded it through - law and practice 
was compliant. Nevertheless, endorsement of the Convention would certainly 
have been at odds with the spirit, if not the word of the Employment Bill then 
progressing through Parliament, and, of course, the unstated overarching 
intention of the Thatcherites to attack collective bargaining mechanisms at every 
opportunity. The government claimed that it could not promote the extension of 
collective bargaining by government intervention – an excuse which combined 
government antipathy to Fair Wage Rulings with traditional reservations.513 The 
promotion of collective bargaining was, and remains, a governmental obligation 
under the provisions of both Convention 98 and the European Social Charter. 
The following year, 1983, the government declined to ratify the Termination of 
Employment Convention 1982 (No.158), and, lessons having been learned about 
the ILO procedures, the Protection of Wages Convention, 1949 (No.95), 
concerned largely with protecting regular payment, and protection against 
deductions and ‘truck’ style payments in kind, was denounced in September 
1983. The ILO were told that 
 
‘because of intended revisions to legislation which might affect the 
government’s ability to satisfy the terms of the Convention, it would 
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 Prior to Howe 12 March 1980, TNA PREM 19/263. The exchange of letters between the three ministers can be 
seen in this file, and in PREM 19/264. 
513See KD Ewing, Britain and the ILO, 1994,p19. 
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denounce it at that time because otherwise it would have to wait a further 
ten years.’514 
 
As we have seen, with the abolition of the Wage Councils in mind, the Minimum 
Wage – Fixing Machinery Convention 1927 (No.25) was denounced in July 1985. 
The Wages Act 1986 reduced the powers of the Councils and ensured that no 
more could be established. It will be recalled that they were intended to promote 
collective bargaining in poorly organised industries.  
 
The formal withdrawal from the fundamental Conventions which protected rights 
the government restricted with the Employment Act 1982 and subsequent 
legislation (listed in chapter 2), was, both for electoral, and for foreign policy 
reasons,515 politically unfeasible and, as it turned out, unnecessary. Instead, as 
they became more confident, the Thatcherites simply did what Prior had in 1980 
seemingly believed to be unthinkable – they disregarded their international 
commitments. When pressed, Ministers would affect to disagree with the 
criticisms of supervisory bodies like the CEACR, CFA, and ECSR, and question their 
authority.   
 
The pivotal episode was the GCHQ case. Staff at Cheltenham were told that they 
had the choice of transferring to less ‘sensitive’ civil service roles or leaving their 
union – if they refused to do one or the other they were to be sacked. These were 
civil servants ‘who had for five decades in the Whitley tradition been encouraged 
to join unions.’516 It was a strange case – arguably an ideological step taken under 
the pretence of national security. While the Government was under pressure 
from the Americans to tackle the occasional instances of industrial action at 
Cheltenham,517 the possibility of banning unions at GCHQ as a security measure 
had first been considered in the 1950s.  That proposal had been rejected in 1956 
and in 1962 largely on the grounds that it was likely to cause the Government 
great problems with the civil service unions, and would be likely to draw 
                                               
514Widdows, 1984, op cit, pp 1059-1060. 
515As well as procedural reasons – like most Conventions (some are renounceable at 5 year intervals) Conventions 
87 and 98 can only be denounced during a one year period every 10 years after first coming into force, and the 
Tories would have had to wait until 1988 and 1989 to denounce them, by which time they had run the proverbial 
coach and horses through them on a number of occasions. For detail on ratification and denunciation see the ILO 
Handbook of procedures relating to international labour Conventions and Recommendations, 2012 
516
Wedderburn 1986, op cit, p277.Wedderburn states that they were also offered £1,000 to relinquish 
employment protection rights  
517 See the account of the GCHQ affair in Ian Beesley, The Official History of the Cabinet Secretaries (London, 
Routledge, 2017) pp 442-448. 
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unwelcome attention to the existence of GCHQ and to the eavesdropping 
activities in which it specialised.518 
 
 The government had arguably blatantly breached Convention 87,519 as well as the 
more specific Convention No.151 on the Right to Organise in the Public Sector. 
Severe censure from the CFA and CEACR followed as a matter of course. When 
the government refused either to act to rectify the situation, or (aware that the 
court would very likely rule against them) to refer the case to the International 
Court of Justice, the matter was considered by the Conference Committee on the 
Application of Standards. After the inevitable condemnation by the CAS, and 
further intransigence on the part of the UK, the matter was sent back to the 
CEACR. 520 The government refused to back down, and the case was referred back 
to the CAS, a process which was repeated on two further occasions. The 
committee came very close to dealing with the case in a special paragraph of its 
annual report to Conference – the most severe sanction then available. However, 
a reluctance to confer pariah status upon a state which had previously been such 
a stalwart ally of the ILO appears to have saved the UK from international 
disgrace. Arguably it must have been obvious to the government that it had 
pushed the ILO as far as it could be pushed, and had demonstrated to the 
Thatcherites just how far they could go when breaking international law.   
 
They had learned that the terms of the fundamental instruments protecting 
freedom of association could not be broken in the guileless fashion that 
characterized the Government’s handling of that case without sustaining 
unacceptable damage to British prestige, and to Tory electoral prospects.521 While 
they knew it was better not to be bound in the first place, they must also have 
come to understand that their policy of non ratification and denunciation could 
not be extended to a denunciation of the fundamental instruments. Documents 
on the case in file LAB 13/3017/1 at the National Archive indicate that the 
government was acutely conscious of the damage caused by CFA Case No.1261. 
The credibility of the government’s stance when condemning human rights 
violations by Iron curtain states was said to be compromised when the ILO 
supervisory bodies made adverse findings against the UK, and it seems that what 
                                               
518See chapter 12 of Ewing, Moretta and Mahoney 2019, op cit. 
519Although it was ultimately held only to have breached Articles 2 and 11 of C87. 
520
Ewing, Britain and the ILO 1994,op cit, chapter 5: GCHQ: A Case Study in the Supervision of Standards. 
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The notices to GCHQ staff were issued in January 1984, six months after the Tories had won a very large working 
majority in the June 1983 General Election. 
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the government most feared was a Commission of Inquiry being set up by the 
ILO.522 
 
Something of the sting was taken out of the GCHQ scandal when the application 
of the trade unions to Strasbourg was rejected as inadmissible by the European 
Commission of Human Rights in Council of Civil Service Unions v UK [1987].523  
While acknowledging that the January 1984 ban on trade union membership was 
a breach of the 11(1), the Article 11(2) qualification was found to apply: The 
GCHQ civil servants were engaged in the administration of the state with a role 
comparable to that of the police or armed forces, and the restrictions, brought 
under the terms of the 1982 Civil Service Order were, therefore proportionate, 
lawful measures, necessary to secure the collective interests of the citizens of the 
UK.524 
 Just as the Tories had understood, as it had prepared for power in the late 1970s, 
that instead of the direct assault on collective bargaining proposed by Hayek the 
‘Stepping Stones’ policy of changing collective political subjectivity combined with 
incremental changes to the law was the workable domestic approach, it 
understood that attrition was the correct tactic to adopt on the international 
plane. While radical breaches or denunciations had the potential to erupt into 
political firestorms more modest breaches or retreats from obligation could, 
however implausible the justification, be undertaken without risking more than a 
manageable spat with treaty monitoring bodies. 
 
One more denunciation took place during the Thatcher years. The Underground 
Work (Women) Convention 1926 (No.45) was dispensed with in May 1988 as the 
Government seized the opportunity in response to the imposition European 
Community principle of equal treatment at work,525 conscious, I would suggest, of 
                                               
522TNA LAB 13/3017/1 ‘CSSA and Political Affiliation: ILO Procedure and Implications,’ Note by Department of 
Employment.’ A Commission of Inquiry is one step short of a referral to the ICJ, instigated by the Governing Body 
following a complaint by a state or a delegate to the ILC that a state is in breach of a convention. If the GB 
considers an inquiry to be necessary on the evidence, or if it has approached the state and been unhappy with the 
response (cases are usually handed to the CEACR or CFA) then it may establish a Commission of Inquiry. If the state 
takes issue with the findings of the Inquiry then it can refer the matter to the ICJ (see Vogt, et al, 2019 pp 15-16). 
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 10 EHRR 269. 
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 See Ewing, 1994, op cit. 
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See BA Hepple, Working Time: A New Legal Framework? 1990, p8. He characterised it as ‘downwards 
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the opportunity to make it seem that denunciation was not always a regressive 
step:The Sex Discrimination Act 1986 and the Employment Act 1989 had seen the 
removal of such protections for women on the domestic plane. The equivalent 
provision of the European Social Charter was also denounced.526 
 
Although the first Blair administration could have been said to have ‘picked the 
low hanging fruit’ in terms of ILO Conventions, there was no significant change in 
policy. Since 1997 the UK has ratified just three fundamental Conventions. In 1999 
the government ratified the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
Convention, 1958 (No.111) – the Convention which had caused Macmillan’s 
Minister of Labour such concern. After it had legislated to permit staff at GCHQ 
freedom of association,527 it ratified the Minimum Age Convention, 1973 
(No.138), along with the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 1999(No.182), 
in 2000. The Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health 
Convention, 2006 (No.187) was ratified in 2008, the Maritime Labour Convention 
2006 was ratified by the Coalition in 2013, and the Work in Fishing Convention 
2007 (No.188) was ratified on 11 January 2019. 
However, despite New Labour’s reluctance to import fresh supranational 
obligation in relation to labour rights, the Human Rights Act 1998 inadvertently 
provided the conduit from the Strasbourg court for the post 2008 wide 
‘integrated’ interpretation of Article 11which ultimately has obliged UK courts to 
recognise a limited right to bargain collectively and to strike. That evolution, and 
the changing attitude of the UK government to the ECtHR after 1970, is examined 
in the next section. 
 
 
                                               
526A8(4)(b). The denunciations permitted the government to repeal s.124(1) of the Mines and Quarries Act 1954. 
A7(8) was denounced in order to permit the government to lift working time protection for 16-18 year olds in the 
Employment Act 1989 (ibid, p9). 
527
The matter had long been a manifesto promise which had arguably helped give the impression of ‘clear blue 
water’ between the Tories and New Labour. 
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The evolving jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights 
A prime example of the post 1970 evolution of the Convention is the case of 
Golder v United Kingdom [1975].528Golder turned on what the British government 
had considered an ‘expansive’ interpretation of Article 6(1) of the Convention, 
which requires civil and criminal proceedings to be heard within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal. The Government argued that the 
reach of the Article was restricted to proceedings already instituted before a 
court, and that it did not guarantee access to justice. 
 The court, on the other hand, upheld the report of the Commission, to hold by 
nine votes to three that right of access was an inherent element of Article 6.529 
The British judge, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, in his dissenting judgment,  argued that 
had Governments agreed to ‘concede some legislative role’ to the Commission or 
Court, or that that the parties to the Convention had ‘intended to delegate in 
some degree the function....of changing or enhancing its effects’ then HMG could 
not have justifiably object to this dynamic interpretive approach. In the absence 
of such agreement, Fitzmaurice believed the UK Government had been justified in 
having refused to settle the case on the basis of the Commission’s interpretation 
of the Convention. 
 
Fitzmaurice’s arguments reflected concerns voiced by members of the 
Government during 1972 – 1973 over the creeping competence of Strasbourg. 
Ultimately, the Prime Minister, the Home Secretary and the Attorney General, 
resolved to seek to rein in the power of the Commission and Court rather than to 
withdraw acceptance of Articles 25 and 46 when the then optional articles fell to 
be renewed in January 1974.530  Nevertheless, they chose only to renew 
                                               
528 ECHR 1. 
529 Para 36. The right is not, of course, absolute, and the court stated that ‘there was room for implied limitations.’ 
530  The Commission’s handling of the Golder case had been cited as one of the reasons for not renewing the 
acceptance by HMG of the then ‘optional articles,’ the Article 25 right of individual petition  and Article 46 
acceptance of  the ‘compulsory jurisdiction’  of the court when it was considered by the Heath Government.  
Ultimately in 1973 it was decoded to renew for only another 2 years, from January 1974 to January 1976 (see TNA  
FCO 41/1110 – 1113). Fitzmaurice, referring in his judgment to the UK’s acceptance of Article 25 and 46 ‘only for a 
fixed, though renewable period’ appears to have been warning the court that the UK and other signatory states 
might in future not renew their acceptance of the articles (para 38).  
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acceptance for a further two years. In 1976 the Wilson Government renewed 
British acceptance for a further 5 years.  
The court’s interpretation of the Convention continued to evolve. In Tyrer v 
United Kingdom [1978] it described the Convention as a ‘living instrument’ for the 
first time,531 and in 1979, in  Airey v Ireland532 and Marckx v Belgium,533 the Court 
acknowledged that civil and political rights had economic and social elements, 
early recognition of the unsatisfactory nature of that crude division. 
 
 It was held in both cases that Article 8(1) went beyond a ‘negative’ prohibition of 
unjustified state interference in family life, 534  and both Governments were held 
to have a positive obligation to put in place legal structures to ensure for citizens 
the enjoyment of the Article 8 rights through the exercise of legal social rights. In 
Airey the Court observed that: 
 
‘The substance of her complaint is not that the state has acted but that it 
has failed to act, although the object of Article 8 is essentially that of 
protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by the public 
authorities... in addition to this primarily negative undertaking there may 
be positive obligations inherent in respect for private or family life.’535 
 
In assessing whether Ireland had failed to protect Mrs Airey’s Article 6(1) right of 
access to justice the Court acknowledged that: 
 
‘While the Convention sets forth what are essentially civil and political 
rights many of them have implications of a social or economic nature. The 
Court therefore considers, like the Commission, that the mere fact that an 
interpretation of the Convention may extend into the sphere of social and 
economic rights should not be a decisive factor against such an 
interpretation; there is no water-tight division separating that sphere from 
the sphere covered by the Convention.’536 
 
                                               
531 ECHR 2. 
532 [1979] ECHR 3 
533
 [1979] ECHR 2 
534
 Article 8: Rigt to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence. 
535
 Airey paras 31 - 32. See also Marckx at para 31 
536Airey para 26.  
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 The Court had little difficulty in interpreting and applying the protection the 
Convention afforded Mrs. Airey against the state’s failure to give her the right in 
practice to divorce, and to lead a life wholly separated from her abusive husband. 
As a consequence the Irish government was ultimately compelled to introduce a 
Legal Aid system which permitted less affluent citizens to exercise their legal 
social and economic rights. 537 
 
 The scene was thus seemingly set for a reinterpretation of the labour rights 
which sat astride the increasingly uncertain dividing line between civil and 
economic or social rights. ‘Negative textual inference’ could surely no longer 
justify the failure of the court to protect a right to bargain collectively or to strike,  
and the obvious next step in relation to freedom of association, after a 
recognition that Article 11 protected those rights must, I argue, have seemed 
likely to be an acknowledgement by the court that states were required to 
facilitate collective bargaining, just as the Irish government had been required to 
facilitate Mrs Airey’s Article 8 and Article 6 rights. 
 
Small wonder then that when the first Thatcher administration was obliged to 
consider the question of renewing acceptance of the optional articles in 
November 1980, as the fifth anniversary of the Wilson renewal approached, the 
cabinet noted that the  
‘Commission and the Court were increasingly placing unexpected and 
embarrassing interpretations” on the Convention, and that “the time might 
come when a judgment was so damaging to the Government as to be 
unacceptable.’538 
 Nevertheless, UK acceptance of Article 25 and 46 continued through the Thatcher 
and Major years, 539 legislating, albeit often reluctantly and only as far as it gauged 
was necessary to avoid further action, in response to adverse rulings against the 
UK. There was no refusal to accept a ruling, nor any serious suggestion that the 
                                               
537 Judge Thor Vilhjalmsson argued the case for adherents of the human rights paradigm in his dissenting 
judgement. 
538 TNA CAB 128/68/17 Cabinet meeting 13 November 1980. They were discussing a memorandum notionally 
written by the Home Secretary (Whitelaw) and the Foreign Secretary (Carrington) (CAB 129/210/16). 
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 Ed Bates has pointed out that no member state failed to renew its acceptance of those articles (‘The UK and 
Strasbourg: A Strained Relationship’ in The UK and European Human Rights: A Strained Relationship?, Zeigler, 
Wicks and Hodson (eds), p48, note 51. 
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Convention be denounced. In 1990, when the question of renewal coincided with 
the Convention’s 30th anniversary, letters from senior ministers to Downing Street 
on the matter indicate complete support for renewal, with Thatcher in a letter 
sent out relating to the UK’s leading role in the anniversary celebrations 
professing to be ‘a strong supporter of the Council of Europe, in particular its 
work on human rights.’540 
 
There can be no doubt that the Young James and Webster case had a powerful 
influence on the attitude of the Thatcherites towards the authority of Strasbourg. 
While that case did see the court build on Merckx and Airey to hold that the state 
had a positive obligation to intervene to secure the Article 11 protections, it also 
showed them that where labour rights were concerned, the Commission and the 
Court could be considered allies of a neoliberal Government and, like the 
government, championed the rights of the individual over those of the collective. 
 
The case signaled a fresh turn back towards the individualistic interpretation of 
Article 11 and away from the collectivist path which appeared to have been 
opening following Airey. 
 
It will be recalled that I have stated that Thatcher’s inner circle, in collaboration 
with the extreme right wing Freedom Association, had ‘run’ the case in the hope 
that the court would rule that Article 11 incorporated a guarantee of non-
association.541 As The Times of 11 August 1981 reported: ‘The National 
Association for Freedom, which has sponsored the case, expects a thorough-going 
condemnation of the closed-shop practices which might oblige Mrs Thatcher’s 
Cabinet to change British law.’542 
 
Shortly after the ECtHR had passed judgement, Margaret Thatcher remarked on 
the case in a letter to Sir Walter Salomon, indicating that the Tories had sought an 
‘adverse’ ruling, and had in effect, run the case against itself for political 
purposes: 
‘I wholeheartedly welcomed the European Court’s ruling in their favour. As 
you know we have consistently condemned their dismissals...However, I do 
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TNA PREM 19/3314. The letter, dated 24 September 1990, was to the Italian Prime Minister. 
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See chapters one & two. 
542  By Paul Routledge, 11 August 1981. 
159 
 
not believe that the government should, as you suggest, have let the case 
before the European Court drop when we took office. The fact was that it 
raised a number of key issues…’  
 
When the case for the Government had first been prepared under the direction of 
the Callaghan administration, Article 11(2) and the importance of the closed shop 
in safeguarding and facilitating effective collective bargaining in the context of 
voluntarism, had been the central argument. The 11(2) qualification, like the 
other paragraph 2 qualifications in the Convention, in effect allows the state to 
override the individual’s claim if the restriction of enjoyment of the freedom in 
question is a lawful and proportionate accommodation with the collective 
interest, as well with the individual rights of other citizens.  
 
Yet at Strasbourg 11 (2) was not once referred to by counsel for the UK 
Government.  It was briefly considered by the court, dismissal for non 
membership under the terms of a union membership agreement being found to 
be neither ‘necessary’ nor ‘proportionate’ as a measure to safeguard and 
facilitate collective bargaining. 
 
 Had counsel argued the point, particularly if the tiny proportion of dismissals 
made for non-membership had been made known to the court, then the court 
may have taken a different view about proportionality.  Instead, Thatcher’s 
Solicitor General, Sir Ian Percival had, before both the Commission and the Court, 
relied on the argument that 11(1) did not embrace the right not to associate that 
counsel for the three men alleged to have identified, ensuring that the argument 
to the contrary, which he knew there was support for at Strasbourg, was the 
focus of the case, directing the court towards making the ruling on the so called 
negative right of non-association which the Government sought. 
 
 Percival had also argued that the railway men had the opportunity to join a union 
of their own choice, or to form a union of their own, while remaining members of 
one of the 3 unions that BR had secured a UMA with, 543which was patently 
untrue, and easily rebutted by counsel for the applicants. It seems likely that this 
was an attempt not only to undermine the Government’s own case, but to draw 
attention to another aspect of British trade unionism considered vulnerable to 
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attack at Strasbourg, the Bridlington Principles, the TUC’s arrangements for 
managing inter-union disputes over the recruitment of members.544 
 
As we have seen the court ultimately ruled ‘against’ the Government, although it 
refused to be drawn on the question of whether there was such a negative right, 
and chose instead to base its ruling on freedom of conscience in the context of 
freedom of association.  
Nevertheless, the Tories ‘milked’ the ruling as best they could.  The unions, and 
the 1974 – 1979 Governments, were cast as violators of human rights, and 
Norman Tebbit, made a considerable show of earmarking £2 million of his 
department’s budget available to compensate workers who had been dismissed 
for refusing to join a union during 1976 – 1980.545 
 
More significantly for adherents of individualistic human rights paradigm and 
opponents of collective bargaining, it overcame the exceptional status of the 
closed shop in the Strasbourg jurisprudence, and paved the way for later cases 
based on the emerging recognition of the negative side to Article 11 identified by 
the Commission and 6 of the 18 judges who found for the railwaymen. This 
negative element evolved into a right, in most circumstances, to not to be obliged 
to join a union.   
 
The first stage of this evolution was the remarkable, and by the standards of 
treaty monitoring, almost immediate, individualising influence on the European 
Social Charter’s Committee of Independent Experts (now ECSR). The Committee 
turned to Article 5 of the Charter, which obliges signatory states to guarantee the 
right to organise, to reserve for itself the possibility of a future condemnation of 
the closed shop. It held that even if the explicit neutral status on the closed shop 
in the Appendix to Part II of the Charter, (which refers to Article 1(2) on the right 
to work), could be said to apply to Article 5, ‘it would not follow that the negative 
aspect of the freedom to organise would fall completely outside the scope of 
                                               
544 On the basics of the Bridlington Principles and Cheall (below), see pp518-521, Collins, Ewing and McColgan 
2012, op cit. 
545 See TNA PREM 19/804. 
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Article 5 or that an obligation to join a trade union would always be in conformity 
with the spirit of this provision.’546 
The obvious next target for the UK neoliberals was the Bridlington Principles.  
Cheall v UK [1985]547 was another tilt at collective solidarity and bargaining 
facilitated by the human rights paradigm. Cheall’s case, however, followed 
expulsion from a union. 
 While s4 of the 1980 Employment Act protected workers against unreasonable 
refusals of membership, or unreasonable expulsions, the Bridlington Principles, 
endorsed by the Donovan committee in 1968, had not been challenged until Mr. 
Cheall sought judicial review of his case at the High Court.548 He had been 
expelled from APEX for joining while still a member of ACTTS,549 and citing Young 
James and Webster, he argued that he had been denied the opportunity to join 
the union of his own choice. However, the then Mr. Justice Bingham, 
acknowledging that the union had a ‘duty to act in the best interests of its 
members as a whole’,  and noting that Cheall was not facing dismissal as a 
consequence of his expulsion, rejected Cheall’s application for an injunction.  
 
 Bingham’s decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal.550 The Lords 
subsequently reversed that decision,551 but at Strasbourg the Commission 
rejected Cheall’s claim that his Article 11 rights had been violated, holding that 
the protection of the Convention only extends to guarding against ‘abuse by 
unions of their dominant position…Expulsion from a union in breach of the 
union’s rules, decided upon arbitrary rules or entailing exceptional hardship.’ 
 
The case was therefore declared inadmissible. It was becoming apparent that 
proportionality, the extent – the consequences – of compulsion, was the key to 
these cases. 
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The questions posed by closed shop style arrangements were revisited by the 
ECtHR in Sibson v UK [1993],552 and Sigurjonsson v Iceland [1993],553 which helped 
clarify the question of proportionality in relation to an obligation to join a union.  
In Sibson, there was held to have been no breach of the applicant’s A11 rights 
when he was presented with the choice of either rejoining the T&GWU or 
transferring to another depot. The applicant, a truck driver worked under a 
contract of employment which incorporated a mobility clause, had been an active 
member of the union, and was willing to rejoin if a grievance was acknowledged 
with an apology. As a consequence the restrictions on his Article 11 freedoms – 
no mention was made of any negative right of non association - were not found to 
be disproportionate,554  the Court concluding that he ‘was not subjected to a form 
of treatment striking at the very substance of the freedom of association 
guaranteed by Article 11.’555 
In Sigurjonsson, which was heard just two months after Sibson, the applicant was 
a taxi driver, said to have sincere beliefs irreconcilable with membership of a 
trade association which he had to join in order to continue plying his trade. The 
Icelandic Government based their case on 11(2), and on the collective benefits 
accruing from compelling the driver to join the association. The court, in its 
deliberations, drew upon Article 5 of the European Social Charter, and the 
relevant conclusions of the Committee of Independent Experts, as well as on 
Young James and Webster and Sibson. The court found that the level of 
compulsion was a disproportionate restriction of Mr. Sigurjonsson’s negative 
freedom of association.  
                                               
552 [1993] ECHR 18. 
553[1993] 16 EHRR 462. 
554 Sibson had been a member of the T&GWU but, dissatisfied with the response of the union to a complaint about 
another member he had resigned and joined the United Road Transport Union. His workmates had threatened to 
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claim for unfair dismissal had failed because he was found not to have been dismissed. Commentary on this case is 
often confused because although a UMA with the T&GWU had been negotiated it was not in force during the time 
Sibson was employed. 
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In 2003 the European Committee of Social Rights heard The Confederation of 
Swedish Enterprise v Sweden,556 a complaint brought by the Swedish equivalent of 
the CBI under the collective complaints procedure alleging a breach of Article 5 of 
the Charter. Exhibiting the familiar concern of the libertarian for workers who 
inexplicably wish to forgo the advantages of collective bargaining, the 
organisation argued that in permitting union membership agreements which saw 
employers obliged to give preference in recruitment to workers belonging to a 
particular union or unions Sweden was in breach of the negative right the ECSR 
had identified in Article 5 following Young James and Webster. Although these 
were merely prospective recruits who were given the choice of joining or not 
joining, and non membership did not exclude them from recruitment, the 
Committee duly found Sweden to be in breach of its Article 5 obligations.  
 
Three years later it was the turn of the ECtHR to further tighten the restrictions on 
union membership agreements. Where previous closed shop cases considered by 
the court had, like Young James and Webster, concerned workers having the 
requirement of membership imposed upon them, in 2006, Sorensen and 
Rasmussen v Denmark [2006],557 concerned contractual requirements for recruits 
to become members of a specified union. By permitting this the Danish 
Government was held to have breached the applicants’ Article 11 rights. This was 
another overtly political case. The two Danes, one who had taken a summer job 
and an older worker who had been unemployed for some time before being 
recruited, objected to contractual requirements to join the appropriate trade 
union, preferring instead remain as members only of the Free Trade Union and 
the Christian Trade Union – organisations established to attack freedom of 
association.  
 
Despite ostensibly convincing 11(2) arguments that the UMAs advanced the rights 
of workers through effective collective representation and the vastly different 
consequences for the two workers of being refused work, the Court found there 
had been a disproportionate interference in the Article 11 freedoms in both 
cases.  
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www.coe.int in ‘Processed Complaints.’ 
557 [2006] 46 EHRR 29. 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly there were 5 dissenting judgments in the Grand Chamber. 
The Court had drawn on Article 5 of the ESC, ILO Conventions 87 and 98, the EC 
Charter of the Fundamental Rights of workers of 1989, and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. The European Committee of Social Rights now takes the 
bizarre view that even ‘union shop’ (aka ‘agency shop’) agreements are a breach 
of Article 5 of the ESC, and the Committee of Freedom of Association holds that 
closed shop agreements imposed by law  breach Conventions 87 and 98.  
The evolution of the Article 11 rights to bargain collectively 
and to strike 
Remarkably however, just as the Strasbourg Court, trailed by its little sister the 
ECSR, appeared to have accommodated the highly individualistic negative 
supposed right of non association into its Article 11 jurisprudence, it started to 
dispense with the narrow individualistic interpretation of - for want of a better 
word - positive freedom of association that it had adopted in the mid 1970s. 
Gustafsson v Sweden [1996] saw the Strasbourg Court arguably starting to grasp 
the collective aspect of Article 11.558  This was another carefully selected political 
case. The litigation, took place at the climax of years of struggle by the Swedish 
Conservative Party and the Swedish Employers’ Federation to force neoliberal 
reforms on the country. 559 
 
We saw in chapter one that the court recognised the importance of collective 
bargaining to Sweden when it held that there was no Article 11 protection for an 
employer against industrial action intended to persuade him to enter into a 
collective agreement the Court. Nevertheless the court stopped short of holding 
that there was an Article 11 right to bargain collectively or even to present a 
collective claim to an employer. 
 
UNISON v UK [2002],560 was an inadmissible application, screened out by the 
Court, the Commission having been abolished in 1998. A  National Health Service 
‘Private Finance Initiative’ had meant it was proposed that many members of staff 
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of the University College London Hospital (‘UCLH’) were to be transferred to 
private companies. The union sought assurance that collective bargaining would 
continue under the same terms after any transfer, and union members were 
balloted on the question of whether industrial action should be taken in support 
of that demand. The domestic courts granted UCLH an injunction on the grounds 
that a dispute about terms and conditions in the future with an as yet unknown 
employer was not a trade dispute within the terms of s244 TUL(C)A 1992.  
The New Labour Government argued that ‘Article 11 did not confer any right to 
strike but only a freedom to protect the occupational interests of its members’ – a 
freedom it believed to be adequately protected in this instance by TUPE and by 
the Employment Relations Act 1999 Schedule 1 recognition procedures and the 
s10 right of accompaniment. The Government also argued that if there had been 
any interference with freedom of association, the 11(2) qualification applied.  
The Court agreed with the Government on the reach of Article 11, recalling that 
Article 11 contained ‘no express inclusion of a right to strike or an obligation on 
employers to engage in collective bargaining,’ citing the third case in the ‘Belgian 
Trilogy’, Schmidt and Dahlstrom v Sweden [1976].  
It did find that there had been a restriction of the Article 11 right to protect the 
occupational interests of the UNISON members, but it confirmed the 
Government’s view that the approach of the UK was within the margin of 
appreciation afforded states in industrial relations, and ‘can be regarded as a 
proportionate measure and ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for the protection 
of the rights of others, namely UCLH.’ 
Six months later the Court handed down their judgement in Wilson, National 
Union of Journalists and Others v UK, a case perhaps better known as Wilson and 
Palmer v UK. The applicants were a journalist employed by The Daily Mail, and his 
union the NUJ, two London dock workers, and their union the RMT, and five other 
workers employed at Cardiff docks.561 
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This pivotal case saw the Strasbourg Court starting to allow those labour rights to 
be found in regional and international legal instruments to influence, rather than 
merely occasionally confirm its interpretation of Article 11.562 Although the 
interpretation of Article 11 owned up to by the court arguably only widened 
slightly beyond that established in the Belgan Trilogy,563 the court appeared at 
times to be close to acknowledging the inevitable: that trade unions are formed 
and workers join them in order to come to collective agreements with employers, 
that protection for freedom of association in the context of labour relations must 
implicitly embrace a right for workers to bargain collectively.  
The court stated that 
‘it is of the essence of the right to join a trade union for the protection of 
their interests that employees should be free to instruct or permit the 
union to make representations to their employer or to take action in 
support of their interests on their behalf. If workers are prevented from 
doing so their freedom to belong to a trade union, for the protection of 
their interests becomes illusory.’564 
The conjoined cases concerned the provision by employers of substantial pay 
rises to workers who, following decisions by their employer to derecognise their 
unions, agreed to sign up to individual contracts of employment, and renounce 
their existing contractual right to collective negotiation and representation. 
Initially held to be breaches of the TULRCA 1992 s.146 right not to be 
discriminated on the grounds of trade union membership, the House of Lords had 
deemed the withholding these payments from workers who preferred that the 
union to continue to negotiate on their behalf to be lawful on the grounds that 
they were acts of omission rather than commission. 
 The case had been referred to in New Labour’s 1998 industrial relations White 
Paper, Fairness at Work, which declared that the new Government was to address 
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the heavily criticised ruling by making  it ‘unlawful to discriminate by omission on 
grounds of trade union membership, non membership or activities.’565 
However, collective bargaining had been defined by elements of the judiciary 
during the course of the Wilson and Palmer cases as a trade union service rather 
than as an activity. Acceptance of that arguably unsatisfactory distinction had 
allowed the EAT to essentially direct the tribunal to reject the claim that s.146 had 
been breached. The Court of Appeal had subsequently taken the commonsense 
view that collective bargaining was an activity and was protected by s.146. The 
response of the Major Government to that decision was the so called ‘Ullswater 
amendment,’ s.13 of TURER 1993,566 which amended s.148 of TULR(C)A 1992, to 
effectively permit these inducements by providing that s146 applied only if the 
action was not one a ‘reasonable employer would take.’ However, the Lords 
overturned the ruling of the Court of Appeal in 1995, holding that collective 
bargaining was a service, and not an activity. 
Thus separated from the protected spheres of membership and activities, 
collective bargaining remained vulnerable to attack and New Labour, arguably 
just as enthusiastic as the Thatcher and Major governments about the individual 
contract of employment, were happy to implement that distinction into black 
letter law.  In ERA 1999 New Labour revised s.146 to encompass acts as well as 
omissions, but at the same time replacing ‘action short of dismissal’ with a ‘right 
not to be subjected to any detriment as an individual,’ resisting recognising 
collective bargaining by the union on behalf of the individual as a central element 
of membership. The Ullswater amendment was retained. Pleading lack of time, 
the Government had legislated only to allow the Secretary of State to introduce 
regulations governing incentives to encourage employees to relinquish collective 
bargaining, and permitted the opposition, with what became known as the ‘Miller 
amendment’ to amend the Bill to ensure that Wilson style bonuses which 
‘reasonably’ related to the employee’s services, and did not require the employee 
to cease to be a member, could not be regarded as S.146 detriments. New 
Labour’s muted, Machiavellian, and determined opposition to collective rights 
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was becoming embarrassingly obvious to trade unionists, if not to the wider 
public. 
The Strasbourg Court recognised that New Labour’s legislative response had been 
inadequate. It noted that the European Social Charter’s Committee of Experts 
had, in its 1995 and 1998 Conclusions, found that in permitting these 
inducements the UK government was in breach of its Article 5 and 6 obligations, 
and had required the repeal of s13 of the 1993 Act.567 
 
For the first time the ECtHR relied on the ILO jurisprudence - the work of the CFA 
and CEACR - and also on the provisions of the European Social Charter. Not only 
was the narrow interpretation of Article 11 widened – the first step taken away 
from the individualistic interpretation adopted by the court in the Belgian Police 
Trilogy of cases in the mid 1970s - but the collective right of the trade union, as 
well as the rights of the individual complainant workers, under Article 11 ‘to make 
its voice heard’ by the employer in the regulation of employment relations was 
recognised.568 
 
This ‘integrated’ approach took root in the ECHR jurisprudence, and flourished, 
resulting in the effective recognition of full freedom of association by the 
Strasbourg Court in 2008 and 2009. It also took into account the obligations 
incumbent on the Government to promote and facilitate collective bargaining in 
ILO Conventions 87 and 98, and a recent complaint that the Committee on 
Freedom of Association had considered, alleging intimidation, and a ‘by-passing’ 
of the union, aimed at facilitating de-recognition at a British steel works. The CFA 
in that case had recalled that while collective bargaining should be voluntary, if it 
appears that there is majority support for it then: 
 
‘the authorities should take appropriate conciliatory measures to obtain 
the employer’s recognition of that union for collective bargaining 
purposes.’569  
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The CFA had recommended the UK ‘reconsider’ s13 in the light of Article 4 of C98, 
a step which the Strasbourg Court noted had been approved by the ILO’s 
Governing Body.570 In a unanimous decision the Court found that the UK was in 
breach of its Article 11 obligations by continuing to permit employers to make 
these inducements. 
Forced to legislate to take account of the ECtHR decision the Government 
nevertheless continued to refuse to align union membership and activity with the 
provision of collective bargaining. By ERA 2004, S146 was amended to make 
detrimental treatment to deter the use of trade union services unlawful. Sections 
30-31, inserted sections 145A and 145B into TULRCA 1992, specifically prohibiting 
inducements relating to union membership and activities (including the use of 
union services). Section 145B applied only to inducements relating to collective 
bargaining. 145B (4) states that: 
‘Having the terms of employment determined by collective agreement shall 
not be regarded for the purposes of section 145A (or section 146 and 152) 
as making use of a trade union service.’  
Collective bargaining was thus now distinct from membership, activities and 
services. The protections against inducements to forego collective negotiation and 
agreement were undermined by further legislative sleight of hand: 
‘145B(1) A worker who is a member of an independent trade union which is 
recognized, or seeking to be recognised by his employer has the right not to 
have an offer made to him by his employer…’ 
But this restricted protection was subject another caveat: ‘The employer’s sole or 
main purpose in making the offer’ must, for the purposes of 145B, be to achieve 
the result that the worker’s ‘terms of employment, or any of those terms will not 
(or will no longer) be determined by collective agreement negotiated by or on 
behalf of the union.’571 
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Consequently the employer can simply derecognise the union and then make 
whatever offers it thinks appropriate. However, if the employer is not prepared to 
take this step, and if it can satisfy the tribunal that the attempt to persuade the 
employee or employees to forgo collective representation in negotiations over 
terms and conditions was merely incidental to another purpose - to allow success 
to be more readily rewarded, for example - then the offer of the incentive 
payments will not be a breach of 145B. 
 The remedy for a breach of 145B is the award of £4,093.572 Employees who 
choose to accept the payment will not be returned to the collectively negotiated 
terms, and arguably many employees will be unlikely to consider it worth 
alienating the employer by pursuing a claim. The prospect having to pay an award 
of £4,093 to any employees brave or foolhardy enough to risk their career by 
making a tribunal claim is unlikely to stop many employers from offering them.573 
The nature of these ‘sweeteners’ is that they are short term financial sacrifices 
made with the intention of saving very considerable sums of money in the long 
term. 
 I suggest that these remedies for breaches of collective rights must be seen to 
have been provided as part of an initiative to appear to provide the bare 
minimum of rights for individual workers sufficient to bring UK collective rights in 
line with her international obligations. Close analysis reveals that the rights 
provided have no real substance - in reality they provide less than the minimum 
demanded: the Daily Mail would have been unlikely to have fallen foul of 145B 
had the newspaper made its offers to Mr. Wilson and his colleagues after the 
2004 Act.  
Even the most robust of new individual rights would not have sufficed to remedy 
the breaches of the rights of the NUJ and RMT identified by the Court. The ruling 
clearly requires that trade unions be given standing to protect their right, and the 
right of their members, not to have inducements made to workers to forego 
collective bargaining, yet New Labour, and all subsequent Governments, have 
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 S145E. 
573 However, see the use – under the supervision of the union - of multiple individual claims for each unlawful offer 
in Kostal UK Ltd v Dunkley & Ors [2017] UKEAT/0108/17/RN. 
171 
 
resolutely refused to go beyond the heavily compromised individual rights that 
were ceded so grudgingly in 2004. 
While the ECtHR was apparently satisfied with New Labour’s legislative gestures, 
the European Social Rights Committee was not. As we have seen, it had long 
taken an interest in the use of these inducements, and following Wilson, it 
continued to hold the UK to be in breach of Article 6(2). In its most recent 
published pronouncement, Conclusions XX-3(2014), the Committee observed that 
although it is  
‘unlawful for employers to offer financial incentives to induce workers to 
exclude themselves from the scope of collective bargaining [S145A TULRCA 
1992]’, there is no right for “workers who did not receive an offer with the 
right to complain about offers made to co-workers...the law also does not 
create a free standing right for a trade union to appeal in a case of 
infringement on its own right to collective bargaining.’  
However, even as the ECSR were harrying the UK government on the inadequate 
response of the UK government to Wilson, and in doing so highlighting the more 
exacting demands of the Charter, the two sister instruments and supervisory 
bodies appeared to fall into line with each other on freedom of association -in 
2008 Demir and Baykara v Turkey had changed everything.574 
 
The acceptance by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR that, based upon the 
international and regional norms evinced principally by the ILO, European Social 
Charter jurisprudence, that the right to bargain collectively is an essential element 
of Article 11 saw real recognition of the collective nature of the right to freedom 
of association in the European Convention of Human Rights.That this right to 
bargain collectively necessarily embraced a right to strike was confirmed the 
following year in Enerji Yapi-Yol v Turkey.575 
 
In the UK, cases like Metrobus and EDF, betrayed the reluctance of the Higher 
Courts to ‘take account’ of events in Strasbourg as required by the Human Rights 
                                               
574
 ECHR 1345 2008. 
575ECHR 2251 [2009] . See also Hrvatski lijecnicki sindikat v Croatia ECHR 27 [2014]. 
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Act.576 Nevertheless, in the conjoined cases of RMT v Serco and ASLEF v London & 
Birmingham Railway,577 heard at the Court of Appeal in February 2011 by Lord 
Justices Mummery, Elias and Etherton, the influence of the integrated approach 
supplied through New Labour’s legislative conduit, the Human Rights Act 1998, 
was for the first time felt in a ruling at the Royal Courts of Justice.  
 
Mummery and Elias were ex-heads of the Employment Appeals Tribunal, Elias 
more than usually expert on labour law matters, and led by John Hendy they 
relied on ILO Conventions 98 and 151, the European Social Charter, and on the 
recent ECtHR jurisprudence supposedly ‘given effect by the Human Rights Act’, to 
recognise a right to strike in English law and to hold as a consequence that 
compliance with the ‘trips and hurdles’ of the balloting requirements cannot be 
construed strictly against trade unionists, and must instead be construed in the 
normal way. As a consequence the injunctions that had been granted in the High 
Court on the basis of very minor procedural balloting errors on the part of the 
unions were discharged.    
 
 A comparatively minor victory for the trade unionists perhaps, but it can 
nevertheless be said that the labour law rulings of the ECtHR have taken root in 
our jurisprudence. These rights to bargain and to strike are, of course, far from 
absolute, and they can be rendered ineffective in practice when the courts permit 
substantial interference. Unfortunately for British trade unionists the ECtHR did 
permit substantial interference when the RMT took the EDF case to Strasbourg in 
2014, and when Unite challenged the abolition of the last of Wages Councils there 
in 2016. 
 
The Tories had been watching developments in the Strasbourg jurisprudence with 
dismay. Eighteen months after the Tories had formed a Coalition government 
with the Liberal Democrats in 2010, the UK took over the chair of the Council of 
Europe, and the Tories were able to take practical steps towards reining in the 
court. Exploiting concerns about the back log of ECHR cases, the Tories pressed a 
draft declaration on the future of the court on member states. That draft 
provided the basis of what became the Brighton Declaration, which in turn 
evolved into ECHR Protocol No.15 (which, requiring ratification by all member 
states, has yet to come into force). The declaration called upon the court to apply 
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 EDF  Energy v National Union of Rail Maritme and Transport Workers [2010] EWCA Civ 173 and Metrobus v 
Unite [2009]EWCA Civ 829 CA (see chapter two). 
577EWCA Civ 226. 
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procedural rules relating to the admissibility of cases more strictly, to, in effect, 
restrict decisions which departed from ‘settled case law’ to the Grand Chamber, 
and to widen the already wider margin of appreciation, accorded states in the 
protection of the labour and social rights embraced by the Convention by laying 
more emphasis the application of the principal of subisidiarity.578 
 
Essentially the Brighton Declaration saw the UK ally with other states unhappy 
about the judicial activism of the court (notably the Russian Federation) to fire a 
shot across the bows of the Strasbourg Court. It demonstrated to the court that 
the UK is a dangerous and influential enemy. That warning appears to have had 
the desired effect. Subsequently, in RMT v UK [2014],579 the court departed from 
a run of freedom of association decisions which had seen each respondent state 
held to have breached the newly invigorated Article 11. The prohibition on 
secondary action in the UK was held to fall within the wide margin of appreciation 
accorded states in matters of labour relations, and the challenge to the 
restrictions on the right to strike imposed by the procedural ‘trips and hurdles’ 
was held to be inadmissible.580 
 
UNITE v UK [2016],581 saw the union rely principally on the requirements in ILO 
Convention 98 and Article 6 of the European Social Charter for states to provide 
machinery to facilitate collective bargaining to challenge the abolition of the 
Agricultural Wages Board, the last of the Wages Councils, by the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2013. That Article 11 challenge was also held by the court 
to be inadmissible. The court took the view that there was no positive obligation 
to secure collective bargaining for workers; the government was obliged merely 
to ensure ‘the right for their union to be heard with a view to protecting their 
interests,’ and to ‘enable trade unions, in conditions not at variance with Article 
11, to strive for the protection of their members’ interests.’582 The essential 
elements of Article 11 included  
 
‘the right to form and join a trade union, the prohibition of closed shop 
agreements, the right for a trade union to seek to persuade the employer 
                                               
578See ‘The Future of the European Court of Human Rights in the Light of the Brighton Declaration’ by Klaus 
Lorcher, in Dorssemont, Lorcher and Schomann, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Employment 
Relation, (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013). 
579
 [2014] ECHR 366. 
580
 See Alan Bogg and KD Ewing, ‘The Implications of the RMT Case’ (2014) 43 ILJ 221.  
581
 [2016] ECHR 1150. 
582Ibid, para 53. 
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to hear what it has to say on behalf of its members, and, in principle, the 
right to bargain collectively with the employer...States remain free to 
organise their systems so as to grant special status to trade unions if 
appropriate.’583 
 
The court referred back to the individual human rights paradigm to state that  
 
‘the essential object of Article 11 is to protect the individual against 
arbitrary interference by public authorities.’  
 
While ‘there may be positive obligations on the State to secure the effective 
enjoyment’ of freedom of association, and that it was necessary for a ‘fair balance 
to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and the 
community as a whole,’584 as far as the protection for collective bargaining 
conferred by Article 11 the court held that: 
 
‘[I]n the present case the United Kingdom does not restrict employers and 
trade unions from entering into voluntary collective agreements...the 
applicant is not prevented from engaging in collective bargaining.’585 
 
Disappointing as these cases were to trade unionists, the RMT case had at least 
confirmed that the rights to bargain collectively and to strike were essential 
elements of Article 11.586 Significantly, in the Unite case the court, while holding 
that Article 11 protection for collective bargaining did no more than prevent 
states from stopping workers and employers from engaging in collective 
negotiation, arguably made it clear enough that governments were free to oblige 
employers to negotiate with unions at either establishment or sectoral level.587 
 
 The RMT case had also clarified the court’s view of the status of the 
interpretations placed upon the ILO Conventions by the CFA and CEACR as binding 
upon the government.588 The government had raised the argument that they 
were not, in anticipation of the court confirming it, much as the Tories had raised 
                                               
583Ibid, para 54, emphasis added. 
584Ibid, para 56. 
585Ibid, paras 59 and 64. 
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  As Hrvatski lijecnicki Sindikat v Croatia[2014],op cit, did later in the same year. 
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See Gustafson v Sweden [1996], op cit. 
588 In accord with the ‘Employers’ Rebellion’ at the ILO (see introduction, above). 
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the argument that there was no negative side to Article 11 in Young James and 
Webster in anticipation of court holding that there was. That weapon had failed 
them then, but this time however it had ‘backfired.’ 
----------------------------------------------------- 
To conclude then, and to take first the relationship of Britain and ILO, it is a 
considerable understatement to say that the position of the government has 
altered radically since it took the leading role in negotiations over the ECHR, the 
ILO constitution and Conventions 87 and 98 in the late 1940s. 
 
Since 1980 only one ILO convention of significance has been ratified by the UK – 
Convention No.111 on Discrimination in 1999. Two other fundamental 
Conventions relating to child labour, as well as the Promotional Framework for 
OSH Convention were also ratified by New Labour, but neither can be said to be 
of any consequence to British workers. Under Conservative administrations, only 
a handful of maritime conventions, and an administrative convention,589 have 
been ratified - the two conventions ratified in 1980 were, in reality, ratified by the 
Callaghan government of 1976 - 79.  
Yet prior to 1981 62 conventions were ratified by HMG. 34 of those were ratified 
between 1945 and 1980.590 
During that period the UK can be said to have led the world in terms of respect for 
the fundamental labour rights.The Attlee governments had effectively required 
signatories of the fundamental ILO Conventions, and the Convention to adopt 
British standards. As a consequence successive administrations were able at once 
to be seen to endorse, impose, yet also to effectively largely avoid supranational 
obligation, other than to maintain for British workers full freedom of association. 
 
All administrations evinced extreme reluctance to legislate on labour relations in 
response to supranational obligation, but such was the respect accorded the rule 
of law that the post war governments considered themselves to be bound by 
those treaty requirements even when it seemed that they would have to break 
with voluntarism to legislate to ensure compliance. 
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The last Macmillan administration of 1959 – 63 compounded this post war cross 
party commitment to maintain full freedom of association when it signed the 
European Social Charter in 1962. This was overlaid by the unmistakeably 
collectivist contributions to the protections for trade union freedom implemented 
into the UN Covenants overseen by British delegates at Geneva, protections 
ultimately ratified by the Wilson government in 1976.We saw too in this chapter 
that the misguided narrow individualistic interpretation of Article 11 ECHR 
adopted in the mid 1970s was ultimately abandoned by the Strasbourg Court to 
reflect the collectivist freedom of association which I showed in chapter one to 
have been implicit the Article 11 and UN Covenant protections for freedom of 
association by virtue of the use of ILO Convention 87 as a floor to those 
guarantees. 
 
Ultimately, I would argue, that despite the efforts of the post 1979 Governments, 
and the emergence of the ‘negative freedom of non association,’ partially as a 
consequence of the machinations of the Thatcher Governments, there is no 
escaping the commitments entered into during 1945 – 1976. The law breaking 
and obfuscation of the politicians, the reluctance of the domestic judiciary to 
protect for workers their right to bargain collectively, and the failure of the 
Strasbourg judges to protect the full freedom of association it had appeared to 
have promised during 2008 - 2014 (and, as we shall see, the similar failure of the 
Luxembourg Court) cannot continue indefinitely. A reappraisal is imminent. 
 
Only membership of the European Union has obliged the government to legislate 
to improve domestic labour employment protection to any appreciable extent, 
and UK withdrawal from the EU can be said to be a manifestation of a desire to 
evade this well publicised example of supranational obligation in the sphere of 
individual employment rights. Elements on the right wing of British politics 
profess to believe that ‘Brexit’ will serve to divest the UK of long resented 
European employment protection obligations, permitting fast moving, ‘dynamic’ 
free trade with other states with similarly unprotected ‘flexible’ workforces.591 
The reality, of course, is that if the UK does leave the European Union (and the 
customs union) to negotiate trade treaties with ‘third states’, it will not emerge as 
a newly ‘competitive,’ lean, deregulated state. It will still be bound by the very 
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considerable ILO, Council of Europe and United Nations obligations it entered into 
in the post war years. Formal British escape from these commitments, as the Tory 
administrations of 1979 – 1997 discovered, is not possible without incurring 
severe, almost certainly unacceptable, domestic political difficulty and 
condemnation from abroad.592 
Moreover, such is the collective power of the EU as a trading bloc that the UK 
government will still almost certainly have to adhere to the very comprehensive 
employment protection that it was bound by when it was a member of the EU, 
and party to the most extensive free trade agreement in the world. It will not 
want to permit an ‘off shore sweatshop’ access to the single market.593 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                               
592 See the GCHQ affair above. 
593 See chapter two. 
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Chapter Four:The influence of the European Union 
In this chapter I show that the EU, like the English common law, is fundamentally 
concerned with the protection of the interests of business. Whatever might be 
said of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and of the protection conferred by 
the Charter and the CJEU of the fundamental freedoms rights and principles of 
the EU, freedom of association is subservient to the freedom to do business. 
 
I show too that, despite the relaxed approach of the EU Commission to the 
enforcement of the individual employment rights deployed to ‘rebalance’ the bias 
of the EU – resisted at every turn by all UK governments since 1979 - that the 
primacy accorded the right to do business has, in the cause of the pursuit of a 
‘level playing field’ for business, provided British workers with a formidable 
mechanism for the protection of employment rights of EU origin.  
 
The Treaty of Rome – ‘the four freedoms’ and other rights 
What has become known as the European Union was, for the first fifteen years of 
its existence,594 essentially an exclusively economic project. The European 
Economic Community was based on free trade,595and the fundamental freedoms 
enshrined in the 1957 Treaty of Rome were economic rights - negative rights 
requiring that Member States open their borders to the citizens of the other 
Member States to create a common market.596 The intention was the ‘progressive 
liberalisation’ of the movement of goods,597 workers, services, and capital.598 
                                               
594
It was envisaged in Article 8 that the ‘common market shall be progressively established during a transitional 
period of twelve years’ (all Treaty references below, unless stated otherwise, are from the 1957 Treaty of Rome). 
595
It evolved from the European Coal and Steel Community established by the 1951 Treaty of Paris. Of course, 
those involved in negotiating these treaties were acutely aware of the contribution that free trade made towards 
keeping the peace. Open borders, free trade and a European Court of Justice make waging war on fellow Member 
States near enough impossible (although opponents of the EU almost invariably ascribe the unprecedented post 
1945 Western European peace to NATO) . 
596Article 2: ‘It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a common Market and progressively 
approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious 
development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability, an accelerated 
raising of the standard of living and closer relations between its Member States.’ 
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 Part 2, Title I. 
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 Part 2, Title III ‘The Free Movement of Persons, Services and Capital’: Chapter 1 – Workers; Chapter 2 – The 
Right of Establishment; Chapter 3-Services; Chapter 4-Capital. 
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These business rights became known as the ‘four freedoms,’ guaranteed under 
the Treaties by Member States, and promoted by Community legislation.599 
 
The few labour rights the Treaty conferred were incidental to the economic 
rights.600 Discrimination on the grounds of nationality had to be prohibited to 
protect freedom of movement and freedom of establishment.601 Equality of 
treatment for men and women,602 that most influential tenet of European law,603 
had its origins in French fears that the Germans would underpay its comparatively 
large female population and undercut French production costs.604 
 
These immediate concerns aside, human rights were scarcely considered by those 
negotiating the treaty. Arguably there was no obvious need. The six nations had 
similar attitudes towards civil, social and labour rights, and the majority had new 
post war constitutions which guaranteed the right to strike, and the right to 
bargain collectively. This new Western European legal, political and constitutional 
consensus was reinforced by the ILO Conventions, by membership of the Council 
of Europe,605 by the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and 
the evolving UN covenants on civil and social rights. The founding states – 
membership was confined to the original six until the UK, Denmark and Ireland 
joined the European Economic Community in 1973 - had ratified the European 
Convention on Human Rights in the early fifties, and all were party to the lengthy 
negotiations over the provisions of the European Social Charter, which was 
ultimately signed by the UK in 1962. National laws in relation to freedom of 
association, to the right to organise, bargain collectively and take industrial action 
were beyond Community competence, and in the 1956 Ohlin Report, the ILO 
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Labour related legislation, under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure, is proposed by the Commission, following 
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602Article 119. 
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604 Martin J. Dedman, The Origins and Development of the European Union 1945-95, 1996, p103 and Novitz & 
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Committee of Experts essentially took the view that a common market would not 
stop Member States from improving workers’ living standards, and could certainly 
not restrict freedom of association. 606 
 
 In the same year the Spaak Report had concluded that free movement would 
ensure that employers were drawn to areas where wages were low and the law of 
supply and demand would force wages up.607 As Catherine Barnard put it, it was 
‘believed that a successful economic model, delivered through an economic 
constitution governed by the rule of law, would bring higher levels of social 
benefits in its wake. Improved working conditions would be the consequence of 
market integration, not a prerequisite to it.’608 
 
The first Social Chapter: Title III Social Policy, Chapter 1 - ‘Social 
Provisions.’ 
Article 117 enshrined in the Treaty this belief that a free European market, the 
‘Common Market’, would deliver prosperity, but gave equal weight to the 
importance of ‘the approximation of legislative and administrative provisions’ in 
improving “the living and working conditions of labour.” 
 
Article 118, however, emphasised the incidental status of labour rights: 
‘Without prejudice to the other provisions of this treaty and in conformity with 
its general objectives, the Commission shall have the task of promoting close 
co-operation between member states in the social field particularly in matters 
relating to: 
 Employment; 
 labour law and working conditions; 
 basic and advanced vocational training; 
                                               
606Social Aspects of European economic co-operation: Report by a group of experts, Geneva, 1956. 
607See Hepple ‘The Crisis in EEC Labour Law,’(1987) 16 (1) ILJ 78. Hepple cited the Spaak Report: ‘Equalisation, so 
far from being a condition precedent to the operation of the Common Market is, on the contrary, its result.’ The 
report was presented to the European Coal and Steel Community by Paul-Henri Spaak, then the Belgian Foreign 
Minister who had headed a committee of representatives from the Foreign Offices of the Member States who 
prepared the report. 
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Catherine Barnard, ‘Employment Rights, Free Movement Under the EC Treaty and the Services Directive’, 
Europa Institute, Mitchell Working Paper Series, 2008, p2 (Barnard’s emphasis). 
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 social security; 
 Prevention of occupational accidents and diseases; 
 Occupational hygiene; the right of association, and collective bargaining 
between employers and workers.’609 
Article 120 provided that: ‘Member States shall endeavour to maintain the 
existing equivalence between paid holiday schemes.’ Parity, rather than progress, 
was at the heart of Community social policy.  
Articles 123-128 established the European Social Fund with ‘the task of rendering 
the employment of workers easier and of increasing their geographical and 
occupational mobility within the Community.’610 Vocational training, and 
resettlement allowances,611 can be obtained by Member States in order to 
facilitate ‘the harmonious development both of the national economies and of 
the Common Market.’612The Commission and a Committee, based on the tri-
partite ILO model, with representatives from Governments, trade unions and 
employers’ organizations, administer the fund, in consultation with the Economic 
and Social Committee.613 
The European Court of Justice rules on questions of law in matters related to the 
legal competences conferred by the treaties. The role of the ECJ is not merely that 
of a constitutional court, interpreting the law relating to cases referred to it by 
member states. It also enforces those laws. From 1957 to 1992, however, the 
court had only the power to make a declaration to the effect that a member state 
had failed to comply with a ruling of the Court. Infringement proceedings were 
brought at the instigation of the Commission only after other approaches had 
failed to secure compliance and to this day the Commission is the ‘guardian of the 
treaties.’ Nevertheless, with only a small number of broadly similar states in the 
                                               
609Article 118 of Title III, Chapter 1, Social Policy. The Article goes on to state that: ‘To this end, the Commission 
shall act in close contact with Member States by making studies, delivering opinions and arranging consultations 
both on problems arising at national level and on those of concern to international organisations.’ The rest of the 
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pay for equal work. 
610Article 123. 
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Article 125. 
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Community, all broadly committed to the European project, these enforcement 
measures sufficed. The use of financial penalties is a relatively recent innovation. 
They were introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, and the first penalty payment 
was imposed on Greece in 2000.614 Arguably financial penalties became essential 
when the EU admitted states sharing neither the prosperity nor the common 
values of the original European Economic Community states –‘peer pressure’ was 
weakened as the EU became a union of 28 states. 
 
Since the introduction of these penalties in 1993 it has been arguable that EU 
treaty obligations are of a wholly different order from those imposed by the ILO, 
European Social Charter of 1961 or the UN Covenants – even the European Court 
of European Rights.  The potential severity of the consequences sets them apart. 
 
The position now is that infringement proceedings can be brought under Article 
258 TFEU by the Commission, by other member states (Article 258) and by 
individuals or organisations making complaints to the Commission.615 States are 
given ample opportunity to rectify their mistakes before the Commission notifies 
the Court, and even when the court makes an adverse finding, the state is 
permitted to ‘set matters straight’ (Article 260(1). However at the instigation of 
the Commission sanctions will be imposed by the Court for a failure to comply 
with a judgment (Article 260(2)). ‘Lump sums’ and ‘penalty payments’ may be 
imposed for a failure to implement a Directive (Article 26-(3)), the unequivocal 
intention being to place the state under economic pressure to rectify the matter. 
Of course, this will very likely also bring very considerable domestic political 
pressure to bear on any errant Government. Financial penalties continue to be 
‘racked up’ if non-compliance continues, based on the seriousness of the breach, 
and the ability of the state to pay. 
 
However, the Commission often shows a marked reluctance to invoke 
infringement proceedings. Where employment protection is concerned, other 
than in the sphere of Occupational Safety and Health where enforcement action 
beyond the immediate post implementation period, is rare enough, proceedings 
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For a readable summary of the infringement process see https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-
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are very rare indeed.616 In December 2017 there were only 15 cases pending in 
the field of ‘Justice (including non-discrimination and data protection)’ in the 
entire EU. Just over half of all infringement cases (51.2% or 698 cases in 2017) 
concern late transposition of EU directives, while the ‘bad application’ of 
directives accounts for just a fifth of all cases (21.5% or 293 cases in 2017).  
 
Although labour rights - equality and anti-discrimination provisions aside - did not 
fall within the legal competences ceded by member states to the Community 
under the 1957 Treaty, national employment laws and practices were occasionally 
challenged at the European Court of Justice on the grounds that they interfered 
with the Treaty rights.617 Collective bargaining systems, collective agreements and 
national laws and practices in relation to the right to strike, were not subject to 
any such challenges. 
 
Initially reluctant to look outside of the treaty for sources of law, 618 by the early 
1970s the ECJ was drawing upon international and regional legal rights 
instruments, and on the rights conferred in the constitutions of member states to 
determine, on a case by case basis, how far basic rights could be permitted 
infringe upon Community law, when Community law was engaged.619These rights, 
although neither Treaty rights, nor rights conferred by legislation adopted by the 
Community under the powers conferred by the Treaty, helped establish the 
parameters of the economic rights, and became recognised by the Court as 
fundamental Community rights. Without the incorporation of these fundamental 
rights into the Treaty, or into the black letter law of the Community, the question 
asked was not whether the Treaty rights could be allowed to infringe these 
fundamental rights, but whether fundamental rights could be permitted to 
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Even in the field of OSH the UK has been permitted to withdraw protections very considerably over the last 30 
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infringe the economic rights.620 This is substantially the same approach that the 
Court employs to this day.  
 
As we shall see, the failure of the European Union to provide more effective 
protection for fundamental labour rights can arguably be at least in part ascribed 
to British resistance to ceding further legal competence in the employment 
sphere to Brussels, to the failure of the EEC/EC/EU to protect the right to bargain 
collectively, and to the reluctance of the ECJ to give sufficient weight to rights 
based arguments.  This continuing failure, while scarcely something that could be 
said to have been unexpected in a regional organisation so unequivocally geared 
to the promotion of interests of business, was later to cause workers considerable 
trouble. 
 
As the prosperous and politically placid years of the late 1950s and early 1960s 
gave way to the more turbulent late 1960s and early 1970s, with the radical left 
enjoying a resurgence in the six member states, the failure to include labour 
rights in the Treaty - the ‘social deficit’ - stoked opposition to what now appeared 
to many to be a trans-national organisation geared to promoting the interests of 
capital. 
 
The Treaty of Rome has been described as a neoliberal treaty, and the years 1957 
to 1972 as period of economic neo-liberalism for the EEC.621 The four freedoms 
are bulwarks against anti- competitive measures - market place ‘distortion.’622 In 
that respect it can be argued that the European project has always been, and 
remains, a neo-liberal project. As Hepple put it: 
 
‘The founders of the EEC were economic determinists. Although article 2 of 
the EEC treaty proclaims the task of promoting “an accelerated raising of 
the standard of living,” this is firmly based in an ideology of economic neo-
liberalism. The task, says article 2, is to be performed “by establishing a 
                                               
620 See  the approach of the ECJ in Viking and Laval (below). The supremacy of EU law and the surrender of legal 
sovereignty might well be seen to have compounded the high handed attitude of the ECJ to rights not found in the 
Treaties, Directives and Regulations. The initial case on EEC supremacy was Costa v ENEL [1964] C-6/64 ECR 585. As 
regards the UK’s grudging acceptance of what had been signed away in 1972, see Factortame v Secretary of State 
for Transport (No.2) [1991] 1 AER 70, 436 [ ECJ: C- 213/89].   
621By Hepple in “The Crisis in EEC Labour Law,” 1987, op cit. Tory neoliberal strategists Strauss and Hoskyns in 
‘Stepping Stones’ (see chapter two) ascribed the dislike of many on the left for the Common Market to their belief 
that it was a ‘capitalist’s club.’ 
622
Article 3 (f) one of the aims of the Treaty: “the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common 
market is not distorted.” 
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Common Market and progressively approximating the economic polices of 
the Member States”...Approximation of municipal laws was described as an 
objective but only “to the extent necessary to the functioning of the 
Common Market.”’623 
 
 In the early years of the Community Member States and the European Council, 
were not however dominated by ideologically driven neoliberals, but by 
pragmatic social and liberal democrats with a keen interest in ensuring that their 
electorates benefited from what Article 2 called a ‘continuous and balanced 
expansion, an increased stability,’ which they hoped would characterise that 
‘accelerated raising of the standard of living.’  
 
As the post war boom faded and the 1973 ‘Oil Crisis’ started to bite, it became 
obvious that the market alone could not be relied upon to deliver increased 
prosperity. It certainly could not provide the desired balance or stability.624 
 
We have seen that Article 117, as well as pinning pious hopes on the power of the 
market to improve living standards, also recognised that the necessity for the 
‘approximation of legislative and administrative provisions,’ and it was Articles 
117, 118, and Article 100 - permitting the adoption of legislation to facilitate the 
‘establishment and functioning of the Common Market’625 - which provided the 
basis for a subsequent change of Community policy.  The Social Action 
Programme, adopted in 1974, was a bold and radical attempt at incorporating the 
required minimum standards of labour protection in the acquis. The preamble to 
the Council Resolution on the programme recalled that: 
 
 ‘The Heads of State or of Government affirmed at their conference held in 1972 
that economic expansion is not an end in itself...such a programme involves 
actions designed to achieve full and better employment, the improvement of 
living and working conditions and increased involvement of management and 
                                               
623 Hepple , 1987, op cit, p77. 
624Ibid, p80 noted that free movement of workers had not “resulted in large scale internal movements of labour to 
countries with higher socials standards; it had instead created a secondary labour market within several Member 
States, populated by a sub class of ‘guest workers’ mainly from outside the Community.” Free movement of capital 
saw the relocation of industry to areas with “low social and wage costs” but also with “low productivity, lack of 
skills, energy and resources.” 
625
 Article 235 permitted legislation as a step towards an objective of the Community in situations where “this 
Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from te 
Commission and after consulting the Assembly, take the appropriate measures.” 
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labour in the economic and social decisions of the community, and of workers in 
the life of undertakings...’  
 
The Council envisaged the adoption of a wide range directives and regulations to 
protect the interests of migrant workers, disabled workers, older and younger 
workers, agency and part time workers, workers on fixed term contracts and 
workers with families. Working time was to be regulated, and workers faced with 
collective redundancies, business transfers and insolvencies were to be given a 
measure of protection.626 Significant strides were taken towards the 
harmonisation of health and safety regulations. An Advisory Committee on Safety, 
Hygiene and Health Protection at Work was set up to assist the Commission, and 
in the following year, 1975, the European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions was established. The same year the Commission 
produced a Green Paper on ‘Employee Participation and Company Structure,’ and 
it appeared that the Community was to take the initiative on a question that had 
been provoking considerable interest in the UK – that of workers’ representatives 
in the board room.627 Trade unions, part of the fabric of society in the six founding 
states, were, of course, deeply involved in all of these initiatives, required or 
expected to monitor, report on and enforce any rights conferred.  
 
This ambitious programme was brought to a halt soon after the first Thatcher 
Government was elected in 1979.628 Political consensus was required for a 
legislative programme, and the election of a neoliberal Government in a member 
state destroyed that consensus. The New Tories were set to implement a ‘social 
dumping’ programme under the guise of cutting the burden of ‘red tape’ on 
business,629 and wanted no part of the Social Action Programme.630  We have seen 
that in their first term in office they had stopped ratifying ILO Conventions, and 
had set out on a programme of denunciation - there was no prospect of the UK 
being obliged by European law to protect workers’ rights. 
 
Essentially, the Tories intended to secure a competitive advantage in the Common 
Market, and with Japan and the USA, by a number of strategies including the 
                                               
626Council Resolution of 21 January 1974 concerning a social action programme. eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.C.1974.013.01.0001.01.ENG 
627See Jeff Kenner, EU Employment Law From Rome to Amsterdam and Beyond, 2003, pp 23-42, for an overview. 
628
Brian Bercusson, European Labour Law, 2009, p 102. 
629
  The genesis of this programme was known to those in Thatcher’s inner circle of Hayakian disciples as Stepping 
Stones. 
630The previous Tory leader Edward Heath had been personally involved in formulating the programme. 
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withdrawal of certain collective labour rights, to ensure what is euphemistically 
referred to as a flexible labour market. That competitive advantage was permitted 
by the absence of community competence in the sphere of pay and the freedom 
to organise and bargain collectively. 
 
Nevertheless, the Tories had to work around some ideologically incompatible so 
called ‘social’ (employment) provisions – the price of continued access to the 
Common Market. The Directives on equal pay and equal treatment,631 and the 
protection of ‘acquired rights’ on the transfer of an undertaking had already been 
adopted under the programme, and were non-negotiable.632 
 
The floor of rights required by the Equal Pay Directive of 1975, and the Equal 
Treatment Directive of 1976, had been laid in December 1975, when the Equal 
Pay Act 1970, and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 had come in to force. 
Protection for pregnant and nursing mothers had followed in the Employment 
Protection Act 1975 which had also implemented the Collective Redundancies 
Directive.633 The Framework Health and Safety Directive of 1980 on protection 
from chemical, physical and biological agents, 635 proved acceptable to the 
Thatcher Government,636 and it had no choice but to implement the Acquired 
Rights Directive as the TUPE Regulations in 1981.637But that was the end of the 
Social Action Programme.  
 
In subsequent years any European initiatives to confer employment rights were 
almost invariably resisted by the Tories. When implementation became 
unavoidable those rights would be provided with as thick an individualistic veneer 
as it was possible to apply. 
 
                                               
631
Fleshing out the existing Treaty rights on equal treatment. 
632
While the equality laws are politically unassailable – except by pricing justice beyond the reach of prospective 
litigants – the TUPE and Collective Redundancy Regulations appear to this day to be seen by the Tories as an 
ancient wrong inflicted on the UK. 
633Directive 75/129/EC. Something of a misnomer because, as Mark Freedland commented, Part IV of the Act 
‘Procedures for Handling Redundancies’ was ‘concerned with entirely individual dismissals’ ( ‘Employment 
Protection: Redundancy Procedures and the EEC,’(1976) 5 ILJ 24)  
635Directive 80/1107 EC 
636During 1979 – 1982 the Tories were proceeding very carefully, and Jim Prior, the Employment Minister was an 
old school ‘wet’, one nation Tory (see chapter 2). Even amongst Thatcher’s intimates the veto of such an obviously 
benign Directive was very likely judged to be a step too far at that stage of the Neo Liberal Revolution. 
637
Directive 77/187/EC.  Directive 80/987/EEC, on the protection of workers on insolvency did not require the UK 
to legislate. The required protection had long been in place. 
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The social dialogue  
 
It was not until the ‘Social Europe’ project was launched under the direction of 
European Commission President Jaques Delors in 1985, following the re-election 
of the Thatcher and the New Tories in 1983, that a serious solution to the post 
1979 impasse was sought, and further steps taken towards remedying the social 
deficit.  
 
Greece had joined the Community in 1981, and Spain and Portugal were due to 
join in 1986. The disparity of wealth between these former right wing 
dictatorships and the rest of the Community heightened the perceived need for 
an approximation of social standards which would facilitate a relatively balanced 
expansion.638 It was recognised that large scale movements of workers and capital 
between states enjoying vastly different standards of living, and differing levels of 
social protection, would be likely to undermine job security, and the terms and 
conditions of employment of workers, threatening popular support for the 
European Project. The phrases ‘social dumping’ and ‘race to the bottom’ became 
current,639 and the ‘social dialogue’ - ‘relations based on agreement’- commenced 
with the ‘Val Duchesse’ meeting of the ‘social partners’ – the representatives of 
labour and capital, employers and trade unions - in January 1985.640 
 
The 1986 Single European Act extended qualified majority voting to certain areas 
of Community competence that had previously required unanimity in order to 
speed progress towards the single market.641 QMV now permitted the Council to 
side step the British veto ‘on measures for the approximation of the provisions 
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member states which 
have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market.’642 
                                               
638
See Article 2 Treaty of Rome. 
639
For an analysis of this ‘social regime competition’ see Bercusson, 2009, op cit,pp132-138. 
640Ibid, pp 132 -33 and 141-2. The Commission were instrumental in forcing the employers to the bargaining table. 
Bercussonsaw the dialogue as ‘a kind of class struggle at European level’ (p138) and famously described it as 
‘bargaining in the shadow of the law’ (Ibid,p148- 151). Progress was slow (ibid,p132 for the first 15 ‘joint opinions’ 
of the social partners). The social dialogue was a key feature of the Maastricht TEU and the Social Protocol in 1991 
(see below) and was subsequently central to the negotiation of EU labour legislation. 
641  See Article 8a Single European Act. Article 100A, introduced by the SEA, permitted the adoption of measures to 
harmonise the laws of Member States that might otherwise impede the operation of the single market by QMV. 
Previously, by Article 100, unanimity was always required. 
642
Article 100A Treaty of Rome, as amended by SEA. Previously such measures had required unanimity (see above).  
Article 235 provided a ‘catch all’ legal basis for legislation which had no obvious basis in the Treaty, but is invoked 
sparingly, undermining as it does the supposed requirement for Community law to have a basis in the Treaty. 
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The Thatcher Government succeeded in ensuring that QMV was not extended ‘to 
fiscal provisions, to those relating to the free movement of persons nor to those 
relating to the rights and interests of employed persons,’643 a qualification which 
appeared to make it impossible for the Social Action Programme to be revived 
without the approval of the British. 
 
The Thatcherites did, however, acquiesce to two revisions of the Treaty of Rome 
related to labour rights. Article 118A permitted QMV in relation to health and 
safety legislation,644and Article 118B saw the recognition of social dialogue as a 
mechanism for steering Community labour policy.645 Consequently, subsequent 
Health and Safety Directives compelled the Major Government to make 
considerable improvements to the maternity leave system,646 and introduce ‘day 
one’ enhanced unfair dismissal protection for those dismissed for ‘whistle 
blowing’ on health and safety matters.647 Following a Directive based on Article 
100, and facilitated by 100A,648 the Major Government also had to extend the 
right for workers to require an employer to provide written particulars of 
employment.649 
 
The European Court also intervened to force the Tories to legislate on 
employment matters. Rulings in sex discrimination and equal pay cases compelled 
the Thatcher Government to amend the Equal Pay Regulations,650 and the 
Employment Protection (Part-time employees) Regulations,651 and to introduce 
the Bills that became the Sex Discrimination Act of 1986,652and the Employment 
Act of 1989.653 A ruling of the ECJ compelled the Major government to revise the 
Collective Redundancy consulting procedures.654 
 
                                               
643
 Ibid, Article 100A. 
644
See Bercusson, 2009, op cit, pp 122-8. 
645
Ibid, 132-8. 
646
Directive92/85/EEC. 
647Health and Safety Framework Directive 89/39/EEC. 
648 See n.641 above. 
649Directive 91/533/EEC. 
650Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations which following Commission v UK [1982] C-65/82. 
651To give part time workers the same qualifying period for unfair dismissal as full time workers. 
652Following the ECJ’s ruling in Marshall v Southampton Health Authority Case [1993] C-271/91 ECR I-4367 the 
Government had to raise the woman’s retirement age to 65, and, in order to comply with the ruling in Commission 
v UK [1982] C-61/81 ECR I-2601, to bring small firms and domestic employees within the ambit of the sex 
discrimination legislation. 
653
Age limits for redundancy brought into line with retirement ages. 
654Commission v United Kingdom [1994] C-383/92ECR I-2479. 
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Otherwise the Tories can be seen to have largely succeeded in avoiding being 
obliged to implement employment protection law. At the tail end of the last 
Major administration the Tories came perilously close to having to concede two 
potentially humiliating defeats. The Protection of Young Persons’ Directive, which 
threatened to prevent 15 year olds from doing a daily paper round while working 
on a ‘Saturday job,’ was adopted in 1994 as a health and safety Directive despite 
the vigorous resistance of the Major Government.655 
 
The big fight, however, was over the Working Time Directive,656 which had been 
adopted on the same legal basis in 1993. The Government, with some 
justification, saw the regulation of working time as a social measure aimed at 
improving conditions of employment, and challenged the validity of the Directive 
at the ECJ.657 The case was lost in November 1996, and the Tories left office in 
May 1997 without having implemented either the Working Time Directive, or the 
Young Persons’ Directive.  
 
The 1989 Community Charter on the Fundamental Social 
Rights of Workers 
 
The Charter had its origin as an attempt to incorporate a floor of labour rights into 
the Treaties. This was blocked by the UK Government. Without British support the 
other 11 states were obliged to settle for a declaration of rights. 
 
The Community Charter created no obligations, and there was no timetable for 
the implementation of the protections featured. Article 27 gave Member States 
responsibility for implementing its provisions in ‘the form of laws, collective 
bargaining, or existing practices.’658 This open ended programme was too much 
for what proved to be the last Thatcher administration, and the UK was the only 
Member State to fail to ratify the Community Charter.  
 
                                               
655 Directive 94/33/EEC. Having to accept European regulation of what were essentially New Tory core values was 
totally politically unacceptable to the Major government, long perceived to have been ‘weak’ on European 
matters. 
656 Directive 93/104/EC 
657
UK v Council [1996] C-84/94 ECR 57/55. The UK argued that Article 118a TFEU was not the correct legal basis for 
the Directive, and it should have been adopted under Article 100 or Article 235 (requiring unanimity). See pp39-43, 
Stephen Weatherill, Cases and Materials on EU Law, OUP, 2005 for an overview. 
658Article 27, Community Charter. 
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Nevertheless, the Community Charter was enormously influential. Article 28 was 
an invitation by the European Council to the European Commission to initiate 
legislation, and shortly before the other Member States ratified the Charter, 
another Action Programme was launched setting in train a series of early 1990s 
directives - this was where the Working Time Directive, the Young Persons’ 
Directive and the Directive on the Protection at Work of Pregnant Women had 
their origins. Some of the numerous Charter Action Programme initiatives went 
on to be implemented under the Social Protocol, and the subsequent Treaty of 
Amsterdam Social Chapter.659 
 
The Action Programme adopted the wording of Article 27 by providing that 
employers and workers’ representatives could negotiate the implementation of 
the directives at national level - the Member State having to guarantee that the 
agreement complied with the minimum demanded by the directive.660 
 
The Social Protocol 
 
 A Protocol and Agreement on Social Policy, laying out radical new procedures for 
the negotiation and implementation of community social protections, was 
appended to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.661 Of the 12 Member States, only the 
UK, failed to ratify what was popularly known in the UK as the ‘Social Chapter.’662 
Creating a mechanism which fell outside of the treaty permitted the Member 
States to address the social deficit without the prospect of the British veto being 
used.663 It also permitted the Major Government, then under very considerable 
pressure from anti-European elements within the Tory party to hold a 
referendum on whether the Government should approve the Maastricht Treaty, 
to sign the Treaty while claiming to have thwarted European attempts to extend 
                                               
659Which made the protocol redundant when the Treaty came into force in 1999. See KD Ewing, The EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: Waste of Time or Wasted Opportunity?, IER 2002, pp 25-27. 
660Bercusson, 2009, op cit, p455. 
661Treaty of the European Union (TEU). It appears to have been assumed that all member states had collective 
bargaining structures in place to allow the domestic social partners to implement the Directives (See KD Ewing ‘The 
Death of Social Europe? Collective Bargaining in Times of Austerity,’ 2015King’s Law Journal, pp3-5). 
662 So called because the intention had been to replace the Social Chapter in the Treaty of Rome  with the text of 
what, because of the British veto became the SPA. The SPA ultimately became the Social Chapter of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (see below). Sweden, Finland and Austria joined the EU in 1995 and also signed up for the Social 
Protocol. 
663Making QMV unnecessary. 
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the legal competence of the EU.664 Arguably it was at this point that the events 
that led to the 2016 Referendum and ‘Brexit’ were set in train. Tory nationalism 
and anti-collectivism could not be squared with the ‘social Chapter,’ and 
essentially the Commission and the UK Government agreed to disagree.665 
The protocol was hugely significant. Member States were to be obliged to 
legislate to protect workers. In a radical departure – first signalled, as noted 
above, in Article 27 of the Community Charter - it was the social partners, 
essentially the European employers’ organisations CEEP,666 BusinessEurope,667 
and the European Trade Union Confederation, rather than the Council of 
Ministers, who were to negotiate agreements which became the core content of 
the Directives. The Commission also contributed, working with these 
organisations on consultative committees to shape the agreements on which 
subsequent Directives were based. The Assembly were not involved.  The 
protocol also permitted member states to allow the social partners to implement 
the Directives through collective bargaining machinery.668 
Of course, this was abhorrent to the Tories. This was collective bargaining on a 
European level, with the social partners now able to collaborate to produce 
agreements on health and safety, working conditions, information and 
consultation, equal treatment, and ‘the integration of persons excluded from the 
labour market,’ which could be put to the Council by the European Commission, 
and, adopted by QMV.669 
The Tories could, however, take comfort that any putative initiatives on social 
security, broader social protection of workers, dismissals, non-EU migrant 
workers, and measures to create jobs would require unanimity, and that Article 
2(6),670 appeared to ensure that the employment aims of social policy as a whole 
                                               
664Article 6(2) of the Maastricht Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) – the revised Treaty of 
Rome - recognised formally the ECJ’s ad hoc approach to the recognition of fundamental human rights. 
665 See chapter two. 
666 Representing public sector employers. 
667 Representing private sector employers. Previously known as UNICE. 
668
Bercusson, 2009, pp152-5. 
669
A huge problem for John Major - see chapter two. 
670
However, Bercusson questioned this, arguing that the social dialogue mechanisms could be seen to permit 
agreements concluded by the social partners on matters such as freedom of association. Essentially ‘agreement is 
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did not encroach upon the Member States’ exclusive competence in relation to 
‘to pay, the right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-
outs.’671 
After a final failed attempt in 1994 to secure the agreement of the UK to agree to 
a draft Directive on ‘atypical’ work, part time, fixed contract and agency work,672 
the social partners were briefed by the Commission, and agreement was reached 
in 1997. A Directive aimed at securing equal protection for part time workers, 
which included the agreement in the text, was adopted in 1998. 
At the time that the Tories had been fighting with each other and with the EU 
over the Maastricht and the social chapter rights, a parallel employment strategy 
was emerging as part of the attempt to address the Community rights deficit. A 
Comité de Sages, appointed to examine the matter observed in its 1996 report 
that: 
‘As regards the Treaties of the European Union, it is not possible as yet to 
speak of a genuine structure of social and civil rights, but rather of ad hoc, 
piecemeal measures to accompany economic integration and allow 
minimum social policies to be pursued: Articles 117-122 of the Treaty of 
Rome, as supplemented by the Single Act of 1986; the Community Charter 
of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, which was adopted in 1989 by 
11 of the then 12 Member States; the new provisions of the Maastricht 
                                                                                                                                                       
reached in another forum authorised by Member States...outside the formal scope of EC competence’ and the 
Member States are obliged to implement the agreement. The old limits are not carried over to the new procedures 
(Bercusson, op cit, pp 156-158). 
671
 The same words are to be found in Article 153(5), Lisbon Treaty, A 118(6) Amsterdam Treaty, A 137(5) Nice 
Treaty. Article 151, which incorporates what is essentially the preamble to the social chapter (Title X ‘Social Policy’) 
remains as it was in the Amsterdam Treaty (then Article 117), an expanded version of Article 1 of the SPA: ‘having 
in mind...the European Social Charter...the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, shall 
have as their objectives the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, so as to make 
possible their harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained, proper social protection, dialogue 
between management and labour...the Union and Member states shall implement measureswhich take account of 
the diverse forms of national practices, in particular in the field of contractual relations, and the need to maintain 
the competitiveness of the Union economy.’ This cautious drafting scarcely augured the emergence of a European 
super state. The employment title, promoting the ‘co-ordination’ of employment measures as Union employment 
policy expressly states that “These measures shall not include harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the 
Member States” (Article 149, Lisbon Treaty, A109(r) Amsterdam Treaty). 
672
See Jeffery, ‘The Commission Proposals on ‘Atypical Work’: Back to the Drawing Board... Again,’ (1995) 24 ILJ 
296 
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Treaty more especially the Protocol on social policy, which was adopted by 
14 of the 15 Member states. Generally speaking, social rights are defined 
outside the Treaty and mainly apply to workers only. The Treaties contain 
no list of fundamental social rights to which the Court of Justice could refer 
in order to review Community acts.’673 
 They proposed that the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of 
Workers be incorporated into the Treaty ECJ framework, along with ‘the main 
international agreements signed by the Member States.’674 
 
This, they reasoned, would incorporate the Charter ‘indirectly’ into the Treaties, 
and would enable the ECHR to be drawn upon and adjusted in a way that would 
not be possible if the community acceded to the Convention. The Committee 
concluded that “accession would offer very limited benefits and would certainly 
not make it unnecessary for the union to set out its own view.”675 
 
The Committee considered that an EU ‘Union specific appeal court’ would be 
better placed to consider questions of breaches of fundamental labour rights than 
the ECtHR.676 They observed that  
 
‘political, civic and social rights...are interdependent and inseparable...the 
committee therefore advocates a declaration featuring both civic and social 
rights.’677 
 
They proposed incorporating this mixed bag of eight rights into the treaty, 
including the ‘right of association and right to defend one’s rights; right of 
collective bargaining and action,’ and a list of social rights be listed in the Treaty 
as ‘objectives to achieve.’678 
                                               
673‘For a Europe of Civic and Social Rights’ Report by the Comite’ des Sages, European Commission, 1996. P15. The 
dissident state was, of course, the UK. 
674 Ibid, P17 
675  Ibid, pp 35-6 & 47. See p15 for employment rights as positive rights. 
676At the time the Strasbourg Court took a very narrow interpretation of Article 11 freedom of association, 
recognising neither a right to collective bargaining nor a right to strike.The Committee did not mention this 
approach – formulated in the 1975 Belgian Police trilogy’ cases (see chapter 1) - and appeared to take as little 
notice of the realities of the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it did to the impossibility of getting the UK Government to 
agree to the proposals it recommended. 
677
Comite’ des Sages, 1996, op cit, P39. 
678Ibid, p17. See also Part 3 p48 & p51. 
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The eight rights were, of course, to apply only in matters relating to member 
states under community law. As an economic counterbalance, the principle of 
freedom of movement within the community was one of the eight fundamental 
rights. Although the committee had separated fundamental labour rights from 
social rights, it is notable that collective action ‘including the right to strike’ was to 
be ‘guaranteed subject to any obligations which might arise from current laws and 
collective agreements,’679 acknowledging and ensuring that EU competence did 
not stray into the realm of industrial relations.  
The Treaty of Amsterdam 
Nothing resembling a bill of rights was included in the Treaty. A few tentative 
steps had been taken towards incorporating human rights in the Treaties: 
 
 The new Article 13 TFEU was of major importance. It extended Union legal 
competence to cover discrimination on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, 
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. Directives on these areas of 
discrimination in relation to employment followed in 2000 and 2006.680 
 
Article 6(1) TEU now emphasised the importance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms to the community, Article 6(2) formally recognised the 
ECHR as a source of community law and Article 46(d) TEU purported to make the 
ECHR rights ‘justiciable.’ However, these were arguably no more than gestures 
made towards assuaging demands for rights protections to be incorporated into 
the Treaties.  The revisions left it open to the ECJ to choose the level of protection 
afforded, and had no real relevance to labour law. Questions of freedom of 
association were not within the Court’s jurisdiction, and Article 11 ECHR was then 
interpreted very narrowly by the Strasbourg Court, which evinced far more 
enthusiasm for ‘negative’ freedom of association, than in the right to organise, 
bargain collectively and take industrial action.681 
                                               
679
Ibid, p50. 
680
Directive 2000/43/EC: equal treatment race or ethnic origin; Directive 2000/78/EC: general framework for equal 
treatment in employment; Directive 2006/54: equal treatment of men and women in employment and occupation. 
681They did in Viking and Laval (see below). 
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Following the defeat of the Tories at the general election on 1 May 1997, and the 
election of a ‘New Labour’ Government ostensibly committed to Social Europe, it 
had been possible to incorporate a new social chapter in the Treaty, 682 which 
became the latest of the labour law generating mechanisms.683 At the time the 
Treaty was signed, in June 1997, two Directives had been adopted under the 
Social Protocol: the European Works Council Directive and the Parental Leave 
Directive.  
 Remarkably, however, the social dialogue was already on the way out.  
The Treaty included a new employment ‘title’ which provided for a soft law open 
method of co-ordination of labour rights.684 Despite the new social chapter, and 
the incorporation of the social dialogue procedure in the TFEU, ‘OMC’, rather 
than legislation, became the approach adopted for the 21st Century. 
 
 Following the November 1997 meeting of the Council of Ministers yearly 
employment guidelines were issued, and on the basis of these guidelines Member 
States submitted National Action Plans to the Commission and Council. This new 
European Employment Strategy was based initially, on four employment ‘pillars’: 
employability, entrepreneurship, adaptability and equal opportunities.685 
Black letter law was out, soft law was in. The arrival of the alternative strategy 
was followed by a change in the political complexion of the EU.  
 
Bercusson has noted that at the time of the Lisbon meeting of the Council of 
Ministers in 2000, and the formal adoption of the ‘Lisbon Strategy’ – the post 
1997 Social Policy Agenda – ‘the position was much different from that of the mid 
and late 1990s.’ Remarkably, the Spanish and British were pushing for de-
                                               
682
Articles 136-139. As was the case with the SPA, QMV could secure adoption. The SPA continued to exist until the 
new Treaty came in to force in 1999. 
683The SAP, the Community Charter and the SPA were, of course, the old mechanisms. The Community Charter has 
a residual influence as guidance for the CJEU. 
684 Articles 125 -130. SeeBercusson 2009, op cit, p102 & 168 -71. This was the incorporation of the ‘Essen Strategy’ 
agreed by the Council of Ministers in 1994, an approach which essentially returned to Member States the choice of 
whether to legislate or not in these areas. 
685The strategy changed in 2003 from four pillars to ‘three overarching objectives (i) Full employment (ii) Improving 
Quality and Production at Work and (iii) Strengthening Social Cohesion and Inclusion’ to be attained by ten 
priorities for action – ‘the management of change and adaptability, synergy between flexibility and security, 
human capital development, gender equality, making work pay and health and safety at work’ (Bercusson 2009, op 
cit, p. 177). 
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regulation. In 2001 the Italians elected Berlusconi, and by 2002 the three Member 
States had become a neoliberal faction, with Italy and Britain issuing a joint 
declaration calling for greater labour market ‘flexibility.’ 686 
 
The Commission had been pushing the concept of ‘flexicurity’ since the early 
1990s but by the very early years of the 21st Century the annual employment 
guidelines were placing the emphasis on employment ‘flexibility’. The social 
partners were now merely invited into a domestic ‘partnership’ with the Member 
States at enterprise level. The need to tackle any fresh ‘challenges’ that the new 
Century might present aside, new legislation was envisaged only ‘to ensure the 
respect of fundamental social rights,’687very likely a reflection of the uncertainty 
surrounding the likely legal status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights which 
was seen by some to have the potential to restart the stalled social 
programme.688 
 
In the UK ‘partnership’ had become one of the New Labour ‘buzzwords.’ Trade 
Unions were invited to go into partnership with employers, and the long awaited 
union recognition procedures introduced in the Labour Relations Act 1999 were 
intended to instigate voluntary agreement.689 
 
However, the little new legislation that was introduced was steadfastly 
individualistic, and the new Government appeared to see the unions as friendly 
societies or staff associations, rather than as regulatory bodies.  Moreover, the 
Government had failed to repeal the legislation which had undermined the unions 
so effectively during 1980 - 1993.690 It did, however, succeed in pleasing many on 
the centre left with the incorporation of the ECHR into UK law under the 
provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
                                               
686
Bercusson2009, op cit, p171, citing Alberta M. Sbragia, ‘Shaping a Polity in an Economic and Monetary union: 
the EU in Comparative Perspective’ in Martin and Ross (eds) Euros and Europeans: Monetary Integration and the 
European Model of Society, (Oxford, OUP, 2004), pp66-8. 
687See Bercusson (ibid) pp177-189. The quote is from the European Commission Social Policy Agenda 2000-5, COM 
(2000). 
688 The Community Charter of 1989 had been the impetus for a number of employment Directives, and the 
precursor of the SPA, and although, in retrospect, we can see that for Social Europe the tide had turned, at the 
turn of the Century there were high hopes for the Charter. An EU constitution was being drafted and the Charter 
was to be incorporated into this constitution. The constitution was to replace the Treaties, and consequently many 
believed that labour rights would, at last, be given equal status with the economic freedoms. 
689
See chapter 5. 
690
New Labour was careful not to pledge that it would, and it was only in the 1998 White Paper Fairness at Work 
that it was made abundantly clear that there was to be ‘no return.’ 
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Courts and tribunals, like other public authorities, had to take into account the 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court in their deliberations, interpret existing 
legislation and case law in the light of the convention rights, and where legislation 
was in conflict with those rights, it had the option of issuing a ‘declaration of 
incompatibility.’  This declaration is essentially an invitation to the Government to 
rectify matters – an invitation which it is free to ignore.691Arguably the HRA did far 
less than it purported to do and far less than most of its opponents and 
proponents appeared to believe it would – much like the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 
 
As well as proclaiming the HRA as its flagship manifesto promise, New Labour 
made much of the promise to ‘sign up’ for the Social Chapter. Yet in the foreword 
to the employment 1998 White Paper Fairness at Work, Tony Blair promised that: 
‘Even after the changes we propose, Britain will have the most lightly 
regulated labour market of any leading economy in the world.’692 
Despite the seeming contradiction Blair was as good as his word. The White Paper 
proposed to change very little, and Blair ensured that the social chapter conferred 
very little extra protection on British workers. The Major administrations of 1990 
– 1997 had been obliged by internal Tory party politics, and by pressure from the 
right wing press, to be seen to resist European employment legislation forced 
upon on them on the basis of powers ceded to the Community under the SEA. 
However, New Labour, if not able to reconcile the conflicting demands of business 
and the unions while implementing the Directives spawned by the SPA and the 
Social chapter, it was able to manage those demands. The Government publically 
welcomed the employment protections demanded by the Directives, accepted 
the plaudits of the left, and set about rendering the legislation ‘business 
friendly.’693  
 
The Working Time Directive, the Part-Time Workers’ Directive, the Fixed Term 
Contracts Directive, and the Parental Leave Directive, were all transposed into 
                                               
691See Chapter 2. 
692Fairness at Work, May 1998, Cm 3968. Today the UK is ranked by the OECD as just behind the US, Canada and 
New Zealand in the world ‘light touch’ employment regulation stakes. 
693
New Labour were able to assuage the left’s long suspicion of the business based EU by implementing Directives 
which appeared to defend workers’ interests, and to please the right wing of the Labour Party, the Liberal 
Democrats, many otherwise natural Tory voters, and big business, with a cautiously presented enthusiasm for the 
EU.   
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domestic regulation during 1998 – 2002. Those that conferred substantive rights 
were rendered comparatively inconsequential by the Government’s clever 
drafting team, matters which I examine in chapters six and seven. Nevertheless, 
the very fact that the UK is required to have those rights in its statute book is 
arguably of huge potential value to British workers – they are entrenched minima 
on which collective bargaining may build, and which subsequent Governments 
may choose to ‘gold plate’ beyond that which is required by the European 
Commission. 
 
THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION  
In 1999 a second Comité published ‘Leading by Example: A Human Rights agenda 
for the European Union for the year 2000,’ which was focused on the need for 
Member States to fulfil their obligations under international and regional rights 
instruments. It recommended Community accession to both the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the European Social Charter. 
 
 Another report on social rights published in the same year ‘Affirming 
fundamental rights in the European Union: Time to Act’ by the Expert Group on 
Fundamental Rights694 revived some of the proposals of the 1996 Comité de 
Sages. The Expert Group recommended that Articles 2 to 13 of the ECHR, along 
with the protocols to the Convention, and a number of economic, social and 
labour rights, be incorporated into a charter of fundamental rights. 
In June 1999 the European Council voted in favour of drafting a charter, and on 14 
January 2000 the European Assembly concluded consideration of the Council’s 
decision by commending the ECHR  
‘and the Court of Human Rights, which have proved their efficiency. It 
accordingly calls on the attention of the body in charge of elaborating this 
Charter to take this mechanism into account. In particular, it recommends it 
to follow the conclusions of the Expert Group on Fundamental Rights... to 
include and incorporate the articles of the ECHR into the Community law, 
                                               
694European Commission, 1999. 
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together with the relevant rights in the protocols to the ECHR... The 
Parliamentary Assembly also reiterates its recommendations that the 
European Communities/Union accede to the ECHR, to which all its member 
states are Parties, as was advised on many occasions in the past both by the 
institutions of the European Communities and by the Council of Europe. It 
could also accede to the European Social Charter. In order to allow this 
accession, the Committee of Ministers should start preparatory work.’695 
The Charter was ‘declared’ in December 2000. Representatives of the Member 
States had come to agreement over the provisions of the Charter – if not the 
status - as the Nice Treaty was being negotiated. That Treaty revised the social 
chapter, and the previously stated aim of the harmonising the laws of Member 
States was replaced by anodyne references to co-operation and co-ordination 
taken from the Amsterdam Treaty TEU Employment Title.696 
At Westminster, the opposition had railed against the new Charter. Leader of the 
Opposition William Hague condemned the Charter as a further erosion of 
Parliamentary sovereignty, citing the European Commission’s modest claim that  
‘It can reasonably be expected that the Charter will become mandatory 
through the Court’s interpretation of it as belonging to the general 
principles of community law.’697 
 Prime Minister Tony Blair responded: 
‘The right hon. Gentleman goes on about the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. The reason the Commission is asking for it to have legal status is 
that it does not have legal status. Our case is that it should not have legal 
status, and we do not intend it to.’698 
 The Government assessment – at the time accurate enough in its way - was that 
the Charter was no more than  
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Preliminary conclusions, paras 50-51, Parliamentary Assembly 14 January 2000 Doc. 8611. 
696
Bercusson 2009, op cit,p 189-90. 
697
Hansard, HC Deb 11 December 2000 column 352. 
698Hansard HC Deb 11 December column 354. 
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‘a showcase of existing rights, rights that have been conferred by either the 
Treaties or legislation...we will resist any attempts to make it binding...The 
Charter is not a platform for new European Union competences, nor a 
launch pad for new EC legislation.’699 
The French Government provided a less carefully presented, and more accurate, 
interpretation of the Charter’s status;  
‘while not legally binding itself, the Charter reaffirms rights which are 
legally binding due to their provenance from other sources that are 
recognised by EU law as binding sources.’700 
The preamble to the Charter makes it clear: 
‘This Charter reaffirms, with due regard for the powers and tasks of the 
Community and the Union and the principle of subsidiarity, the rights as 
they result, in particular, from the constitutional traditions and 
international obligations common to the Member States, the Treaty on 
European Union, the Community Treaties, the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Social 
Charters adopted by the Community and by the Council of Europe, and the 
case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and of the 
European Court of Human Rights.’ 
The Charter purported to be a codification of the rights of the citizens of the 
European Union exercisable in relation to the competences conferred on the EU 
by the Treaties, and was to be incorporated into the draft EU constitution that 
was intended to replace the Treaties. Consequently many believed – although it 
seems unlikely that the New Labour leadership shared their credulity - that the 
Charter was likely to place labour rights on a par with the economic freedoms.701 
                                               
699Keith Vaz MP: Evidence by the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, on the Helsinki European 
Council, 3rd Report 1999-2000, HL 22. Q 50 and Q 260 to the Lords Select Committee on the European Union 
(quoted in 8th Report 1999-2000 para 55). 
700
Bercusson, 2009, op cit,pp387-388, based on the oral submissions of the French Government in European 
Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-05769, para 38. 
701 Encouraged by the wording of the Lisbon Treaty (see n. 626 below, Bercusson, 2009, op cit, pp394-5, and P. 
Sypis, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: Much ado...But about What?’ (2008) 37 ILJ 232). Jean Michel Servias (2014, op cit) 
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Arguably the great contribution of the Charter was to augment the influence of 
the ECHR by explicitly citing the Convention as the floor of any EU rights 
embraced by the Convention and the ECtHR jurisprudence: 
 Article 52(3): 
‘In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights 
guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the 
same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not 
prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.’  
In 2009 when the Lisbon Treaty came into force, Article 6(1) TEU gave the Charter 
‘the same legal value as the treaties’ while providing that ‘the Charter shall not 
extend in anyway the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties.’ 702 
Unlike the treaties, however, the Charter rights can only be relied upon when 
states engage EU law. 703 
                                                                                                                                                       
appears to believe that the Charter has been incorporated into the treaties (para 283), and for an example of an 
academic who believed that the Charter would have equal status see n.701below. 
702Lisbon also added to the evolution of Article 6(2) TEU. The TEU now requires EU accession the ECHR. However, a 
similar caveat to that in Article 6(1) was added in regard to the competences of the treaties and the Convention 
rights. The British and Polish protocol to the Lisbon Treaty appeared to make these carefully worded reservations 
certain. However it has been argued that this Protocol 30 is not all it seems. Although Article 1(1) of Protocol 30 
states that the Charter does not permit any court, including the CJEU, to find that the UK has acted inconsistently 
with the provisions of the Charter, and 1(2), re-iterates this statement with particular regard to the ‘solidarity 
chapter’ of the Charter, PP Craig has argued that had the UK wished to opt out of the Charter then a far less 
convoluted form of words would have done the job and that the text of the Protocol confirms that the Charter 
does apply to the UK. He points out that Article 1(1) does no more than reaffirm Article 51(2) of the Charter, that 
the Charter does not extend the competences of EU law, and that Article 2 of the protocol, which states that the 
Charter applies to the UK only as far as national law and practices allow, appears to overlook the fact that it is up 
to the CJEU to determine what national laws which engage matters within the competence of the treaties allow or 
do not allow. Craig mentions the ‘official view’ that the government were concerned about the possible effect of 
the Charter on UK businesses, and suggests that ‘the protocol was motivated as, much, if not more, by the 
Government’s desire to show that the Lisbon Treaty differed in certain respects from the Constitutional Treaty, 
and that therefore a referendum on the former was not necessary’ (See PP Craig, ‘The Charter, the ECJ and the 
National Courts,’ 2013, op cit pp 84-87). 
703
Charter Article 51(1). ‘Implementing’ is the usual UK term for legislating in response to a directive. However, it is 
uncontroversial to argue that the Charter applies where Member States ‘act within the scope’ of EU law, and not 
merely when legislating, and Craig argues, inter alia, that the CJEU have tended to use ‘implementing’ in this latter 
sense, and cites the original charter explanatory memorandum as stating that the Charter rights are “only binding 
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Nor, arguably, can they be truly said to have either vertical direct effect, or to 
have horizontal direct effect. Treaty rights, regulations and decisions do have 
horizontal direct effect and can be invoked in disputes between private parties, 
and directives have vertical direct effect and can similarly be enforced by private 
parties against public authorities. The Charter can, of course, be referred to show 
that a right relied upon in the acquis is a fundamental right or to interpret a legal 
right of EU origin or to show that state protections are inadequate.704While the 
rights and principles the Charter lays down are part of the acquis, and EU black 
letter law is supreme, the Charter is not a Bill of Rights permitting judges to strike 
out conflicting legislation.  
 
Craig has argued that:  
 
‘Member States are bound by the Charter when implementing Union law. 
This includes national courts, which would therefore also be subject to the 
injunction to respect observe and promote the application of Charter 
rights, irrespective of whether the case involves a public authority or 
not.’705 
  
In essence Craig was stating that the Charter is an interpretive tool. However, in 
practice the Charter is now arguably being used by judges less as the interpretive 
tool it was intended as, but as a Bill of Rights permitting the disapplication of 
national law which prevent the exercise of rights which have been identified in 
the Charter as fundamental rights whether or not EU law is engaged.  
 
For example, following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Benkharbouche in 2017,706 
when diplomatic immunity conferred by the State Immunity Act 1978 was lifted 
                                                                                                                                                       
on the Member states when they act in the context of community law” ( pp 91 -94 ‘The Charter, the ECJ and the 
National Courts’ by PP Craig, in Re-socialising Europe, Countouris and Freedland (eds), 2013.). 
704
 In a piece posted on eutopialaw.com by Dr. Albert Sanchez Graells Is Costa v ENEL forgotten? CJEU trips over 
supremacy and direct effect in case concerning Art 41(2)(c) CFREU (C-313/12), Dr Graells professed surprise that 
despite Article 6(1) TEU (see above) the Luxembourg Court continues to refuse to give the Charter rights the same 
status as the Treaty rights: ‘I cannot get my head around the fact that, as no one would doubt, the CJEU has kept 
for time immemorial the position that the Treaties (now including the Charter of Fundamental Rights for these 
purposes) are supreme and directly effective without any need for internal measures...they are directly and 
unconditionally applicable in all Member States- and yet it shows a stark resistance to apply these principles to the 
Charter.’The reality is that just because TEU says the Charter rights have the same legal value as the treaty rights 
does not mean they are the same – see below on Viking and Laval, and on the failure of the CJEU to keep pace with 
the new interpretation of Article 11 ECHR. 
705
PP Craig, 2013, op cit, p91. 
706Benkharbouche v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2017] UKSC 62. 
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by the court to permit a victim of domestic servitude to access justice, it was 
questioned whether the court was actually implementing EU law,707 and it was 
argued that the case ‘illustrates how the Charter can, in practice, be applied 
mechanically, without sufficient attention to its proper limits, both in EU law and 
UK law” to “override clear legislative choices made by Parliament.’708 
 
And in practice the Charter is also being given direct effect: For example, in Max-
Planck –Gesellschaft v Shimizu [2018],709 the CJEU held that as the right to leave in 
the Working Time Directive is incorporated in the Charter (Article 31(2)) as ‘an 
essential principle of EU social law,’ it is, in effect, directly horizontally effective 
between private parties, in addition to being directly vertically effective against 
public authorities.710 
 
Arguably the Charter has, in practice, permitted the British judiciary to rely on the 
acquis, or what it imagines the acquis to be, much as it relies on the common law. 
In the recent judicial review of the CAC decision to deny couriers working for 
Deliveroo the right to bargain collectively – a matter which did not engage EU law 
- the judge in, confirming the Committee’s extraordinary ruling, relied heavily on 
Article 16 of the Charter which recognises the freedom to conduct a business, and 
to the protection for the owners of capital to bargain conferred by the common 
law.711However, it seems very likely that this decision will be the subject of an 
appeal. 
 
The Information & Consultation Directive 
The evolution of the Information & Consultation Directive of 2002,712had its 
origins in the 1974 Social Action Programme,713 and Article 17 of the 1989 
                                               
707
The court had placed considerable reliance on Article 5 of the Charter which does not reflect black letter EU law 
but which identifies the prohibition of forced labour as a fundamental right. 
708
‘Latest Supreme Court judgment shows why the EU Charter must be axed,’ a ‘blog’ by Mikolaj Barczentewicz for 
the right wing Policy Exchange, 19 October 2017. 
709 EU C -206/874 6 November 2018.  The court held that workers are able to carry annual leave entitlement over 
from one year to the next if the employer has failed ‘diligently’ to give the worker the opportunity to take that 
leave in the year it should have been taken. 
710See chapter six. 
711R (On the Application of the IWUGB) v CAC and Roofood Ltd, t/a Deliveroo [2018] EWHC 3342 (Admin). See also 
chapter 7. 
712
Directive 2002/14/EC 
713
See above. The promotion of worker participation was, as noted, expressly part of the SAP and the Acquired 
Rights and Collective Redundancy Directives (1977&1975) incorporated information and consultation 
requirements. 
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Community Charter states that: ‘Information, consultation and participation for 
workers must be developed along appropriate lines, taking account of the 
practices in force in the various member states.’714 Preliminary, ultimately 
unsuccessful, negotiations between the Commission and the social partners 
began following the 1994 adoption of the European Works Council Directive,715 
‘EWC’s essentially being vehicles for information and consultation.716 
 
 The near total absence of works councils, and relative scarcity of collective 
bargaining structures in the UK, and the consequent consultative compromises 
necessary when Directives were implemented,717had helped convince the 
Commission of the need for an Information and Consultation Directive.718 With 
the Commission unable to persuade the social partners to come to an agreement 
the terms of the Directive were negotiated by the Council of Ministers. New 
Labour, which had been compelled to implement the EWC Directive as part of the 
price of signing up for the social chapter,719 had now a hand in drafting the terms 
of the new Directive, and the ETUC delegation in Brussels were evidently 
surprised ‘to find that the Directive had a strong and determined enemy in the 
new British government.’720 Strong information and consultation rights, in 
addition to those already conferred on recognised unions for the purposes of 
collective bargaining,721 might well have been thought to have provided a 
                                               
714Article 17. 
715Directive 94/45, adopted under the SPC without British input, and subsequently implemented in the UK in 2000. 
EWCs were established in very large trans-European undertakings – with at least 1,000 employees within the EU 
with undertakings in at least two member states employing at least 150 each. 
716 See Brian Bercusson, European Works Councils-Extending the Trade Union Role, (London, IER, 1997). Bercusson 
cited the 1993 closure of the Hoover plant at Dijon and its relocation to Scotland following the renegotiation of the 
Scottish collective agreements as the trigger for agreement on the adoption of the EWC directive. The French and 
British unions had been ‘wrong footed,’ by the firm and had there been effective I&C arrangements in place they 
would have at least been able ‘to coordinate their response’ (p1). Bercusson refers to ‘The Hoover affair and social 
dumping’ (1993) 230 European Industrial Relations Review 14. 
717
TUPE, Collective Redundancy, Working Time, Maternity and Parental Leave, and Fixed Term contracts 
Regulations, for example. British arrangements were condemned by the ECJ in cases C-382/92 and C-383/92 
Commission v UK [1994] ECR I-2479, see P Davies and C Kilpatrick, ‘UK Worker Representation After Single 
Channel’ (single channel being that between recognised union and employer, a dual channel ‘European approach’ 
being through a union and a works council) (2004), 33 ILJ 121. 
718In June 1997 – with the British finally behind the social chapter - the Commission proposed that the social 
partners negotiated an agreement on information and consultation. Unfortunately, and paradoxically, the private 
sector employers could not be coaxed to the negotiating table, and it fell to the Council to negotiate the terms of 
the Directive. 
719 In the form of the Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 1999. 
720
F. Beckett and D Hencke, The Blairs and Their Court, 2004, p. 201, cited by Collins, Ewing and McColgan, Labour 
Law, 2012, p625. The last sentence was John Monks’ observation on New Labour’s aggressive stance. 
721 Labour imposed a ‘General Duty of employers to disclose information...for the purposes of all stages of 
collective bargaining’ (now TULR(C)A 1992 s 181)’ in the EPA 1975, along with the provisions necessary to 
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convenient ‘third way’ in industrial relations following the retention by New 
Labour of the restrictions imposed by the Tories on freedom of association. It 
appears, however, that New Labour understood that ‘I&C’ requirements had the 
potential to empower recognised unions,722 by expanding the range of matters 
employers were required to reveal and discuss with them,  and provide a ‘foot in 
the door,’ at firms where unions were not welcome.723 While a ‘second channel’ 
might have been perceived by some to pose a threat to a recognised union, it is 
notable that the TUC was an enthusiastic proponent of the Directive,724 and there 
were, for example, high hopes that requirements for consultation for collective 
redundancies would, as a consequence, be less easily ignored by employers.725 
 
Council opposition to the proposed Directive, orchestrated to a considerable 
degree by the British Government folded in 2001,726 but the UK fought a spirited 
rearguard action during the negotiations, succeeding by one account in 
persuading the Council to drop the requirement to impose effective sanctions on 
firms failing to inform and consult, dispense with references to a ‘right’ to 
information and consultation, and to give Member states the option of making 
the provisions of the Directive applicable either to undertakings with 50 or more 
were employees, or establishments where 20 or more were employed. 727  
                                                                                                                                                       
implement the consultation requirements of the Collective Redundancies Directive of 1975. These were added to 
the consultation requirements of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. The TUPE consultation requirements 
were implemented by the first Thatcher administration in 1981. For an overview of I&C rights see chapter 15, ‘The 
right to be informed and consulted’ in Collins, Ewing and McColgan, Labour Law, (Cambridge, CUP, 2012).  
722 See the regard trade unionists had for the opportunity for consultation even at the height of voluntaristic union 
power in HA Clegg and TE Chester, ‘Joint Consultation,’ in A Flanders and HA Clegg (eds), The System of Industrial 
Relations in Great Britain; It’s History, Law and Institutions (Oxford, Blackwell, 1954) 
723
 See K Sisson ‘The Information and Consultation Directive: Unnecessary “Regulation” or an Opportunity to 
Promote “Partnership?”’ (2002) 67(2) Warwick Papers on Industrial Relations 6.  
724 See Mark Hall ‘Assessing the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations,’ 2005, ILJ 34(2), p116. 
725 See KD Ewing and GM Truter, ‘The Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations: Voluntarism’s Bitter 
Legacy’, 68 The Modern Law Review 626 (at p626 and [p3 of 6], and see also ‘A Pick and Mix Approach,’ n.727 
below . 
726The Directive was arguably an attempt to impose German style works councils on the EU 15, and many Member 
States were unenthusiastic about it. 
727On the negotiation by the Council, and much more, including (at p108-9) a very useful chart presenting ‘The ICE 
Regulations in Outline,’ see Hall 2005, op cit. Since 2008 the UK threshold has been 50 workers in an ‘undertaking.’ 
On the distinction between undertakings and establishments, see Mark Butler, ‘A ‘Pick and Mix Approach to 
Collective Redundancy : USDAW’ (2018), 47 ILJ 297 on the ‘Woolworths Redundancies’ ECJ ruling, C-80/14, Union 
of Shop, distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW), Wilson v WW Realisation 1 Ltd, in liquidation, Ethel Austin Ltd, 
Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills EU:C:2015:291. Broadly speaking an undertaking is taken to 
be the entire firm, and an establishment a ‘distinct entity’ within that undertaking. Marks & Spencer, for example, 
would be seen as the undertaking, with the various warehouses, shops and offices in different localities seen as 
establishments - as the units to which an individual worker is assigned.  
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More remarkably the British pressure ensured that the Directive permitted the 
adoption of wholly alternative arrangements in lieu of the standards required by 
the Directive, to allow employers to pre-empt employee attempts at negotiating 
information and consultation. This carefully engineered lacuna is reminiscent of 
the then recently adopted British statutory union recognition procedures which 
allow an employer to set up a ‘poodle’ staff association to block legitimate 
recognition bids from the workforce.728 As Ewing and Truter pointed out in 2005, 
‘[t]here is a legitmate fear that some employers will use the Regulations to 
establish workplace procedures which will have the effect of discouraging trade 
union organisation in non recognised workplaces. The announcement by News 
International in October 2004 that it was planning to cut 700 jobs should be a 
timely reminder to any worker tempted by the seduction of non union forms of 
workplace organisation.’729 
 
The implementation period  was extended to 3 years for the UK, permitting New 
Labour to wait until 2005 before legislating – even then the Directive was not fully 
implemented until 2008. The Regulations were complex, and in characteristic 
New Labour style, riddled with calculated flaws. According to Collins, Ewing, and 
McColgan: 
‘Having failed to block the Directive, the British government managed 
successfully to dilute its impact. The weaknesses of the Directive are now 
fully exposed by the ICE Regulations, weaknesses reflected in the 
apparently limited use of the procedures they contain, even those these 
procedures would appear to be especially relevant  in an age of austerity 
and the erosion of workers’ rights. There are in fact a number of problems 
with the ICE Regulations, including the need for workers to trigger the 
creation of an  information and consultation procedure, the 
encouragement to set up a voluntary ‘pre-existing agreement’ that need 
not meet the Directive’s standard provisions, and the absence of a sensible 
enforcement regime even where a statutory procedure as been 
triggered.’730 
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See chapter five. 
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 See Ewing and Truter 2005, op cit. 
730Collins, Ewing and McColgan 2012, op cit, p625. 
208 
 
In December 2018 it was announced that the percentage support of the 
workforce required to trigger ‘entitlement to data’ and to request the negotiation 
of agreement is to be reduced from 10% to 2% from April 2020,731 although the 
minimum number of employees compromising the percentage remains at 15. It is 
perhaps a tribute to the innocuous nature of the Regulations and the amendment 
that in the explanatory notes to the amending instrument the government states 
that ‘an impact assessment has not been prepared as no significant impact on 
individuals or businesses is foreseen.’ 
The Expansion of the EU 
 
In 2004 and 2007 the accession of 12 nations not yet able to offer citizens the 
wages and the social protections enjoyed by the other Member States, 732 saw the 
European Community firmly back on the road favoured by business interests and 
the British Government – ‘wider and shallower’ integration.  While the existing 
industry in these States posed little challenge to British exports to the EU, new 
markets were opened up to British manufacturers, but more significantly a huge 
fresh pool of cheap labour became available. The effects of the expansion were 
more than merely economic: it changed the political complexion of the EU. A 
number of the new Member States were served by right wing Governments, and 
the accession of Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Hungary to the European 
Union has been described of as the entry of a ‘neo-liberal Trojan horse,’733the 
political contents of which seemingly only became apparent when the former 
Soviet satellite states were inside the EU. Even in the former Czechoslovakia, 
arguably long considered the most ‘western,’ and politically liberal of the Iron 
Curtain States, an aggressive strain of neoliberalism emerged following the 
‘Velvet Revolution.’ Czech lawyer and academic Barbara Havelková confirms that 
‘economic liberalism tied to capitalism with an emphasis on the free market’ have 
tended to prevail, an approach ‘concerned with unbounded freedom of markets 
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732 In 2004: Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Cyprus (although 
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and entrepreneurs,’ and ‘very hostile to civil society and rights as well as to the 
rule of law,’ yet wedded to ‘socially conservative attitudes.’734 
 
Most of the EU15 states had chosen not to elect to adopt the full transitional 
seven year suspension of the right to free movement for workers from the new 
Member States, although most imposed some restrictions. The UK government 
permitted workers from the states admitted to the EU in 2004 immediate access, 
and in subsequent years many British workers perceived their terms and 
conditions of employment to be threatened as employers hired migrants 
seemingly prepared to work long hours for low wages.735 In industrial relations 
terms, however, little happened;736the comparative absence of collective 
agreements and low levels of union membership in the industries most affected 
meant that the labour market was left to adjust accordingly. 
                                               
734 Havelková: Gender Equality in Law: Uncovering the Legacies of Czech State Socialism, (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
2017), p200. Havelková states ‘Czech liberalism has been centred on a very fundamentalist understanding of 
individual liberty and the free market. The ideal has been... ‘anarcho capitalism,’ a very tough Darwinistic 19th 
Century capitalism in which greed for money and wealth, not social, are the preferred attitudes of the economic 
actors’ (277-8). 
735
According to the Commission in 2008 the influx new workers made ‘a largely positive contribution’ to economic 
and social conditions in the EU. The very comprehensive Commission Report Employment in Europe 2008 
(Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities) concluded that: ‘Third country 
immigration and intra-EU mobility have made a significant contribution to growth in recent years, but also pose 
important policy challenges’ (p19). Worker hostility to the influx of eastern European labour is one such challenge 
– see, for example, Sonia McKay’s ‘Migrant workers in hard times,’ (particularly pages 6-8) in Labour migration in 
hard times: Reforming labour market regulation? (Liverpool, IER, 2013). In the same volume, in ‘Workers without 
footprints: the legal fiction of migrant workers as posted workers’ Hayes and Novitz refer to a Swedish paper which 
in essence shows that while buying imported manufactured goods amounts to much the same thing as the use of 
posted workers, the latter excites much more opposition (Camfors, Dimidins, Gustafsson Sendén, Montgomery 
and Stavlöt: ‘Why Do People Dislike Low Wage Trade Competition with Posted Workers in the Service Sector’ 
(2012) CESifo Working Papers Series No.3842). The chapter by Hayes, Novitz and Hannah Reed, ‘Applying the Laval 
Quartet in a UK Context: Chilling, Ripple and Disruptive effects on Industrial Relations,’ in Bucker and Warneck 
(eds) Reconciling Fundamental Social Rights and Economic Freedoms After Viking, Laval and Ruffert, (Baden-Baden, 
Nomos, 2011) acknowledges that the approach of the ECJ fuels hostility to posted workers by discouraging or 
stopping industrial action which would serve to neutralise that hostility. The authors (at pp223-4) state that the 
fear of being undercut and replaced by cheaper eastern European labour played a significant role in the triggering 
of the Heathrow Gate Gourmet dispute (see chapter five below), and the related British Airways ‘unofficial 
walkouts’ by baggage and cargo handling staff. 
736
 For a study of European trade union reactions to the 2004 and 2007 expansion, see Torben Krings, ‘A Race to 
the Bottom? Trade Unions, EU Enlargement and the Free Movement of Labour’, European Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 2009, Vol 15, No.1, 49. 
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There was, however, an element of protection. The Posted Workers Directive had 
been adopted in 1996.737 It explicitly protected the freedom for firms to operate 
in other states using its own workers (under the fiction that they do not gain 
access to the host state’s labour market),738 employed on the (invariably inferior) 
terms they had been hired on in their home state. These economic rights were 
ostensibly balanced that by requiring that they adhere to the core statutory 
labour rights in host countries and ‘universally applicable’ national or sectoral 
legally enforcable standards established by collective agreement or statute, like 
OSH protections, limits on working time, and minimum wage.739 However, it has 
been convincingly argued that the PWD is a directive intended primarily to 
promote the interests of businesses rather than those of ‘guest workers,’ or 
workers in the host state,740 that it is another manifestation of the primacy 
afforded the interests of capital by the EU.  
Reflecting EU consciousness of the limits of its competence in the sphere of 
employment, the Directive emphasised that its provisions were ‘without prejudice 
to the law of the Member states concerning collective action to defend the 
interests of trades and professions.’741 Nevertheless, subsequent events were to 
further emphasise the fact that the EU is primarily a vehicle for business - one 
                                               
737Directive 96/71/EC. 
738 See Hayes and Novitz, in Labour migration in hard times 2013, op cit..  
739Although neither the directive, nor the subsequent 2014 and 2018 directives (below) do not mention the ILO, 
they are obviously based on the 1949 ILO Convention No. 97 Migration for Employment Convention, which was 
ratified by the UK in 1951. Article 6 requires the UK government to “apply without discrimination in respect of 
nationality, race, religion or sex, to immigrants lawfully within its territory, treatment no less favourable than that 
which it applies to its own nationals.’ Where such ‘matters are regulated by law or regulations, or are subject to 
the control of administrative authorities,’ migrant workers are entitled to equal ‘Remuneration, including family 
allowances where these form part of remuneration, hours of work, overtime arrangements, holidays with pay, 
restrictions on home work, minimum age for employment, apprenticeship and training, women’s work and the 
work of young persons,’ and to accommodation and social security. The value of collective bargaining in imposing 
equality is recognised, with migrant workers being guaranteed equal access to ‘Membership of trade unions and 
enjoyment of the benefits of collective bargaining.’  
740 On the PWD as an instrument intended to protect service providers rather than workers see L Hayes, T Novitz 
and T H Olsson, ‘Migrant workers and collective bargaining: institutional isomorphism and legitimacy in 
resocialised Europe,’ in Countouris and Freedland (eds) Resocialising Europe in a Time of Crisis (Cambridge, CUP, 
2013). 
741
Cited in the introduction by Ewing and Carolyn Jones to KD Ewing and John Hendy (eds) The New Spectre 
Haunting Europe – the ECJ, Trade Union Rights, and the British Government, p4. 
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which has failed to accommodate workers exercising their right to freedom of 
association.  
 New Labour implemented the bare minimum of protection – ‘the UK government 
did not seek to make use of any of the permissions contained in the Directive so 
as to apply to workers posted into the UK any non-core rules whether to be found 
in legislation or collective agreements.’742 This manifestation of New Labour’s 
neoliberal philosophy backfired badly for Gordon Brown in 2009 when a well 
organised workforce at the Total Oil Refinery at East Lindsey took industrial action 
in response to the use of posted Italian workers on terms which were inferior to 
the terms of their collective agreements.743 While the trade unions wanted to see 
‘equal pay for equal work’, New Labour, pragmatic as ever, fell back on the 
decidedly protectionist tabloid friendly sound bite of ‘British jobs for British 
workers’, until the dispute was settled and the story faded.744 
 In Sweden and Finland however the use of cheap posted Estonian and Latvian 
labour triggered the events that led to two ECJ cases which revealed that the 
European Union remains a fundamentally neoliberal project.745 The two cases, 
decided within days of each other in 2007, went beyond merely highlighting the 
continuing weakness of the protection afforded fundamental labour rights by the 
EU. They can arguably seen as an attack on organised labour, with the Court, 
encouraged by New Labour, effectively choosing to extend the legal competence 
of the EU into collective labour law to restrict freedom of association. 
VIKING AND LAVAL & the right to strike in EU law 
The EU had by 2007 increased in size considerably. The subsequent economic 
upheavals led to industrial action as workers acted to force employers to agree to 
employ the influx of labour on the same terms as the existing workforce. The 
                                               
742Paul Davies, ‘The Posted Workers Directive and the EC Treaty’ (2002), 31 ILJ 298. 
743Remarkably Total had not breached either the Regulations, or the Directive. The terms of the Directive have to 
be reconciled with the freedom to provide services – see Viking and Laval, below. 
744
See C. Barnard, ‘British jobs for British workers’: the Lindsay Oil Refinery dispute and the future of local labour 
clauses in an integrated EU market,’ ILJ 2009,38(3) 245. 
745
Compare the response of the EEC to the oil crisis and radical (1968 – 1976) Europe with the response to the 
Eurozone crisis and to Neo-Liberal Europe. 
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Baltic region was particularly affected. Finland and Sweden, with perhaps the 
most comprehensive social protections in the EU, and very high levels of trade 
union membership,746 were close neighbours of the relatively impoverished states 
of Estonia and Latvia.  
The now famous Viking and Laval cases were brought by Finnish and Swedish 
employers against unions that had responded to ‘social dumping’ by taking 
industrial action. The employers claimed that the action taken breached the 
economic freedoms guaranteed by the EC treaties. 
 Viking, a Finnish ferry company, had sought to move its base from Finland to 
Estonia to make use of the many workers in the former Soviet Bloc country 
prepared to work for considerably less than Finnish workers, and to take 
advantage of the less stringent Estonian ‘flagging’ arrangements. Those of Viking’s 
workers who belonged to the Finnish Sailors’ Union went on strike. The FSU is 
affiliated to the International Transport Workers’ Federation. The ITF, which had 
long been campaigning against ‘flags of convenience’, urged its members to 
‘black’ Viking.  
 
 Laval was a Latvian construction company working on a site in Sweden. Laval 
refused to accept the terms of a collective agreement with the Swedish unions 
which would have put its posted Latvian employees on the terms and conditions 
enjoyed by Swedish workers. The response of the Swedish trade union was to 
mount a picket. The Swedish building workers ‘blockaded’ the site, and other 
trades unions boycotted all of Laval’s Swedish work. Laval took the unions to 
court in Sweden claiming they had breached the company’s Article 49 freedom to 
provide services within the EC. 
 
 The ITF is based in the UK and Viking were granted an injunction in the High 
Court.747On appeal however the Court of Appeal,748 less certain than the High 
Court judge as to whether industrial action fell within the ambit of the treaties 
                                               
746Trade union membership densities in 2004: Sweden 78.1%; Finland 71.5%; UK 28.9%; Estonia 10.1% (OECD.Stat 
Trade Union Density). Latvia has yet to join the OECD but ETUI estimate trade union membership in Latvia to be 
about 13% (www.worker-participation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Countries/Latvia/Trade-Unions). 
747Article 13 of the Finnish constitution guarantees the right to take collective action, and the blacking would 
almost certainly have been ruled legal under Finnish domestic law. Not so in the UK where no forms of secondary 
action (other than in relation to picketing) have had had the protection of the statutory immunities since 1990. 
However, the question at issue was whether EU law rendered the blacking unlawful. 
748[2005] EWCA 1299(CA). 
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and whether European law was capable of ‘direct horizontal effect’ in such cases, 
referred the case to the ECJ. The Swedish Court, expressing similar doubts, also 
made a referral. 
 
Although domestic labour law had, as we have seen, been subject to challenge 
when provisions had conflicted with the business rights conferred by the Treaty, 
disputes between employers and trade unions had previously been thought to 
have fallen outside the jurisdiction of the Luxembourg Court.749 In Albany,750 in 
1999, the ECJ had acknowledged, in relation to EU competition law, that: 
 
‘It is beyond question that certain restrictions of competition are inherent 
in collective agreements...However the social policy objectives pursued by 
such agreements would be seriously undermined if management and 
labour were subject to [the Treaty]...It therefore follows from an 
interpretation of the Treaty as a whole which is both effective and 
consistent that agreements concluded in the context of collective 
negotiations between management and labour in pursuit of such objectives 
must, by virtue of their nature and purpose, be regarded as falling outside 
the scope of [the Treaty].’751 
 
Written observations on the Viking case were submitted to the Court by a 
number of Member States and organisations. The UK New Labour Government 
took the opportunity to argue that the right to strike was not a fundamental 
principle of European law, and that EU competence did extend into the regulation 
of industrial relations. 752 
                                               
749
The ECJ is, of course, only concerned with matters governed by EU law. The Laval and Viking cases concerned 
the free movement guaranteed by the Treaties, but it was argued that Article 137(5) EC (now 153(5)) stipulated 
that the competences conferred by the Treaties do not extend to  strikes, lock outs and pay,  and that the ECJ had 
no jurisdiction over the disputes at issue . However, the court held that this merely excluded EU from legislating on 
strikes, lock outs and pay, and does not exclude the ECJ from considering the effect of Treaties on industrial action 
(see N. Reich‘Free Movement v Social Rights in an Enlarged Union – the Laval and Viking cases before the ECJ, 
’2008 9 German Law  Journal, 105, pp128-129). Laval and Viking were novel cases in that trade unions, not 
member states (for permitting the interference with the economic freedoms) were challenged in the Luxembourg 
court. The Finnish and Swedish Governments submitted arguments to the court supporting the opinions of the 
trade unions: that the right to strike is a fundamental social right not affected by the Treaty; that A137(5) [A 
153(5)]explicitly excluded the Treaty from the cases; and that Albany [1999] had demonstrated that such collective 
matters were outside of the ambit of the Treaty.  
750 [1999] C-67/96 ECR I 5751. 
751
 Bercusson on Albany (ibid) in The Trade Union Movement and the European Union: Judgement Day, European 
Law Journal, Vol. 13, No.3, May 2007, 279-308 at p282  
752
 Bercusson looked into the arguments offered in ‘The Trade Union Movement and the European Union: 
Judgement Day’, European Law Journal, Vol. 13(3), May 2007, 279 at pp 282-286. 
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 Brian Bercusson, who was closely involved with the conduct of the Laval and 
Viking cases, observed that despite the conflicting views presented in the various 
submissions, there was an overwhelming consensus that European law 
incorporates a fundamental right to collective action, and that this consensus 
largely derived from ILO Conventions 87 and 98, the European Social Charter, and 
ECHR, and Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.753  Even the Estonian 
Government and the Viking Line accepted that the right to strike was a 
fundamental principle of European law, and ‘the only unequivocal assertion that 
there was no fundamental right to take collective action in community law came 
from the UK.’ 
 
This perverse argument was based on a reading of the treaties which ignored the 
influence of all other sources of European law – with the exception of the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR. The Government appeared to have shopped around 
for a team of barristers prepared to sell them a Counsel’s Opinion that told them 
what they wanted to hear. According to the UK submission: 
 
‘Collective bargaining agreements are expressly made subject to 
Community law by existing legislation...There is no indication in the Treaty 
that social rights should have primacy over other provisions. Article 140 EC 
states it is ‘without prejudice’ to other Treaty provisions. Albany provides at 
best a limited immunity...There is no legally binding fundamental social 
right to take collective action in community law... Although Article 11 of the 
1950 ECHR safeguards a generalised form of collective action, it is not the 
case that rights are guaranteed to take specific forms of collective action. 
Article 11 recognises a right to be heard but not as fundamental [sic] any of 
the specific actions a trade union may adopt in pursuit of that right. It does 
not confer a right to strike. None of the other charters creates any 
fundamental right to take collective action that is protected by community 
law. The fundamental social right to take collective action...is not a legally 
binding right in community, as it law it derives from the Community 
Charter. The 1989 Charter is not leally binding. The UK accepts the trade 
union interest in collective action, but not that EU law accepts a right to 
strike. ‘754 
                                               
753
  Ibid, p 300 and 306. As noted above, the Charter appeared to be on the verge of incorporation into an EU 
Constitution. 
754
Ibid, footnotes 16, 29, and 137 pp 283-284, and p300. The UK submission was prepared by O’Neill, Andersen, 
Swift and Lee. 
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Of course, these wholly disingenuous arguments (see chapter five on the right to 
strike) could cut no ice with the Luxembourg Court. The provisions of the 
Community Charter, the Charter of Fundamental Social rights, the European 
Social Charter and ILO Convention 87,  gave the court no option other than to 
describe the right to strike as a fundamental right in EU law. However, ultimately 
the court did reach a decision which must have found favour with the British 
Government. The ECJ determined that when unions were exercising a regulatory 
function they were drawn in to the legal competences conferred by the 
Treaties.755In both Viking and Laval the court found that the unions had restricted 
the economic freedoms while exercising a regulatory function, ‘market access’ 
had been impeded.756 
 
The court had reached back to a 1991 case, Sagar, which had established that 
where labour law permitted practices ‘liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the 
activities of a provider of services established in another Member State where he 
lawfully provides similar services’ then those restrictions had to be justified by the 
principle of proportionality. 757 They had to have been imposed for a legitimate 
purpose compatible with the treaties – ‘overriding reasons of public interest.’ 
They had to be proportionate in the circumstances.758 
 
 By the time of Laval and Viking this approach to restrictions on the freedom to 
provide services – reminiscent of the grounds permitting state infringement upon 
the rights protected by Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 ECHR - had been extended to all 
restrictions on freedom of movement,759 although restrictions on Treaty rights 
imposed in order to protect workers, to prevent social dumping or to maintain 
order in the labour market had, when considered by the ECJ, all been seen to 
have been justified.760 
 
                                               
755Viking [2007]C-438/05 ECR I-10779 paras 64 & 65, see also KD Ewing The function of Trade Unions, 2005, 
34(1)ILJ 1. 
756Laval [2007] C-341/05 ECR I-11767 
757Sagar[1991] C-76/90 ECR I-4221. 
758Sager paras 12 and 14. See Novitz and Syrps ‘Giving with One Hand and Taking with the Other: ‘Protection of 
Human Rights in the European Union’ in Human Rights at Work, Perspectives on Law and Regulation, 2010, pp474 
– 479 for discussion of ‘legitimate aim and proportionality. 
759
See Commission v Denmark (company vehicles) Case C-464/02 [2005] ECR I-7929, para 45 (see Barnard, 
‘Employment Rights, Free Movement Under the EC Treaty....’2008, op cit, pp6-7) 
760
Webb [1981] C- 279/80 ECR 3305 para 19; Commission v Germany [2006]C-244/04 ECR I-885 para 41;Commision 
v Luxembourg [2004] C-445/03 ECR I-10191 para 38 (See Barnard, 2008, op cit, p7). 
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 In Viking the court acknowledged that the protection of workers was one of the 
overriding reasons of public interest.761 However, it ruled that the restriction on 
the freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty – the industrial action – could only be 
justified to counter serious and immediate threats to jobs or attempts to impose 
inferior terms and conditions of employment.762 Although the court considered 
this a question for the UK court to decide it made it plain that it considered the 
action of the FSU was, in the circumstances, not justified. The court ruled that 
industrial action should be resorted to only when negotiation had failed and all 
other legal options exhausted, indicating that it considered that the FSU had been 
too quick to go on strike. The court offered the opinion that the Court of Appeal 
would be unlikely to find that attempts on the part of the ITF to prevent 
reflagging in Estonia were restrictions on Articles 43 (now 49) and 49 (now 56) 
which could be justified. However, the case was settled before the case could be 
heard by the Court of Appeal.763 
 
 In Laval the court was rather less equivocal. It acknowledged that industrial 
action to prevent social dumping could be regarded as a matter which could 
justify restricting the fundamental freedoms, and that the action taken by the 
Swedish union, seen as a response to a serious threat to jobs and to the terms 
and conditions of employment, could be seen to be justified.  However, as an 
attempt to coerce the employer into coming to an agreement with the union the 
Court held that the action could not be justified - the Posted Workers Directive 
prohibited member states from requiring the employer to engage in negotiations 
on pay and conditions with the unions in the host member state or to attempt to 
coerce the employer into providing terms and conditions beyond those 
demanded by the directive.764 Having determined that the breach could not be 
justified it did not go on to consider the question of proportionality. 
                                               
761 Para 77 and Laval [2007], op cit, para 103. 
762  Viking [2007] ,op cit, para 81. 
763Bercusson 2009, op cit, noted of the many submissions received from Member states in Viking ‘It is a bracing 
reminder that to EU lawyers of the power of political and economic context to influence legal doctrine that the 
new Member States [Estonia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland etc] were unanimous on one side of the arguments on 
issues of fundamental legal doctrine (horizontal direct effect, discrimination, proportionality) and the old Member 
states virtually unanimous on the other’ (p305). The UK, however, sided with the new Member states. 
764 As Hayes, Novitz and Olsson (2013, op cit) point out, the consequence is that these national and sectoral 
standards consequently, for posted workers, set maximum rather than minimum standards (p457-8). 
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 Back before the Swedish Court at the end of 2009 Laval were awarded 
substantial damages. The Swedish Government which, as we have seen, had 
supported the right of the trade union to take action were subsequently subject 
to a complaint made by the Swedish Trade Union Confederation under the 
European Social Charter collective complaints procedure. The European 
Committee of Social Rights found that in permitting the restrictions on the right to 
strike imposed by the ECJ the Swedish Government were in breach of Article 6(4) 
of the European Social Charter, and in permitting Laval to ignore the relevant 
collective agreement in respect of the terms and conditions of the Lithuanian 
workers, they found that the Swedes had breached Article 19(4)(a) and (b). 765 
There could be little doubt too, that this was a breach of the post Demir 
interpretation of Article 11 ECHR - that the PWD, as it then stood, breached the 
principles of freedom of association laid down in the fundamental ILO 
conventions, the UNICESCR, as well as the ECHR.766  
The right to strike had been recognised by the ECJ. Unfortunately, just as the UK 
confers heavily circumscribed immunities from civil liability rather than a right to 
strike, the European Court preferred to cast the right to strike as a very narrowly 
defined derogation from the economic rights conferred by the Treaty, instead of 
as a truly fundamental right given equal weight with the economic freedoms 
conferred by the treaties. 
Two new directives on posted workers were adopted in the wake of Viking and 
Laval in order to ease the tensions when posted workers were used. The 
approach was one of rebalancing the rights of businesses to provide services in 
other states with the right of posted workers to equal treatment, while 
discouraging the abuse of posted worker status by employers who were primarily 
interested in circumventing the employment rights in the host country. 
                                               
765Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) and Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO) v Sweden, 
complaint No.85/2012 (‘Processed complaints’ at www.coe.int), see Ewing and Hendy, The Eclipse of the Rule of 
Law: Trade Union Rights and the EU , 2016, pp9-10. 
766 See Hayes, Novitz and Olsson, 2013 op cit, p458-9. It seems likely that the 2018 one year/18 month limit to 
‘posted’ status (see p219 below) would see the treatment of posted workers ‘excused’ by Article 11(2). 
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Directive 2014/67/EU on the enforcement of the 1996 Directive emphasised that 
posting was an aspect of the right to provide services in another member states 
(Article 56 TFEU) unrelated to the free movement of workers,767 that the use of 
these guest workers must be transparent, closely monitored by host states, and 
should not be allowed to impinge upon fair competition, or upon the freedom for 
workers to take industrial action and conclude collective agreements. Essentially 
the directive defined posted work as a strictly temporary arrangement to permit 
workers from another EU state, employed by firms established in that state, to 
carry out specific ‘substantial activities.’ It required the host state to be supplied 
with all the employment details of the workers, and to oblige host states to 
provide mechanisms whereby posted workers can complain to trade unions about 
their terms and conditions of employment, and to bring claims against their 
employer – in the host state. Crucially it provided the basis of a system of cross 
border procedures to permit states to settle disputes, including the use of 
financial penalties, arguably a first step towards the establishment of the EU 
European Labour Authority in 2019 (when Article 24 of the 2014 directive is 
scheduled for review) which will deal with all cross border labour disputes.  
In 2018 directive 2018/957 amended the 1996 directive to further discourage the 
abuse of posted worker status. States have to implement it by 30 July 2020, so it 
is very likely it will become UK law whatever our future relationship with the 
Union. 
The core terms and conditions in Article 3 of the 1996 directive were extended, 
and states are required to publish them on one well publicised official web site.  
Article 1(2) requires that posted workers must have parity with workers in the 
host country in relation to rights to working time limits, paid holidays, 
remuneration (other than pensions), agency worker protections, OSH, pregnancy 
and maternity rights, non-discrimination, accommodation and accommodation 
and travel allowances imposed ‘by law, regulation or administrative provision, by 
                                               
767
 This didn’t stop two MEPs contributing an article to the Independent entitled‘The EU has just passed a law that 
could end the problems with free movement which led to Brexit in the first place’ following the adoption of the 
2018 directive (30 May 2018). Jude Kirton-Darling and Agnes Jongerius probably still believe that posted workers 
are migrant workers exercising freedom of movement. 
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collective agreements or arbitration awards which have been declared universally 
applicable.’ However, the really important change was the imposition of a 12 
month limit for those with posted status. 
Those workers posted beyond 12 months have to be given complete parity with 
the terms and conditions enjoyed by workers in the host state, although if a good 
reason can be found as the basis of a ‘motivated application’, a state can permit 
an employer to provide the particular workers with only the basic Article 1 (2) 
rights for a total of18 months (Article 1(2)(b). 
Demir and Baykara & the right to collective bargaining 
Remarkably, the right of workers to engage in collective bargaining was not 
expressly considered in either Laval or Viking, or in Rüffert v Land 
Niedersachsen,768 in which the contractual requirement of a local authority that 
contractors adhere to minimum standards of pay and conditions for their 
workforce was successfully challenged as a breach of the Posted Workers 
Directive.769  This was despite the explicit requirements of Article 3 of the 
Directive (above) in relation to the terms of ‘generally applicable’ collective 
agreements. 
It appears that the right of workers to bargain collectively is not something that 
the Court wishes to consider unless compelled.  Yet Article 28 of the EU Charter 
explicitly refers to the right to collective bargaining. Unlike protection in the 
Charter for businesses, which is framed merely as the recognition of the freedom 
to conduct business in accordance with domestic and EU law and practice, Article 
28, apparently drawing on the European social Charter, confirms that workers in 
EU states have the right to bargain collectively: 
‘Workers and employers, or their respective organisations, have, in 
accordance with Community law and national laws and practices, the right 
to negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels 
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[2008] C-346/06 ECR I-1989. 
769See Novitz and Syrps 2010, op cit, p473. 
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and, in cases of conflicts of interest, take collective action to defend their 
interests, including strike action.’ 
There can be no doubt that the right to engage in collective bargaining is a 
fundamental right of the European Union,770 although one not enshrined in the 
acquis as black letter law, and seen by the court as subservient to the business 
freedoms. As we have seen, the Social Protocol looked to European level 
collective bargaining to negotiate the content of the directives, and to collective 
bargaining at national level for their implementation. The constitutions of many 
Member States guarantee workers the right to engage in collective bargaining.771 
Moreover, the developments at the ECtHR with regard to Article 11 must be said 
to have fed into Article 28 to further bolster that status. 
In 2008, the year that the ECJ considered Rüffert, the ECtHR, as we saw in chapter 
three,, changed tack on freedom of association, and building upon the approach it 
had taken in Wilson and Palmer, it gave a much more generous interpretation of 
the protections afforded by Article 11 holding the right to bargain collectively to 
be an essential element of freedom of association. Like the European Court, the 
ECtHR drew on the ILO Conventions, the European Social Charter, the EU Charter, 
and to national practices, to determine whether the Turkish courts had breached 
Article 11 in refusing to recognise the collective agreement that had been entered 
into by a Civil Service union. Crucially the Court held that the ILO conventions, 
recommendations, and the reports and observations of the organisation’s various 
bodies were a floor of labour rights for the Council of Europe. 
The fact that Turkey had not ratified the ILO Conventions relied upon was 
considered irrelevant. The Court ruled that there had been a breach of the civil 
servants’ Article 11 rights, found that there had, then looked to 11(2) to assess 
whether the interference could be justified. The court asked the familiar 
questions – was it lawful? Was it made in pursuit of a legitimate purpose 
                                               
770 See also Hayes, Novitz and Olsson 2013, op cit, p451-2. 
771
See KD Ewing, Labour Rights or Human Rights? - It is Time to Move On pp5-7 (speech to the International Society 
for Labour and Social Security Law, Dublin, 18 September 2014), and Bercusson, ‘Collective Bargaining and the 
Protection of Social rights in Europe’ in Ewing, Gearty, Hepple (eds) 1994, op cit. 
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recognised in 11(2)? Was it a proportionate measure in the circumstances? The 
Turkish Government had requested that the case be heard by the Grand Council, 
and a full panel of 7 judges found against the Turkish Government. 
The decision has considerable significance in relation to the law of the European 
Union: 
Article 12 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights states that 
‘Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of 
association at all levels, in particular in political, trade union and civic 
matters, which implies the right of everyone to form and to join trade 
unions for the protection of his or her interests.’ 
Article 52(3) of the Charter: 
‘In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights 
guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the 
same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not 
prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.’  
 The next year the Strasbourg Court’s radical new approach was followed in Enerjii 
Yapi-Yol Sen v Turkey, a case which concerned the disciplinary action taken 
against civil servants who had participated in a strike in order to press their case 
for a collective agreement. There was an absolute ban on strike action by public 
servants and again the ECtHR found against the Turkish government. Three more 
cases followed in the same year which turned on the right to take industrial 
action, two brought against the Turkish Government and one against the Russian 
Government.772 
K. D. Ewing has observed that the ECHR jurisprudence has fed into the Charter, 
and into the EU jurisprudence, making the ‘token gesture’ offered by the ECJ in 
Viking and Laval in relation to the importance of the ILO Conventions, now ‘a 
                                               
772 See chapter 2 . 
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positive duty to engage with the substance of the Conventions, and to the 
decisions, rulings and recommendations of the its supervisory bodies.’  
He argued that:  
‘One effect of Demir and Baycara v Turkey relates to its impact on the 
relationship between articles 12 and 28 of the Charter. The effect of that 
influence could work in one of two ways. One possibility is that Art.28 of 
the EU Charter has become redundant because of the higher standard of 
Article 12. Or Art.28 is informed by Art,12, so that when Art 28 refers to a 
right in accordance with Community law, that Community law must include 
Art 12 of the Charter, which, by virtue of Art.52(3) must be construed by 
reference to the Strasbourg jurisprudence...although there may be no 
direct obligation under EU law to have “legislation necessary to give effect 
to the provisions of the international labour conventions already ratified”773 
by the Member State in question, such an obligation arises by virtue of 
what is probably the unanticipated consequences of Article 12 as informed 
by the ECHR.’774 
Consequently the Charter of Fundamental Rights has, in theory at least, worked to 
indirectly raise the bar for EU Member States. The unexpected volte face at 
Strasbourg should have had consequences for European labour law. But, so far, it 
has not, because the European Court has chosen to ignore the new wide 
interpretation of Article 11 and the new protection for the freedom to bargain 
and to strike. 775 
 
 
                                               
773 Referring to para 157 ofDemir. 
774Ewing above ‘Labour Rights or Human Rights’, pp10-11. 
775
The Strasbourg cases, and the ILO Conventions, were cited in recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada 
where repressive labour laws were struck down in cases turning on the Canadian Charter of Rights and the 
guarantee of freedom of association: Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan [2015] SCC 4 and 
Mounted Police Association of Ontario v Canada (Attorney General) [2015] SCC 1. 
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Pragmatism: the revival of Community neoliberalism and ‘the 
eclipse of the rule of law’ 
Since the 2008 – 2014 financial crisis in the ‘Eurozone’, Brussels and Luxembourg 
appear, in practice, to have largely abandoned even the pretence of protecting 
workers’ rights. The EU might be said to have revealed itself to be the essentially 
neoliberal construct some had long believed it to be.776 
 Article 28, and Article 52(3) of the EU Charter appear to have been forgotten by 
the ECJ, and the court has paid scant attention to developments at Strasbourg.  
All states have been put under pressure to withdraw from national sectoral 
bargaining by the Commission, which has argued that such arrangements put 
states at risk of breaching EU competition laws. Those states unfortunate enough 
to have required financial assistance from the ‘Troika’ have found themselves 
obliged to at least cut back severely their national and sectoral mechanisms,777 
depending on the terms of the particular Memorandum of Understanding which 
they had to agree to in order to receive that assistance in a coercive ‘attempt to 
further economic objectives as opposed to respect human rights...intended to 
drive down labour standards,’ unsupported by ‘external international legitimacy’ 
and running ‘entirely counter to previous established human rights norms.’778 
Collective bargaining mechanisms  in Spain, Greece, Portugal, Romania, Italy, 
Belgium and Ireland, have been attacked by the European Commission, the 
European Bank and the International Monetary Fund as part of the austerity 
measures instituted as part of the financial ‘bail outs’, and in the guise of co-
ordinating economic policy.779 
 
                                               
776 See, for example, Hepple 1987, op cit. 
777 Thus making it harder to oblige the employers of posted workers to adhere to collective agreements (Hayes, 
Novitz and Olsson, 2013, op cit, p449). 
778 Ibid,p 454-5. The authors consider EU efforts to apply the template of the 1996 PWD to third country migrants 
and ultimately raise the question ‘whether Laval and other judgments really did depend upon free movement of 
services rights or whether they were more simply about promoting cheap labour’(p 463). 
779
See Ewing, above, ‘Labour Rights or Human Rights’, pp12-19 and Ewing and Hendy ‘Eclipse of the Rule of Law: 
Trade Union Rights and the EU’, 2016. 
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For example in Portugal there has been a reduction of sectoral coverage from 
50%, down to 10%. The Government is however now committed to a return to 
 
‘an approach to collective bargaining that favoured inclusiveness and 
stability, through promotion of regular sectoral bargaining and extended 
coverage and improvement of company level agreements.’780 
 
 In Rumania national level bargaining ceased, sectoral bargaining coverage fell by 
60%, and overall collective bargaining coverage fell from 98% in 2010 to 35% in 
2014. Rights to organise, bargain and strike have been said to have been 
‘slashed.’781  Extraordinarily, attempts to legislate to conform to ILO minimum 
standards were opposed by the Troika.782 In Greece, the hardest hit state, 
‘disorganised decentralisation’ was said to have ‘brought the bargaining system to 
the brink of collapse,’ effectively delivering the long standing pre-crisis demands 
of Greek employers’ organisations,783 and there, as well as in Ireland and Portugal, 
laws were passed to permit establishment level negotiations between an 
employer and ‘non-trade union, even non elected representatives.’784 
 
In July 2017, the head of the IMF, Christine Lagarde, advised the Greek 
Government that the Government ‘should reconsider the decision to reverse 
cornerstone collective bargaining reforms after the end of the program...’785 
 
The attacks by the Troika on sectoral mechanisms, and the associated campaign 
against French collective labour protections by President Macron’s government, 
are legislative assaults, justified by the state economic audits of the Commission, 
and upon the arguably willfully misinterpreted requirements of the single market. 
The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association holds that the ‘determination of 
                                               
780  The influence of the Troika on the erosion of collective bargaining in Portugal: changing rules and outcomes by 
Maria Da Paz Campos Lima, Lisbon University(2.3), from the EU sponsored workshop onEvolution of Collective 
Bargaining in Troika Programme and Post Programme Member States Brussels 18 February 2016, Directorate 
General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy.  
781 ‘The state of play of collective bargaining in Romania’, by Aurora Trif of Dublin City University, (3.3). 
782 Ibid (2.4). 
783The Greek system of collective bargaining during the economic crisis, by Aristea Koukiadaki, University of 
Manchester, ibid, (2.6). 
784 Hayes, Novitz and Olsson 2013, op cit, p455 & 456. 
785
IMF Executive Board Approves in Principle 1.6 Billion Stand-By Arrangement for Greece, IMF Press Release No. 
17/294, 20 July 2017. 
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the bargaining level’ should be left to negotiation and ‘not be imposed by law,’786  
and the largely unilateral withdrawals of sectoral mechanisms in the EU states hit 
hardest by the Eurozone crisis are of doubtful legality.  
The ILO Committee of Experts,787 and the Council of Europe’s European 
Committee on Social Rights, 788 expressed grave reservations about these events. 
The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association deprecated the Spanish, Irish,789 
and Greek Government’s Troika prompted unilateral retreat from national and 
sectoral collective bargaining arrangements.790 The Committee appointed an ILO 
High Level Mission to investigate events in Greece, and were appalled by what 
they found - brazen breaches of C87 and C98.791 
 
The rights and principles of the EU Charter clearly have nothing like the value of 
the treaties – it would seem that even the fundamental principles enshrined in 
the treaties are dispensable. Citing Article 2 TEU commitment to ‘the values of 
respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights,’792 and the claim in the preamble to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights that ‘the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values 
of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity...the principles of democracy 
and the rule of law,’793 Ewing and Hendy have argued that  
‘the EU legal order is built on a lie, or a series of up to 28 lies. The Member 
States collectively may have committed themselves to the rule of law...but 
they do not observe the commitment, at least in relation to labour rights.’ 
Initially the fundamental Community labour rights were drawn from the 
constitutions and national practices of Member States, from the European Social 
                                               
786
 2006 ILO CFA Digest of Decisions, para 988 – 91. 
787Ewing, ‘Labour Rights or Human Rights’(above), p17. 
788European Social Rights Committee, Conclusions XX-3 (2014). The committee found that the Spanish Government 
had violated Art.6(2) of the ESC ( See Ewing and Hendy, 2016, op.cit, pp8-9 ). 
789The Irish government didn’t require prompting. 
790ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Case No.2947 (Spain), Report No.371 (2014); Case No.2780 (Ireland), 
Report No. 363(2012); Case No.2829 (Greece), Report No.365 (2012) 
791International Labour Office, Report on the High Level Mission to Greece (Athens, 19-23 September 2011); see 
also the CEACR Reports in 2010 (99
th
 Session) and 2011 (100
th
 Session) cited by Hayes, Novitz and Olsson (2013, op 
cit) at p459. 
792
Ewing and Hendy, 2016, op cit, p3. 
793Ibid, p6. 
226 
 
Charter, and the Strasbourg jurisprudence, by the ECJ. The 1974 labour and social 
policy initiative was temporarily halted by the by the emergence of the Thatcher 
government, revived by Delors in the mid 1980s, revitalised by the Community 
Charter and fashioned into the Maastricht Social Protocol Agreement. The social 
dialogue, the resulting directives, and the subsequent legislation – sabotaged in 
the UK by New Labour – saw the brief flowering of Social Europe before it was 
abandoned,794 in favour of a new fundamental rights strategy - the Charter. Any 
hopes that the Charter might see a resurgence of labour rights were dashed by 
Viking, Laval and Ruffert at Luxembourg, then seemingly salvaged by Demir and 
Baycara at Strasbourg, and then sunk without trace in the wake of the Eurozone 
crisis. 
Now, however, just as the EU is making a strong economic recovery and there are 
signs of some signs of a limited revival of social europe,795 the UK is seemingly 
poised to leave the EU and the single market. 
‘BREXIT’ 
The very considerable margin of appreciation afforded states where labour 
relations are concerned and the singularly relaxed approach taken by the 
Commission to enforcement action made apparent in this chapter have given 
states in practice ample opportunity to emasculate the employment protection 
required of members of the European Union. New Labour took full advantage of 
this. I set out the detail in the two chapters on individual employment rights, 
chapters 6 and 7.  
 
However, for many Tories, the very fact that HMG had been obliged to legislate 
and intervene in the contract of employment was unacceptable. This is why, prior 
to the 2016 referendum the Cameron administration was making much of 
                                               
794See Gold, Cressey and Leonard, ‘Whatever Happened to Social Dialogue? From Partnership to Managerialism in 
the EU Employment Agenda’, European Journal of Industrial Relations (2007) 13(1)7. 
795 See, for example, European Commission: ‘Priority Policy Area; European Pillar of Social Rights; Building a more 
inclusive and fairer European Union: ‘Today we commit ourselves to a set of of 20 rights and principles and rights. 
from the right to fair wages to the right to health care: from live long learning, a better work life balance and 
gender equality to minimum income: with the European Pillar of Social rights, the EU stands up for the rights of its 
citizens in a fast-changing world.’ (President Jean-Claude Juncker 17 November 2017) 
www.//ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/deeper-and-fairer-economic-and-monetary-union/european-pillar-
social-rights_en 
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supposed ‘renegotiation’ with Europe and of ‘repatriating employment rights,’ 
with particular emphasis being placed on the Working Time Directive.796 The 
much misunderstood EU Charter of Fundamental Rights was a similarly totemic 
symbol of EU ‘oppression.’ As a consequence S.5(1) of the Withdrawal Act makes 
the apparently unequivocal statement that the ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights is 
not part of domestic law on or after exit day.’ 
 
 S.5(1) has arguably been included in the Act for political reasons. As we have 
seen, the Charter never has been part of domestic law. As we have seen, it 
reflects the acquis, and should only be cited to support claims in court when EU 
law is engaged, whatever certain judges may believe. That is why s5(5) of the Act  
states that ‘references to the Charter’ may still, after exit from the EU, made in 
respect of ‘any fundamental rights or principles which exist irrespective of the 
Charter.’  The potential for legal confusion and uncertainty is considerable.797 
 
If we do leave the EU, and the Single Market, then, under the terms of the 
Withdrawal Act, the directives which have been implemented under authority of 
the 1972 Act into UK regulations,798 and those Articles in the treaties, EU decisions 
and regulations, which confer rights apt for inclusion in domestic law (which 
previously applied directly without the necessity for transposition), but which 
have not so far been so implemented, will survive the repeal of the European 
Communities Act 1972.799   
 
Decisions of the EAT, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court, reflecting and 
influenced by the acquis, and the ‘pre-exit’ case law of the CJEU, will remain 
binding precedents for the lower courts. 
 
                                               
796 See chapter two. 
797 See Schona Jolly ‘EU Law and the effect of Brexit,’ in Daphne Romney QC 2018, op cit, p 4-5. Jolly makes much 
of the robust entrenchment of equality rights in the acquis (which she details pp6-13) and their vulnerability post 
Brexit, whatever political pledges are made, and suggests that much more use may need to be made of the ECHR 
(p5). One might add that, given the UK’s record with regard to international and regional treaty obligations 
guaranteeing labour rights and freedoms, employment rights will be vulnerable whatever treaty arrangements are 
made with the EU. 
798
Not the directives themselves, although the domestic courts may refer to them in interpreting the regulations. 
799 On ‘retained EU law,’ see Jolly 2018, op cit, pages 3-4. She points out that it ‘seems likely that there will remain 
considerable legal uncertainty as to the manner in which ‘retained EU law’ status will operate.’  
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However, there will be no fresh Defrenne style direct application of the treaties, 
no Marshall style ‘direct effect’ of inadequately transposed directives,800 and no 
Francovitch style awards to compensate those who suffer loss as a consequence 
of state failure to implement a directive.  While judges may choose to interpret 
law with EU origins in the light of the terms of a directive, regulation, decision, 
treaty article, or post BREXIT decision of the ECJ,801 there will be no Factortame 
style ‘disapplication’ of national law, and no referrals to the European Court.802 
The Supreme Court will, if we leave the EU on the terms envisaged by the 
Withdrawal Act, be no more bound by EU case law than it is by UK case law, and, 
of course, it will no longer be bound by the Treaties. 
 
It had initially been anticipated that EU derived employment rights would no 
longer be effectively entrenched in domestic law, and even subject to alteration 
by the Henry XIII powers given ministers post BREXIT to change regulations.  
The restrictions on the exercise of those powers imposed during the Bill’s 
turbulent passage through Parliament, followed by agreement for a post Brexit 
transition period during which the UK will still be subject to EU law until at least 
December 2020, and the November 2018 ‘backstop’ protocol to the Withdrawal 
Agreement, have, however, since put a stop to such speculation. 
 
As matters stand the UK will, whatever else is agreed after the transition period 
ends, have to comply with at least the EU standards on labour protection extant 
at the end of the transition period,803 because that is what is required by the 
‘backstop’ protocol to the Withdrawal Agreement. In effect it is the bare bones of 
any subsequent free trade agreement. 
 
 The Protocol states that: The provisions of this Protocol shall apply unless and 
until they are superseded, in whole or in part, by a subsequent agreement.’804 
 
                                               
800 Defrenne saw Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome used directly in  a national court and thus horizontally in  a 
claim against a private employer ,and Marshall is the classic example of a directive being directly effective in a 
claim against a public authority employer. 
801  Withdrawal Act S.6 
802Withdrawal Act s.5(1). On this ‘removal of critical enforcement mechanisms,’ see Jolly 2018, op cit, p3 & p4 
803Articles 12-132 Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, as agreed at negotiators’ level on 14 
November 2018 (TF59(2018)-Commission to EU27. 
804
 Article 1(4) Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, annexed to the  Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy 
Community, as agreed at negotiators’ level on 14 November 2018 (TF59(2018)-Commission to EU27. 
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Article 6(1) of the Protocol requires that in order to ensure ‘the maintenance of 
the level playing field conditions’ necessary for the maintenance of a single 
customs territory, ‘the provisions set out in Annex 4 to this protocol shall apply.’ 
 
Article 4 of the annex demands ‘non regression of labour and social standards.’ 
The level of protection cannot be ‘reduced below the level provided by the 
common standards applicable within the Union and the United Kingdom at the 
end of the transition period’ (Article 4(1)). 
 
The arbitration procedures, and the threat of lump sums and penalty payments of 
Article s 170-181 (in effect the proposed post transition period infringement 
procedures) do not, however, apply (Article 4(2)).  
 
Nor do they apply to the requirements of Article 5 on social dialogue, adherence 
to the ILO Conventions and the provisions of the European Social Charter, and on 
the ‘exchange of information on the respective situations and advances of the 
Member States and of the United Kingdom’ on the (revised) Charter and the ILO 
Conventions. They do, however apply to the ‘monitoring and enforcement of 
labour and social standards: 
 
‘Noting that within the Union the effective application of Union law 
reflecting the common standards referred to in Article 4(1) is ensured by 
the Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union acting 
under the Treaties the United Kingdom shall ensure effective enforcement 
of Article 4 and of its laws, regulations and practices reflecting those 
common standards in its whole territory, without prejudice to Article 4(2). 
 
The United Kingdom shall maintain an effective system of labour 
Inspections, ensure that administrative and judicial proceedings are 
available in order to permit effective action against violations of its laws, 
regulations and practices, and provide for effective remedies, ensuring that 
any sanctions are effective, proportionate and dissuasive and have a real 
deterrent effect.’ 
 
These are an interesting set of demands, and arguably illustrate the very relaxed 
approach the Commission takes to the enforcement of employment rights. The 
UK has not got an effective system of labour inspection. Indeed it is arguable that 
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it has no system of labour inspection at all,805 and for four years, between 2013 
and 2017, tribunal fees ensured that most of the EU labour protections were in 
practice denied the majority of workers. That was a matter rectified by judicial 
review without any intervention from the Commission. There was no suggestion 
that the infringement procedures would be invoked. Moreover, even without the 
fees regime, the remedies and sanctions for breaches of very many employment 
rights of EU origin are not effective, proportionate or dissuasive as they are 
required to be (see chapters 6 and 7). Seldom has the Commission evinced 
interest beyond requiring that the rights are on the statute book. 
 
Consequently, while the requirement that the UK shall maintain an effective 
system of labour inspections, can plausibly be said to mean that the UK will liable 
to enforcement action if at some point it is held not to have an effective 
system,806 such action is unlikely. 
 
Obviously one cannot predict the outcome of future negotiations, but given the 
need to discourage other states with ‘popularist’ anti EU movements,807and the 
fact that the EU does not want a large economy operating as an ‘off shore sweat 
shop,’808it seems very likely that ultimately the UK will be obliged to concede 
‘dynamic’ alignment or compliance with EU labour standards under any future 
free trade deal. 
 
It seems likely that the negotiators stopped short of an explicit requirement for 
dynamic alignment in order to give the agreement more of a chance of being 
approved by Cabinet and Parliament.809 Article 6 (1) of the backstop protocol, 
referring to Annex 4, and the requirement for the UK to adhere to EU labour 
standards (see above), states that “Where appropriate, the [EU/UK] Joint 
Committee may modify Annex 4 in order to lay down higher standards for these 
                                               
805
While Article 6 might be said to infer that the UK does have an effective labour inspection regime, effective 
sanctions and the like, it is arguably imposing the EU principle of effectiveness on the post withdrawal UK and 
making a breach of that principle grounds for infringement proceedings. 
806As opposed to recognition that it has an effective system and is required to maintain that system. 
807Italy and France for example. 
808A phrase employed by Neil Kinnock during John Major’s ‘Maastricht crisis.’ 
809   Article 4 (1) ‘The United Kingdom shall ensure that no diminution of rights, safeguards and equality of 
opportunity…as enshrined in the provisions of Union law listed in Annex 1 to this Protocol.’ Annex 1 (pp331-332) 
lists the equality directives. (Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, annexed to the Draft Agreement on the 
withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the 
European Atomic Energy Community, as agreed at negotiators’ level on 14 November 2018 (TF59(2018)-
Commission to EU27). 
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level playing field conditions.”810 This would appear to allow for negotiation over 
improved standards; it permitted both sides to postpone the decision on dynamic 
alignment. 
 
 The UK is then explicitly required, in the (unlikely) event both of the Agreement 
being sanctioned by Parliament and of no deal being in place after the end of the 
transition period, to maintain the employment rights of EU origin. 
 
However, we know now that non regression in employment rights must be the 
minimum requirement of any future arrangement, unless the UK ‘crashes out’ 
with no agreement in place – an increasingly unlikely scenario. The questions of 
whether any breach of that condition can be the subject of infringement 
proceedings and financial penalties, and of whether dynamic alignment will be 
required, have effectively been left open, ‘kicked down the road’ by clever 
drafting. 
 
If the UK joins EFTA, and therefore remains in the EEA, known as the ‘Norway 
option’ or as ‘Norway plus,’ it will, in practice,811 have to accept dynamic 
alignment with the EU protections. The UK will accept the jurisdiction of the EFTA 
Court, which, while it makes rulings on non compliance with input from the 
Commission and often from the ECJ, it has no powers to impose infringement 
penalties. Iceland, Lichtenstein, Switzerland and Norway deal settle such matters 
through negotiation. 
 
However, the only labour law initiative on the horizon, is the proposed ‘European 
Pillar of Social Rights,’ an expansion of the employment rights featured in the EU 
Charter. Among other proposals very likely to send many in the Tory party 
apoplectic with rage, states will be very likely ultimately be required to legislate to 
provide a right not to be unfairly dismissed, and to provide social protection for all 
workers, including the self employed. But all this is a very long way off. Few of the 
ex Soviet Bloc states admitted to the EU after 2003 can realistically be believed to 
                                               
810The role of the Joint Committee, the Arbitration panel and the CJEU are well explained in an article in Civil 
Service World by Richard Johnson – see’ Brexit: EU-UK joint committee to oversee withdrawal agreement disputes 
under draft deal’, 15 November 2018 www.civilserviceworld.com/article/news/brexit-eu-uk-joint-committee-
oversee-withdrawal-agreement-disputes-under-draft-deal 
811
While EFTA states can in theory decline to accept fresh legislation, refusal in practice is limited to wholly fresh 
areas of regulation which would not require a very likely unworkable ‘unpicking’ exercise. See J Hendy and T 
Novitz, ‘The Holships Case,’ (2018) 47 ILJ 315. 
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comply with current EU employment protection standards,812 and setting the bar 
higher still would be for the Commission to risk  considerable criticism from all 
sides, not least from the new Member States themselves. 
 
As a consequence the approach is to be one of gentle persuasion rather than 
obligation, and the initiative currently amounts to little more than a series of 
proposals for Commission Recommendations,813 for interpretive ‘guide’ Directives 
on the Working Time and Written Statement Directives, and for a ‘New Start to 
support work-life balance for parents and carers,’ intended to set ‘a number of 
new or higher minimum standards for parental, paternity and caring leave.’814 
 
There are, however, proposals in train on consultation with workers, on ‘social 
dialogue,’ and on managing Laval and Viking style cross border disputes. A 
‘European Labour Authority,’ effectively a supra national Ministry of Labour, is to 
be established in 2019, to be fully functioning by 2023, and it is to be hoped that, 
as the EU enters a post crisis era, with the economies hit hardest by the Eurozone 
crisis recovering well, that the value of national and sectoral level collective 
bargaining will be accorded proper recognition.  
The workshop held at the request of the European Parliament’s Committee on 
Employment and Social Affairs on the Evolution of Collective Bargaining in Troika 
                                               
812 For example, Czech academic lawyer Barbara Havelková (2017, op cit) has stated that ‘the Czech Republic’s EU 
derived anti-discrimination provisions, were seen merely as an ‘offering’ to the EU in the process of their adoption, 
are also widely disregarded and routinely misapplied by the courts’ (p75). She also tells us that employment 
regulations are ‘widely circumvented or disregarded’ (p193); that ‘the adoption of anti-discrimination guarantees 
has been strongly and persistently resisted in Parliament and no woman thus far has won a sex discrimination case 
outright before any Czech court. Sex equality and anti discrimination measures are ‘largely still a mirage’ (p212); 
‘…while Czechia has formally transposed the EU gender equality acquis, it has done so without its lawmakers and 
judges really subscribing to and understanding its rationales. This has resulted in a poor standard of 
implementation’ (p225); Havelkva tells us that the doctrines of direct and indirect effect have been used only once 
in a sex discrimination case ‘even when specifically and…correctly, requested to do so by the claimant (p236). As 
for ‘real and effective compensation or reparation,’ Havelkova reports that Czech courts have been known to 
require discriminatory employers merely to apologise to claimants (p236). 
813See the following European Commission documents: Proposal for a Council Recommendation on access to social 
protection for workers and the self employed COM (2018) 132 final; Stakeholder Consultation - Synopsis Report 
accompanying the Proposal for a Recommendation on access to social protection for workers and the self 
employed SWD(2018) 79 final; Impact assessment accompanying the Proposal for a Recommendation on access to 
social protection for workers and the self employed  SWD(2018) 70; DG Employment Social Affairs and Inclusion, 
Stakeholder Consultation Strategy – Access to social protection (2017). See also Sacha Garben, ‘The European Pillar 
of Social Rights: Effectively Addressing Displacement?’(2018) 14 European Constitutional Law Review 210. 
814
 European Commission, Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion, ‘European Pillar of Rights in detail’: 
ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catld=1310&langld=en#navitem-2 
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Programme and Post Programme Member States,815noted that it was the states 
with very high levels of national collective bargaining coverage which had 
weathered the crisis most successfully - Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden.816 Collective bargaining was said 
to have ‘shown to have important potential to increase sector and company 
competiveness and productivity,’ enabling ‘businesses to adapt to global 
challenges...policy makers should take action to support collective bargaining as 
an important asset of the EU social model.’ 
With the panic engendered by the Eurozone crisis subsiding, given the importance 
placed on collective bargaining by the original six states which comprise the core 
of the EU, as well as by Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Slovenia, Spain, Croatia, 
Romania, Greece, Malta and Portugal, the pragmatists at the Commission may yet 
lead Europe to a fresh reconciliation of labour and capital, and a return to respect 
for the rule of law. 
In this chapter I have outlined the evolution of the EU employment protections, 
and the extraordinary success of the European project in obliging the government 
to provide important workplace rights by making such protection a condition of 
access to the single market, and by the ever present threat of the invocation of 
the potentially very powerful EU infringement regime. Nevertheless, such is the 
modest nature of the demands of the EU in respect of the effectiveness of those 
rights, that British workers should not place much reliance on the protection 
conferred by Europe – as the tribunal fees episode attests.  
I characterised the EU as essentially a vehicle to facilitate cross border business, 
institutionally incapable of reconciling the right of workers to bargain collectively 
and to strike with the protections afforded employers to do business within the 
single market. Even before the ‘Euro Zone Crisis’ the Viking and Laval cases had 
                                               
8152016, op.cit. 
816See the EU 2015 report ‘Collective Bargaining in Europe in the 21st Century,’ overseen by Ricardo Rodriguez of 
the EU Eurofound Agency. Chapter 4 makes it apparent that prosperity and stability goes hand in glove with 
collective bargaining. Tables 14 and 15 in  show that the states listed were those with ‘very high’ collective 
bargaining coverage in 1997-1999, with the exception of Spain, the same states with very high coverage in 2011-13 
which were least affected by the crisis. While coverage in Germany had decreased ,the state has lately experienced 
an ‘impressive U-turn’ and coverage is extending, with new erga omnes regulations adopted in 2014 (p49). 
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showed that the collective labour rights in the EU Charter were subservient to the 
business freedoms. Individual rights on the other hand, are compatible with 
business freedoms.  When economic disaster loomed the ECJ and Commission 
revealed that they were prepared to sanction the dismantling of sectoral 
collective bargaining mechanisms. Although the EU has demonstrated the 
importance it places on the contribution of trade unions to the European project, 
in particular the ground breaking ‘social dialogue’ negotiation and 
implementation the ‘social’ rights, and another attempt at reconciling the rights 
and interests of labour and capital appears to be underway, the events of the last 
decade outlined in this chapter indicate that British workers would be ill advised 
to look to the EU for effective protection for freedom of association, either now 
or in the future. 
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Chapter Five: 
BENCHMARKING COLLECTIVE LABOUR RIGHTS  
I established in chapter one that the right to bargain collectively and the right to 
strike are the two inextricably linked essential elements of freedom of 
association.  817 
There we saw that the ILO constitution, and ILO Conventions 87 and 98, when 
read independently and when read together, provide the basis for the recognition 
of these interdependent rights in international law, and in UK law. They are the 
core of our labour law obligations, and through the interpretations placed upon 
their provisions by the CFA and CEACR, they provide the common standard for the 
protection of freedom of association in the UN Covenants, the Council of Europe 
rights instruments and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
 When the full freedom of association the two conventions demand is protected 
the implementation and enforcement of the economic and social rights which the 
less fundamental ILO Conventions seek to protect are, in broad terms, assured. 
Those economic and social rights particularly valued by trade unionists, like 
housing, education and the provision of social protections for the elderly and the 
vulnerable, which the European Social Charter and the UN Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights oblige states to guarantee, are also lent a 
measure of protection when the right to strike is exercisable beyond the bounds 
of a ‘trade dispute’.   
This is the essence of the 1946 ILO Constitution and, although more honoured in 
the breach than the observance, the provisions of the constitution (and we have 
seen that representatives from the UK exercised considerable influence over the 
drafting of the constitution) are a commitment to which the UK government 
remains bound. The adoption of Conventions 87 and 98 in 1948 and 1949, and 
the subsequent ratification by the UK, ‘fleshed out’ the detail, and the ‘fine 
                                               
817
In the context of modern UK industrial relations the right to organise is best considered an essential element of 
the right to bargain collectively. 
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tuning’ of interpretation and application has been a task undertaken by the 
CEACR and CFA during the past 60 odd years. 
Arguably, when these basic freedoms are respected, and collective bargaining 
facilitated, eventually all else will follow even without statutory minima in place – 
OSH, working time, equality protections and fair remuneration will be 
negotiated.818 However, when they are not sufficiently well protected industrial 
relations become unstable,819 and society itself becomes unstable.820 
 
 It is for that reason that I will examine first the extent to which the UK’s regional 
and international treaty obligations protect the fundamental rights with and the 
extent of current UK compliance with the standards demanded – whether the 
position is lawful or unlawful. 
  I consider first the protection of the freedom for workers to take industrial 
action – ‘the right to strike’ which secures the right to bargain collectively. Having 
established in previous chapters the nature of the right in the UK as a limited 
freedom, reliant upon the suspension of the common law by the statutory 
immunities, and augmented by regional and international treaty obligations, I will 
begin with a consideration the legality of procedural obstacles to industrial action 
– the ‘trips and hurdles’ first considered in chapter two. 
.1: PROCEDURAL OBSTACLES TO INDUSTRIAL ACTION 
Other than in sectors providing essential services, the only lawful restrictions on 
the right to strike are proportionate requirements for unions to ballot members 
on whether to take industrial action; to give an employer reasonable notice of any 
action duly sanctioned or to suspend industrial action for a reasonable period in 
                                               
818
 The basis of the case for voluntarism. 
819As the CFA  put it: “repeated recourse to statutory restrictions on collective bargaining could, in the long term, 
only prove harmful and destabilize labour relations, as it deprived workers of a fundamental right and a means of 
furthering and defending their economic and social interests” (ILO 2018 Compilation of Decisions of the Committee 
on Freedom of Association (‘2018 Compilation’), para 1422). 
820
See KD Ewing and John Hendy, ‘New Perspectives on Collective Labour Law: Trade Union Recognition and 
Collective Bargaining,’ (2017), 46 ILJ 1.  
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order to facilitate arbitration or conciliation, where effective mechanisms are 
available to the parties.  
The International Labour Organisation’s CEACR holds that 
‘procedural rules before launching a strike are admissible provided that 
they do not make the exercise of the right to strike impossible or very 
difficult in practice which would result in a very wide restriction of this right 
in fact.’821  
 
Whether presented as a ‘cooling off period,’ or as balloting or strike ‘notice’, 
periods during which action is suspended ‘should not be an additional obstacle to 
bargaining, with workers in practice simply waiting for its expiry in order to be 
able to exercise their right to strike.’822  
 
The UN CttESCR considers ‘that...[an] excessively lengthy procedure for declaring 
a strike legal constitutes a restriction on the right [to strike] provided for in article 
8(1)(d) of the Covenant.’823 
 
The ILO’s CFA places much emphasis on what is ‘reasonable’ in the 
circumstances.824Extended periods of strike notice are permissible where 
important public services, and essential services,825 are concerned, as long as they 
are proportionate. 20 days’ notice where ‘services of social or public interest’ 
were concerned,826 and a 40 day ‘cooling off’ period intended to provide the 
opportunity for an agreement to be reached  prior to a strike in an essential 
service,827 have both been deemed acceptable by the Committee. 
 
                                               
821
 1994 ILO General Survey on the Reports on Convention 87 and 98 by the CEACR [‘1994 General Survey’], para 
179.Whether lawful strike action is impossible for a week, a month or indefinitely, it will still be a breach of 
Convention No.87. 
822 1994 General Survey para 172. 
823 UN CttESCR Concluding Observations [‘CO’], Bolivia E/C.12/1/Add.60, 21 May 2001, para18. 
824Procedures ‘should be reasonable and...should not be so complicated as to make it practically impossible to 
declare a legal strike’ (2018 Compliation, paras 789, 790 and 793). 
825See below. 
826
 2018 Compilation para 801 citing the 2006 CFA Digest of Decisions, which in turn cites 309
th
 Report Case 
No.1912 (United Kingdom 1998) where the CFA held that the notice requirement for a ‘sit in’ at a power station 
was justified.  
8272018 Compilation para 802. 
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The principle of proportionality thus governs the legality of the restrictions, and 
while the suspension of a strike for ‘a reasonable period’ to facilitate voluntary 
conciliation and arbitration is a proportionate restriction, there must be effective 
mechanisms in place to facilitate such negotiation.828 A requirement for advance 
notice to be given to an employer before a strike takes place is, it should be 
noted, merely ‘acceptable’ to the Committee.829 ‘Secret and direct voting’ on the 
other hand, ‘is certainly a democratic process and cannot be criticised as such,’830 
the Committee holding that  ‘The only limitation on the rights set out in Article 3 
of Convention No.87 which might possibly be acceptable should aim solely at 
ensuring respect for democratic rules within the trade union movement.’831 
 
The UK procedures, however, are, as we have seen in chapter two, products of 
the neoliberal revolution, essentially intended to prevent industrial action, or to 
delay, and consequently blunt the effectiveness of any action taken. The unions 
have been deliberately mired in over complex regulation, and - the basic 
requirement for a strike ballot apart - the procedures have little to do with 
‘democratisation.’832 
 
 The restrictions unarguably go beyond that which is necessary to safeguard the 
rights of others, and by the restrained standards of international and regional 
treaty reporting and monitoring, there has been a barrage of condemnation from 
the various supervisory bodies. 
 
Although the trips and hurdles were the subject of one of the complaints 
presented to the European Court of Human Rights in RMT v UK [2014], the court 
avoided considering the matter by the application of newly adopted rules of 
procedure – a matter, it will be recalled, which was considered in chapter 3.  The 
Council of Europe’s ECSR has however been vocal in its condemnation of the UK 
                                               
828Ibid, paras 792, 794 and 798. 
829Ibid, para 799. 
830Ibid, para 572. 
831Ibid, para 676. This is a reference to internal administration/organisation rather than strike balloting, but it is a 
principle that might be employed by the government to justify the balloting thresholds. 
832  Proposals for strike ballots were set out by the government in Democracy in Trade Unions, 1983 (Cmnd.8778). 
It has been suggested that the original balloting requirement was intended to make workers think twice about 
engaging in secondary action (Collins, Ewing and McColgan, Labour Law, Texts and Materials, 2005, p897). On the 
‘simplifications’ of the balloting regime in 1999 and 2004 see B Simpson, ‘Code of Practice on Industrial Action 
Ballots and Notice to Employers 2000 (2001) 30 ILJ 194, and ‘Strike Ballots and the Law: Round Six: Code of 
Practice on Industrial Action Ballots and Notice to Employers 2005 (2005) 34 ILJ 331. 
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procedures, and in 2014 it referred to both the UK Court of Appeal case RMT v 
Serco [2011],833 as well RMT v UK to reiterate its 2010 conclusion that the notice 
periods required for ballots and strikes notice are ‘excessive,’ ‘imposing 
unrealistic burdens on unions and their officers,’ and consequently breach Article 
6(4) of the European Social Charter. 834 
The Committee had concluded in 1987 (reference period 1984-85)  that a 
requirement for secret strike ballots imposed by the Trade Union Act 1984 ‘does 
not adversely affect the exercise of the right to organise as provided for in Article 
5.’  In Conclusions XII-I 1991, however, the Committee asked the Major 
government for a detailed account of the narrowing of the immunities since 1980, 
and one of the matters of concern raised by the Committee was that ‘strikes are 
only lawful if they have been approved by a majority of workers, through a secret 
ballot, the legal provisions regarding which are highly complex and limiting. ’835 
 No satisfactory response was received. 
In 1995 the Committee greeted theTrade Union Reform and Employment Rights 
Act 1993 [TURERA] requirements for unions to provide employers with notice that 
a ballot is to be held (s18, inserting 226A  TULR(C)A 1992), notice of ballot result 
(s19, inserting 231A) and notice that industrial action is to be taken (s21, inserting 
234A) demanding what was effectively a list of union members in each 
establishment (234A(3)(a)) – as ‘a threat to freedom of association.’836 In 2004 
New Labour amended the legislation to remove the requirement for names, but 
what are now the section 226A Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) 
Act [ TULR(C) A] requirements for notice of a ballot remain in the view of the 
Committee ‘excessive.’837 As yet unresolved, the matter has become one the 
Committee’s pet subjects, and in Conclusions XX-3 2014 it reiterated its view ‘that 
the requirement to give notice to an employer of a ballot on industrial action is 
excessive, since in any case unions must issue an additional strike notice [234A 
TULR(C) A] before taking action.’ Indeed, it is arguable that strike notice should 
                                               
833See chapter 3. 
834Conclusions XX-3. This has been a regular theme of the Committee’s since 1991. In Conclusions XVI-1 (2003) the 
ECSR concluded that ‘the onerous procedural requirements and the serious consequences for unions where 
industrial action is found not to be lawful’ places the UK in breach of 6(4). 
835
Conclusions XII-I 1991. 
836
Conclusions XIII-3 1995, Article 5. 
837Conclusions XVI-I 2003, Article 5. 
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not be permitted to suspend industrial action at all, but be incorporated into a pre 
strike conciliation period, or post ballot ‘window’ when the result has been 
communicated to the employer, and arrangements being finalised between the 
workforce and the union.838 
 
In the Direct Request adopted by the CEACR in 2012, 839 the committee, while 
welcoming the new approach to the consideration of applications for labour 
injunctions which rely on minor procedural errors made by trade unions 
established in RMT v Serco [2011],840 referred to the danger of imposing 
‘unrealistic burdens on unions and their officers,’ and to TUC complaints that ‘the 
legislation continues to impose intolerable demands on trade unions.’ 
 
Nevertheless, the grip of procedural ‘blue tape’ has tightened since 2014.  
 
In a Direct Request in 2016 the CEACR noted, in the light of the long standing 
criticism of the UK procedures by the ESRC, that the proposal for 14 days’ strike 
notice, (previously 7 days) in the Bill that became the Trade Union Act 2016,841 
and the requirement for postal voting factors in further delays, imposing, 
according to the TUC, de facto strike notice of as much as 42 days.842The extended 
strike notice was explicitly allied to proposals to change the law to allow agencies 
to hire out strike breaking labour.843  The extension was presented solely, and 
unashamedly, as an initiative to help employers make preparations to mitigate 
the effects of a proposed strike.  
 
This was the context in which the Committee considered the restriction of the 
ballot mandate in the Act to six months (or nine months with the agreement of 
the employer), which means that in long running disputes, unions are now 
required to hold more than one ballot. This replaced the previous requirement for 
the industrial action proposed to commence within 4 weeks of the ballot (the 
period could be extended to 8 weeks with the agreement of the employer), after 
                                               
838The IER Manifesto for Labour Law (2016 & 2018) proposes a 3 day strike notice period. 
 839 On Convention No.87 - Published 102nd ILC session (2013). 
840See chapter 3. 
841S8 Trade Union Act 2016 , substituted ‘14th day before the starting date’ of the industrial action in s234A 
TULR(C)A 1992. 
842
Direct Request (CEACR) – adopted 2016, published 106
th
 ILC session (2017) C87. 
843
 The proposals were not included in the Bill.Prior to 8 June 2017 they remained ‘under consideration, although 
there is no prospect that the proposals will be implemented by the current minority Tory government. 
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which the union had an open ended mandate to continue with the action.844 
While the CFA has held that a legal requirement for a second ballot if the 
industrial action has not commenced 3 months after the initial ballot does not 
amount to an infringement of freedom of association,845 the new mandate 
provisions were held by the CEACR to be a breach of Article 3 of Convention 
No.87. Arguably they must also be considered breaches of Article 6(4) of the 
European Social Charter and Article 8 of the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. Workers must be permitted ‘to call a strike for an indefinite 
period if they so wish,’ and the CEACR expressed ‘its concern that the expiration 
of the ballot mandate coupled with the extensive notice requirements and the 
current context of a postal ballot’ are a breach of Convention No.87. The 
Committee indicates, however, that should electronic balloting be allowed then 
the necessity to refresh the mandate may be permissible. 846 
 
The wholly unconvincing pretence of union ‘democratision’ arguably unravelled   
as long ago as 1988 when s3 of the Employment Act (now s65 TULR(C)A 1992) 
withdrew the right of unions to discipline members who ignore ballots in favour 
of taking industrial action,847 and sections 10 (now incorporated into s222 
TULR(C)A 1992) and 11 of the Act made ‘post entry’ closed shop Union 
Membership Agreements  unworkable.848 With dismissal no longer a potential 
lawful consequence of non membership, much of the sting was taken out of 
expulsion.849 In 1990 the threat of exclusion was similarly neutralised when non 
membership could no longer be used as a lawful justification for the rejection of 
an applicant for a job.850 
 
                                               
844
A ‘trip’ provided by sections 7 and 8 of the Employment Act 1990.  
845
2018 Compilation para 814. 
846
Direct Request (CEACR) – adopted 2016, published 106
th
 ILC session (2017) C87. 
847
 The ILO held this to be a breach of Article 3 C87 in a 1989 Observation by the CEACR  published 76
th
 ILC session 
(1989) . 
848S 10 made industrial action to enforce membership unlawful and s11 made action by employers to enforce 
membership of employees actionable. 
849  What are now sections 174 – 177 TULR(C) A, further limiting the freedom of unions in this sphere, followed in 
1993. The 1988 Act (by section 1) attempted to add the appearance of democratisation by making the failure by a 
union to adhere to the balloting rules grounds for an application by a member entitled to vote in such a ballot to 
the High Court to ‘make such order as it considers appropriate’ to oblige the union to repudiate the industrial 
action in question. This appears to have been a response to the accusation that the requirement for strike ballots 
was intended to benefit employers rather than trade union members, and had the no doubt ideologically pleasing 
virtue of permitting individual union members to undermine and halt collective action.  No such applications were 
ever made, and s1 has been repealed. 
850Employment Act 1990, section 1.  
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The 1988 Act, which was the main concern of the ECSR in 1991, also required 
unions to ballot each individual workplace separately where members were 
employed at different establishments under the same employer, increasing the 
opportunity for solidarity to be undermined – a lesson very likely drawn from the 
effect the dissension of large numbers of Nottinghamshire miners had on the 
national strike of 1984-1985.851  While that provision can plausibly be justified as 
the promotion of democratic principles, the requirement for ballots to be 
conducted by post cannot. 
 
 Between 1984 and 1993 secret balloting could lawfully take place in the 
workplace, but the Major government, by s17 of TURERA 1993, obliged unions to 
use postal voting, which not only slows the process but ensures the lowest 
possible participation at the greatest expense to the union – it will be recalled 
that the 1993 Act also withdrew the balloting subsidies provided by the 
Employment Act 1980.  These, I would argue, are prima facie breaches of the 
obligations considered above, intended to undermine, rather than to bolster, 
trade union democracy, and they are a key element of the quorum and majority 
threshold package ultimately introduced to Parliament in the first year of the first 
Tory government [2015] since 1997.852 
 
______________________________________ 
 
We can then see that, with regard to the pre-strike procedures, the record of the 
UK is less a matter of non compliance with treaty standards, than one of active 
opposition to those standards. Since 1984 numerous procedural requirements 
have been imposed making it increasingly difficult for workers to take lawful 
industrial action and correspondingly easier for employers to find procedural 
irregularities on which to base applications for labour injunctions. The 
government has been found to be in breach of its international and regional 
treaty obligations on the following grounds: 
 
 The procedures are overly complex; 
 The requirement for ‘ballot notice’ is disproportionate;  
 The required period of strike notice is disproportionately long; 
                                               
851
 See Beckett and Hencke, Marching to the Fault Line, 2009, pp219-225. 
852
Unfinished Business is the title of Norman Tebbit’s 1991 memoir of the political events of 1979-1990, and many 
Tories saw their 2015 election victory as an opportunity to ‘finish the job’ of destroying the unions. 
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 Only postal voting is permitted; 
 
 Workers are obliged to re-ballot every six months to sanction lawful 
industrial action. 
 
The requirements for postal voting, ballot notice and strike notice are not 
unlawful per se, despite their arguably obvious adoption as devices to 
undermining the opportunity to take lawful strike action. However, taken 
together, and with the other lesser procedural hurdles, like the necessity to 
produce a copy of the ballot paper for the employer 3 days before the ballot, 
which  do not delay the industrial action, they compound the ‘chilling effect’ on 
the exercise of the right to strike created by the procedures as a whole.853   
 
2) Quorums and majorities 
 
A quorum of 50% or less is a lawful restriction on the right to strike. Although 
failure to reach such a quorum will invalidate a strike ballot, votes not cast must 
not be allowed to affect the result, and consequently the lawfulness of majority 
thresholds is questionable. It is certainly the case that any threshold must be 
pegged at less than 50%, and if, as is the case now in certain sectors in the UK,854 a 
majority threshold of 40% coupled with a quorum of 50% serves to make it ‘very 
difficult or impossible’ to secure a majority sufficient to sanction lawful industrial 
action then that threshold is unlawful, unless the sector concerned can be 
considered to provide an essential service. The current position of the ILO 
supervisory bodies on the matter is unclear, but it seems likely that states seeking 
to impose lawful restrictions on the right to strike in non essential services 
through the imposition of balloting thresholds are limited to choosing either a 
quorum of up to 50% or a majority threshold of 25% plus one vote. 
_______________________________ 
                                               
853 The term coined by Hayes, Novitz and Reed 2011, op cit, to characterise the inhibiting effect on industrial action 
of the Viking and Laval series of cases discussed in chapter four. 
854
 Section 3, Trade Union Act 2016. On the new procedures see R Dukes and N Kountouris, ‘Pre-strike Ballots, 
Picketing and Protest: Banning Industrial Action by the Back Door?’ (2016) 45 ILJ 337, pp 345-355. 
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As with the approach taken in relation to procedures in general by the ILO 
supervisory bodies the overarching question is whether lawful strike action is 
made ‘difficult’ in all the circumstances.855 
 
The ILO’s CFA holds that a quorum ‘may be considered acceptable.’856A quorum of 
two thirds would, however, appear in most circumstances to be unacceptable.857 
The CEACR considers that in general a quorum in excess of half of the workers 
involved is excessive, and two thirds “could restrict the right to strike in 
practice.”858 
 
 A Bulgarian requirement for a majority threshold of more than half of those 
eligible to vote has been held by the CFA to be ‘excessive as it could excessively 
hinder the possibility of carrying out a strike,’859 a restriction on the right to take 
industrial action considered to be compounded when large numbers of workers 
are to be balloted. 860  In that case the Committee requested the government “to 
take the necessary steps to amend this provision so that account is taken only of 
the votes cast.” In a Direct Request adopted by the CEACR in the same year the 
Committee of Experts held that states “should ensure that account is taken only 
of the votes cast and the required quorum and majority are fixed at a reasonable 
level.”861 
 
In 2000 the UNCttESCR expressed concern about an Egyptian law ‘denying 
workers the right to strike without the approval of two thirds of a trade union’s 
membership.’862 In 2003 it expressed similar views about the Russian Labour Code 
imposing ‘undue restrictions on the right to strike, by requiring a quorum of two 
                                               
855
See above and 2018 Compilation paras  789 & 790, On overall difficulty.as well as the imposition of pre-strike 
‘test balloting’ procedures  to allow employers to determine how likely it is that a strike will be sanctioned, see 
Direct Request (CEACR) C87 Adopted 1998 (Australia), published 87
th
 ILC session (1999). 
856
 2018 Compilation para 809.  
857
Ibid, para 810..  
8581994 ILO General Survey, para 147; 2018 Compilation paras  805-808. 
859 2018 Compilation paras   paras 806 - 808, based on Report No. 316, June 1999, Case No.1989 (Bulgaria), 
complaint date: 6 October 1998. para 190. The Bulgarian legislation required members and non members to be 
balloted. At para 806 the Compilation additionally cites 357th Report Case No.2968 [Australia 2010] para 225 and 
371st report Case No.2988 [Qatar 2014] para 850, instances where the CFA reminded the Governments that 
procedural requirements should be reasonable and not impose substantial limitations on industrial action and that 
a requirement that more than half of the workers involved must support the action is excessive. 
860
 The Trade Union Bill TUC Submission to the ILO Committee of Experts 2015 (paras 38 and 39) cited the CEACR 
Observations of 1998 and 2014 (Bulgaria), to argue that the proposed UK thresholds breached C87.  
861
Direct Request (CEACR) C87 Adopted 1998 (Australia), published 87
th
 ILC session (1999). 
862UN CttESCR: CO Egypt, E/C.12/1/Add.44 (23 May 2000), para 18. 
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thirds of the total number of workers and the agreement of at least half of the 
workers present at the meeting to call a strike,’ therefore requiring at least one 
third of the workforce to vote in support of a strike – imposing an effective 
majority threshold of one third plus one vote.863 
A Guatemalan requirement for 50% plus one of those (other than workers in 
‘positions of confidence or who represent the employer’) of all working in an 
enterprise to be in favour of any subsequent strike action prompted the CEACR in 
a 2002 observation to require the Government to amend the legislation to ensure 
that ‘only the votes cast...be counted in calculating the majority, and that the 
quorum...be set at a reasonable level.’864 
 
In 2016 the CEARC noted with approval that a new Bill submitted to the 
Guatemalan Congress had sought to replace ‘the requirement of a majority of all 
workers in the enterprise, with a requirement of the majority of the workers 
present at the assembly specially convoked for the strike ballot,’865 again 
indicating that abstentions should not be allowed to influence whether or not a 
majority can be permitted to sanction lawful industrial action. 
 
The CEACR has stated that although the imposition of a quorum and a 
requirement that voting be conducted by post are not in principle at variance with 
Convention 87  
 
‘the ballot method, the quorum and the majority required should not be 
such that the exercise of the right to strike becomes very difficult, or even 
impossible in practice...If a member State deems it appropriate to establish 
in its legislation provisions which require a vote by workers before a strike 
can be held, it should ensure that account is taken only of the votes cast 
and that the required quorum and majority are fixed at a reasonable 
level.’866 
 
                                               
863UN CttESCR: CO Russian Federation E/C.12/1/Add.94 (12 December 2003), para 21. 
864Observation (CEACR) on Convention 87 – adopted 2002, published 91st ILC session (2003), para 3. The 2012 
CEACR General Survey is muddled about this case and appears to mistakenly laud the requirement for a 50% plus 
one as a requirement for a simple majority, rather than as a majority threshold. 
865
And, incidentally, the elimination of the prohibition on solidarity strikes: ‘Legislative issues’ in Observation 
(CEACR) on Convention 87-adopted 2016, published 106
th
 ILC session (2017). 
866
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining. International Labour Conference 81
st
 Session 1994, General 
Survey on the Reports on Convention 87 and 98 by the CEACR, para 170. 
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In 2016 when considering the UK thresholds imposed by the Trade Union Act the 
Committee confirmed that it ‘has consistently considered that a quorum of 50% is 
indeed within such limits of reasonableness.’ 
 
A quorum of 50%, of course, imposes an effective majority threshold of 25% plus 
one vote of all those entitled to vote. Any threshold beyond this limit, is, I would 
argue, prima facie unreasonable, a disproportionate restriction on the right to 
strike, thresholds 
‘incompatible with the generally accepted principle that the public 
authorities should refrain from any interference which would restrict the 
right of workers’ organisations to organise their activities and to formulate 
their programmes, or which would impede the lawful exercise of this 
right.’867 
 
In the UK the Trade Union Act requires a quorum or ‘turn out’ of 50% of those 
entitled to vote, and in certain ‘important public services’  [IPS],868 where the 
majority is in favour of strike action  for that majority to comprise at least 40% of 
those entitled to vote for the strike to be lawful. To sanction a strike where 1,000 
workers are entitled to vote, 500 must ‘turn out.’  
 
In an IPS of those 500 voting workers 400 must vote in favour – an 80% majority. 
If 700 vote then there must be a 58% majority. Only if 800 vote (80% of those 
entitled to vote) will a simple majority suffice to sanction a strike. Clearly the 
balloting thresholds in an IPS restrict the right to strike more effectively than 
those in the Russian Federation, and can be said to be a clear breach of Article 8 
UNICESCR. However, if that IPS is an ‘essential service’ then, as is considered in 
the following section, the restriction on the right to strike is permissible providing 
satisfactory compensatory measures are set in place. 
 
Moreover, the cases cited above involved the consideration of workplace voting 
or balloting practices which encourage high levels of participation. In the UK 
where postal voting ensure low levels of voting the effect of the 40% majority 
threshold is to make in most circumstances a de facto majority requirement of in 
excess of 50% whenever there is a turn out of less than 80% (see above) so the 
                                               
867
 2018 Compilation para 739 – a reference, of course, to Article 3 C87. 
868
  The IPSs are listed rather than defined. For the detail on IPSs see the five sets of ‘Important Public Services 
Regulations 2017’: Border Security (No.136); Transport (No.135); Fire (No.134); Education (No.133) and Health 
(No.132). 
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CFA is likely to hold the IPS threshold a breach of the Article 3 obligations. They 
cannot be considered as being aimed ‘solely at ensuring respect for democratic 
rules within the trade union movement.’ Nor can they plausibly be said to be 
reasonable. 
 
 The Government claims that the primary intention behind the 40% threshold is to 
save the public inconvenience, and disingenuous as that claim almost certainly is, 
it is nevertheless an unequivocal admission that the requirements are not solely 
intended to promote trade union democracy but instead are intended to make 
lawful strike action difficult or impossible.  
 
Crucially, votes not cast should not influence the outcome of the ballot, and the 
thresholds also effectively make votes that are not cast ‘no’ votes, contrary to the 
ILO supervisory bodies’ interpretation of the application of Convention No.87 to 
balloting procedures cited above.  
 
One often forgotten – if obvious - aspect of trade union democracy is that those 
who do not wish to go on strike can and will vote not to go on strike. In binary 
yes/no ballots votes that are not cast should not be allowed to influence the 
decision. Moreover in the UK unions are not permitted either to expel or 
discipline members who ignore a democratic vote and refuse to take industrial 
action.869 As a consequence a UK strike ballot now determines only whether the 
action proposed is lawful or unlawful, and the quorum and majority threshold 
arguably therefore serve only to restrict the right to strike and thus be said to be 
only loosely related to trade union democracy. When the trips and hurdles are 
surmounted, whether the industrial action takes place at all, and the effectiveness 
of that action, depends on the inclination of the members, and, of course, the 
inclination of workers who do not belong to the union,870 not specifically on the 
result of the ballot. 
On the question of whether the exercise of the right to strike has become difficult 
or impossible, recent research has shown that a very substantial proportion of the 
                                               
869
Of course, even if they were since the effective end of the post entry closed shop in 1988 dismissal for non 
membership of a trade union is a prima facie case of automatic unfair dismissal. 
870
 Who arguably will generally, almost invariably, if not subject to employer interference, walk out with their 
colleagues. 
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strikes that have taken place in recent years would not have received lawful 
sanction had the thresholds then been in place.871 
 
Practical experience is as yet comparatively slight - the relevant regulations came 
into force on 1 March 2017 - but it does appear that the thresholds will make 
strike action very difficult, if not quite impossible. 
 
 An analysis of ballots and industrial action undertaken since that date by Gregor 
Gall of Bradford University, suggested that the picture likely to emerge is that 
fewer strike ballots are being held, and that unions are testing the likely outcome 
with unofficial ballots before deciding to commit to an official ballot. Full voting 
figures had been released on only thirteen ballots. Nine ballots resulted in 
support for industrial action with the thresholds satisfied,872 while the other four 
saw similar large majorities in favour of industrial action where ‘turn outs’ short 
of the 50% ensured that despite the democratic mandates for action, any 
subsequent strikes will be unlawful.873 
None of these ballots related to essential services, although six were called by the 
RMT and two by the NUT ballots in support of action in the rail transport and child 
education sectors. Nevertheless, rail workers, and head teachers and teachers at 
public sector schools (see the IPS Regulations 2017 above) are deemed to provide 
Important Public Services, and the combined 50%/40% thresholds applied.874  
Levels of participation are known to be closely related to the method of voting, so 
the decision to retain the compulsory postal voting system, and not to permit the 
electronic voting methods which are known to secure better levels of 
participation,875 further discredits the government’s claim to be promoting trade 
union democracy.    
 
                                               
871R. Darlington and J. Dobson, The Conservative Government’s Proposed Strike Ballot Thresholds: The Challenge to 
the Trade Unions, (Liverpool, IER, 2015). 
872Three RMT ballots, three UNITE, two NUT and one EIS FELA (Scottish Further Education Lecturers). 
873Three RMT ballots, and one UNISON ballot. One of the RMT ballots saw a call for a strike defeated 48%/52% 
while the proposal for action short of a strike received 65% support. A ‘turn out’ of 48% undermined the result. 
874Three of the RMT ballots fell foul at the first hurdle, with a 48% turn out on two occasions and 34% on the third, 
although the overwhelming majority voted to take industrial action in each ballot. The NUT ballots, and the other 
RMT ballots fulfilled both the quorum and the majority threshold. 
875
See ‘The government should let union members choose how they vote’ by The Electoral Reform Society 
(www.electoral-reform.org.uk). 
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KD Ewing has suggested that the 40% threshold could be considered 
‘reasonable,’876 within the meaning of the ILO jurisprudence, if electronic voting 
was introduced, and therefore compatible with Convention No.87.877 The ILO 
Conference Committee has requested the UK government to review voting 
methods with the social partners in the light of the quorum and the thresholds, 
indicating that Ewing might well be right.878 In the relevant Observation the 
CEACR noted ‘that these changes come within a cumulated content of heavy 
procedural requirements, including the fact that balloting must be by postal 
voting only and that secret work place voting and electronic voting is not 
allowed.’ This may indicate that a change of heart by the government on balloting 
procedures might prompt the Committee to take a more relaxed view of the 
thresholds. However, I would argue that the ILO jurisprudence is emphatic 
enough about not allowing abstentions to influence the result of a ballot,and the 
CEACR has requested ‘the government to review this matter with the social 
partners concerned with a view to modifying the Bill so as to ensure that the 
heightened requirement of support of 40% of all workers does not apply to 
education and transport services,’879 and since the Act has been passed has 
requested the UK Government ‘take the necessary measures’ to that end.880 
 
The 50% quorum, the maximum permissible, combined with the 40% majority 
threshold can thus be said to be lawful only in respect of strike ballots called by 
workers in essential services. Even with electronic voting, in non- essential sectors 
the effective requirement for at least 80% of those voting to vote in favour of 
industrial action could still be said to be excessive –  difficult to achieve in practice 
and consequently unreasonable. Moreover, it could be argued that requiring a 
majority threshold to be surmounted when a quorum has been met is always 
                                               
876
  In the sense that lawful industrial action would no longer ‘difficult,’ or ‘impossible.’ Len McCluskey is on record 
as having stated that UNITE would be ‘comfortable’ with the new thresholds if electronic voting is permitted (Pete 
Glover, Marxist World, ‘Electronic Voting in the Trade Unions’, issue 1, April 2016). Glover cited the words used by 
McCluskey in an ‘offer’ to David Cameron over the provisions of the TU Bill (The Guardian October 2015). It would 
be inaccurate to suggest that McCluskey would drop his opposition the imposition of the quorum and the 
threshold if electronic voting was permitted. 
877
On the confusion of the ILO jurisprudence and the question of what is reasonable in the light of voting 
procedures see KD Ewing’s response to questions from Rishi Sunak MP Cons. Richmond, Yorks, Col 128 Public Bill 
Committee Trade Union Bill, 15 October 2015. 
878ILO 105th Session Geneva 2016 Committee on the Application of Standards at the Conference, Part I, Convention 
87 Individual cases, 22 [p87]. 
879Observation (CEACR) C87 adopted 2015, published 105th ILC session (2016). 
880
Observation (CEACR) – adopted 2016, published 106
th
 ILC session (2017) C87: ‘Follow up to the conclusions of 
the Committee on the Application of Standards (International Labour Conference, 105th Session, May – June 2016)’ 
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unreasonable, unless the majority threshold permits a simple majority to sanction 
a vote in favour of action – in which case the threshold is irrelevant. To go beyond 
that would be to allow votes not cast to affect the result. Of course, if sufficient 
numbers of those entitled to vote choose not to vote, then the quorum will not 
be met, and the ballot will be invalid. There is, however, no question that a 50% 
quorum is within the principles of freedom of association, and the rule that 
abstentions should not affect the result relates only to the use of majority 
thresholds. 
________________________ 
 
We can, therefore, draw the following conclusions: 
 
 The Trade Union Act’s 40% majority threshold which allows abstentions to 
affect the result of the ballot, and in practice makes lawful industrial action 
difficult to achieve in non essential services, is a breach of Convention 
No.87. 
 
 In the event of electronic or workplace balloting becoming permissible in 
the UK then, although it may no longer be considered difficult or impossible 
to take industrial action in ‘important public services’, the ILO jurisprudence 
indicates that a majority threshold pegged at a level which permits 
abstentions to affect the outcome of any ballot, should be held by the ILO 
supervisory bodies to breach Convention No.87. With the 50% quorum 
requirement in place the effect is to make the application of the majority 
threshold either unlawful or redundant.  
 
 The 40% majority threshold is lawful only in respect of strike ballots called 
by workers in essential services, and only then if compensatory 
mechanisms are set in place. 
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4) ESSENTIAL SERVICES 
 
These are defined by the ILO as: ‘services whose interruption would endanger the 
life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population.’881 The police 
and the armed forces are the archetypal essential services, and they may lawfully 
be denied the right to organise. Public servants providing essential services, 
whether employed by the state or otherwise, may not be denied the right to 
organise, but can be denied the right to bargain collectively and the right to strike. 
Other workers may be denied the right to bargain collectively and to strike during 
periods of acute national emergency. In all cases appropriate compensatory 
mechanisms must be provided. In non-essential, but nevertheless important 
public services, the right to strike may be restricted to the extent that a minimum 
service can be lawfully demanded, although this must not be such as to 
disproportionately blunt the effectiveness of the strike weapon. Longer periods of 
strike notice to permit arbitration and conciliation are similarly permissible in 
such circumstances. 
______________________________________ 
Convention 87 Article 9, ILO Constitution Article 19(8), and Convention 98 Article 
5, permit states to prohibit the police and armed forces from organizing, 
bargaining collectively and taking strike action. This license extends to civilians 
employed in similarly ‘essential’ roles in the civil service and public sector – and 
occasionally in private firms operating in the public sector. Hence: 
CFA 2006 Digest of Decisions (para 572):   
 
‘Recognition of the principle of freedom of association in the case of public 
servants does not necessarily imply the right to strike’; 
 
Convention No.98 on the right to organise and bargain collectively: 
‘This Convention does not deal with the position of public servants engaged 
in the administration of the State...’ (Article 6); 
                                               
881 2006 Digest, para 583. 
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CFA on Convention No.151 on collective bargaining in public services:  
‘All public service workers other than those engaged in the administration 
of the state should enjoy collective bargaining rights.’882 
 
Compulsory arbitration and regular reviews of terms and conditions are required 
where collective bargaining and strike action has been restricted;883 all affected 
must be compensated for by efficient and impartial mechanisms for the 
resolution of complaints and disputes.884 Where such procedures are adopted 
then, if the parties are required to pay for those services, then those ‘costs must 
be reasonable’ they must ‘not inhibit the ability of the parties, in particular those 
with inadequate resources, to make use of the services.’885 
 
 Questions of ‘mediation’ versus conciliation do not trouble the CFA as long as the 
body concerned is impartial.886Where strikes are totally prohibited the CFA states 
that conciliation and arbitration procedures are not appropriate.887 Regular 
statutory reviews of terms and conditions, and the use of comparator trades and 
professions would appear to be the appropriate approach. 
 
In this context Wedderburn commented that ‘The definition of ‘emergency’ is as 
much a political decision as anything else,’888 and the range of services deemed to 
be essential by a state requires careful monitoring. 
 
Industries and Services deemed to be essential by the CFA:889 Hospitals; electricity 
and water supply; telephone services; police and armed forces; fire brigade; 
prison service; school canteen workers and cleaners;890 air traffic control. In the 
                                               
882
 2018 Compilation para 886, emphasis added. 
883
 1994 General Survey para 258. See 2018 Compilation paras   816 & 818. Para 817 cites 374
th
 Case No.3084: 
‘compulsory arbitration is acceptable in cases of acute national crisis.’ 
884 See 2018 Compilation para 768  in relation to a prohibition of strikes where a collective agreement is in force. in 
relation to compensatory mechanisms for the public servants and essential services, paras 827 & 853. ‘Adequate, 
impartial and speedy’ and ‘independent ‘(paras 856 & 859); ‘provision of joint conciliation procedures and where, 
and only where, conciliation fails, the provision of joint arbitration machinery’ (para 860). 
8852018 Compilation para 862.. 
886Ibid, para 863. 
887Ibid,para 861. 
888
KW Wedderburn, ‘Labour Law and Labour Relations in Britain’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 1972, p274. 
889
2018 Compilation para 840.. 
890
The CFA consider that children should attend school during teachers’ strikes (supervised by a minimum service 
provision) and expect a square meal be provided, and a clean environment maintained. 
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latter case any disruptive industrial action at all is, with good reason, regarded as 
a danger to life. 
Industries and services that have been deemed by the CFA not to be essential 
services ‘in the strict sense of the term’ – effectively considered by the Committee 
to be merely important public services:891 
Radio and TV; the ‘petroleum sector’ and the production transport and 
distribution of fuel;892 ports; banking; computing services for state tax services; 
‘metal and mining sectors’;893 ‘transport generally’; aircraft pilots; post office;894 
refuse collection; refrigeration; hotels; construction; agriculture; food supply and 
distribution; government printing services and education.895 
A useful example is Case No.3107, a complaint against the government of Canada 
brought before the CFA by the Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU), Local 113,896 
last reported on in March 2016. The Toronto bus and road passenger services (the 
Toronto Transit Commission) had been classified as ‘essential services’ after 
‘decades of hard bargaining by the ATU to improve protection and working 
conditions for its members. 897 The Committee stated that:  
‘the transport of passengers and commercial goods is not an essential 
service in the strict sense of the term; however...a minimum service in the 
                                               
8912018 Compilation para 842.Also included in this category by the CFA were department stores; ‘pleasure parks’; 
state alcohol, salt and tobacco monopolies; car manufacture and mineral water bottling. While these were 
justifiably seen not to be essential services their inclusion is not helpful to an illustration of the distinction between 
what is essential and what are merely important industries and services. It is extraordinary that these services (the 
salt and water bottling aside) were even discussed in the context of essential services. 
892
The energy sector is considered non essential by CESCR CO Bulgaria, E/C.12/Add.37 (8 December 1999), para10. 
893
The UN CttESCR concur:  CO Zambia, E/C.12/1/Add.106 (23 June 2005), para 20. 
894The UN CttESCR concur: CO Bulgaria E/C.12/Add.37 (8 December 1999), para 16. 
895Although ‘.principals and vice principals can have their right to strike prohibited’ (2006) para 588. 
896ILO. Governing Body 326th Session, Geneva, 10-24 March 2016 [GB.326/INS/12] 377th Report of the Committee 
of Freedom of Association paras 215-244. 
897 Ibid, paras 218-19. However see ILO. Governing Body 328th Session, Geneva, 23 November – 10 December 2016 
[GB.32/INS/14] 380th Report of the Committee of Freedom of Association paras 18-26. Case No.2654 (Canada) 
relating to Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan [2015] 1 SCR 245. Following the decision of the 
Canadian Supreme Court the statutory definition of essential services in the State legislation was dispensed with 
on grounds that it breached the right to strike protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In future 
the social partners will negotiate and between them to decide which services are to be deemed essential and what 
amounts to a minimal service. Disputes will be resolved at a special tribunal. 
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event of a strike can be justified...a substantial restriction or total 
prohibition of strike action would not appear to be justified...’898 
The prospect of economic damage was the impetus for the action taken by the 
Canadian government, and the union drew the attention of the Committee to the 
right to strike in the ILO jurisprudence,899 and to the established rule that the 
economic damage caused by the interruption of a service is not relevant to the 
question of whether a service is deemed to be essential.900 
Teaching is not an essential service either. As the CFA has stated: 
‘the right to strike can only be restricted and even prohibited in the public 
service...or in the essential services in the strict sense of the term... the 
Committee considers that workers in education are not covered by the 
definition of essential services or of the public service exercising the powers 
of public authority.’901   
 
The CEACR has held that teachers are not public servants ‘exercising authority in 
the name of the State,’ thus denying governments the opportunity to argue that 
the exceptions in C98 and C151 permitting certain public servants to be denied 
the right to bargain collectively.902 The Canadian government has attempted to 
justify its failure to ratify C98 to the UN CttESCR on the grounds that it would 
oblige some Canadian states to permit those engaged in providing essential 
services the right to strike.903 The Committee was unimpressed, and noting ‘that 
some categories of workers, such as public servants and employees of crown 
                                               
898
  Ibid, para 240. The Committee referred to the 2006 Digest paras 522,576,587,607 (2018 Compilation paras 
753,826,842,867 and 893 ).See also 199 General Survey, paras 152- 164. 
899
  The right to strike is ‘an intrinsic corollary to the right to organise protected by Convention 87’: Case No.1954, 
para 405 [cited in para 230 of Case No.3107] 
900
Case No. 1963, para.230; para 230 of Case No.3107. See also 2006 digest para 592. 
901CFA 272nd Report, Case No.1503 [Peru 1990] paras 116-117, cited in 277th Report, Case No.1528 [Germany 1991] 
para 285, which refers to the 1985 Digest and the cases cited therein, and points out that ‘this approach is 
consistent with other instruments adopted on the international level on the issue, in particular clause 84 of the 
ILO/UNESCO Recommendation concerning the Status of Teachers of 1966’ [para 286]. However, para 844 of the 
2018 Compilation states that although education is not an essential sector, the CFA ‘has held that principals and 
vice-principals can have their right to strike restricted or even prohibited.’ 
902 The Committee cited para 130 1994 General Survey, and the CEACR Observation of 2010.  
903
UN CttESCR: Canada Reply to IssuesE/C.12/CAN/Q/5/Add.1 (27 April 2006), para 1. The Canadian government 
suggested that although denied the right to strike these workers were free to engage in collective bargaining: 
‘while entitled to engage in collective bargaining on a voluntary basis,[they] are excluded from industrial relations 
legislation.’ 
255 
 
corporations, public school teachers and college and university professors are 
excluded from the right to strike in Canada,’ it found that ‘the explanation 
provided by the State party that these workers provide essential services, is not 
satisfactory under articles 4 and 8 of the Covenant.’ 904 
 
The perceived opportunity to withhold the key elements of freedom of 
association from teachers and civil servants presented by the ILO ‘administration 
of the state’ lacuna has been grasped by numbers of states.  In 2001 the UN 
CttESCR interceded on behalf of South Korean teachers, ‘concerned that they are 
still prevented from participating in collective bargaining and in strikes,’905 and in 
2009 expressed concern about the ban on unions and strikes in universities,906 
and the Committee has condemned disproportionate bans on civil service strikes 
on a number of occasions.907 In 2001 the UN CttESCR told the Japanese 
government that it ‘strongly urges’ it to repeal and narrow bans on right to strike, 
and to limit the prohibition of strikes in the civil service ‘to those responsible for 
keeping order,’ drawing a distinction between those who keep order and those 
whose absence may be expensive and inconvenient but not actually 
dangerous,908recommending ‘in line with the ILO, that the State party ensure the 
right of civil servants and public employees not working in essential services to 
organise strikes.’909 In 2009 it told the South Korean government that it 
‘recommends...lifting the restrictions imposed on the right of civil servants to join 
a trade union and to strike in conformity with the comments made by the [ILO] 
Committee of Experts’ in 2001.910 
 
Although ostensibly following the lead of the ILO the UN CttESCR have arguably 
contradicted the ILO to extent by finding ‘health services’ to be non essential,911 
and ‘communications’ non essential,912although it seems likely that if called upon 
                                               
904 UN CttESCR:  CO Canada E/C.12/CAN-CO/4-5, 22 May 2006, para 19. 
905UN CttESCR: CO Republic of Korea E/C.12/1/Add.59, 21 May 2001, para 19. 
906UN CttESCR:  CO Republic of Korea E/C.12/KOR/CO/3, 17 December 2009, para 19. 
907 UN CttESCR: CO Benin E/C.12/1/Add.78, 5 June 2002, para 35. 
908UN CttESCR:  CO Japan E/C.12/1/Add.67, 24 September 2001, para 21. 
909Ibid,para 48. The Committee has also expressed its dissatisfaction with the restrictions on the right to strike in 
the Indian civil service, a matter similarly related to uncertain distinctions between essential services and 
important services: India Concluding Observations E/C.12/IND/CO/5 (8 August 2008), para 23. 
910
UN CttESCR CO Republic of Korea E/C.12/KOR/CO/3 , 17 December 2009,, para 19. 
911
 UN CttESCR CO Bulgaria E/C.12/Add.37,  8 December 1999, para 16. 
912 UN CttESCR CO Zambia E/C.12/1/Add.106, 23 June 2005, para 20. 
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to consider telephone services specifically the Committee would concur with the 
CFA.  
More puzzlingly the UN CttESCR also consider the fire brigade to be a non 
essential service: In addition to general restrictions on right to strike in Zambia 
‘and in particular, the procedural requirements which make it difficult to 
effectively exercise the right to strike,’ the Committee expressed equal concern 
about ‘the broad definition of the concept of ‘essential services’ which exceeds 
the ILO definition by including fire fighting, sewerage and certain mining 
operations.’913  In 2004 the Committee found Chilean legislation to be similarly 
‘too broadly defined.’914 The Committee has drawn attention to the need for 
states to be specific about the sectors considered to provide essential services, 
and in 2008 expressed concern about arrangements in India, and ‘the complete 
ban on strikes under the Essential Services Maintenance Act which does not 
prescribe an official list of the essential services that falls under its purview.’915 
 
As for the UK, the Committee has confined itself to recommending ‘that the State 
part undertake a thorough review of the new trade union act 2016 and take all 
necessary measures to ensure that, in line with its obligations under article 8 of 
the Covenant, all workers enjoy their trade union rights without undue 
restrictions or interference.’916Useful British examples to illustrate the delineation 
of essential services are prison officers and those employed by HMRC. Only prison 
officers (some employed by private security firms), and certain customs officers, 
are prohibited from taking strike action. All in HMRC are engaged in the 
‘administration of the state’ but only those engaged in certain roles in border 
control can be said to provide essential services. The crucial difference is that 
prison officers and border security are said to ‘keep order,’ a distinction the UK 
Prison Officers’ Association learnt when they took a case to the CFA in 2004.917  
                                               
913Ibid. 
914UN CttESCR  CO Chile E/C.12/1/Add.105, 1 December 2004,para 19. 
915UN CttESCR  CO India E/C.12/IND/CO/5, 8 August 2008, para 23. 
916
  UN CttESHR: CO United KingdomE/C.12/GBR/CO/6 14 July 2016, para 39. 
917
CFA case No.2383 (United Kingdom) – complaint date 20 August 2004, Effect given to the recommendations of 
the Committee and the Governing body – Report No.38, November 2005, see para 314. The Committee however 
requested that the government establish the appropriate mechanisms in the private sector to compensate for the 
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The government may legitimately choose not to engage in collective bargaining 
with these workers, although they must be permitted to organize, their collective 
voice must be heard, and compensatory arrangements must be set in place.918 
The ILO also distinguishes between essential and merely important services and 
industries where minimum service provisions are required. Minimum staff levels – 
possibly full staffing and a complete prohibition on strike action - will be required 
in the first category. In the latter category certain ‘necessary staff’ may be obliged 
to remain at work when a strike is in progress. 919 In some industries the 
necessary staff would be required from the outset, in others, only if the strike was 
prolonged.  The CFA acknowledges that a strike in a non essential service may if it 
goes on long enough be legitimately seen as a strike in an essential service,920 
with refuse collection being the obvious example.921 
 The unions should, according to the CFA, help define ‘necessary staff,’ and 
arrange such cover with employers and governments. Strikes cannot, however, be 
allowed to become ineffective through the imposition of ‘over generous’ 
minimum staffing.922 In some industries it has been accepted by the CFA that, 
questions of the importance of service or industry aside, during a strike ‘staff 
necessary for the safety of machinery and equipment and the prevention of 
accidents’ might be obliged to remain at work.923 
Failure to co-operate in providing a minimum service cannot justify a court 
deciding ‘to suspend or revoke a trade union’s legal status.’924 The CFA has held 
                                                                                                                                                       
limitation on the right to strike, and improve the current mechanisms overseen by the Prison Service Pay Review 
Body. Awards should be binding and the government should ensure that the Body is seen to be impartial and 
independent (ibid). In Report No.359, March 2011 the CFA ‘noted with regret that little progress had been made’ 
on implementing its recommendations (para 159). 
918 See also CEACR 1994 General Survey, Para 127. 
919 2018 Compilation paras  865-870. Concerns raised with the CESCR about health workers and nurses being 
denied the right to strike were assuaged when it was explained that the restrictions on their right to strike were 
only a requirement for a minimum service to be provided during periods of industrial action (UN CttESCR: Reply to 
Issues E/C.12/CAN/Q/5/Add.1 27 April 2006 para 8). 
920 2018 Compilation para 837.. 
921Ibid, Para 847.. 
922
Ibid, paras 866-883. Disputes over such matters to be resolved by an independent body, a definitive ruling to be 
obtained through a judicial hearing (paras 884 and 885). 
923
Ibid, para 865. 
924 Ibid, para 905. 
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that ‘measures taken by the authorities to ensure the performance of essential 
services should not be out of proportion to the ends pursued or lead to excess.’925 
 
A requirement for a minimum service provision has been considered justified by 
the CFA in cases concerning underground railways, over ground railways, ferries 
to island communities, postal services, banking, the mint, the petroleum industry, 
refuse collection, education, and road haulage. 926 However, while strikes in these 
sectors ‘might disturb the normal life of the community.’ the CFA concedes that 
they could not be said to ‘cause a state of acute national emergency’ obliging the 
state to send in the army, recruit replacement staff or prohibit workers in those 
sectors from striking to defend their ‘occupational and economic interests.’927 In 
truly essential sectors a state might be justified in taking such steps.928 
The use of the armed forces, or ‘another group of persons’, as substitutes can 
only be justified for “the operation of services or industries whose suspension 
would lead to an acute crisis.”929 The UN CttESCR in 2004 noted ‘with concern’ 
that the Chilean Labour Code ‘provides for the possibility of the replacement of 
striking workers.’930 
_______________________________________ 
We can conclude then, that while workers in the non essential services listed as 
‘important public services’ by the Trade Union Act 2016 may be subject to 
minimum service requirements, and to extended strike notice,931 they cannot 
lawfully have their right to strike restricted by the majority threshold, and 
therefore: 
                                               
925Ibid,para 967. 
926Ibid, paras 886-905. 
927Ibid, para 923 & 924 
928
Ibid, para 926. 
929
Ibid, para 922. 
930
 UN CttESCR: CO Chile E/C.12/1Add.105, 1 December 2004,para 19. 
931See section 1, p3. 
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 The Act must be amended to define and list essential services subject to the 
threshold in accord with its treaty obligations and exclude the education 
and transport sectors.932 
 Suitable mechanisms must be introduced to compensate for the restriction 
on the right to strike in the essential sectors where the thresholds apply  – 
tripartite Wage Council style bodies, regularly reviewing terms and 
conditions of employment and determining the outcome of disputes. 
4) Secondary action & political strikes  
 
The opportunity for workers to take secondary, sympathy or solidarity industrial 
action in the pursuance or furtherance of objectives beyond the improvement of 
their own immediate terms and conditions of employment should be guaranteed 
by states.  This embraces action taken by workers not in dispute with their 
immediate employer in support of workers engaged in industrial disputes 
elsewhere, and actions intended to impress upon governments and employers 
the economic and social priorities of workers - which would include civil rights 
protests. Industrial action ‘of a purely political character,’ however, falls outside 
of the ILO principles of freedom of association, and the ambit of regional and 
international economic and social rights instruments, and past form suggests that 
it is unlikely that any state prohibiting political strikes would be found to have 
breached the European Convention of Human Rights, or the UN International 
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. 
________________________________________ 
 
The CEACR and the CFA, have long held that where sympathy strikes are 
concerned ‘workers should be able to take such action, provided the initial strike 
they are supporting is lawful.’933 In regard to the UK the CFA and CEACR has for 
years held the prohibition on secondary action in sections 223 and 224 of 
TULR(C)A to breach C87,934  and the government has long been required ‘to take 
                                               
932 See n. 866 on p247 above for the regulations which currently list ‘IPS’s where workers are bound by the 
thresholds.  
933
 1994, General Survey, para 168. 
934Most recently in Observation (CEACR) – adopted 2012, published 102nd ILC session (2013).  
260 
 
the necessary measures to ensure that secondary action and socio economic 
protest action are not prohibited.’935 
 
Nevertheless the CEACR ‘has always considered that strikes that are purely 
political in character do not fall within the scope of freedom of association.’936 In 
accord with Hepple and Kahn-Freund’s perceptive 1972 analysis of the UK 
position,937the Committee does, however, allow that 
 
‘it is often impossible to distinguish in practice between the political and 
occupational aspects of a strike.’938 
 
 Outside of the public sector, all specifically political action will almost invariably 
take the form of secondary industrial action, while in the public sector action that 
is politically motivated is almost impossible to distinguish from that which is 
occupational. 
 
We saw in chapter two that between 1980 and 1990 the law was changed to 
prohibit sympathy strikes and ‘blacking.’ In 1980 the government restricted such 
action to the immediate customers and suppliers of the employer with which the 
workers were in dispute. The 1982 Employment Act made much secondary action 
unlawful by narrowing the definition of a trade dispute to cover only a dispute 
between workers and their immediate employer, and limiting lawful industrial 
action to that which is undertaken ‘wholly or mainly in relation’ to a trade dispute 
rather than the previous less specific requirement that the action be merely ‘in 
connection’ with a trade dispute. In 1989 the CEACR noted that: 
 
‘Taken together, these changes appear to make it virtually impossible for 
workers and unions lawfully to engage in any form of boycott activity, or 
‘sympathetic’ action against parties not directly involved in a given 
dispute.’939 
 
 In 1990 all secondary and solidarity action was unequivocally prohibited. 
                                               
935‘Effect given to the recommendations of the committee and Governing Body’ – Report No. 349, March 2008, 
Case No.2472 (United Kingdom) – Complaint Date: 16 December 2005. The case related to the law of Jersey, but is, 
of course, just as applicable to the situation in Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
936
 1994, General Survey, para 165. 
937
Chapter 3. 
938
Ibid. 
939Observation (CEACR) – adopted 1989, published 76th ILC session (1989). 
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The CFA anticipates that workers should be able to use strike action to seek 
‘solutions to economic and social policy questions and problems facing the 
undertaking which are of direct concern to the workers.’940 So, while the ‘day of 
action’ against the policies of the first Thatcher administration in the Express 
Newspapers case could certainly be said to be protected by the principles of 
freedom of association,941 a consideration of the BBC case by the CFA would turn 
on whether the apartheid policy in South Africa could be said to be of ‘direct 
concern’ to the technicians.942 
Secondary action is of colossal importance in combating the worst excesses of 
globalization. As Wedderburn observed in 1972 as the US multinationals started 
to have a serious impact;  
 
‘the flexible power of the multinational employer makes it less than ever 
appropriate for national systems of labour law to curtail ‘solidarity’ or 
‘sympathy strikes and similar industrial action by unions with interests that 
spread with the movement of capital across frontiers…’943 
 
The waters here have been muddied somewhat by the fact that the CFA has held 
that laws against boycotts (boycotts or blackings, like political strikes in the 
private sector, are almost inevitably instances of secondary action) cannot be 
seen as restrictions of trade union freedom. 
 Strikes in protest at the outcome of cases brought to determine the legality of 
such actions also fall outside of the protection afforded freedom of association by 
                                               
940
 2018 Compilation para 578. See also General strikes or strikes relating to socio-economic issues and 
restrictions on civil service strikes – Definitive Report – Report No.378, June 2016 Case No.3111( Poland) – 
Complaint date: 14 January 2015. 
941See 2018 Compilation paras  780 and 781 for the explicit sanction of a 24 hour general strike intended to 
persuade a government to adopt policies to raise the minimum wage, decrease prices and reduce unemployment. 
9422018 Compilation paras  761: “strikes of a purely political nature and strikes decided systematically long before 
negotiations take place do not fall within the scope of the principles of freedom of association” and para 762: 
“...trade unions should be able to have recourse to protest strikes, in particular where aimed at criticising a 
government’s economic and social policies.” 
943Wedderburn, ‘Labour Law and Labour Relations in Britain’, 1972,op cit, p289. 
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the CFA,944 for while protest strikes against certain laws are protected by the ILO 
jurisprudence, those aimed at judicial decisions, or the judiciary, are not. So 
protest strikes against judicial activism, decisions like Rookes v Barnard,945would 
not fall to be protected - the prohibition of such strikes would not breach the ILO 
principles of free association. Arguably, this stance is itself a political ‘trade off’ or 
quid pro quo: 
 Trade unions ‘without prejudice to the freedom of opinion of their 
members...should limit the field of their activities to the occupational and 
trade union fields; the government, on the other hand, should refrain from 
interfering in the functioning of trade unions.’946   
Unions are expected to confine themselves to economic and social matters of 
direct concern to their members as workers, and governments should not 
intervene in a union’s legitimate activity because of an objection to its political 
affiliation.947 
The CFA does not sanction laws or other measures brought to bear against wholly 
political strikes or activities – it merely considers them to beyond its brief: 
‘Political matters which do not impair the exercise of freedom of 
association are outside the competence of the Committee.’948 
However, much as Hepple and Kahn-Freund saw UK voluntarism permitting in 
many circumstances strikes which elsewhere would have been considered wholly 
political and unlawful, the CFA appears to allow that an occupational element in 
what might otherwise be seen as a political action will be likely to make any 
attempt to restrict it a concern of the CFA.949A similarly grey area is the use of the 
‘boycott.’ 
                                               
9442018 Compilation para 767.. 
945 See chapter 2. 
9462018 Compilation para 721. 
947 Ibid, para  722. 
948Ibid para 314.. This separation of economic and social objectives from politics appears to have its origins in the 
35th Session of the ILC in 1952 where the principle adopted was that involvement in politics beyond matters 
immediately of concern to members was likely to damage the trade union movement. 
949
 248th Report of the CFA,. Case No.1381 (Ecuador 1987), para 412. The CFA cited a 1972 case from its 127
th
 
Report, Case No.660 (Mauritania 1971), para 303: ’the prohibition of strikes designed to to coerce the 
Government, if they are non-occupational in character, does not constitute an infringement of the principles of 
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‘Blacking’ – declaring an employer to be ‘black’ and instituting a boycott - has 
proved an important weapon in UK recognition disputes. The potent action taken 
against DC Thomson in 1952 was a boycott,950 and the use of the boycott in the 
late 1970s to secure union membership agreements notably by the Society of 
Lithographic Artists, Designers and Engravers (SLADE) proved outstandingly 
successful.951 The CFA is noticeably circumspect in its approach to the use of the 
boycott, and it seems likely that the reason for this is the comparative ease with 
which this devastating tactic can be employed – workers don’t have to make the 
sacrifices that a strike, or even a ‘work to rule’, involves: 
 
‘The boycott is a very special form of action which, in some cases, may 
involve a trade union whose members continue their work and are not 
directly involved in the dispute with the employer against whom the 
boycott is imposed. In these circumstances, the prohibition of boycotts by 
law does not necessarily appear to involve an interference with trade union 
rights.’952 
 
Although couched in cautious terms the CFA is telling us that only certain boycotts 
will fall outside of the protection of the ILO jurisprudence - in most cases a 
boycott will fall within the principles of freedom of association. For example, in 
two Australian CFA cases, one from 2000, concerning ‘boycott prohibitions’ as 
well as prohibitions on trade unionists calling for sympathy action,953  and another 
concerning the introduction in 2004 of more severe penalties for engaging in 
‘sympathy action and secondary boycotts,’954  the CFA held the prohibitions to 
breach C87. The cautious use of language in the Digest indicates that a distinction 
is drawn between the use of the boycott in a dispute, and activities of unions like 
SLADE, which on occasions ordered their members to black the work of firms in 
their industry where there was no actual dispute. The employees in the firms 
targeted by SLADE were often members of other unions, engaged on contracts 
                                                                                                                                                       
freedom of association..freedom of association in the case of public officials does not necessarily imply the right to 
strike.” 
950See chapter 3. 
951 See ‘the Leggatt Report’ of 1979: Andrew Leggatt QC ‘Report of Inquiry into Certain Trade Union Recruitment 
Activities,’ Cmnd 7706. See also TNA STAT 14/4652 ‘Government report of an inquiry into certain trade union 
recruitment activities conducted by Andrew Leggatt QC: HMSO involvement’, 1979 which was released to the 
National Archives in 2005. 
952
 2018 Compilation para 748. 
953
CFA 320
th
 Report, case No.1963 [Australia 1998] 
954CFA 353rd Report, case No.2326 [Australia, 2004] 
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negotiated by collective agreement. The intention was to coerce the employer 
into requiring those workers into joining SLADE.955 
 
The Committee of Experts has been more forthright than the CFA. In 1989 the 
CEACR stated that although it ‘has never expressed any decided view on the use 
of boycotts as an exercise of the right to strike,’ it took the view  
 
‘that where a boycott relates directly to the social and economic interests 
of the workers involved...the boycott should be regarded as a legitimate 
exercise of the right to strike. This is clearly consistent with the approach 
the Committee has adopted in relation to sympathy strikes.”956 
 
As ever, the European Social Right Committee’s approach to the matter is less 
nuanced than that adopted by the ILO supervisory bodies.The ECSR holds the 
blanket ban on secondary action to breach the UK’s obligations under Article 6(4) 
of the European Social Charter.  
In 1991 the Committee noted that ILO CEACR Observations in 1989 and 1991 had 
recorded that the immunities of trade union officials and members had been 
eroded over the previous 10 years,957 and in 1993 the ECSR noted that ‘significant 
reductions in the number of working days lost as a result of industrial disputes’ 
appeared to reflect the new restrictions on the right to strike imposed by the 
Employment Act 1990 – the complete ban on secondary action, extending to the 
prohibition on picketing anywhere other than one’s own place of work, and the 
withdrawal of the immunity for strikes in support of dismissed unofficial strikers. 
In Conclusions XIV-I 1998 the ECSR reiterated past criticisms to conclude that the 
combined effect of the ‘step by step’ legislative war of attrition on the right to 
strike ‘are such as to constitute a restriction of this right going beyond what can 
                                               
955See Leggatt 1979, op cit and K Barlow, The Labour Movement in Britain from Thatcher to Blair (Frankfurt am 
Main, Peter Lang, 1997) pp83-86. 
956  I have removed the words ‘in either or both of the original dispute and the secondary action, and where the 
original dispute and the secondary action are not unlawful in themselves’ from this passage because the CFA 
clearly cannot mean that if secondary action is contrary to domestic law then a secondary boycott is not a 
‘legitimate exercise of the right to strike.’  
957Conclusions XII-I 1991. 
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be justified under the terms of Article 31 [proportionate restrictions to protect 
the rights of others]… the United Kingdom is in breach of the Charter’: 
‘All forms of picketing (other than at the worker’s own place of work) and 
other secondary action is unlawful.” 
‘Lawful ’trade disputes’ are narrowly defined making it difficult to ensure 
that the strike is lawful.’ 
‘Trade unions may take action only against ‘their’ employer, making it 
impossible for them to take action, inter alia, against the company which is 
the true employer, but which may work through an intermediary 
company.’958 
‘Strikes are only lawful if they have been approved by a majority of 
workers, through a secret ballot under very restrictive conditions.’ 
‘An employer may seek an interlocutory injunction in cases where a strike 
may be unlawful and that such an injunction can be granted provided the 
employer can show that there is a case to answer, without the court 
deciding the issue on the merits.’ 
The Committee expressed their hope that these matters would be addressed New 
Labour’s forthcoming White Paper on industrial relations – what became Fairness 
at Work. They were, of course, to be disappointed, and the blanket prohibition on 
secondary action has become, along with the freedom given employers to 
lawfully dismiss strikers, a mainstay of article 6(4) Conclusions on UK reports.  In 
2014 the Committee recalled that in XVII-1(2004);959 XVIII-1(2006), and XIX-
3(2010) it had  
‘concluded that the scope for workers to defend their interests through 
lawful collective action was excessively circumscribed in the UK….the 
                                               
958 See for example, Dimbleby & Sons v NUJ [1984] ICR 386.  
959
Actually February 2005. The Committee had made much the same criticisms of the same matters before that 
inConclusions XVI-1 2003. It ‘banged on’ for years about 235A of TULR(C)A 1992 until it finally learned that the 
right for 3
rd
 parties to obtain an injunction against industrial action had only been exercised once in the highly 
unusual  P v NASUWT [2003] ICR 386(HL). 
266 
 
prohibition of secondary action, the limitation of lawful collective action in 
s244 TULR(C)A 1992 to disputes between workers and their employer 
constitutes an interference with the right of workers guaranteed in Article 
6(4) of the Charter.’960 
The failure of the Charter and Convention jurisprudence to accord on the 
question of secondary action in UNISON v UK and RMT v UK has already been 
noted. It will, however, be recalled that the Strasbourg court held that 11(1) 
protects the right to strike, which includes the right to take secondary action, and 
held that it is the wide margin of appreciation accorded states in industrial 
relations matters, rather than the 11(2) ‘limitation clause,’ which permits the UK 
to impose the blanket ban on secondary action.  
Ewing and Hendy, writing in 2011 as the impact of the integrated approach to the 
new wide interpretation of A11 ECHR in their IER pamphlet Days of Action The 
legality of protest strikes against government cuts, have however,  argued that 
Article 11(2) should permit political strikes. 
Their thesis has yet to be tested at Strasbourg, and in the light of the RMT case, 
the labour movement may best be advised to postpone any likely test case until 
the court starts to indicate that it is prepared to take a more robust approach to 
UK breaches of its Article 11 obligations. 
__________________________________________ 
We can however conclude that, despite the reluctance of the ECtHR to intervene 
to protect the right to strike in the UK, the position in relation to secondary action 
is clear:  
 The ban on occupational secondary action is an unequivocal breach of the 
UK’s obligation to protect freedom of association. 
 
 While the prohibition of political strikes cannot be said to be a breach of 
international and regional standards, the failure to guarantee workers the 
                                               
960 Conclusions  XX-3 on Article 6(4) 2014. 
267 
 
opportunity to lawfully engage in industrial action to protect their 
economic and social interests beyond immediately occupational concerns is 
not only unarguably a breach of the obligation to guarantee freedom of 
association. Particularly where the prohibition of secondary picketing is 
concerned it is also a prima facie breach of the obligation to guarantee the 
freedoms of expression, conscience and assembly. 
5) Picketing 
‘Firmly but peacefully inciting other workers to keep away from their workplace 
cannot be considered unlawful.’961  While the police must be allowed to keep 
order, and enforce the law peaceful persuasion must also be permitted, and the 
criminal law should not be invoked against those engaged in peaceful picketing. 
‘Zero tolerance’ policing is not conducive to good industrial relations, and is 
inappropriate on picket lines where robust verbal exchanges are to be expected. 
The  freedom of assembly and expression recognized in the UNICCPR and ECHR 
dictates that numbers of pickets present, providing that the highway is not 
obstructed, should not be a factor in determining whether pickets be dispersed or 
restrained, unless the circumstances are such that there is a genuine risk of 
physical harm or a serious threat to public order.  
_________________________________ 
 
The rights to freedom of thought, conscience, and expression are guaranteed by 
Articles 9 and 10 of the European Convention. Freedom of assembly and 
association are guaranteed by Article 11. All are engaged by UK legislation which 
restricts the right to picket and to protest beyond that necessary for the 
maintenance of public order. The specific and discriminatory application of such 
measures against those participating in industrial disputes will engage Article 14. 
 
Restrictions on picketing are restrictions on the right to strike. Following a 
complaint brought under the European Social Charter collective complaints 
procedure against the Government of Belgium, the ECSR warned that a restriction 
                                               
961 2018 Compilation para 941. 
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on picketing which does not violate the rights of others is ‘a restriction on the 
right to strike itself, as it is legitimate for striking workers to attempt to involve all 
their fellow workers in their action.’962 We saw in the previous section that the 
prohibition in the UK of secondary picketing was seen by the Committee as one of 
the factors which led to the conclusion that the UK government is in breach of 
Article 6(4). 
The right to picket – and the right to strike - is guaranteed by Articles 3 and 10 of 
Convention No.87, and, as noted in the previous section, the UK prohibition of 
secondary picketing, where the primary action is lawful, is a breach of the 
Convention. The ILO Committee of Experts has stated on many occasions that 
‘restrictions on strike pickets and workplace occupation should be limited to cases 
where the action ceases to be peaceful.’963  Questions of trespass aside, where 
the pickets are employed should not be a consideration. 
 
The CFA takes a similar view,964 holding that only where there is violence and 
coercion of non-strikers can the police be justified in intervening,965 and the CFA 
have held that the police and security forces should only act in ‘grave situations 
where law and order is seriously threatened,’966 where there is a ‘genuine threat 
to public order.’967 Two CFA cases brought by Moroccan trade unionists in 
response to police intervention in industrial disputes in the 1990s, Cases 1691 and 
1712968 helped establish the basic, simple principle that ‘firmly but peacefully 
inciting other workers to keep away from their workplace cannot be considered 
unlawful.’  969 
                                               
962European Trade Union Confederation v Belgium [2012] 54 E.H.R.R. SE21, paras 35 and 36. 
963 1994General Survey,para 174. Cited in ’ILO Principles concerning the Right to Strike,’ Bernard Gernigon, Alberto 
Odero, Horacio Guido, (Geneva, ILO, 2000). 
964 See 2018 Compilation paras 930 and 936-941. 
965Ibid, paras 939 & 940. 
966Ibid, para 931-933. 
967
Ibid, para 935. 
968
  299
th
 report CFA 1995 Complaints against the Government of Morocco presented by UMT Moroccan Labour 
Union and IUF International Union of Food, Agricultural, hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers. 
9692018 Compilation para 939. 
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The 2006 CFA Digest of Decisions states that: ‘Allegations of criminal conduct 
should not be used to harass trade unionists by reason of their union membership 
or activities.’970 It goes on to recall that: 
‘Measures depriving trade unionists of their freedom on grounds related to 
their trade union activity, even where they are merely summoned or 
questioned for a short period, constitute an obstacle to the exercise of 
trade union rights.’971 
The detention of trade unionists for defending ‘the interests of workers 
constitutes a serious interference with civil liberties in general…a serious obstacle 
to the exercise of trade union rights and an infringement of freedom of 
association.’972 
In a recent Spanish CFA case, Case No.3093, the Committee, ‘frequent recourse to 
criminal proceedings in the area of collective labour relations does not help 
maintain a stable and harmonious system of labour relations.’973 
With regard to South Korea the UN CttESCR in 2009 expressed great concern 
 
‘about the frequent prosecution of workers...and the excessive us of force 
demonstrated against striking workers, mainly on the grounds of article 314 
of the Penal Code regarding ‘obstruction of business.’ The Committee 
reiterates its concerns that trade union rights are not adequately 
guaranteed in the State party (art.8)’974 
 
In 2001 the Committee had held the Korean stance to be a clear negation of 
Article 8, and the criminalisation of strike activities ‘completely unacceptable.’ 975 
UK law has a surfeit of criminal offences designed to be employed against pickets; 
the police have wide powers which can be used to disperse pickets, and to justify 
their arrest. In Piddington v Bates [1961] Lord Parker established that a police 
                                               
970Para 41, which cites para 43 of the 1996 Digest  (para 88 of the 2018 Compilation) and 305th Report, Case No. 
1773, para.365; 306th Report, Case No.1884, para.700; and 327th Report, Case No.2018, para.117. 
971 2018 Compilation paras 122 & 139.   
972
Ibid, paras 123,-125, 131 and 135. 
973
Para 500 
974
 UN CttESCR: CO Republic of Korea, E/C.12/KOR/CO/3, 17 December 2009, para 20. 
975 UN CttESCR: CO Republic of Korea, E/C.12/1/Add.59 21 May 2001, para 20.   
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officer was permitted to use his discretion and make arrests if he believed that it 
was necessary to do so in order to limit the numbers of pickets present and 
prevent a breach of the peace.976 During the Miners’ Strike of 1984-85 the police 
made full use of these common law powers, and the case provided authority for 
the arrest pickets on their way to a picket line.977Reliance by both the police and 
the courts on the Picketing Code of Practice, which states that  ‘ in general the 
number of pickets should not exceed six at any entrance’ (para 56)  has meant 
that the standard maximum number of pickets tolerated for policing and 
injunctive purposes is frequently only six. While that may be an appropriate limit 
in certain circumstances, its adoption as a standard requires review in the light of 
government obligations to guarantee freedom of assembly, association and 
expression. 
The Public Order Act 1986, passed in the wake of the Miners’ Strike, provided a 
wide array of offences, many obviously – if not explicitly - aimed at picketing. 
Section 14 ‘Imposing conditions on public assemblies’ provided the police with 
new powers to supervise marches and assemblies. Violence and intimidation, as 
well as much less serious conduct, was targeted with a number of new statutory 
offences. Some were based upon old common law offences, and others were 
wholly new. All convicted of either causing violent disorder (Section 2); affray 
(Section 3); fear or provocation of violence (Section 4) or harassment, alarm or 
distress (Section 5) are at risk of very large fines and/or long prison sentences.   
This formidable array of offences was augmented in 1994 by the addition of 
sections 14A, 14B and 14C to the 1986 Act by sections 70 and 71 of the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act, supposedly intended to stop illegal ‘raves’ but which 
permit the police to obtain an order to prohibit an assembly on a public road of 
20 or more persons. These powers are explicitly referred to in the 2017 Picketing 
Code of Practice (para 55). A new section 4A offence of causing ‘Intentional 
harassment, alarm or distress’ was also added to the 1986 Act by the 1994 Act. 
Ostensibly implemented to tackling ‘stalking’ an ancillary intention was clearly to 
get as close as possible to criminalising peaceful, if forceful, picketing, with those 
convicted of this summary offence liable to a unlimited fine and up to 6 months 
                                               
976
Piddington v Bates, 1 WL 162. In that case the police drew the line at two pickets  
977  See Moss v McLachlan [1985] IRLR 76 
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imprisonment.  It appears that it was an attempt to provide an alternative to 
section 241 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. 
Section 241 (formerly section 7 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 
1875),978 represents the original pre 1980s British approach to the boundaries of 
peaceful picketing, one which is in accord with the ILO jurisprudence.  This 
carefully drafted piece of legislation – a typically British bid  to liberalise by 
making clear what is unlawful and reining in the common law - attempts to 
ensure that workers are able picket lawfully, effectively straddling the line 
between civil and criminal liability for unlawful conduct on the picket line. The 
section deals with ‘Intimidation or annoyance by violence or otherwise,’ and 
criminalises actions which go beyond peaceful picketing, like ‘watching and 
besetting’, behaviour intended to compel the victim to take a particular course of 
action. But because these offences are also torts, ‘certain classes of acts which 
were previously wrongful,’ 979 in order to secure a conviction, the tort, as an 
essential element of the offence, must be complete. Therefore the attempt 
tocompel must have been successful,980  allowing, when the section is applied as 
it should be, a distinction to be drawn between robust persuasion and genuinely 
threatening behaviour. S.241 was last invoked in an industrial context in 2014. In 
that case a London Underground ‘cover supervisor’ had crossed an RMT picket 
line and, later that day, had complained to the British Transport Police that one of 
the pickets, Mr Mark Harding had shouted at him and called him a ‘scab.’ He was 
initially charged with a public order offence but that was substituted by section 
241. Four months later he was acquitted – the supervisor had crossed the picket 
line and gone into work. Even if there could have been said to have been an 
attempt to compel, which given the facts is doubtful, it was unsuccessful. The 
magistrate had no alternative but to acquit. 981 
 
Judicial interventions in the 1890s diminished the liberalising influence of the 
1875 Act,982 and s2 of the Trade Disputes Act provided the necessary clarification, 
                                               
978There are slight differences between section 7 of the 1875 Act and section 241 – and amendments were made 
to the old Act between 1875 and 1992 – but they are essentially the same. 
979 Fletcher Moulton LJ  in Ward, Lock & Co Ltd v Operative Printers’ Assistants’ Society [1906] 22 TLR (CA) 327 at 
329. This view was approved by the Court of Appeal after the 1906 Trade Disputes Act in Fowler v Kibble [1922] 1 
Ch.487. 
980
DPP v Fidler [1992].   
981
Harding was arrested and held for over 12 hours. See WWW.defendtherighttoprotest.org/rmt -activist-mark-
harding-found-not-guilty-an-important-win-for-the-right-to-picket/. See also Morning Star 3 June 2014. 
982Particularly Lyons v Wilkins, an 1896 Court of appeal decision. 
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providing that ‘It shall be lawful for one or more persons acting on their own 
behalf or on behalf of a trade union’ to picket peacefully in contemplation or 
furtherance of a trade dispute. It has often been argued that s2 of the TDA, and 
subsequent formulations of the application of the immunities to picketing, 
provided effective protection from the strict application of the offence of 
obstruction of the highway.983 A more accurate appraisal would be that: 
‘It shall be lawful’ means in practice that ‘the police may permit.’984 
When one of the leading picketing cases (DPP v Broom [1974]) was considered at 
first instance, the magistrates were of the opinion that pickets were permitted to 
obstruct delivery vehicles, albeit briefly, in order to communicate information. 
Understandably this belief was shared by most trade unionists and most police 
officers - that is what picket lines are for. The Lords, however, held otherwise, and 
after Labour returned to office in February 1974 serious consideration was given 
to giving pickets an explicit right to stop vehicles in the legislation which replaced 
the Industrial Relations Act 1971.985 Although the proposal arguably meant no 
more than the adjustment of the immunity that had been conferred by the 1906 
Act to accommodate the age of the motor vehicle, it was vehemently opposed 
and did not become law. Such a law would have had the virtue of bringing UK law 
into line with the government’s obligations under the ECHR. 
The CFA stated in 2007 that: 
‘It might be very difficult to hold a picket without some obstruction of a 
path, road, entrance or exit to premises and if these are unlawful…the 
union could not picket lawfully. It is our view that to give no immunity from 
such liability runs the risk of breaching the right to freedom of expression in 
Article 10 or freedom of assembly in Article 11 of the ECHR.’986 
 
                                               
983 See, for example, Collins, Ewing and McColgan Labour Law, 2014, p691. A 1925 circular to Chief Constables by 
Tory Home Secretary John Anderson, issued in 1926 as Intimidation and Molestation, Cmnd.2666, and referred to 
by the Attlee cabinet in 1947, outlines the interaction of s7 and s2 and specifically states that these do not permit 
obstruction of highway. The strikers and the police in the case considered in 1947 (the Savoy Hotel dispute) did 
appear to believe the strikers could obstruct the highway (TNA HO45/25592). 
984
Chris Ralph, The Picket and the Law, 1977, p9. 
985
TULRA 1974. 
986
Report No.346 June 2007, Case No.2473 (United Kingdom) [the case concerned Jersey] complaint date 16 
December 2005, para 1501. 
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In the civil courts, in contrast to the application of section 241, it is only necessary 
for the tort of intimidation to be threatened before interlocutory relief can be 
obtained. Nevertheless the judiciary have taken account of the provisions of the 
ECHR to adopt a suitably nuanced approach.  
 
 The leading picketing case is Gate Gourmet London Ltd v T & GWU [2005].987 The 
report records events during a strike at Heathrow Airport – some of which I was 
witness to – and as well as a guide to the application of the civil law, the case 
illustrates the current approach taken by the police in such circumstances.  The 
peaceful persuasion employed by the strikers was robust in the extreme. The 
police could easily have made arrests for any number of public order offences, 
and for obstruction of the highway, but they maintained a very low profile.988 The 
judge took into account the pickets’ rights to freedom of expression, assembly 
and association, and the terms of the injunction granted permitted the picketing 
to continue, without, it should be noted, restricting the numbers of pickets.  
 
The current cautious approach of the police, and the courts, extends beyond 
picketing to ‘leverage’ demonstrations related to trade disputes.989 In the 
committee stage of the Trade Union Bill Deputy Chief Constable Hall of the 
National Police Chiefs’ Council and Steve White Chair of the Police Federation told 
assembled MPs that:990 
 
‘there is no real need for the police to be involved with industrial 
disputes…we would wish to avoid it if we can.’  
 
‘It would be a travesty if we ended up going back to the days of the 1970s 
and ‘80s when rightly or wrongly, the police service was seen as an arm of 
the state.’  
 
 The laws nevertheless remain on the statute book should the police and their  de 
facto masters in the Home Office choose to return to the industrial and political 
policing of the 1980s. Workers should not be obliged to depend on the liberal 
                                               
987EWHC 1889 (QB) 
988I saw the pickets on an almost daily basis during the dispute. 
989Which, it can be argued, illustrate the artificiality and unworkable nature of the restriction of picketing to the 
worker’s own place of work, particularly when one considers that the law in the UK still permits pickets to 
persuade workers employed elsewhere to breach their contracts of employment – the familiar example being that 
of the lorry driver persuaded not to a cross picket line. 
990Public Bill Committee, 15 October 2015 col 93-99. 
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consciences of judges and police chiefs for the protection of their rights. The 2016 
ILO Conference Committee on the Application of Standards called upon 
Governments to ensure that workers are able to engage freely in peaceful actions 
both in law and in practice, without the risk of legal sanction. 991 
 
The picketing provisions of the Trade Union Act 2016 arguably had their origins in 
efforts to combat ‘leverage’ protests.992 However, in the absence of any real 
support for very radical restrictions on freedom of assembly to rein these protests 
in, and in the face of much opposition to the Bill,993 freedom of assembly and 
association on the picket line were instead further eroded with what the 
Government could ‘get away with’ in the pragmatist manner of the Tories of the 
1980s and 1990s.994 The new provisions, requiring the presence of an identifiable 
picket supervisor armed with a letter of authorisation, are apparently intended, 
where possible, to effectively define those workers present as unauthorised 
secondary pickets, and increase the opportunities for employers to obtain labour 
injunctions. 995  
  
These new picketing ‘procedural obstacles’ are, however, creating unwelcome 
publicity for the Government. The interest of the Committee of Experts has been 
heightened by allegations of police surveillance of trade unionists submitted to it 
by the TUC, and by the discriminatory nature of restrictions on freedom of 
assembly aimed only at trade union protestors. Twice now the Committee has 
requested the Government for information on the handling of the information 
picket supervisors are required to hand over to the police, its impact on industrial 
action, and any complaints made about its, collation and use. The Committee has 
                                               
991
Provisional Record No.16, Part 2, 105
th
 Session of the ILC, May-June 2016. See also 2006 Digest of Decisions, 
para 629. 
992 See Michael Ford and Tonia Novitz, ‘An Absence of Fairness...Restrictions on Industrial Action and Protest in the 
Trade Union Bill 2015’ (2015) 44 ILJ 522: ‘Huddled around a brazier near the workplace in a dispute about wages, 
the strikers are pickets; if they march down the road they magically transform themselves into protestors’ (p545) 
See particularly 545-457. 
993 See the House of Commons Library Briefing Paper on the Trade Union Bill, CBP 7297, 7 September 2015 By 
Doug Pyper on the background to the picketing provisions (section 7.2); B Carr QC; The Carr Report: The Report of 
the Independent Review of the Law Governing Industrial Disputes, 2014; the Government Consultation Tackling 
intimidation of non –striking workers, the outcome of which was published on the day the Trade Union Bill was 
introduced to Parliament, and R Dukes and N Kountouris  2016, op cit, 355-360. 
994 See chapter two. 
995 The Bill initially sought to require the picket supervisor to show the letter to any police officer who asked to see 
it or ‘any other person who reasonably asks to see it’ (Cl.9(6)). As the Act stands, although members of the public 
have been cut out of the picture, in the event of the absence of such a supervisor, or a refusal to show such a letter 
to a police officer or the employer, those present become ‘unauthorised’ pickets,’ giving the employer grounds for 
an injunction, much as if the secondary picketing prohibited since 1980 (see chapter two) was taking place. 
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also requested ‘any information’ the Government can supply ‘on the blacklisting 
of individuals engaged in lawful picketing,’ and invited it to comment on 
allegations of the use of ‘undercover’ police to gather information on trade 
unionists.996  
________________________________ 
 
On the basis of the above, UK law should therefore be amended to ensure that:  
 
 Secondary picketing is lawful 
 
 Pickets are permitted to stop vehicles entering and leaving premises in 
order to communicate information 
 
 Picketing be excluded from the embrace of the s14 Public Order Act 1986 
police powers to impose conditions on and prohibit public assemblies. 
 
 The de facto general default maximum of six pickets for policing and 
injunctive purposes is addressed, arguably by changes to the Picketing Code 
of Practice with specific references to the right to freedom of assembly, 
association and expression, and by the issue to the judiciary of fresh 
guidelines by the Lord Chancellor 
 
6) LIABILITY FOR ENGAGING IN INDUSTRIAL ACTION 
 
Workers should incur no legal liability, or any unfavourable treatment, for 
exercising their right to take industrial action, and they should be permitted to 
return to their job after a strike has concluded.  
_____________________________________ 
 
We have seen that in the UK not only is there not an effective right to strike, there 
is no real freedom to strike merely, in certain restricted circumstances, a 
suspension of tortious liability. As a consequence, a worker engaged in industrial 
action is still theoretically vulnerable to a claim for breach of contract, and, if 
unofficial, or unlawful, action is taken, the worker can be summarily dismissed for 
                                               
996 Observation (CEACR) adopted 2018, published 108
th
 Session (2019) on C87, and Observation (CEACR) adopted 
2016, published 106th Session (2017) on C87 
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that breach. Members and officials, as well as workers who are not members of 
the union or unions involved, are also theoretically vulnerable to claims in tort 
when unlawful industrial action is procured, and since 1982 trade unions have 
been vulnerable to such claims in practice.  So a union engaging, for example, in 
sympathy or secondary action, or otherwise lawful industrial action, following a 
ballot in which the requisite majority threshold was not attained, can be held 
liable in damages for the subsequent losses incurred by the employer.997 Liability 
for contempt of court when the terms of interim injunctions granted in such 
circumstances are broken is, of course, a related matter, one governed by the 
criminal law. Such breaches have the potential to attract unlimited fines and 
terms of imprisonment. 
 
Where dismissals are concerned, the common law position is that strikers can be 
dismissed en masse, or selectively. Statute has, however, intervened, and after 
the Industrial Relations Act 1971, a selective dismissal in such circumstances 
became grounds for a claim of unfair dismissal. This area did not escape the 
attentions of the Thatcher governments, and in 1982 the Employment Act 
permitted employers to re-engage workers selectively after 3 months. Since 1990 
an employer has been able to dismiss a striker engaged in unofficial action for 
breach of contract in any circumstances (TULR(C) A sections 237 & 238).998 In 
1999 New Labour introduced 8 weeks of blanket protection for strikers taking 
official action, extended to 12 weeks in 2004 (TULR(C)A 238A and 238B). The 12 
weeks of statutory ‘protection’ afforded those who engage in official action is no 
more than the provision of  grounds for a claim of unfair dismissal offering only 
the prospect of a modest financial award should the worker be dismissed for 
breach of contract during the first 12 weeks of industrial action. 
 
The position in international law is less complex. According to the ILO Committee 
on Freedom of Association 
 
‘The dismissal of workers because of a strike constitutes serious 
discrimination in employment on grounds of legitimate trade union 
activities and is contrary to Convention No.98.’999 
                                               
997Damages in such circumstances are capped, the maximum fine dependent on the number of members of the 
union concerned. 
998
See para 49-55 of Report No.277, March 1991, Case No.1540 (United Kingdom) – complaint date 29 June 1990 
for an account of the evolution of this legislation. 
999 2018 Compilation para 957.. 
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The Committee requires ‘root and branch’ reform. It has recorded that it “could 
not view with equanimity a set of legal rules which: (a) appears to treat virtually 
all industrial action a breach of contract…(b) makes any trade union or official 
thereof who instigates such a breaches of contract liable in damages for any 
losses incurred...and (c) enables an employer faced with such an action to obtain 
an injunction to prevent the commencement (or continuation) of the unlawful 
conduct. The cumulative effect of such provisions could be to deprive workers of 
the capacity lawfully to strike action to promote and defend their economic and 
social interests.”1000 
 
In 1989 the ILO’s Committee of Experts told the UK Government that it ‘considers 
that it is inconsistent with the right to strike a guaranteed by Articles 3, 8 and 10 
of the Convention [No.87] for an employer to be permitted to refuse to reinstate 
some or all of its employees at the conclusion of a a strike, lock out or other 
industrial action…’1001 Unimpressed by the ‘protection’ afforded within the 12 
week period, the freedom for employers to hire permanent replacements while 
the workers are on strike, and the rarity of dismissed workers being reinstated or 
re-engaged after a successful claim for unfair dismissal, the Committee of Experts 
has made six Direct Requests to the government on the situation in the UK in the 
last ten years.1002  
 
The ECSR has since the 1970s ‘consistently considered that the UK was not in 
conformity with Article 6(4)’ of the European Social Charter because it allows 
workers to be dismissed for taking industrial action.1003 In 1993 the Governmental 
Committee of the European Social Charter, following a series of Conclusions by 
the ECSR that the UK was in breach of Article 6(4), issued a Recommendation that 
it amend the law.1004 The Major Government failed to act, and in 1997 a 
Recommendation by the Committee of Ministers followed.1005  In 2014 the ECSR 
recalled that in 2010, and in 2006, it had concluded that the loss of employment 
protection after 12 weeks was ‘arbitrary.’ In 2010 it had not been reassured by 
the government’s claim that ‘96.5% of all industrial actions last less than 12 
                                               
1000 2018 Compilation para 960.. 
1001 Observation (CEACR) on C87 – adopted 1989, published 76th ILC session (1989). 
1002 The first was in 2008 – Direct Request (CEACR) adopted 2008, published 98th ILC Session (2009) on C87 
1003Conclusions XII-I 1991. 
1004 See the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation No. R Chs (93) 3 On the Application of 
the European Social Charter by the United Kingdom During the Period 1988-89 (12
th
 Supervision Cycle). 
1005 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation No. R Chs (97) 3 On the Application of the 
European Social Charter by the United Kingdom During the Period 1992-93(13th Supervision Cycle). 
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weeks’;1006 in 2006 it had noted that the protection extended only to those 
engaged in official action.1007 
 
The UN CttESCR, with characteristic bluntness, told the first Blair government in 
1997 that  
 
‘failure to incorporate the right to strike into domestic law constitutes a 
breach of article 8 of the Covenant ...the common law approach recognising 
only the freedom to strike, and the concept that strike action constitutes a 
fundamental breach of contract justifying dismissal, is not consistent with 
protection of the right to strike. The Committee does not find satisfactory 
the proposal to enable employees who go on strike to have a remedy 
before a tribunal for unfair dismissal.’1008 In its recommendations it went on 
to argue that ‘...the current notion of freedom to strike...simply recognises 
the illegality of being submitted to an involuntary servitude.’ 
 
The failure to protect unofficial strikers is arguably more serious than the absence 
of protection for those few workers who may be engaged in official action after 
12 weeks. The number of unofficial actions are unknown, but likely to be few in 
number – only 101 ‘stoppages’ of any description occurred in 2016 – but they will 
become increasingly important  as the restrictions on the right to strike start to 
bite. Recently prison officers, unable of course to take official action, have been 
engaged in a series of unofficial actions, and workers on Southern Rail (subject to 
the IPS thresholds) were alleged to have taken unofficial action.  
 Yet the ILO jurisprudence makes it very clear that protection for unofficial action 
is embraced by the principles of freedom of association.The CEACR considers that 
UK conformity with Convention No. 87 depends upon the government  
‘strengthening the protection available to workers who stage official and lawfully 
organised industrial action...,’1009 but it emphasises that sanctions for strike action 
should be possible only where the prohibitions in question are in conformity with 
                                               
1006Conclusions XIX-3 2010 ‘Consequences of collective action.’ 
1007Conclusions XVIIII-1 ‘Consequences of collective action.’ The committee also noted without comment that the 
government had supplied information on Davies v Friction Dynamics (see chapter 2)following a request made in 
Conclusions XVII-1 2005. 
1008
 UN CttESCR: United Kingdom CO E/C.12/1/Add.19 (12 December 1997), para 11. The proposal resulted in the 
initial ‘8 week’ rule to protect strikers in official actions in ERA 1999. 
1009Direct Request adopted 2012, published 102nd ILC session (2013). 
279 
 
the principles of freedom of association...’ Even then ‘sanctions should not be 
disproportionate to the seriousness of the violations,’1010 so dismissal, or liability 
for damages for breach of contract, theoretical or otherwise, may well be argued 
to be excessive. 
 
A distinction  could reasonably be drawn between action taken by workers in 
defiance of the instructions of their union and workers in poorly organised 
establishments or sectors where the terms and conditions of employment are not 
governed by collective agreement. Strikes engaged in by workers in the latter 
category should prompt government intervention to promote collective 
bargaining, rather than the dismissals of the workers.1011 However, the UK 
approach (Section 237 (2) TULR(C)A) is merely to provide that where no trade 
union members are involved in the industrial action taken then action cannot be 
deemed ‘unofficial’ and the workers involved will benefit from the 12 week 
protected period.1012 Of course, in very few instances will industrial action be 
taken exclusively by workers who are not members of a trade union which 
represents workers in that sector.1013  
 
A third category of unofficial action is that which is necessarily unofficial because  
restrictions on industrial action contrary to the principles of freedom of 
association  have obliged the union to denounce it. Examples are the actions 
taken by workers employed by Southern Rail and by prison officers, arguably the 
consequence of the effective categorisation of the former as workers providing an 
essential service and the failure of the government to put in place the required 
effective conciliation and arbitration mechanisms to compensate for restrictions 
of the right to strike, both unequivocal breaches of Convention No.87. 
While Article 8 (1) of C87 states that: 
                                               
10101994 General Survey, para 177-8. 
1011Industrial action in such circumstances can arguably be said to be the consequence of government failure to 
fulfil its obligations under C87 and C98. When Order 1305 (see chapter 2) was in place between 1940-1951 the 
penal provisions of the order were never used against workers not employed under terms and conditions 
governed by collective agreement. Section 237 (2) & (6) of TULR(C)A 1992 provides the narrow current  version of 
this approach. 
1012
 Industrial action in such circumstances can arguably be said to be the consequence of government failure to 
fulfil its obligations under C87 and C98. 
1013 See s 237(6). 
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‘In exercising the rights provided for in this Convention workers and 
employees and their respective organisations, like other persons or 
organised collectivities, shall respect the law of the land’ 
Article 8(2) requires that: 
“The law of the land shall not be such as to impair, nor shall it be so applied 
as to impair the guarantees provided for in this Convention.’ 
If the prohibitions on industrial action are not in conformity with the principles of 
freedom of association then unlawful and unofficial action is inevitable. Workers 
forced to break the law must be protected. 
The UK government must therefore ensure that the law is revised so that: 
 Workers cannot be lawfully dismissed for taking industrial action under any 
circumstances. 
 Any such dismissals are remedied by reinstatement 
 Employers are not permitted to hire permanent replacements for striking 
workers 
7) The Right to Bargain Collectively 
States are in practice obliged merely to guarantee the freedom for employers and 
workers to bargain collectively. They are required to promote and encourage 
voluntary negotiation, rather than recognise a right for workers to bargain 
collectively.  While state compulsion in order to provide workers with an effective 
right to bargain collectively is contrary to the voluntary nature of collective 
bargaining states are obliged to promote, it is not a breach of the principles of 
freedom of association. States are obliged to negotiate with those employed in 
the public sector on a collective basis. Only public servants with responsibilities 
for maintaining public order can be denied the right to bargain collectively. When 
an industry is nationalised, and where privatisation is imposed, states are obliged 
to ensure that the enterprise concerned recognises the relevant unions for 
collective bargaining purposes.  
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__________________________________ 
The concept of collective bargaining as a wholly voluntary arrangement between 
workers and employers has meant that state obligations are expressed as 
obligations to promote and encourage, rather than to recognise the right of 
workers to choose to bargain collectively, a legacy, I would suggest, of the 
voluntaristic influence of the British government on the ILO during the crucial 
years of 1945-1949.  
Citing the key phrase in Article 4 of C98 that governments are obliged to 
‘encourage and promote the full development and utilisation of machinery for 
voluntary negotiation,’1014 the CFA holds that: 
 
‘The right to bargain freely with employers with respect to conditions of 
work constitutes an essential element in freedom of association.’1015 
 
The Committee has on numerous occasions emphasised the voluntary character 
of collective bargaining which underpins the industrial freedom of association 
demanded by the ILO Conventions, the UN Covenants, and the Council of Europe 
instruments: 
 
‘Nothing in Article 4 of Convention No.98 places a duty on the government 
to enforce collective bargaining by compulsory means with a given 
organization; such an intervention would alter the voluntary nature of 
bargaining.’1017 
 
Yet, I would argue that the right to bargain collectively is in practice not one 
jointly exercisable by employers and workers, as the ILO jurisprudence would 
have us believe. It is a right relied upon solely by workers, requiring the employer 
to negotiate with them in good faith, as a combination, ‘in the shadow’ of the 
threat of industrial action. If that is not feasible then the mechanisms to promote 
collective bargaining kick in. Effective collective bargaining mechanisms inevitably 
require an element of state compulsion. While the minimum terms and 
                                               
1014
 2018 Compilation para 1231. Article 3 requires the establishment of such machinery. 
1015
Ibid, para 1232. 
1017Ibid, para 1216. 
282 
 
conditions of employment imposed by sectoral collective bargaining can be said 
to encourage recalcitrant employers to engage with other employers to engage in 
collective negotiation with unions and to negotiate bespoke collective 
agreements at enterprise level, statutory recognition procedures ultimately rely 
on the power of the state to require a recalcitrant employer to recognise the 
union or unions concerned. The ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association 
acknowledges that compulsion may be necessary, and cautions states only that 
The public authorities should however refrain from any undue interference in the 
negotiating process.’1018  
 
 
Moreover, the state itself is itself obliged to bargain collectively with those it 
employs. Obliged to ‘encourage and promote’ the practice,  it has been 
acknowledged that ‘after the Second World War successive government treated 
the public sector as a “model employer,” understood to mean “that government 
as direct employers could set the standards for employment policy and 
practice.”’1019 
 
 Governments had been bargaining collectively with public servants since the First 
World War,1020 and as Heath’s Tories acknowledged in their 1968 employment 
manifesto Fair Deal at Work (albeit downplaying the level of obligation on the 
government): 
 
‘[T]he principle that workers should have the right to organise and to “bargain 
collectively” is incorporated in ILO Conventions 87 and 98. Parliament has 
recognised this principle in the Acts governing the nationalised industries, and it is 
indirectly recognised in Acts which oblige employers to observe Fair Wages 
Resolutions.’1021 
 
                                               
1018 2018 Compilation para 1317. 
1019 Howell 2005, op cit, p90, citing B Carter and P Fairbrother, ‘The Transformation of British Public-Sector 
Industrial Relations: From “Model Employer” to Marketised Relations,’ (2000) 7 Historical Studies in Industrial 
Relations, p123. 
1020 Since the establishment of the Ministry of Labour and the report  of the Whitley Committee at the end of WWI 
(see Howell 2005, op cit, pp69-75). 
1021 Conservative Party Political Centre, April 1968, pp43-44. 
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The Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 (No.151), in Articles 7 & 8, 
emphasise that the C98 and C154 obligations apply to ‘public employees.’1022 As 
noted above, while civil servants engaged with responsibility for keeping order 
may be denied the right to bargain collectively, the vast majority of those 
employed in the public sector may not. 
 
C151 clarifies the provisions in C98 in relation to the public sector. Article 7 uses 
the familiar unsatisfactory imperative – the obligation is to ‘encourage and 
promote.’ Nevertheless, where the government is the direct employer I argue 
that it is obliged to engage in collective bargaining unless the workers concerned 
fall into exempted categories. Public servants have the option of not bargaining 
collectively but their employer, but the government, required as it is to 
‘encourage and promote’ the practice does not have any choice in the matter.  
 
When the Thatcher government attempted to withdraw from collective 
bargaining with the civil service unions in 1980 – provoking a lengthy and highly 
expensive dispute – the CFA ruled that while the government had not breached 
C98,1023 it had breached C151.  
 
The European Social Charter’s ECSR has taken a less nuanced approach than the 
CFA to the right in the public sector, and in a characteristically clumsy pre-1991 
statement on the UK civil service dispute it recalled that under the terms of 
Article 6(2) ‘the rights of collective bargaining can be denied to civil servants.’1024 
In the same set of conclusions it held that the provision of a staff association for 
the 7,000 GCHQ civil servants famously denied the right to organize on grounds of 
national security,1025 brought the restriction within the terms of the Charter’s 
Article 31 ‘limitation clause’ – contradicting the ILO supervisory bodies which had 
uniformly held GCHQ to be an egregious breach of C87 [the equivalent of Article 5 
                                               
1022Despite the C98 Article 6 proviso that ‘This Convention does not deal with the position of public servants 
engaged in the administration of the state’ which permits those with public order responsibilities to be denied 
collective bargaining. 
1023An odd decision in the circumstances (see chapter 3). 
1024Conclusions XI-I 1989 Article 6(2), recalling Conclusions III. Only those tasked with the administration of the 
state may be denied the right to bargain collectively (see above). 
1025
See chapter 3. The GCHQ affair was not directly connected with the civil service dispute. That started in 1980 
when the government first sought to replace collective bargaining arrangements with a statutory pay review 
structure. The involvement of GCHQ staff in the ensuing strikes did, however, pay a significant part in motivating 
the government to deny the GCHQ civil servants the right to organise. 
284 
 
of the Charter].1026 In the watershed year of 1991,1027 however the Committee 
revised its opinion to hold that the arrangements in the UK whereby the Secretary 
of State effectively dictated pay rates ‘nonetheless entails the obligation to 
arrange for the participation of those concerned through the intermediary of their 
representatives.’1028 It would appear now, however, that the Committee’s 
interpretation of the application of Article 5 and Article 6(2) to the civil service is 
in accord with that of the ILO supervisory bodies, and the UN CttESCR, excluding 
only those engaged in the administration of the state from the right to bargain 
collectively, and only then where satisfactory alternative arrangements have been 
provided. 
 
In R v Minister for the Cabinet Office [2018],1029 a judicial review of the 
departmental denial of even a consultation with recognized trade unions over pay 
was refused. Recognition and a disputed promise did not mean that three unions 
representing 200,000 civil servants could claim to have a legitimate expectation to 
be consulted over a pay review. 
 
Clearly UK law and practice falls short of the standards set by Convention 151, 
and Articles 5 and 6(1) of the Charter. 
 
State owned industries 
 
The CFA merely hold that workers employed in nationalised industries ‘should 
have the right to negotiate collective agreements.’1030 
 
The level of obligation is less absolute where state owned ‘nationalised’ 
enterprises are concerned. In such cases the government controls the purse 
strings but is not the employer. However, a nationalised firm should arguably be 
obliged by the memorandum and articles of association, drafted under the 
                                               
1026The ECmHR had deemed the case inadmissible, so the two Council of Europe supervisory bodies were roughly 
in accord.  
1027When, prompted by the ILO’s CEACR, the Committee finally ‘woke up’ to the attack on freedom of association 
that had been in progress in the UK since 1980. 
1028 Conclusions XII-I 1991, again recalling Conclusions III. 
1029EWHC 2746 (Admin). 
10302006 Digest, para 894. Where temporary workers in the public sector are concerned – the Committee had in 
mind ‘Community Programme’ style initiatives for easing unemployment - the CFA stipulates that they ‘should be 
able to negotiate collectively’ (2006 Digest, para 906).The CESCR has held a Canadian denial of the right for 
‘workfare’ workers the opportunity to join trade unions to be a breach of UNICESCR Article 8 (UN CttESCR:  
Canada, CO EC.12/1/Add.31, 10 December 1998, para 31). 
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supervision of a government under an obligation to promote and encourage 
collective bargaining, to recognize and negotiate with the relevant trade 
unions.1031 
 
Teachers are variously employed by local authorities, school governing bodies, 
and academy trusts, and health care workers are usually employed by NHS trusts. 
So while public sector employees, they cannot be said to be employed directly by 
the government unlike, for example, public sector prison officers, or those 
working for HMRC.  
 
Where their terms and conditions of employment are directly controlled by 
government – as is the case with teachers and health care professionals like 
doctors and nurses - then the government is obliged to bargain with them. Where 
they are not then I would argue that the government was obliged to ensure that 
the trust is itself obliged to bargain collectively with its workforce when it 
transferred responsibility to the trust. The same holds in relation to the private 
enterprises which took the opportunity to turn a profit by buying up what were 
previously state owned enterprises, and to firms who have won government 
contracts to provide previously state run services, whether they be prisons or 
canteen facilities in government departments.  
 
The TUPE regulations have, of course, performed this function since 1981,1032 
although in the UK, with secondary action unlawful, collective agreements 
generally unenforceable, and the regulations weakened by recent government 
responses to ‘employer friendly’ decisions by the CJEU, the position of transferred 
workers is parlous. As we saw in  chapter four, the Acquired Rights Directive was 
reinterpreted by the court to provide safeguards for businesses,1033 and the 
previously obscure Article 16 of the EU Charter relied upon to allow transferee 
firms to abandon obligations under collective agreements entered into by the 
                                               
10311996 Digest: ‘...a successive government in the same state cannot, for the mere reason that a change has 
occurred, escape the responsibility deriving from events that occurred under a former government...the new 
government should take all necessary steps to remedy any continuing effects which the events on which a 
complaint is based may have had’ (para 18). 
1032 Although the Tories initially excluded six million public sector workers by restricting the regulations to non 
commercial undertakings until obliged to broaden the embrace of the regulations following C-383/92 Commission 
v UK [1994] ECR I-2479 (see K Williams and N Johnson, ‘Transferring Employment Between the Public and Private 
sectors in the United Kingdom: Acquired Rights and Revising TUPE’ (2007) 23 International Journal of Comparative 
Labour Law and Industrial Relations 285). 
1033
The Directive is wholly concerned with workers’ rights and no where in the text is any reference to the rights of 
employers. 
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transferor – without the rights of workers under the Charter even being 
mentioned. With the neoliberal credentials of the CJEU firmly established, and, in 
the UK, the inability of trade unionists to take solidarity action in support of 
transferred colleagues,1034 or to press their concerns prior to the transfer,1035the 
TUPE regulations serve now in most cases  only to preserve the terms and 
conditions of transferred workers for only the first year with their new employer. 
 
Freedom to bargain collectively, by contrast, permits employers to decide 
whether to allow workers to negotiate with it, or with an employers’ organisation 
to which it belongs, on a collective basis. Where only the freedom is protected, 
workers are largely dependent on the use of industrial action to persuade the 
employer to negotiate. The state permits workers to make their demands known, 
but permits the employer to decline to bargain with the union. Because in the UK 
only the freedom to bargain collectively is protected, and the freedom to take 
industrial action is heavily restricted, there is no effective right to effective 
collective bargaining. As a consequence the numbers of workers covered by 
collective agreements are minimal. 
 
I argue, however, that the requirement for states to promote and encourage 
collective bargaining does demand the effective recognition of a right to collective 
bargaining which would oblige employers to negotiate with the collective. To hold 
otherwise would be to return to the similarly artificial individualistic 
interpretation of freedom of association offered by Dicey and by his neoliberal 
disciples. 
 
The 2008 recognition by the Strasbourg Court that Article 11 protects the right to 
bargain collectively, followed by the inevitable acknowledgement of its 
inseparable sister right, the right to strike, and the subsequent ‘backpedalling’ 
evinced in RMT v UK [2014] and UNITE v UK [2016] to accommodate prima facie 
British breaches of the new wide interpretation of Article 11 freedom of 
association, have been examined in some detail in previous chapters. It will be 
recalled that UNITE v UK, in which the union argued unsuccessfully that the 
abolition of last of the Works Councils,1036 the Agricultural Wages Board, was a 
                                               
1034
 Sanctioned by the ECtHR in RMT v UK (see Chapter 3). 
1035
 Sanctioned by the ECtHR in UNISON v UK (see Chapter 3). 
1036 See K Arabadjieva ‘Another Disappointment in Strasbourg: Unite the Union v United Kingdom’ (2017) 46 ILJ 
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breach of the government’s Article 11 obligations, illustrates the limits to the right 
to bargain collectively in the Strasbourg jurisprudence – its subservience in 
practice to the right to strike, and failure of the provisions European Social 
Charter, and Convention 98, requiring states merely to ‘promote and encourage’ 
wholly voluntary collective bargaining, to persuade the court that Article 11 
requires the provision by the UK of effective bargaining mechanisms .  
The six judges, including the newly appointed British judge, Paul Mahoney, 
appeared to have been anxious not to alienate the British government. They 
seized upon the weaknesses of the right, and resurrected the old civil and 
political/economic and social rights divisions to rein in the possibilities raised by 
Demir and relegate the right for workers to bargain collectively to a freedom to 
bargain collectively. 
While the right to strike, requiring states only to refrain from interference to 
permit workers the freedom to take industrial action more readily fits in with the 
traditional negative conception of civil and political rights, and obliged the court 
in the RMT case to look to the margin of appreciation and the new procedural 
rules to let the UK ‘off the hook,’ the positive obligations inherent in recognising 
an effective right to collective bargaining allowed the court to find simply that:  
 
 
‘the United Kingdom does not restrict employers and trade unions from 
entering into voluntary collective agreements.’ 1037 
 
Despite the right to collective bargaining having been recognised as an essential 
element of freedom of association, the court held that there was no obligation on 
states to secure the right:  
 
‘even accepting the applicant’s submission that  voluntary collective 
bargaining in the agricultural sector is virtually non-existent and 
impracticable...1038the European and international instruments to which the 
                                               
1037UNITE V UK, para 59. 
1038
Para 65. Counsel for UNITE, John Hendy, had told the court that the National Farmers’ Union refused to bargain 
collectively with the union, and that of the 350,000 agricultural workers that had previously come within the ambit 
of the AWB, and had been represented in collective bargaining by UNITE, only a fraction of 1% worked for an 
employer with 21 or more employees allowing the union to apply to the CAC for recognition. Even if many more 
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applicant referred, as they currently stand, do not support the view that a 
state’s positive obligations under Article 11 extend to providing mandatory 
statutory mechanism for collective bargaining...’1039   
 
Disappointing as the ruling is, it must be borne in mind that the ECtHR is 
effectively a broad civil and political rights ‘back stop’ to the more comprehensive 
and nuanced policing of the essential elements of freedom of association 
undertaken by the ILO bodies, UNCESCR and ESRC. Crucially, neither the court nor 
the UK government chose to question the status of the Wages Council as a 
mechanism for promoting and facilitating voluntary collective bargaining – a tacit 
acknowledgement that the provision of minimum terms and conditions through 
tripartite negotiation cannot be said to amount to state compulsion.1040 
 
 Nevertheless a brief reconsideration of ‘the European and international 
instruments’ referred to is required to rebut the implication that they are 
insufficiently emphatic about the obligation to promote collective bargaining. It 
will be recalled that the full text of  Article 6, European Social Charter is set out in 
chapter 3 (p119). 6(2 requires states: 
 
 ‘[W]ith a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to bargain 
collectively…to promote, where necessary and appropriate, machinery for 
voluntary negotiations between employers’ organisations and workers’ 
organizations…’ 
 
Agriculture would be precisely the sort of sector where machinery is ‘necessary 
and appropriate’ – so much so that, in the absence of a national minimum wage 
the Major government was obliged to leave the AWB alone. Without it there 
                                                                                                                                                       
farmers were to employ in excess of 20 employees, the task of bringing tens of thousands of Schedule A1 
applications would be expensive and time consuming (see below for consideration of the statutory recognition 
procedures). 
1039Ibid. Although the government did argue that the National Minimum Wage meant that the AWB was no longer 
required it was careful not to refer to the reason the last Major government (arguably more radical than any of the 
Thatcher governments) had retained the AWB – without it the terms and conditions in the sector would have been 
likely to have plummeted to levels low enough to disgrace an already beleaguered administration. 
1040
Certainly an indication that the government did not want a ruling on the question, which amounts to the same 
thing. 
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would have been a ‘race to the bottom’ in an underpaid and badly organised 
sector – a potential political embarrassment.1041 
State acceptance of the right – as opposed to the mere freedom - to bargain 
collectively, as well as the requirement to promote collective bargaining and 
establish machinery to that end could scarcely be clearer. The approach of the 
ECSR has, however, been remarkably cautious when called upon to censure the 
UK over Article 6 (1) and (2), and this clearly influenced the reasoning in the 
UNITE case – a cynic might suggest that it helped the Strasbourg justify the ruling 
it wanted to hand down. 
 
The committee prefers to accord more weight to the obligation to guarantee 
workers the freedom to strike as a means to persuade employers to the 
bargaining table: Article 6(4), binds the right to strike to collective bargaining. In 
its first supervisory cycle the Committee held that ‘any limitation to this right to 
strike connected with the conclusion of new collective agreements could not be 
considered compatible with the provisions of the Charter,’1042  confirming that 
6(4) obliges governments to protect the right of workers to strike in support of 
recognition for the purposes of collective bargaining in a dispute with both their 
immediate employer, and in support of workers employed elsewhere engaged in 
a similar dispute. Similarly the Committee holds that a state in breach of its Article 
5 (right to organise) obligations cannot be said in conformity with 6(2). 
So while the UK government’s brazen breach of its obligation to actively promote 
collective bargaining has largely escaped the explicit censure it arguably deserves, 
Article 6(4) and Article 5 have served to ensure that its success in undermining the 
opportunity for workers to bargain collectively by restricting the right to strike has 
not. It will be recalled that the Committee’s recent condemnation of the UK 
blanket ban on secondary action was notable for its stridency.  
While it is perhaps unfortunate that the ECSR has laid so much emphasis on the 
role of the right to strike in securing recognition for collective bargaining 
                                               
1041In the UNITE case the government argued that the provision of the NMW rendered the AWB redundant. 
However, a minimum hourly wage is only an aspect of the terms and conditions governed by the AWB. Working 
time and overtime rates are as important. The abandonment of ‘time and a half’ and ‘double time’ in favour of flat 
rates and the introduction open ended working days (hence the extraordinary hostility to the Working Time 
Directive) are an overlooked feature of the reduction in collective bargaining coverage of the last 30 odd years. 
1042
Conclusions 1, p183, see Lenia Samuel, Fundamental Social Rights, Case Law of the European Social Charter, 
(Strasbourg, Council of Europe,1997) p.164. 
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purposes, the ILO supervisory bodies have been less distracted by the reliance of 
collective bargaining on the freedom to strike. 
It will be recalled that Convention No. 154 on Collective Bargaining was not 
ratified because the Thatcher government did not want to be obliged to promote 
collective bargaining – something it was, of course, already obliged to do by virtue 
of Convention No.98, and Article 6(2) ESC, among other treaty obligations. It is 
also the case that the ECtHR in UNITE took the view that C154 is a ‘technical’ 
rather than a fundamental Convention. 
 
 It is certainly the case that the provisions of C154 are an aid to the interpretation 
of C98 (and that the ILO categorises it a s a technical convention), but it can be 
argued that C154 is embraced by the 1998 Declaration requiring all states ‘even if 
they have not ratified the Conventions in question’ to recognize freedom of 
association and ‘the effective recognition’ of the right to bargain collectively.1043 It 
is a fundamental Convention in that it clarifies the obligations imposed by C98 to 
show the ‘recognition of the right to bargain collectively’ goes well beyond the 
mere freedom that the ECtHR protects. It demands positive action by states -
effective mechanisms like the AWB. 
 
The Collective Bargaining Recommendation (No.163) 1981 accompanied C154. 
The recommendation presents us with the ‘Means of Promoting Collective 
Bargaining.’ Essentially these are the adoption of ‘measures adapted to national 
conditions… so that …representative employers’ and workers’ organizations are 
recognized for the purposes of collective bargaining’; government training for 
negotiators; and the provision of information to facilitate collective bargaining.1044 
Article 5 of C154 tells us that ‘promotion’ first requires that collective bargaining 
‘should be made possible’ [Article 5(2)(a)]. This, of course, is as far as the ECtHR’s 
unsatisfactory current interpretation of Article 11 ECHR takes us. Yet, where 
workers are faced with an employer who refuses to negotiate and effective strike 
action in pursuit of recognition is unlawful, then arguably bargaining cannot be 
said to be possible.  
                                               
1043ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work ,para 2(a).  
1044
From paras 2-9 of the Recommendation. That R163 has not been accepted by the UK is irrelevant. This is what 
the ILO consider to be the promotion of collective bargaining demanded by C98 and A6ESC. Of course the 1999 
Schedule 1 recognition procedures and the existence as Acas, unsatisfactory as they are, can arguably be said to 
support a claim that the UK adheres to the R163 guidelines. 
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Assuming the ‘level playing field’ provided by the full freedom of association 
demanded by C87 and C98, and, as a consequence, the natural progression to 
recognition that full freedom should ensure, Article 5 of C154 then goes on to 
require that ‘collective bargaining should be progressively extended’ to cover all 
the matters in a comprehensive list set out in Article 2 of the Convention [Article 
5(2)b], and that rules should be set to establish the bargaining procedures [Article 
5(2)c]. Conscious that such regulation can be used to stifle the freedom to 
bargain, the Convention states that the rules must not be such as to hamper 
proceedings, nor should they be inadequate or inappropriate [Article 5(2)d]. 
Article 5(2)(e) requires that ‘bodies and procedures for the settlement of labour 
disputes should be so conceived as to contribute to the promotion of collective 
bargaining.’   
 
Clearly the UK falls well short of its obligations in this regard. Acas, as was noted 
in chapter 3 was stripped of its duty to promote collective bargaining in 1993, the 
year the Wage Councils were abolished. The nearest the UK has to a set of 
bargaining rules is the basic collective agreement on hours, pay and holidays that 
the CAC can – although such a step has very rarely never yet been necessary - 
impose upon an employer who refuses to recognize a union despite a ‘declaration 
for recognition’ having been issued under the statutory recognition procedures.  
___________________________________ 
 
We can conclude therefore that in order to comply with its obligations under the 
ILO and European Social Charter jurisprudence the UK government must give 
effective recognition to the right of workers to negotiate collectively. This 
requires full freedom of association. 
 
 The freedom to take secondary action must be restored 
 In poorly organised sectors, mechanisms to promote and facilitate 
voluntary collective bargaining must be established: modern equivalents of 
the old Wage Councils should be set up to oblige the representatives of 
employers and workers to negotiate minimum terms and conditions of 
employment in these sectors 
 Formal bargaining procedures, and properly trained negotiators to facilitate 
the negotiation of establishment level collective agreements should be 
provided 
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To these requirements must be added the needs identified in chapter 3 with 
regard to inducements made by employers to persuade workers to forgo 
collective bargaining: 
 
 Workers and trade unions should be able to invoke the law to prevent 
employers offering inducements to workers to forgo collective 
bargaining. 
 
 
8) The Right to Recognition 
 
Where a significant number of workers in a given bargain unit are represented by 
a trade union the employer the union should be recognised for collective 
bargaining purposes. Where exclusive bargaining rights are sought, if majority 
support can be demonstrated by the union concerned then exclusive recognition 
should be granted. Governments are obliged to promote, encourage, and, where 
necessary, establish machinery to facilitate voluntary recognition,but compulsory 
recognition is not prohibited by the principles of freedom of association. 
Recognition of an employer dominated staff association for collective bargaining 
purposes cannot be justification for non-recognition of a representative union. 
Recognition procedures must not exclude any aspect of the employment 
relationship from collective negotiation. 
_____________________________________________ 
The ILO supervisory bodies have made state obligations in this often over 
complicated area plain enough. The CFA:  
 
‘Recognition by an employer of the main unions represented in the 
undertaking, or the most representative of these unions, is the very basis 
for any procedure for collective bargaining on conditions of employment in 
the undertaking.’1045 
 
The CEACR emphasises the voluntary nature of such recognition:  
                                               
10452006 Digest, para 953. 
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‘the public authority should encourage employers to recognise trade unions 
which can prove their representivity.’1046   
Government intervention should be restricted to  
‘a legal framework and an administrative structure to which they may have 
recourse on a voluntary basis and by mutual agreement…1047machinery and 
procedures should be designed to facilitate bargaining between the two 
sides of industry leaving them free to reach their own settlement.”1048 
However, as already noted, this voluntaristic stance sits uneasily with the practical 
realities of overcoming employer resistance, particularly in states like the UK 
which restrict the freedom for workers to take industrial action. All sectoral 
bargaining systems and recognition procedures inevitably rely on an element of 
compulsion. It is also worth reiterating my argument that state compulsion does 
not breach the ILO principles of freedom of association. 1049 As the CFA Digest of 
Decisions puts it, it is not contrary to Convention No.98  
 
‘to oblige social partners, within the framework of the encouragement and 
promotion of the full development and utilization of collective bargaining 
machinery, to enter into negotiations on terms and conditions of 
employment. The public authorities should however refrain from any 
undue interference in the negotiation process.’1050 
 
Arguably recognition mechanisms should exist only to ensure an ordered and 
strike free path to the negotiating table. With full freedom of association assured, 
recognition for collective bargaining purposes should be usual in all but the most 
exceptional circumstances. However, lawful secondary action has, of course, 
always been crucial to securing recognition, and without it any procedures geared 
towards securing voluntary recognition, are hamstrung. 
                                               
1046 CEACR 1994General Survey 1994, para 240, emphasis added. 
1047 Ibid, para 247, emphasis added. 
1048 1994 General Survey, Para 248 
1049States permitting trade unionists to compel employers to recognise trade unions and conclude a collective 
agreement do not fall outside the principles of freedom of association (see Gustaffson v Sweden ECtHR [1996], op 
cit). 
1050
Para 921. Notice only ‘undue interference’ in the actual negotiations is discouraged. See with regard to the 
European Social Charter Federation of Finnish Enterprises v Finland [2007] Case No. 35/2006, a case considered by 
the ECSR under the Collective Complaints Procedure to be found at www.coe.int ‘Processed Complaints.’. 
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 The CFA holds that: 
 
‘A ban on strikes related to recognition disputes (for collective bargaining) 
is not in conformity with the principles of freedom of association.’1051  
 
The fundamental importance of secondary action to the achievement of 
recognition was identified – and targeted - by the first Thatcher government: 
Section 14 of the Employment Act 1982 (now S. 225 of TULR(C)A)  expressly 
placed secondary industrial action engaged in to persuade an employer to 
recognize a trade union beyond the protection of the statutory immunities, 
tightening the restriction on lawful secondary action that had been imposed in 
1980 when the immunities were narrowed to action against the immediate 
suppliers or customers of the employer in the primary dispute imposed in 1980. 
 
In 1997 the incoming New Labour government was obliged to restore the full 
freedom of association lost during 1980-1993, but it did not.1052 Instead it passed 
the Employment Relations Act 1999 - essentially a handful of union friendly 
individual rights accompanying the new trade union recognition procedures in 
Schedule A1 of the Act. The new government withheld the full freedom of 
association required to secure voluntary recognition agreements but presented 
the labour movement with a complex and carefully drafted set of regulations 
ostensibly aimed at facilitating recognition. It is a tribute to the ineffectiveness of 
the regulations that they have remained intact during the last eight years of Tory 
dominated governments.  
 
When denied full freedom of association, and the opportunity to take lawful 
secondary action to require employers to bargain with them in 1971, workers in 
the UK found themselves compensated with statutory recognition procedures. 
 
However, then the Wages Councils system was intact, voluntary Joint Industrial 
Councils still existed, and the levels of collective agreement coverage were 
around 80% and rising. In 1999 coverage was around half of that figure and 
                                               
1051  See 2006 Digest, paras 534 & 535 & 536. The prohibition of strikes in support of the extension of collective 
agreements to other employers is similarly a breach of the government’s obligation to protect freedom of 
association (ibid, paras 539-540). 
1052
  See note 201 above on responsibility of current governments for legislation of past governments in the ILO 
jurisprudence. 
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falling. Of the Wages Councils, only the Agricultural Wages Board remained, and 
the JICs had disappeared. 
 
In the 1970s much would have depended on the attitude of the Department of 
Employment (strictly speaking power lay with the Secretary of State) which had 
considerable discretion, much as Order 1305, Order 1376 and the 1959 Terms and 
Conditions of Employment Act had given the Ministry of Labour a great deal of 
discretion over what could be said to have been de facto recognition. However, 
the 1971 procedures were part of a bid to replace voluntarism with a new, less 
volatile, more formal system of industrial relations, and the Act sought to 
promote collective agreement at establishment level, and there is no reason to 
believe, that had the 1971 procedures actually been utilised, they would not have 
been effective.  
 
In contrast, the1999 procedures were arguably essentially a political gesture to 
atone for the continuing denial of full freedom of association and the 
maintenance of a new industrial relations system based on the individual contract 
of employment, and had been calculated to be ineffective. Compulsory 
recognition of representative unions,1053 which would have gone some way 
towards compensating for the restrictions on freedom of association, was never a 
realistic hope, and the UK procedures have been described, as ‘semi-
voluntary,’1054coaxing the employer towards voluntary agreement at every stage. 
If majority support can be demonstrated in a ‘bargaining unit’, the unit either 
agreed by the parties or determined by CAC, then an employer can ultimately be 
obliged to negotiate with the union concerned on pay, hours and holidays. Should 
a collective agreement not be reached then the CAC can impose one – the ‘model’ 
agreement is legally binding, and few employers have been misguided enough to 
push the procedures to this point.  
 
                                               
1053Compulsory recognition, as well as being at odds with the voluntary nature of the collective bargaining that 
states party to the ESC, UNICESCR and fundamental ILO Conventions, is likely to test the ‘good faith’ of the parties 
– the standard of mutual respect and confidence required by the CFA for effective negotiation (2006 digest paras 
934-943). Even an employer determined to take an ‘uncompromising’ stance can be said to negotiate in good faith 
(2006 digest para 938) but one forced to the negotiating table to face union representatives unable to back their 
demands with effective industrial action is likely to be both uncompromising and contemptuous. 
 
1054
See Sian Moore Ten Years of Statutory Recognition –A changed landscape for UK industrial relations? [2010] 
Sianr.moore@uwe.ac.uk 
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Governments can by pass or mitigate the ‘rough and tumble’ of free voluntary 
collective bargaining by choosing to introduce effective statutory recognition 
procedures which provide a legally enforceable right to collective bargaining. That 
proposed by the IER Manifesto for Labour Law, for example, would require 
evidence of majority support, and evidence that 10% of the workers in the 
bargaining unit in question are members of the union to trigger compulsory 
recognition, imposing on the employer to bargain with the union on all the terms 
and conditions of employment. If those thresholds are not reached then each 
worker should be able to require their employer to bargain in good faith with 
their particular trade union.1055 This would confer on workers both a collective 
legal right to require the employer to bargain with one union, and an unequivocal 
individual legal right to bargain collectively, in addition to the freedom to bargain 
guaranteed in practice by full freedom of association. 
 
Here however is the rub; voluntary recognition will almost inevitably lead to a 
collective agreement which the employer is free to break, contrary to the ILO 
jurisprudence, which holds that ‘agreements should be binding on the parties,’1056 
while compulsory recognition – falling outside the ILO concept of freedom of 
association - can potentially result in a collective agreement which binds the 
unwilling employer. Recognition will have the effect also of giving the union 
consultation rights on redundancies, TUPE transfers, and health and safety 
matters, compounding the level of state compulsion. But with the opportunity to 
take lawful industrial action so heavily restricted UK statutory recognition must 
inevitably have resort to compulsion – without it, weak and ‘employer friendly’ as 
they are, the procedures would be wholly meaningless. 
The relationship of the UK Regulations with the ILO jurisprudence can thus 
arguably best be described as dysfunctional. 
 UK procedures are arguably unnecessarily geared to securing exclusive 
recognition and incorporate ILO safeguards against trade union monopolies to the 
detriment of unions obliged to use the procedures to secure recognition. The 
government is not presented with a binary choice of either exclusive recognition 
                                               
1055
See Ewing, Hendy & Jones (eds), A Manifesto for Labour Law: towards a comprehensive revision of workers’ 
rights, 2016, paras 3.19-3.21. 
1056CFA 2006 Digest, para 939 – see also paras 940-943. 
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or non exclusive recognition, but it presents workers with the choice of exclusive 
recognition or no recognition at all. Trade unions with significant levels of 
membership among an employer’s workforce should be recognized for non-
exclusive collective bargaining purposes. The current regulations cater for 
minority unions only in so far as they permit conjoined applications for exclusive 
rights. 
 Yet the CFA have held that ‘to negotiate a collective agreement at the enterprise 
level’ – not exclusive rights – ‘it should be sufficient…to establish it is sufficiently 
representative.’  1057Where the law demands a 50% support threshold for 
recognition as a bargaining agent,1058 and ‘a majority union which fails to secure 
this absolute majority is thus denied the possibility of bargaining’ then ‘collective 
bargaining rights should be granted to all the unions in this unit, at least on behalf 
of their own members.’1059 
 The majority ballot threshold is 40% in the UK procedures, ensuring that the ILO 
jurisprudence cannot be relied upon to argue that rights be granted in this way 
should produce anything other than a binary ‘all or nothing’ result. Requiring first 
evidence of majority support and 10% membership density in a bargaining unit, 
and then winning a majority in a ballot which includes 40% support from all who 
are eligible to vote still ensures that it is very difficult to secure the necessary 
majority,1060 and it will be recalled that this is the figure used in relation to 
‘important public services’ in the Trade Union Act 2016. 
Remarkably, if employers choose to voluntarily recognise a non independent staff 
association (or, of course, an independent union) that recognition will then block 
all statutory applications, even where the union has majority support. The UK 
regulations depart radically from their loose approximation to the ILO standards 
at this point to breach all government treaty obligations in respect of collective 
bargaining. The obscurely worded para 35(1) which provides this lacuna is said to 
                                               
10572006 Digest, para 957. Emphasis added. 
1058
 1994 General Survey, para 240 
1059
Ibid, para 241. 
1060 On the obstacles presented by the para 36 thresholds see Ruth Dukes, ‘The Statutory Recognition Procedures 
1999: No Bias in Favour of Recognition?’ (2008) 37 ILJ 236. 
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have been the price of Rupert Murdoch’s support for New Labour in 1997.1061 The 
CAC, in one recent case,1062 ruled that permitting the establishment of a staff 
association to block a statutory bid by an independent union would be a breach of 
Article 11 ECHR, and that therefore the procedures must be construed to allow 
the union’s application. The Court of Appeal however ultimately held that the 
procedures are compliant with the ECHR, and workers must formally derecognise 
the staff association before the application by the union can be considered.1063 
The decision was arguably a direct consequence of the 2016 UNITE Strasbourg 
case, the court taking the view that the union in question had not been denied the 
freedom to bargain. The staff association could be derecognised – even if, given 
the inadequacies of the procedures, and particularly the protections against anti-
union strategies and individual victimisation,1064 there was little chance of that 
happening. 
 
 The decision is highly questionable. The CEACR specifically hold that Article 2(2) 
of Convention No.98 prohibits the establishment of employer dominated staff 
associations to block attempts by independent unions to gain recognition (paras 
228 - 234 CEACR General Survey 1994), while in the context of the limited right to 
strike in the UK, 35(1) is still arguably a prima facie breach of Article 11 ECHR, 1065  
 As well as Article 6(2) ESC and Article 8(a) and (c) UNICESCR. 
 
 In a Direct Request in 2012 the CEACR had questioned the position under the 
recognition procedures whereby the derecognition of an non independent 
incumbent union, ‘the very existence of which is a violation of ILO Convention 
No.98, Article 2’, cannot be made by an independent trade union must be made 
                                               
1061
News International has had a Staff Association since it left Fleet Street for Wapping in 1986.  KD Ewing argued 
that the so called ‘Murdoch clause’ breached Article 2 of C98 ECHR in ‘Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 1992, Schedule A1’ (2000) 29 ILJ 267. 
1062Pharmacists’ Defence Association v Boots Management Services Ltd (TUR1/823/2012). 
1063PDA v Boots and Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills [2017] EWCA Civ 66. 
1064 On the unsatisfactory, individual nature of these protections, see Alan Bogg, ‘Employment Relations Act 2004: 
Another False Dawn for Collectivism?’ (2005)  34 ILJ 72. Existing protections had been augmented by the 2004 Act. 
Bogg made a damning reappraisal of the ineffectiveness of the Schedule A1 protections against anti-union 
strategies and individual victimisation in the context of statutory recognition in ‘The Mouse that Never Roared! 
Unfair Practices and Union Recognition’ (2009) 38 ILJ 390. See also KD Ewing, S Moore and S Wood, Unfair Labour 
Practices: Trade Union Recognition and Employer Resistance (Liverpool, IER, 2007). 
 
1065 See Alan Bogg and Ruth Dukes’ arguments in ‘Article 11 ECHR and The Right to Collective Bargaining: 
Pharmacists’ Defence Association Union v Boots Management Services Ltd’ (2017) 46 ILJ 543 
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by an individual worker, and that while the derecognition procedure is in train the 
incumbent union has a right to communicate with the workforce but any union 
seeking recognition in its place does not.1066 The union should be permitted 
access to the work place to present its case to the workforce. Article 2 of 
Convention No.135 of 1971 requires employers to provide ‘such facilities’ as to 
enable workers’ representatives ‘to carry out their functions,’ and the 
accompanying recommendation (No.143), at 16(1) states that: 
 
‘Trade union representatives who are not employed in the undertaking but 
whose trade union has members employed therein should be granted 
access to the undertaking.’ 
 
The 1999 recognition procedures fall short of ILO standards in one other 
important respect. When obliged to recognise a union only pay, hours and 
holidays need be the subject of collective negotiation.1067 The CEACR has noted 
that a common infringement of the autonomy required by C98 is ‘the exclusion of 
certain matters from the scope of bargaining,” 1068 and ‘considers that measures 
taken unilaterally by the authorities to restrict the scope of negotiable issues are 
often incompatible with the Convention…’1069 
___________________________________ 
 
UK compliance with its obligations to secure employer recognition of trade unions 
for collective bargaining purposes therefore depends upon: 
 
 The freedom for workers to take secondary action 
 
 The amendment of the statutory procedures to ensure that ‘sufficiently 
representative’ minority unions are recognized by employers for 
collective bargaining purposes where no one union has the right to 
exclusive recognition 
                                               
1066Adopted 2012, published 102nd ILC Session (2013). This followed Observation (CEACR) – adopted 2010, 
published 100th ILC session (2011) on C98 in which the Committee ‘once again requests the Government to provide 
its observations’ on these matters and on the ‘various unfair practices and anti union tactics in the framework of 
the statutory recognition scheme’ brought to the attention of the CEACR by the TUC and ITUC. 
1067 Odd when one considers that they were drafted at the height of Social Europe when so much was expected in 
terms of workplace negotiation for the implementation of workplace rights that had been negotiated by what was 
effectively european level collective bargaining. 
1068
 1994 General Survey, para 248. 
10691994 General Survey, para 250. 
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 The removal of the ‘Murdoch clause’, Regulation 35(1) 
 
 Access to the workplace for independent trade unions seeking 
recognition  
 
 The extension of the areas subject to collective negotiation under the 
statutory procedures to those listed in Article 2 of Convention No. 154 
 
While the failures of the UK government to adhere to its regional and 
international obligations with regard to the fundamental labour rights identified 
in this chapter are wide ranging and egregious, the blanket ban on secondary 
action is arguably the most significant. So fundamental is the freedom to take 
secondary industrial action in support of the occupational aims of other workers 
and to bring human rights concerns – whether categorized as civil and political or 
economic and social rights - to the attention of government, and the wider public, 
when lawful secondary action is prohibited all labour rights are undermined, both 
collective and individual. 
 
The fundamental rights stand together and fall together – taking individual rights 
with them, as we saw during 2013 – 2017 under the fees regime. Not only would 
there have been little prospect of a Tory dominated government being able to 
impose a fees regime if workers had enjoyed full freedom of association, but, 
such is the inter-relationship of the two broad categories of rights, that individual 
rights depend to large degree on organised labour for their effectiveness. It was 
noted following the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 that there was 
no evidence that it was the prospect of being brought before a tribunal which saw 
employers respecting statutory rights,1070 but that the crucial factor was a trade 
union presence in the workplace.1071 It was noted that since 1980 there had been 
a shift in the primary role of unions ‘from limiting the obligations placed on 
employees by employers, towards monitoring the exercise of employers’ 
obligations towards their employees’, 1072 and, by the turn of the century, it was 
apparent that  
                                               
1070 Brown et al 1999, op cit, p624. 
1071 Ibid, ‘…as in other areas of labour law such as health and safety…statutory rights are more likely to be upheld 
where trade unions are present ‘(p623). 
1072 Ibid, p 619.  
301 
 
‘the extent to which employers are complying with their legal obligations 
depends significantly on the presence of active trade unions at workplace 
and trade union level. The study suggests that collective procedures are the 
custodians of individual rights.’1073 
 
Effective collective bargaining is, as we have seen, dependent on the opportunity 
for workers to take lawful and effective industrial action. Effective industrial 
relations is similarly dependent. As the blanket ban on secondary action was 
imposed, step by step, during 1980 – 1990 industrial relations were thrown into 
disarray. The corner stone of voluntarism had been removed, and workers found 
themselves unable to hold the government to its obligation to promote collective 
bargaining through lawful strike action, just as the government found the 
confidence – for want of a better word - to act in breach of many of its treaty 
obligations and abandon the rule of law. The prohibition on secondary action 
(effectively achieved by 1984,1074 although the matter was not explicitly 
addressed in a statute until 1990), permitted the post Miners’ Strike legislation of 
1986 – 1993 to pass on to the statute books without the wave of industrial action 
which very likely would otherwise have been provoked. When the attack on 
workers’ rights was renewed after the Tory and Liberal Democrat Coalition 
government was formed in 2010, the extraordinary 2013 imposition of 
employment tribunal fees, and the Trade Union Act 2016 went similarly 
unchallenged, although, after 35 years of declining union membership, and the 
erosion of  the ability of trade unions to enforce solidarity, there is some question 
as to how effective any ‘days of action’ would have been even if by some miracle 
the ban on secondary action had been lifted temporarily to permit a lawful 
general strike.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1073 Ibid, p 627. 
1074When the Employment Act 1982 came fully into force. 
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Chapter Six 
Benchmarking Individual Workers’ Rights – interventions into 
the ordinary terms and conditions of employment 
In this chapter I examine the minimum terms and conditions the Government is 
bound to guarantee the individual worker in relation to workplace safety, working 
time, remuneration and dismissal. This first category of rights can be seen as 
something of chimera - a prime example of the interrelationship of individual and 
collective rights. Rights to occupational safety and health [OSH] are arguably as 
easily characterised as civil rights as they are as social or economic rights, falling 
to be enforced by the individual worker, and by public authorities, as well as by 
trade unions. Unions work with employers to monitor workplace safety, and there 
are said to be around 150,000 union health and safety representative in the UK. 
The issues they raise are sometimes the subject of dispute and negotiation, 
occasionally necessitating strike action.  
 While individual workers are able to seek compensation for injury and 
consequent loss through actions in tort for workplace negligence and breaches of 
statutory duty,1075 local authorities and the Health and Safety Executive have the 
overarching responsibility for supervising and monitoring compliance with the 
law, and investigating workplace accidents and instances of ill health caused by 
exposure to substances in the workplace, working conditions and working 
practices.1076  Breaches of health and safety law by employers occasionally invite 
the ultimate form of collective intervention in the form of criminal proceedings 
and imprisonment.  
Statutory intervention into working time, remuneration and dismissal  can 
arguably be seen as the antithesis of voluntarism, and, as we have seen, UK 
governments have usually declined to ratify ILO Conventions which demanded 
such intervention on the grounds that these were matters best left to collective 
                                               
1075
 Almost exclusively the former now that s6 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 had amended s47 
of the HSWR 1974 to remove strict liability for most breaches of H&S regulations. 
1076
 For the division of responsibility see www.hse.gov.uk/foi/internationalops/og/og-00073-appendix1.htm, which 
will show the Health and Safety (Enforcing Authority) Regulations 1998: A-Z guide to allocation. 
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agreement. Before the age of individualism these rights were, on the domestic 
plane, exclusively contractual rights. They were the product of the exercise of the 
collective rights and freedoms which were the subject of the previous chapter. It 
is notable that the first statutory individual rights were rights to minimum notice 
and to redundancy payments, conferred in an attempt to reduce the incidence of 
industrial action and can also therefore be seen to be the product of collective 
action. 
As a consequence, although certain obligations relating to fair remuneration and 
working time had been acceptable to pre-1979 Governments (previously satisfied 
precisely because ‘the great majority’ of workers were protected by collective 
bargaining),1077 the majority of the obligations considered in this chapter, 
imposed by the EU, the European Social Charter and UN Covenant of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, are obligations which have evolved. 
Not only have evolving interpretations added to the burden of obligation, but 
commitments made by Governments in the 1960s and 1970s to the progressive 
realisation of the Charter and Covenant rights have, with the passage of time 
crystallised into immediate obligations. Similarly, the individual employment 
rights imposed by virtue of EU membership were the result of evolution, of ‘ever 
closer union’ – of developments only very few had envisaged in 1973. 
1: The Right to Health and Safety at Work 
A ‘comprehensive national policy on occupational safety and health’ is required, 
policed by an independent and adequately resourced inspectorate to investigate, 
monitor, and implement enforcement action where substantive general and 
industry specific technical and procedural standards are breached.  An adequate 
OSH regime will include the provision of adequate pay, daily and weekly rest, 
holidays, and paid sick leave. 
Advice and guidance should be provided employers, but appropriate and 
dissuasive penalties must be imposed. The reach of the inspectorate should 
                                               
1077
 The government is now in breach of those requirements as a consequence of the withdrawal of collective 
bargaining. See, for example Article 4(1) in the section on the Charter in chapter 3. 
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extend into the informal economy, and to domestic workers. It must have the 
authority to enter workplaces freely and without prior notice.  
There must be grievance mechanisms for workers. Treatment, rehabilitation and 
compensation for those injured must be guaranteed. 
Comprehensive reporting systems must be established.  
 
States are required to notify the public of occupational accidents and disease.  
 
‘Whistle blowers’ must be protected. 
 
______________________________________ 
Just two ILO Conventions impose OSH sectoral, activity, and substance specific 
obligations on the Government, the Radiation Protection Convention No.115 of 
1960, and the Working Environment (Air Pollution, Noise and Vibration) 
Convention (No.148) of 1977.The vast majority of health and safety workplace 
rights take the form of duties imposed upon employers as regulations deriving 
their authority from the European Union treaties which bind the Government. 
The content of these sectoral, activity, and substance, specific regulations is 
dictated by a range of EU Directives, augmented by EU Regulations. As we have 
seen in previous chapters, Directives permit states a margin of appreciation in 
their application. Where implementation has been inadequate they may be 
‘directly effective’ against public authorities. EU Regulations apply almost as if 
they were domestic legislation, and are said to be ‘directly applicable,’ whether or 
not states choose to incorporate them in domestic law.1078 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights reflects the complex European health and 
safety regime in a necessarily generalised but recognisably individualised form: 
Article 31(1) states that ‘Every worker has the right to working conditions which 
respect his or her health, safety and dignity.’ The regime, which places specific 
obligations on employers in order to secure to this simple entitlement is, 
however, of considerable complexity. 
                                               
1078 See P Craig and G de Búrca, EU Law Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford, OUP, 2011) p107-8. 
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The first two OSH Directives were adopted in 1977 and 1978, results of the Social 
Action Programme launched in 1974.1079 One required workplace notices to 
indicate particular dangers and the location of safety equipment, and the other 
governed the use of a category of particularly harmful chemicals. Although overt 
OSH interventions ceased during 1979 – 1986,1080 two subsequent action 
programmes undertaken between 1978 and 1986 saw a number of public safety 
‘technical’ directives adopted, including, in 1980, a Framework Directive on 
hazardous agents,1081 which spawned three ‘daughter’ directives controlling 
noise, and the use of lead and asbestos. A fourth unequivocally prohibited the use 
of a number of highly toxic substances. 1082 
 
The new competence conferred by Article 118a, inserted into the Treaty of Rome 
by the SEA 1986 (now Article 153 of the TFEU), explicitly extending the reach of 
the European Community to workplace health and safety,1083 permitted the 
adoption in 1989 of the Occupational Safety and Health Framework Directive,1084 
and the five basic OSH daughter directives on specific workplace hazards adopted 
under the authority of Article 16(1) of the Framework Directive. These related to 
work places and equipment in general, and, more specifically, to personal 
protective equipment, ‘manual handling’ – safe lifting and carrying - and the use 
of display screens. 1085A raft of occupation, equipment and material specific 
Directives followed. Currently there are 19 individual 16(1) Directives in force, 
including the original five (or revised versions of those five).1086 Beyond those 
there are the directives less closely related to the provisions of the Framework 
directive, such as the Working Time Directives, and OSH Directives specifically 
aimed at protecting workers considered more vulnerable - those employed on 
fixed term and temporary contracts, and younger workers.  
 
                                               
1079
 See chapter four. 
1080
 Ibid, on UK resistance to the SAP.  
1081
 Directive 80/1107/EEC. See Barnard, EC Employment Law, 3
rd
 Edition pp 541-543. 
1082 Ibid, p543. 
1083 See chapter 4 for a discussion of QMV, the SEA H&S competence and the overlap with employment matters 
believed by the UK to require unanimous approval.  While OSH measures can be seen as economic measures 
ensuring ‘a level playing field ‘for competition, workplace safety can also be seen to merges with public safety. For 
example, under the Euratom Treaty the health and safety aspects of ionising radiation were, and continue to be a 
matter of primary importance. The road haulage driving time ‘tachograph rules’ (see p** below) are also H&S laws 
which arguably transcend categorisation to become public safety matters. 
1084
 Directive 1989/391/EEC, closely modeled on ILO Convention No.155 which has not been ratified by the UK 
1085
 Directives 89/654 – 656 and  90/269 -70. 
1086
 Listed in an article by Carsten Bruck of Kooperationssteelle Hamburg IFE GmbH, Germany in General Principles 
of EU OSH legislation on the EU OSH Agency website ‘OSH WIKI.’ 
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The less overtly OSH technical Directives, augmented by EU Regulations, had 
continued to be adopted  and revised during the 1979 – 1986 hiatus, and in 1998 
the ‘hazardous agents’ Framework Directive of 1980 and its progeny  were 
subsumed into the new regime. Since then more dangerous substances and 
associated procedures have been targeted, notably by the REACH Regulations,1087 
and by fresh directives like the Carcinogens Directive of 2004,1088  as the focus has 
shifted on to the causes and prevention of occupational disease, and away from 
immediate physical workplace safety.  
 
These EU obligations can also be said to be European Social Charter obligations. In 
the first interpretative statement on Article 3 of the Charter the European 
Committee on Social Rights holds that in order to fulfil the requirements of Article 
3(1), the ‘core’ requirement for states to issue OSH regulations, states must 
‘prove that safety and health regulations have been issued for all economic 
sectors.’ 1089A recent Statement of Interpretation on Article 3(1) incorporates a 
very comprehensive list broadly covering all the areas of EU regulation. These are 
subject to regular updating. The Committee  ‘has at its disposal a very complete 
set of international technical reference standards which can be of use for defining 
and listing the main risks and occupations,’ which require protective measures 
sufficient to comply with 3(1). It promises that it ‘will explain the new areas to 
which it will turn its full attention each time it examines Article 3.’1090 
 
 Article 3(1) can thus be seen to require the UK to adhere to the requirements of 
the EU OSH regime whether or not in continues to be bound by the EU treaties. 
 
Similarly, the ILO Promotional Framework Occupational Safety and Health 
Convention No.187 of 2006, ratified by the UK in 2008, requires states to have a 
national health and safety policy, system and programme in place. In the General 
comment (No.23) on Article 7of the United Nations International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights guarantees the right to just and favourable 
conditions of work the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights holds 
that the provision of a ‘comprehensive national policy on occupational safety and 
health’ is a core obligation of states party to the Covenant.1091 
                                               
1087 Reg (EC) No.1907/2006 concerning the Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals. 
1088
 2004/37. 
1089
 Conclusions I,1965-1967 Statement of Interpretation Article 3. 
1090
 Conclusions XIV-2, [1999] Article 3(1) & Statement of Interpretation (2013) Article 3. 
1091 Ibid, para 65. 
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‘Safe and healthy working conditions’ [A7 (b)] require ‘broad participation in the 
formulation, implementation and review’ of the policies to ensure such 
conditions. Not only must trade unions be involved, ‘whistle blowers’ must be 
protected.1092 Comprehensive reporting is a necessity; 
 
‘the policy should promote the collection and dissemination of reliable and 
valid data on the fullest possible range of occupational accidents and 
disease, including accidents involving workers while commuting to and 
from work.”1093   
 
States have a specific legal obligation to establish ‘notification schemes in the 
event of occupational accidents and disease.’ 1094  ‘Under reporting’ is an 
undisputed aspect of the UK OSH regime, acknowledged even by the Health and 
Safety Executive,1095 and is an unequivocal breach of the basic regimes required 
by the Covenant, the ILO, and the European Social Charter. The HSE estimated 
that in 2016 -17 there had been 1.3 million cases of work related ill health in the 
UK. Those cases, however, were only the cases where the individuals concerned 
had worked during the previous 12 months - the long term cases were excluded 
from the figures. Yet the annual cost in 2015-16 of these new cases alone was 
estimated to be in the region of 9.7 billion pounds. 
 
There were around 600,000 non fatal workplace injuries in 2016-2017,1096and the 
annual toll is estimated to cost the UK 14.9 billion pounds.1097  Yet the HSE records 
only 137 work place deaths in 2016/17, while 92 members of the public were 
killed ‘due to work related activities.’1098 These figures mask the true individual 
                                               
1092
 Ibid, paras 26 & 27. The UK protections for whistleblowers are robust enough if highly complex. See  recent 
Court of Appeal cases Beatt v Croydon Health Services [2017] EWCA Civ 401; Royal Mail Group v Jhuti [2017] EWCA 
Civ 1632; Chesterton Global v Nurohamed [2017] EWCA Civ 979. See also J Ashton, ’15 Years of Whistleblowing 
Protection under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998: Are We Still Shooting the Messenger’ (2015) 44 ILJ 29. 
1093
 Ibid, para 28. See Art 1(d) of Protocol of 2002 to No.155 (above). 
1094 Ibid para 62. 
1095 Steve Tombs and David Whyte, Regulatory surrender: death, injury and the non-enforcement of law, (IER 2011) 
pp 41-45. 
1096 HSE : Health and Safety at Work Summary statistics for Great Britain 2017. Numbers of cases are Labour Force 
Survey figures, while the costs are HSE figures. None of figures take into account road traffic accidents., although it 
is notable that the second most common cause of death to a worker ,after a fall from a height (28%), is being 
struck by a moving vehicle (17%). www.hse.gov.uk/statisitcs/causing/kinds-of-accident.pdf. 
1097
Figure from the 2017-18 HSE Annual Report, ‘excluding long latency illnesses’ for 2015-16. Such estimates 
appear to be very approximate – in the ‘summary statistics for Great Britain 2017’ cited in the preceding note the 
figure was 5.3 billion. 
1098www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/pdf/fatal injuries.pdf 
308 
 
and collective cost of failures of workplace safety which ultimately cause the 
premature death of workers. The TUC has stated that ‘Even by the most 
conservative estimates 20,000 people die prematurely each year as a result of 
injury or illness caused by the work they do.’1099 Some consider the figure to be 
closer to 50,000 per year,1100 and it is notable that in their 2017-18 Annual Report 
the HSE states that there are ‘12,000 lung disease deaths each year estimated to 
be linked to past exposures at work.’ 
 
The workers succumbing to this epidemic of work induced ill health have to be 
supported. According to the UN Committee on Economic and Social Rights:  
 
‘Paid sick leave is critical for sick workers to receive treatment for acute and 
chronic illnesses and to reduce infection of co-workers.’ 1101 
 
Unfortunately in the UK, because many employers will not pay those who are ‘off 
sick,’ very many workers are eligible only for Statutory Sick Pay, and Short Term 
Incapacity Benefit and literally cannot afford to not to go to work. In 2013 the 
European Committee Social Rights held in the context of the European Social 
Charter Right to Social Security (Conclusions XX-2), that Statutory Sick Pay and 
Short Term Incapacity Benefit were ‘manifestly inadequate in the meaning of 
Article 12(1) of the Charter as they fall below 40% of the Eurostat median 
equivilised income.’ At the end of the reference period in question (2011) the 
median figure was 714 Euros, while those workers on short term incapacity 
benefit or statutory sick pay received approximately 440 and 370 Euros each 
month (£97 and £81.60 per week). In 2017 the ILO Conference Committee on the 
Application of Standards discussed the UK’s failure to comply with the  Social 
Security (Minimum Standards) Convention 1952 (No.102),1102with representatives 
from France, Sweden and Australia noting that British protections were wholly 
inadequate. The Committee of Experts had found in 2016 that SSP, and 
Employment & Support Allowance, which is available to the self employed and 
the very low paid who do not qualify for SSP, fall much below the minimum rate 
of 45 percent [‘of the reference wage of an ordinary labourer’] guaranteed by the 
                                               
1099 ‘The Case for Health and Safety’ TUC 7 September 2010 www.tuc.org.uk/research-analysis/reports/case-
health-and-safety. The devastating effects of occupational diseases, including workplace induced repetitive strain 
injury, stress and depression, have arguably long overtaken immediate physical safety as the primary health and 
safety problems facing ‘first world’ states. 
1100
See Tombs and Whyte, 2011, op cit, p 43. 
1101
 Ibid, para 30. 
1102 Individual Case (CAS)-Discussion: 2017, Publication: 106th ILC session (2017). 
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Convention/Code and concluded that ‘social security benefits in case of sickness, 
as they are understood and conceived by government, do not permit the United 
Kingdom to fulfill its obligations under Part III[which concerns sickness benefit] of 
the Convention/Code as regards the level of benefit.”1103 In a Direct Request the 
Committee, has asked the Government to explain the reasoning behind the 
Agricultural Sick Pay scheme. ‘ASP’ is less generous even than SSP, and is paid only 
to those who have worked with the one employer for 52 weeks,1104 in contrast to 
SSP which is available to all employees outside of the agricultural sector as a ‘day 
one’ right. Why farm workers are discriminated against in this fashion remains 
unexplained.  
 
A lesser known right, closely related to the provision of sick leave, is conferred by 
Article 2(4) of the European Social Charter: Workers engaged in dangerous or 
unhealthy work are entitled to reduced hours or additional holiday in order to 
compensate for ‘residual risk.’ In the UK neither  the law nor collective agreement 
guarantee the great majority of such workers this increased ‘down time,’ and, as a 
consequence in Conclusions XVIII-2 (2007), XIX-3 (2010) and  XX-3 2014, the UK 
was found not to be compliant with 2(4).In its Cycle XXI-3 (2018) report the  
Government ‘respectfully’ stated that it  
‘continues to disagree with the Committee’s conclusions…The UK has a 
robust framework for reducing risk…the established principles of 
elimination, reduction, assessment and control of risk… presents the 
potential for higher levels of risk control than simply focusing on reducing 
the time of exposure…’ 
 Effectively the government refuses to comply with 2(4). Moreover, its 
disingenuous argument ignores one of key reasons for the provision of increased 
rest - the purpose is not merely to reduce risk, but to ‘allow for a reduced 
accumulation of physical and mental fatigue.’1105 
                                               
1103
 Observation (CEACR) – adopted 2016, published 106
th
 ILC Session (2017). 
1104
 Direct Request (CEACR) – adopted 2016, published 106
th
 ILC session (2017), Social Security (Minimum 
Standards) Convention, 1952 (No.102), United Kingdom (Ratification: 1954). 
1105 From the statement of interpretation in Conclusions V, 1974-75. 
310 
 
Such a brazen denial of the authority of the Charter, and of the Committee, 
undermining, as it does, the concept of treaty obligation and the rule of law, is 
uncharacteristic, tending to be employed where more minor state transgressions 
are concerned.1106 The Government’s approach to the vital issue of OSH 
inspection provides a more representative example of its handling of these 
matters – it relies on obfuscation and misinformation to disguise non compliance 
with more fundamental obligations.1107 
 The backbone of any adequate health and safety programme might reasonably 
be said to be workplace inspection and the enforcement of standards. 
Compliance with Article 7 of the UN Covenant requires states to undertake 
adequate inspection and investigation, to make reports, and to impose 
sufficiently dissuasive penalties on employers who breach OSH standards.1108 
The UN Committee, as we have seen in previous chapters, relies very much on the 
provisions of the ILO Conventions and on the work of the ILO supervisory bodies 
when interpreting state obligations under the Covenant.  However, few of the 
very many Conventions relating to health and safety have been ratified by the UK. 
As a consequence it is arguable that while the Covenant provides a conduit of 
sorts, its obligations do not ‘feed in’ to reinforce the ILO obligations as they do in 
relation to freedom of association,  a matter, it will be recalled, which was 
considered in the previous chapter.  
Where workplace inspection is concerned, however, the position is different. One 
Convention, ratified by the Attlee government in 1949, the Labour Inspection 
Convention (No.81) of 1947 requires the UK to maintain a vigorous inspectorate 
and a rigorous enforcement regime.  
C81 is very important. It is a Governance Convention, one of four ‘priority’ 
instruments, just one step down from the eight Core Conventions, and it obliges 
the UK by Article 3 ‘so far as such provisions are enforceable by labour 
inspectors’: 
                                               
1106
 See below in section 2 in relation to workers taking public holidays. 
1107
 See below in section 3 in relation to the minimum wage. 
1108 UN CttESCR General Comment on Article 7, para 29.  
311 
 
(a) ‘to secure the enforcement of the legal provisions relating to conditions of 
work and the protection of workers while engaged in their work, such as 
provisions relating to hours, wages, safety, health and welfare, the 
employment of children and young persons, and other connected 
matters...’ 
The UK has chosen to give its inspectorates at least some responsibility for all of 
the matters specifically mentioned in Article 3, although the principal 
responsibility for HSE and local authority inspectors has always been, and 
remains, workplace safety. Crucially, Article 10 requires that  
‘The number of labour inspectors shall be sufficient to secure the effective 
discharge of the duties of the inspectorate and shall be determined with due 
regard for (a) The importance of the duties which inspectors have to perform, 
in particular- 
(i) The number, nature, size and situation of the workplaces liable to 
inspection; 
(ii) The  number and classes of workers employed in such workplaces; and 
(iii) The number and complexity of the legal provisions to be enforced. 
By Article 12 (1) ‘Labour inspectors provided with proper credentials shall be 
empowered: 
(a) To enter freely and without previous notice at any hour of the day or night 
any workplace liable to inspection; 
(b) To enter by day any premises which they may have reasonable cause to 
believe to be liable to inspection; and 
(c) To carry out any examination, test or enquiry which they may consider 
necessary...(i) to interrogate, alone or in the presence of witnesses, the 
employer of the staff or undertaking on any matters...(ii) to require the 
production of any books, registers or other documents the keeping of 
which is prescribed by national laws or regulations...’ 
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And, although due regard is given to states allowing inspectors to choose to 
give warnings and advice, and to issue remedial notices, Article 17 requires 
that 
‘Persons who violate or neglect to observe legal provisions enforceable by 
labour inspectors shall be liable to prompt legal proceedings without previous 
warning.’ 
Article 3(2) of the European Social Charter also requires the effective 
enforcement of health and safety regulation. In the first interpretative statement 
on Article 3 the Committee held that states must ensure that OSH  
‘regulations are adequately enforced through inspection and civil and 
criminal sanctions… to safeguard the implementation of the rights to safe 
and healthy working conditions in practice.’ 1109  
It has long been established that all government reports to the committee on 3(2) 
should record  
‘the number of visits made by labour inspectorate staff, and the number of 
enterprises subject to inspection, with a breakdown for the different 
sectors of activity…number and percentage of workers covered by 
visits…number of staff employed in labour inspectorates and details of their 
assignment to the various sectors…this information should be supplied for a 
period covering the last four years if possible.’1110 
 UK Government reports failed to supply these figures. Even the Health and Safety 
Executive has become markedly coy about revealing the inspection figures, with 
the ILO’s Committee of Experts noting in 1993 that 
 
‘no later copies of annual inspection reports are available than the Health 
and Safety Commission Report for 1987-88.’1111 
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 Conclusions I,1965-1967. Statement of Interpretation Article 3. 
1110
 Conclusions XIII-I (1990 -1991). Statement of Interpretation Article 3(2). 
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 Direct Request (CEACR)- adopted 1993, published 80
th
 ILC session 1993, Labour Inspection Convention 1947 
No.81. 
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When pressed by the European  Committee on Social Rights the government did, 
however, append the HSE 2010-2011 Annual Reports and Accounts to its 2012 
report,1112 where, on pages 18-19, it is briefly acknowledged that ‘Approximately 
500 hundred proactive inspections were undertaken,’ the first mention of 
numbers of preventative inspections mentioned in any HSC/HSE report  since 
2002. 1113 There is good reason for this reluctance to reveal the numbers of 
inspections. 
 
The TUC reported in 2010 that in 1999-2000 the HSE Field Operations Division had 
made 75,272 inspections of workplaces compared with 23,004 in 2008-09.1114 A 
2010 paper from the influential right wing Policy Exchange ‘think tank’ put the 
figure at 41,496 in 2006-7, ‘around 55,000 in 2004-5, ‘down from over 65,000 in 
2002-3’ and 2003-4, estimating the frequency of local authority inspections as 
‘not much higher.’1115 The paper acknowledged that these figures were low in 
comparison with other EU states, noting that Germany conducted in excess of 
one million such inspections each year.1116 It failed to mention that in the UK in 
the 1970s it was not unusual for the HSE and local authorities to make between 
them in excess of a million workplace visits each year.1117 
 
The long term picture in relation to prosecutions is as startling.  According to the 
TUC, prosecutions fell from 1,986 in 2001-02 to 1,090 in 2008-2009,1118 while the 
Policy Exchange paper gave a figures embracing both local authority and HSE 
cases: 2,500 in 1999-2000, described as a ‘high’, and ‘around 1,400’ prosecutions 
in 2008-9. Steve Tombs and David Whyte state that Inspections by the HSE Field 
Operations Directorate and by local authority Environmental Health Officers both 
fell by 69% between 2003 and 2016, while preventative inspections by the latter 
fell by an astonishing 96%.  Improvement notices and prohibition notices imposed 
                                               
1112  32nd Report on the Implementation of the European Social Charter submitted by the Government of the 
United Kingdom, Articles 3,11,12,13 and 14, 2008-2011, 30 November 2012. 
1113 Health and Safety Commission Annual Report and the Health and Safety Commission/Executive Accounts  
2001-2, p.55. 
1114 Statistics cited by the TUC in their paper ‘The Case for Health and Safety’, September 2010 
(www.tuc.org.uk/research-analysis/reports/case-health-and-safety). 
1115 Corin Taylor, Health and Safety Reducing the Burden, 2010.  
1116
 Ibid, p13. 
1117
 See Phil James and David Walters, Health and Safety at Work: Time for a Change, (Liverpool, IER, 2016, note 47 
. 
1118 TUC,2010, op cit. 
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by the HSE fell by 14% and 35%, and those imposed by local authorities 65% and 
28% in the same period. Convictions fell by 60% during 2003 – 2015.1119 
 
All of these reductions were the direct consequence of cuts in funding, 
augmented by executive orders issued by the Government and a creeping 
privatisation programme. In 2009 the ‘Primary Authority Scheme,’ a ‘partnership’ 
arrangement which entails companies contracting with the local authorities of 
their choosing and in effect paying that LA to be its health and safety mentor was 
established.  In March 2011 the Department of Works and Pensions declared 
most sectors to be ‘low risk, introducing its Good Health and Safety, Good for 
Everyone policy,1120 requiring the HSE to ‘concentrate on higher risk areas and on 
dealing with serious breaches of health and safety regulation. This will mean a 
very substantial drop in the number of health and safety inspections carried out in 
the UK.’1121 A ‘Fees for Intervention’ [‘FFI’] scheme to charge employers when 
their failures obliged the HSE to inspect or investigate was announced, and, 
extraordinarily, an on line ‘self assessment’ programme was to be rolled out for 
employers operating in the low risk sectors to replace all other than ‘intelligence 
led’ preventative inspections.  ‘Free guidance and advice’ is available from the 
Health and Safety Laboratory.1122 Should employers choose to buy advice, the HSL 
offers ‘paid for services such as training consultancy and bespoke research’, and 
private health and safety consultants – the HSL offers training- can also be called 
upon  to assist with ‘in house’ inspections. 
It was envisaged that the HSE would reduce preventative inspections by 11,000, 
one third of the 33,000 inspections made during 2010-11, and this has been 
achieved. Only 23,472 inspections were made in 2013-14, 20,200 in 2014-15 and 
18,000 in 2015-16.1123The target of a one third reduction in inspections by local 
                                               
1119 From an unpublished draft of IER document 2017 by Tombs and Whyte. 
1120Good Health and Safety, Good for Everyone; The next steps in the Government’s plans for the reform of the 
health and safety system in Britain, DWP, 21 March 2011. 
1121 Ibid, p3. 
1122
 Health and Safety Laboratory, ‘Enabling a Better World,’  About Us, www.hsl.gov.uk/about-hsl 
1123
 James and Walters p15. The 2013-14 figure is credited to HSE 2015 Health and Safety Statistics: Annual Report 
for Great Britain 2013/14, and the 2015-16 figures to the Health and Safety Executive Annual Report and Accounts 
2015/16. 
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authorities was exceeded. Preventative inspections fell from 118,000 in 2015-16 
to 5,400 in 2014-15.1124 
Phil James and David Walters estimate that according to government projections 
for 2020, ‘HSE’s funding will staggeringly have fallen by more than 60% over the 
period from 2004/05.’1125 Where local authorities are concerned the funding 
picture is necessarily more complex, but just as dramatic. The number of 
inspectors fell by 30% between 2009 and 2015, while 
 
‘in many local authorities these inspectors now carry out no enforcement 
on workplace health and safety whatsoever…’ 1126 
 
Reading the government’s 2017 report to the European Committee of Social 
Rights, one would not suspect that such a massive retreat had taken place. 
Without troubling the Committee with statistics the Government explains that 
the HSE’s current approach  ‘accommodates the need for inspectors to target key 
risks and take proportionate action...inspection is concentrated on the higher risk 
industrial sectors...However, employers in any sector who under perform in any 
health and safety may still be visited.’ 1127 
Extraordinarily, in 2018, the Committee, seemingly satisfied with the 
Government’s reassurances, still holds the UK to be compliant with Article 3(2) 
(Conclusions XXI-2 2017, published January 2018).1128Working under the 1961 
procedures, and thus ostensibly reliant on the Government’s version of events, 
this sustained de-regulatory campaign has not been revealed to the Committee 
‘on the record.’ Referring the Government report it stated that  
‘there have been several government reviews of health and safety…These 
found no case for radically altering the existing legislation, with the HSE 
said merely to have ‘revoked and amended legislation to make the legal 
                                               
1124 James and Walters, p15. They credit these figures to ‘HSE 2014’. 
1125 James and Walters, p24. 
1126 Ibid. 
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framework for health and safety clearer by removing unnecessary 
burdens…’ 1129 
 Thus with a few words a radical withdrawal of workplace inspection unarguably 
in breach of Article 3 is passed off as if it were a matter of administrative 
streamlining. There is, however, at least some indication in the Conclusions that 
members of the Committee might be conscious that the government are not 
being entirely frank with them:  
‘The Committee notes from the HSE’s Annual Report and Accounts 2014/15 
that the number of HSE staff…was 2,454 on 31 March 2015 and 3,183 on 31 
March 2013…The Committee asks that the next report provide detailed 
information on the new system, particularly with regards to the number of 
labour inspectors.’ 
Article 3(1) provides the basic requirement for states to issue health and safety 
regulations ‘against most of the risks provided in the international technical 
reference standards,’1130 and protection must be extended to all workers in all 
sectors.  Consequently the committee held the failure to provide OSH protection 
for domestic workers (see chapter 7, section 2 on ‘domestic servitude’), and to 
the effect of s3(2) of the Deregulation Act 2015, which removes the self employed 
from the ambit of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 if their activities pose 
no risk to other workers and members of the public, to be breaches of Article 
3(1).  
 
Although the Committee did not refer to it, a Statement of Interpretation from 
the 1970s states the case for covering the self employed: 
 
‘there is no impossibility in imposing a duty of self protection…no one 
would suggest punishing workers for injuring themselves…it will normally 
be in their own interests to have their position defined by regulations.’1131 
 
                                               
1129 This was in relation to 3(1) and the necessity to issue H&S regulations, rather than supervision 3(2), although, 
of course, the requirements are inextricably intertwined. 
1130
 From the Statement of Interpretation on 3(1) Conclusions XIV-2 
1131
 Conclusions IV (1972-1974) Statement of Interpretation Article 3(1). The stance of the Committee differed 
from that of the Governmental Committee, the status of the self employed in relation to H&S having been 
disputed in the late 60s and early 70s . 
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Given the ‘tsunami’ of deregulation during the reference period (2012-2015) the 
focus on this legislative gesture arguably highlights the ineffectiveness of the 
reporting system more than it does UK non compliance with Article 3(1).1132 
 
So, despite the complexity of the EU health and safety regime – even arguably 
because of the EU regime – businesses in the UK have largely been left to their 
own devices where compliance is concerned. Yet this failure to enforce has not 
triggered EU infraction proceedings, the EU principle of effectiveness  having 
apparently been usurped that of subsidiarity, 1134 with member states in practice 
afforded a very wide margin of appreciation in enforcing the health and safety 
directives. A sceptic might be tempted to suggest that this another example of the 
the unofficial EU principle of business friendly pragmatism in action – states are 
left to do very much as they please as long as it can plausibly claimed that the 
Directives have been implemented.  This can have paradoxical effects. For 
example, we have seen that in contrast to the UK Germany rigorously enforces its 
health and safety laws. Germany was nevertheless subject to infraction 
proceedings after it had by law explicitly excluded firms employing 10 or fewer 
workers in certain sectors from the reach of some of the EU derived health and 
safety regulations. Had it simply withdrawn from inspection or enforcement in 
the manner of the UK, then it seems unlikely that the Commission would have 
taken an interest. 
Yet the EU Commission acknowledges that workplace inspections are crucially 
important, and that preventative inspection is the cornerstone of the health and 
safety edifice:  
‘legal requirements combined with inspection are major reasons explaining 
why establishments develop occupational safety and health policies and 
take relevant action. Inspections can indeed contribute to a true prevention 
culture.’  
                                               
1132 Of course, the UK has not ratified the 1996 Revised Charter nor has it signed up to the Collective Complaints 
Procedure (see chapter 3 and chapter 8). 
1134
 See para 106 of the Supreme Court tribunal fees UNISON judgement (R (on the application of UNISON) v Lord 
Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51): ‘the procedural requirements for domestic actions must not be “liable to render 
practicably impossible or excessively difficult” the exercise of rights onferred by EU law’, citing Impact v Minister 
for Agriculture and Food [2008] C- 268/06 ECR I-2483, para 46 as an example.  
318 
 
The Commission noted the ‘tangible impacts of inspections...in terms of a 
reduction on injury rates following inspection’ and ‘a decrease in the rate of 
severe injuries’ where employers received numbers of OSH inspections and 
infractions were penalised. It lamented the fact that the frequency of inspections 
varied considerably across the member states.1135 In a 2004 paper the 
Commission had cited ‘the only empirical study as regards health and safety at 
work’ - which was conducted in the UK - and found that the overwhelming 
majority (80%) of employers were interested in Health & Safety only to pass 
inspections and avoid legal liability.1136 
The ILO’s Committee of Experts is, however, less relaxed about failures to monitor 
workplace health and safety. 
A spate of Observations on the UK and C81 followed three Direct Requests made 
during the early 1990s as concerns were raised by the TUC about the withdrawal 
of inspections in the late 1980s. 1137In a fourth, in 1995, the Committee of Experts, 
adopted in relation to Article 18 of the Labour Inspection Convention, ‘hit the nail 
on the head’, stating that it  
 
‘regrets the reluctance on the part of HSE to enforce legislation arising from 
EC (EU) Health and Safety Directives. According to the TUC unless an 
employer knows that prosecution is likely in cases of health and safety 
offences, large sections of industry will fail to adopt a positive 
approach…’1138 
 
                                               
1135
 The 2017 Communication by the Commission on ‘Safer and Healthier Work for All – Modenisation of the EU 
Occupational Safety and Health Legislation and Policy’( Brussels 10 January 2017 COM (2017) 12, p16-17). 
1136 COM (2004) Commission of the European Communities, 5 February 2004, p.15. See also  COM (2014) 332; 
Communication on an EU Strategic Framework on Health and Safety at Work 2014-2020. 
 
1137 A Direct Request in 1993 mentions a 1988 Observation ‘following comments as to the decline in the numbers 
of inspectors and inspection visits made by the Trades Union Congress’ Direct Request (CEACR)- adopted 1993, 
published 80th ILC session. 
1138 Among other matters, information was requested on the abolition of the Works Councils; the fact that the TUC 
had reported ‘that only safety, health and welfare at work are subject to inspection,’ that the government had 
failed to show that the number of inspectors is sufficient to discharge their duties, and TUC allegations that firms 
could only expect an inspection every 7 years on average (Direct Request – adopted 1995, published 83
rd
 ILC 
session (1996). 
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Three more Direct Requests have been adopted since, in 2000 – also in relation to 
the Observation adopted in the same year - 2003, and 2009, again following an 
Observation. However only the Direct Requests of 1993 and 1995, and the 2013 
and 2016 Observations, out of the six adopted between 2000 and 2016, can be 
said to have made the Committee’s dissatisfaction with UK deregulatory non-
enforcement abundantly clear. 
 The 2013 Observation, adopted after the CEACR had information on workplace 
inspection in the wake of the 2011 ‘launch of the ‘Good Health and Safety, Good 
for Everyone’ programme,’ citing concerns that Articles 2,3,5,10,11,13,17,18,22 
and 23 of C81 had potentially been breached or were likely to be breached. 
Information was requested on the targeting of workplaces for inspection, 
whether  unions and employers organisations were consulted on such selection,  
whether self assessment in low risk sectors was voluntary or mandatory, and 
whether ‘underperformance in the area of OSH’ in workplaces left to monitor 
their own compliance could be picked by the inspectorate. Detail on the impact of 
these measures, and the new FFI scheme, on the identification of infractions, the 
numbers of accidents and the incidence of occupational disease was also 
requested. 1139 
 
Following an unsatisfactory response by the Government, the 2016 Observation 
adopted a more confrontational tone. Concerns reported to the Committee in 
2013 by the TUC were reiterated;  
 
‘workplaces identified with lower safety risks do not necessarily have a 
lower incidence of cases of occupational disease, and that they should 
therefore not be categorised as low risk.’1140 
 
 The Committee, stated that it considered ‘it important that certain, often 
vulnerable, categories of workers...are not excluded from protection,’ due to this 
targeting. It wanted more information than it had required in 2013; statistics on 
the number of inspections, especially in SMEs, the numbers of infringements 
detected, the numbers of inspectors and the budget allocations since 2011, and 
more information on the targeting criteria. The CEACR ‘also once again requests 
that the Government provide information on the means used by the labour 
                                               
1139
 Observation (CEACR) – adopted 2013, published 103rd ILC session (2014). 
1140 Observation (CEACR) – adopted 2016, published 106th ILC session (2017). 
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inspectorate to detect underperformance in the area of OSH of workplaces that 
are currently not expected to be subject to inspections,’ and seeks reassurance 
that workplace whistle blowers be assured confidentiality in their dealings with 
the HSE.  
 
With regard to ‘self assessment’ as a preventative measure it held that ‘on line 
risk assessment’ in conjunction with advice from the HSL is acceptable as long as 
it is ‘complementary to’ and not a replacement for labour inspection. Self 
assessment programmes require monitoring with ‘dissuasive sanctions’ imposed 
for false claims, and ‘once again requests that the Government provide 
information on whether the use of self assessments in workplaces not subject to 
inspection is voluntary or mandatory.’ It asked the Government to indicate 
whether self inspection data ‘are fed into the inspection programme process and 
to indicate that all workplaces remain liable to inspection by the labour 
inspectorate.’ The Committee is ‘cranking up’ the pressure on the Government. 
A failure by the Government to fund the inspectorate sufficiently undermines 
effective enforcement, and the Committee asked for more detail on the reliance 
of the HSE on funds raised through the FFI. The Committee has requested 
information ‘on any measures by the Government to avoid potential damage to 
the reputation of the HSE concerning impartiality and independence.’ The FFI 
scheme, which the Government proposes to expand, is, like the Primary Authority 
scheme, seen by many as a step towards privatiation.  
 The CEACR is focused on the HSE and has yet to come to grips with either the 
withdrawal of inspection by Local Authorities or the Primary Authority scheme. 
The same is true of the European Social Charter’s ECSR, although the scrutiny of 
the ECSR is, as we have seen, is considerably less intense than that of the 
Committee of Experts. 
 Nevertheless, confrontations between both Committees and the UK government 
appear to be looming, although there are indications that the Government is at 
least starting to reconsider its position, it having announced  in February 2018 as 
part of its Industrial Strategy that: 
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‘For the benefit of firms, workers and the public interest we need to 
develop a more proactive approach to workplace health.’1141 
__________________________________ 
While parts of that strategy have been implemented as improved employment 
protections for those engaged on ‘atypical’ contracts,1142 as yet been no fresh OSH 
initiatives have been announced, and it must therefore be concluded that: 
 Preventative workplace inspection in the UK is wholly inadequate.  
 Substantive standards are not enforced.  
 Statutory sick pay, short term incapacity benefit and the employment and 
support allowance are inadequate. 
 Workers engaged in hazardous work exposed to ‘residual risk’ should be 
guaranteed reduced hours or longer periods of leave. 
 UK reporting and notification arrangements are inadequate. The under 
reporting of deaths, injuries, disease has become accepted. Those suffering 
long term ill health as a result of working conditions and practices should 
be recognized in the figures. 
 Self employed workers and domestic workers should be given afforded OSH 
protection - protection must be extended to all workers in all sectors. 
 These shortfalls, and the use of ‘on line risk assessment’ and private Health 
& Safety consultants in the place of preventive inspections, in all but severe 
and high risk sectors, are unequivocal breaches of C81, Article 3(2) of the 
European Social Charter and Article 7 of the UN Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. 
 The impartiality and independence of local authority inspection is 
undermined by the Primary Authority Scheme, and that of the HSE is 
threatened by the expansion of the Fees for Intervention scheme and 
privatization. These initiatives are prima facie breaches of C81 and Article 7 
UNICESCR. 
                                               
1141
  HM Government Industrial Strategy: Good Work, A response to the Taylor Review of Modern Working 
Practices, February 2018, p.12. 
1142See chapter 7. 
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2: Working Time 
Workers should be guaranteed a maximum average 48 hour working week 
(calculated over a 17 week reference period), with an absolute cap of 60 hours. A 
20 minute break is required after 6 hours work, and workers must be given a 
minimum of 11 hours ‘daily’ rest.  48 hours of continuous ‘weekly’ rest is required 
after a maximum of 12 days continuous work. A 40 hour week is the maximum 
average for night work, and there is an absolute cap for hazardous or especially 
stressful work, of 8 hours per night. The Night work reference period, and the 
definition of hazardous work must be determined by collective agreement.  
These limits can be varied to suit the needs of a particular industry or seasonal 
changes in work loads by collective agreement at sectoral or enterprise level if 
compensatory rest is provided to bring the averages to within the requisite limits.  
The 17 week reference period may be extended to 26 weeks – 52 weeks in some 
cases - to accommodate the needs both of workers and employers by ensuring 
that compensatory rest serves to reduce the average week to no more than 48 
hours. 
Individual workers, other than mobile transport workers, are permitted to elect to 
‘opt –out,’ and make a voluntary and informed decision to relinquish their 
entitlement to a limit on the hours worked. 1143 
 
Clear and robust safeguards must be implemented to prevent these opt outs from 
effectively undermining the purpose of the Directive and the Regulations.1144 
 
A record must be kept of the workers who elect to dispense with the weekly 
protections, of the hours they work, and of any health and safety concerns raised 
                                               
1143 The original 1993 Directive and the amended 2003 Directive. 
1144 EU competence where working time is concerned is justified by Article 137(1) TEU. It is a health and safety 
measure, although it would be disingenuous to pretend that it is not also a social entitlement. It has been pointed 
out that to permit workers to surrender a right to health and safety is absurd. While it is noticeable that in 
transport, where over tired workers can cause catastrophic accidents (see below), no opt-outs are permissible, it is 
the case that very many workers permitted to waive their entitlement to the 48 week have killed and injured 
themselves and others after becoming over tired. For a raft of evidence on theses matters and much more see 
Hazards Magazine ‘Work schedules and work hours’ at www.hazards.org which provides a mass of links to 
evidence on the threat to health of long hours and cases where workers have been killed or injured through be 
required to work excessive hours. 
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in connection with their work. A record must be kept of the breaks taken by all 
workers. 
 
States should be progressing towards an ideal standard of a maximum 40 hour 
week for all workers. 
 
5.6 weeks of paid annual holiday must be provided. 
 
The ‘great majority’ of workers must be permitted to take public holidays with 
pay. Those obliged to work should be paid a premium or be compensated with 
extra leave, as well being given time off equivalent to that lost on the public 
holiday. 
 
________________________________________ 
The 40 hour week, worked over 5 days, has been the internationally accepted 
ideal since the 19th Century. The ILO Forty Hour Week Convention 1935 (No.47), 
which came into force in 1957, is a declaration of approval of ‘the principle of a 
forty hour week’ for states which choose to ratify the Convention.1145  This is the 
benchmark target states are urged to aim for when, as for example the European 
Social Charter requires, they are obliged to ‘provide for reasonable daily and 
weekly working hours’ on an incremental basis in accord with improvements in 
workplace efficiency, with ‘the working week to be progressively reduced to the 
extent that the increase of productivity and other relevant factors permit.’1146 The 
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights is more specific:  
 
‘The Committee is aware that many States parties have opted for a 40 hour 
week and recommends that States parties that have not yet done so take 
steps progressively to achieve this target.’ 1147 
 
While 40 hours is the target, the ILO Convention No.1 on Hours of Work 1919, 
reflects the fundamental international norm: 
                                               
1145
  C47 Article 1(a). 
1146
 European Social Charter Article 2(1) –  a paragraph which has yet to be ratified by the UK (see chapter 3). 
1147 General Comment on Article 7 (2016), paras 35 and 37. 
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‘The working hours of persons employed in any public or private 
undertaking or branch thereof, other than an undertaking in which only 
members of the same family are employed, shall not exceed eight in the 
day and forty eight in the week…’ Extensions to the working day must be 
subject to collective agreement, but ‘the average number of hours worked 
per week, over the numbers of weeks covered by any such agreement shall 
not exceed forty-eight.’1148 
While the UK has not ratified this Convention, it is required to conform to the 
broadly similar terms of the EU Working Time Directive, which stipulates that:  
 
‘Account should be taken of the principles of the International Labour 
Organisation with regard to the organisation of working time, including 
those relating to night work.’1149 
 
The following ILO Conventions, along with C1 and C47, represent all of those 
which have imposed, or continue to impose, state obligations on the 
management of working time. None of the Conventions listed have ever been 
ratified by the UK:  
Hours of Work (Industry) Convention 1919 (No.1); Weekly Rest (Industry) 
Convention, 1921 (No.14); Night Work (Bakeries) Convention, 1926 (No.20); 
Hours of Work (Commerce and Offices) Convention, 1930 (No.30); Hours of Work 
(Coalmines) Convention 1931, (no.31); Hours of Work (Coalmines) Revised 
Convention, 1935 (No.46); Forty Hour Week Convention, 1935 (No.47);  Reduction 
of Hours (Glass Bottle Works) Convention,1935 (No.49); Reduction of Hours 
(Public Works) Convention,1935 (No.51); Holidays with Pay Convention, 1936 
(No.54); Reduction of Hours of Work (Textiles) Convention, 1937 (No.61); Hours 
of Work and Rest Periods (Road Transport) Convention, 1939 (No.67); Night Work 
of Young Persons  (Non Industrial Occupations) Convention, 1946 (No.79); Night 
                                               
1148 Articles 2, 2( b) and 5 (2).  See also the Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention 1921 (No.14); Hours of Work 
(Commerce and Offices) Convention 1930 (No.30),;Weekly Rest (Commerce and Offices)Convention 1957 
(No.106); and  Hours of Work and Rest Periods (Road Transport) Convention 1979 (No.153). None of these 
Conventions have been ratified by the UK. 
1149 Para 6 of the preamble to Directive 2003/88/EC. 
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Work (Women) Revised Convention, 1948 (No.89); Night Work of Young Persons 
(Industrial) Convention, 1946 (No.90);  Weekly Rest  (Commerce and Offices) 
Convention,, 1957 (No.106); Holidays with Pay Convention (Revised), 1970 
(No.132); Hours of Work and Rest Periods(Road Transport) Convention, 1979 
(No.153); Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, 1981, (No.156); Night 
Work Convention, 1990(No.171), and the 1990 Protocol to the Night Work 
(Women) Revised Convention, 1948.  
However, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Right’s General 
Comment on Article 7 of the Covenant draws so heavily  on the Conventions to fill 
in the detail of the Covenant obligations on working time - the Committee relies 
on them exclusively  - that it cannot reasonably be denied that it is a conduit  for 
the provisions of the unratified Conventions.Consequently UK courts and 
tribunals would not, so would seem, have any option other than to interpret 
working time law in the light of the Conventions, although judges, seldom refer to 
either the Conventions or the ILO jurisprudence, still less the Covenant and the 
findings of the UN Committee.  
The Covenant could, in theory, operate to effectively entrench the substance of 
the EU Working Time regime in the unlikely event of a ‘no deal Brexit.’  More 
realistically, if the WTR were challenged by fresh primary legislation the ILO and 
Covenant standards could be cited in Parliament as the minimum requirement for 
any domestic working time regime.  As we have seen, the ‘progressive realisation 
of the right to just and favourable conditions of work using maximum available 
resources,’ does not allow for a paring back of existing rights. A retreat would be 
an unequivocal breach of international law.1150 
The provision of minimum standards of daily and weekly rest, and holiday 
entitlement is a core obligation under the Covenant. 1151A 40 hour week is the 
benchmark.1152  The basics are as follows: 
                                               
1150
UN CttESCR General Comment on Article 7 (2016) para 50, citing General Comment No.3 (1990) on the nature 
of States parties’ obligations. 
1151
UN CttESCR General Comment No.23 on the right to just and favourable conditions of work, para 65. 
1152 UN CTTESCR General Comment No.23 on the right to just and favourable conditions of work, para 2. 
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Daily hours: ‘General daily limit’ to be laid down in legislation - eight hours before 
overtime, with a ‘reasonable’ maximum which includes overtime.1153 ‘Exceptions 
should be strictly limited and subject to consultation with workers and their 
consultative organizations.’ Where 8 hours is exceeded, compensatory rest should 
intervene to bring the average day down to 8 hours or less. Any ‘on call’ 
requirements ‘need to be taken into account.’1154 
 
Daily rest breaks: Legislation is required to ensure adequate rest periods with 
specific reference to night work, nursing mothers, workers undergoing medical 
treatment, and those operating machinery which poses potential hazards.  
Weekly rest: At least one day in seven, with 48 hours ‘preferable as a general rule 
to ensure their health and safety.’  1155 The days off should correspond to the 
traditional days of rest.1156 
 
Annual leave: 3 weeks paid leave - eclipsed by the 5.6 weeks required by the EU. 
The pay must be ‘normal’ pay, the qualifying period, no more than 6 months, at 
which point the worker can take ‘paid leave proportionate to the period of 
employment,’ periods of illness cannot be deducted for the purposes of 
calculating compliance with the qualification period.1157 Part timers must be given 
the same leave on a pro-rata basis.1158 Payment in lieu of holiday is not permitted, 
nor can workers ‘voluntarily’ relinquish leave. The question of when leave can be 
taken is left to ‘negotiation between worker and employer’.1159 
 
The European Union regime originated with the 1993 adoption of the Working 
Time Directive, which was implemented by the UK in 1998. 1160  This directive, and 
subsequent consolidatory and complementary directives, now provides the core 
                                               
1153 Ibid, para 36. 
1154 Ibid, para 35. 
1155 Ibid, para 39. 
1156 Ibid. 
1157 Ibid, para 41. 
1158 Ibid, para 42. 
1159
 Ibid,para 43. 
1160
Directive 93/104/EC.  This has now been replaced by Council Directive 2003/88/EC, a codification of the general 
regime which has since been augmented by directives relating to particular sectors initially excluded from the WT 
regime, principally Directive 2002/15 covering road transport.  
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of the domestic working time regime. While in implementing Article 7(d) of the 
UN Covenants states are said to ‘have flexibility in the light of the national 
context, they are required to set minimum standards that must be respected and 
cannot be denied or reduced on the basis of economic or productivity 
arguments,’1161 and the directives provide these minimum standards. 
Unfortunately, as I will show, the UK approach has been to deny or dilute them at 
every opportunity, although Diceyan concerns for the freedom of workers to work 
long hours,1162 rather than economic arguments, tend to be cited to justify the 
diluted domestic regime. 
 
The principal tool of evasion in the UK regulations is the individual ‘opt-out’ from 
the 48 hour week,1163initially transposed into the domestic regime only by the 
UK,1164 but  increasingly finding favour in states where objections have been 
raised to the limit the Directive places on work in which long periods are spent on 
‘stand by.’ 1165 
 
The UK goes further than it should, by in practice permitting employers to require 
workers to sign an opt-out as a condition of recruitment.1166 Such a requirement is 
a breach of the Directive, although one that has yet to be challenged, either in a 
domestic court or tribunal, or by the Commission.  
 
Although this surrender of OSH protection can subsequently be withdrawn by a 
worker,1167  it requires considerable self confidence - and perhaps confidence in 
                                               
1161 Ibid, para 34. 
1162The Sun, 16 December 2017: ‘SHACKLES COME OFF. British workers set for post-Brexit overtime boom as 
ministers plot to scrap EU limits.’ The paper told readers that ‘A Sun analysis suggests that the current limit could 
cost some families £1,200 in lost pay….’ 
1163
 See Article 22 of the 2003 directive and ‘Miscellaneous Provisions’, specifically Article 1 (a)-(d) of those 
provisions. For a discussion of the directive see ‘Opting out of the 48 hour week: employer necessity or individual 
choice?’ Barnard, Deakin and Hobbs (2003) 32ILJ 223. The 48 hours includes overtime work, but annual leave and 
sick leave should not be included in the calculation. 
1164 According to the Commission, in its 2003 Communication, COM (2003) 843, 30 December 2003, (para 2.2.1.1.), 
although it is said that Ireland did the same but dropped the opt out shortly afterwards.   
1165 Following CJEU decisions (SIMAP [2000] C-303/98 ECR I-7963Jaeger [2003] C-151/02 ECR I-8389, Dellas [2005] 
C-14/04 ECR I-10253 and most recently Ville de Nivelles v Matzak [2018] Case C-518/15, which held that ‘on call’ 
time to be held as working time (but not necessarily paid working time) other states adopted the opt out 
provisions, a matter referred to in the Commission Communication COM (2003) 843, 30 December 2003, at 2.2.2 
(see the text above). 
1166
 See “The Return of the Long Hours Culture” TUC 2008 www.tuc.org.uk/extras/longhoursreturn.pdf 
1167
  Workers have of course to be informed that they have that right - terminable at between 7 days and 3 months 
notice according to the terms of the ‘agreement’ (Reg 5 of the 1998 Regulations). The ECJ has held that the opt out 
can only be agreed to by a worker ‘with full knowledge of all the facts’ (Pfeiffer [2004] C-397/01 ECR I-8835).  
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the anti detriment provisions of the regulations and unfair dismissal ‘protection’ - 
to tell an employer that they are exercising their right not to be obliged to work 
more than an average of 48 hours in a 7 day period.1168 Moreover, those workers 
who do not enjoy the protection of a vigorous trade union will very likely not be 
aware that such a withdrawal is not a breach of contract, and will believe 
themselves bound. 
 
The EU Commission issued a Communication in 2003,1169 arguing that the 
recruitment requirement undermines the principle of free consent on which the 
legitimacy of the opt-out depends, and which the directive demands; 
 
‘if the opt-out agreement must be signed at the same time as the employment 
contract, freedom of choice is compromised….’1170  
 
The Communication concerned itself with the 1993 Directive, and its extension to 
other sectors under Directive 2000/34/EC. Nevertheless, the observations 
referred to here are pertinent to the 2003 directive, and the amended UK 
regulations. 
 
 The Commission also observed that the Directive requires a record to be kept of 
the hours worked by workers who work in excess of the 48 hour average, in 
contrast to the UK regulations which require only that a record is kept of the 
decision to opt out.1171 Compliance is also compromised by the failure of the 
regulations to require employer to make a record of breaks taken by all workers. 
In the characteristically diplomatic language of the Commission the 
communication goes on to state that ‘the way the Directive is transposed into 
national law, it could in practice prevent the workers in question benefiting from 
certain rights laid down in the Directive.’ 1172 
 
                                               
1168 This is distinct from the measurement of compliance which relates to an average of 48 hours over a four month 
(17 weeks) ‘reference period.’ 
1169 COM (2003) 843, 30 December 2003.  
1170 It would arguably be possible for a worker refused employment in these circumstances to rely directly on the 
terms of the directive in a claim against a public authority, or, invoke horizontal direct effect against a private 
employer by requiring the tribunal refer to the directive in interpreting the provisions of the regulations, although 
the low level any potential award appears to have discouraged any such claim being made. 
1171
 As a result of amendments to the regulations made in 1999. 
1172  COM (2003) 843, 30 December 2003, para 2.2.1.2. 
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The Commission is right, although during the 15 years since its observations were 
made there has been no suggestion of infraction proceedings being brought.  The 
Regulations are arguably a ramshackle accommodation with the requirements of 
EU membership, rarely enforced by the public authorities given that task. In 
practice workers find themselves either unable or discouraged from enforcing 
their rights under the Directive.  
While tribunal claims for breaches of the rest break, daily and weekly rest, holiday 
entitlements and compensatory rest can be made, only modest amounts of 
compensation are awarded. Such claims tend to be made after employment has 
been terminated, as a claim ancillary to one attracting more worthwhile 
compensation. Awards are made at the discretion of the tribunal according to 
‘equity and the substantive merits of the case,’1173 and are rarely sufficiently 
dissuasive. For example, in Miles v Linkage Community Trust [2008],1174 the EAT 
upheld a tribunal’s decision to award no compensation to a claimant who had 
succeeded in a claim for a breach of Reg 24 of the WTR governing daily rest 
because he suffered no pecuniary loss, and there was ‘no culpable default’ on the 
part of the employer, who was confused by the complexity of the WTR.1175  Such 
is the inadequacy of the enforcement regime employers sometimes prefer to 
continue to breach the regulations even after a tribunal has found against 
them.1176 
 Extraordinarily, while a dismissal because a worker insisted on his or her rights 
under the WTR will be deemed automatically unfair, and subjecting a worker to a 
detriment for the same reason is also actionable,1177 the Working Time 
Regulations do not provide standing for workers to bring a tribunal claim to either 
compensate a worker for being compelled to work in breach of the 48 hour limit, 
or to oblige an employer to adhere to the 48 hour limit.1178 
                                               
1173 “...having regard to” the default of the employer and the loss to the worker (Reg.30(4)(a) and (b). 
1174 UKEAT/0618/07/DA 
1175 Ibid, paras 11 & 12 and 30-34.  
1176 Arguably the ‘commodifiction’ of the rights and of breaches of the rights. 
1177 Provided by ERA 1996 ss101A and 45A. The EAT held in Miles  (para 11) that the WTR  did not permit 
compensation for injury to feelings alone. In contrast, in  South Yorkshire Fire & Rescue v Mansell  [2018] UKEAT 
0151 17 3001, fireman who suffered a detriment for asserting their WTR rights in breach of ss45A and 48 ERA 1996 
were given such an award. 
1178 Although if there has been no opt out criminal penalties are a theoretical possibility (Reg 4(2)). 
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While a claim for breach of contract was successful in the High Court in Barber v 
RJB Mining, after employees had been obliged to work in excess of the WTR 
limits,1179 the case does not amount to a precedent.1180 The remedy was merely a 
declaration that there had been a breach of Reg.4(1), which had been held by the 
court to be an implied term of the contract of employment. While the miners 
were held to be entitled to cease working until their average fell to within the 48 
hour average, the judge, noting the potential financial damage such a ‘walk out’ 
could inflict, refused to grant the injunction that the miners sought to restrain the 
employer from ‘forcing’ them to work. Any detriment or dismissal that followed 
the exercise of their right to cease work would therefore have seen the employee 
‘protected’ only by the prospect of a compensatory award under section 45A or 
101A ERA 1996,1181rather than by the additional and dissuasive threat of criminal 
liability. 1182 
 
While the judiciary is traditionally reluctant to grant injunctive relief in such cases, 
tribunals are able only to grant interim relief only in very limited circumstances, 
and breach of contract claims can be brought to tribunal only after the 
employment relationship has terminated. Workers still under contract must go to 
the County or High Court. Those obliged by financial circumstance to enforce their 
rights at tribunal are obliged to resign before bringing a claim. An additional 
problem is that tribunal claims for breach of contract are subject to a ceiling of 
£25,000. 
 
Nevertheless, Barber must have come as something as a surprise to those 
responsible for the implementation of the WTD. New Labour’s draftsmen had 
sucked as much of the substance out of the right to a 48 hour week as it could 
and it appears that they had not considered that Article 4(1) could be seen as an 
implied term of the contract of employment. The WTRs were intended to have 
been monitored on an ‘employer friendly,’ rather than adversarial basis, with 
employers arguably intended to be largely free to do as they pleased.  
 
                                               
1179Barber v RJB Mining [1999] ICR 679. 
1180 In Sayer v Cambridgeshire County Council [2007] EWHC 2029 (QB) the High Court held that a breach of 
statutory duty could not amount to a breach of contract (Tamara Lewis, Employment Law, an adviser’s handbook, 
11th Ed, p 127 n.288). 
1181
Barber p686. 
1182
 The judge stated that he made his ruling conscious of the fact that the miners had brought the case as a 
negotiating tactic. The case was bankrolled by the miners’ union NACODS a union which had proved reluctant to 
commit to the 1984-5 Miners’ Strike. 
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Enforcement of the 48 hour average is the responsibility of the HSE and local 
authorities (Reg 28(2)). 1183 The HSE failed to intervene over the breaches 
considered in Barber obliging the miners to litigate,1184 the ‘arms length’ nature of 
its role, and conciliatory nature any likely intervention is flagged on both the HSE 
and Gov.UK websites - they direct parties to Acas as a first point of contact for all 
working time matters. Only when Acas have failed to diffuse any dispute will they 
contemplate informing a local authority or the HSE. HSE Working Time Officers 
are ‘reactive.’ They don’t inspect, they respond to complaints. Those complaints 
are ‘prioritised,’ and investigated initially by ‘non visit methods’ – by a telephone 
call to the employer, when advice and guidance is given. Thus there is no 
incentive for employers to comply with regulations until and unless approached 
by Working Time Officers.1185 Enforcement action is almost unheard of.  
 
The HSE is also responsible for overseeing the use of forms of collective 
agreement used to vary the application of the WTR to groups of workers.  The 
approach taken here similarly undermines the impact of the right to protection. 
Article 17 of the WTD permits worker rest entitlements,1186 the Article 8 general 
‘daily’ night work limit of 8 hours,1187 and the general 48 hour average [Article 
16(b)], to be varied by collective agreement at enterprise, national, or sectoral 
level, to tailor them to the needs of a particular industry, or for with particularly 
busy periods of work.  Article 17(2) requires compensatory rest to be provided to 
‘rebalance the books,’ and an extended reference period of up to 6 months may 
be necessary in to accommodate the extra rest, and bring the overall weekly 
average down to 48 hours (Article 19). So, while there is ample scope for 
derogation, a relaxation of the working time rules requires collective agreement, 
and, as would be expected where such agreement is sought, compensatory 
arrangements must be made.  
                                               
1183
 HSE ‘for schools, hospitals, factories etc’, local authorities ‘for retail, catering, offices and leisure etc’ (Tamara 
Lewis, Employment Law, an adviser’s handbook, 10th edition, para 4.92).  
1184 There was no explanation as to why the HSE did not investigate or prosecute in the report of the case. 
1185 The Working Time Regulations 1998: Guidance on the Legislation for Working Time Officers and their 
Managers Flowchart: www.hse.gov.uk/foi/internalops/ocs/001-099/1_6-apendices/ap6.pdf See also the 
reluctance to take enforcement action evinced in ‘Dutyholder and strategic factors to be taken into account when 
determining the enforcement conclusion following non-compliance with the working time regulations’: 
www.hse.gov.uk/foi/internalops/ocs/001-099/1_6-apendices/app3.htm. The number of WT officers is unknown, 
but the total number of ‘inspectors, visiting officers and regulatory compliance officers’ was 1,058 on 31 March 
2018, down from 1,106 in 2016 (HSE Annual Report 2017-18). 
1186
 Articles 3, 4, & 5; periodic rest breaks, daily rest and weekly rest. 
1187 Capped at 8 hours, and which cannot be the subject of an individual opt out. 
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In Barber, the employer’s negotiations with the union, NACODS, had failed, so 
there was no such agreement in place permitting the employer to require the 
miners to work beyond the 48 hour week. Had individual workers voluntarily 
‘opted out’ then the employer could have obliged those particular workers to 
work, unless and until the opt out was withdrawn. But the individual opt out is a 
supposedly informed choice, one made independently, which cannot, by 
definition, be a substitute for a collective agreement permitting a variation of the 
WTR protections. Consequently, where a union is not recognised employers are 
permitted by the regulations to use ‘Workforce Agreements’ to impose the 
working patterns they require on particular shifts, or categories of workers – 
even, in practice, on the entire workforce. 
 
Article 18 of the WTD provides for member states to ‘lay down rules’ for ‘the 
application of that Article [17] by the two sides of industry’ where ‘there is no 
statutory system’ or ‘specific legislative framework.’1188 On that basis the UK, 
under  Schedule 1 of the Working Time Regulations, permits enterprise and 
workplace level ‘Workforce Agreements’ to effectively ‘rubber stamp’  the 
employer’s preferred arrangements where no pre-existing  collective agreement 
is in place. Copies of the agreement (valid for up to 5 years) and written guidance 
(or verbal guidance if the employer might reasonably think that is what is 
required), must given to all the workers affected. No other body receives a copy. 
The employer decides on how many ‘workforce representatives’ are necessary 
and organises a secret ballot so that the affected workers may vote for the 
candidates. The workers don’t actually vote on whether to accept the WA, they 
merely select the representatives who will validate the WA - the agreement 
requires the signature of the representatives to become effective.    Where 20 or 
fewer workers are concerned the WA can be signed by either the representatives 
of the workforce or by the majority of the workforce.  Such arrangements are 
arguably amount to no more than an administrative chore for HR, and this is not 
the quality of agreement required by the Directive. Moreover, both the Directive, 
and the regulations require compensatory entitlements be provided. Were a 
workforce to genuinely agree to sacrifice statutory rest to accommodate the 
needs of the employer it would require longer holidays, or longer weekly rest 
periods when extra daily hours are agreed to, or shorter days when breaks are 
reduced or dispensed with. But this is not how these agreements were intended 
                                               
1188
 Article 17 in the 1993 directive. This accords with the approach taken in such circumstances since Commission 
v UK[1994] C-383/92 ECR I-2479 since when the UK was obliged to set up consultation arrangement with 
representatives in collective redundancy cases  where the employer does not recognise a trade union. 
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to work. The regulations were intended to minimise the impact of the Directive 
on managerial prerogative. There is very rarely any negotiation, yet negotiation is 
what is required by the Directive.1189 
 
The concept of compensatory rest has, along with the concept of the regulation of 
working time as a justiciable matter, been allowed to fade out of public 
consciousness. In Jaeger the CJEU held that in ‘exceptional cases where it is not 
possible for objective reasons to grant’ periods of compensatory rest, member 
states must ensure that ‘the workers concerned are afforded appropriate 
protection,’1190 and it seems likely that, if pressed, the UK Government would 
argue that the UK OSH regime does afford ‘appropriate protection,’ much as it did 
when justifying its breach of Article 2(4) of the European Social Charter.1191 But 
we have yet to find out because the Government has not been challenged by the 
Commission, while at home obfuscation and muddle have served to bury the 
issue. 
 
‘Compensatory rest’ is defined on the Gov.UK site only in relation to the 
postponement of the 20 minute statutory break required after 6 hours of work. 
There is no reference to either to compensatory rest, or night work in the Gov.UK 
brief on ‘Maximum weekly working hours,’ although the 26 week reference 
period for trainee doctors and 52 week reference period for off shore oil workers 
are cited as examples of jobs with different reference periods. In contrast there is 
plenty of information on opting out of the 48 hour week.1192 
The implementation and enforcement of the WTD is, I would argue, eminently 
challengeable. In Max-Planck –Gesellschaft v Shimizu [2018],1193 the ECJ  held that 
                                               
1189
 ‘....collective agreements or agreements concluded between the two sides of industry at national or regional 
level or, in conformity with the rules laid down by them, by means of collective agreements or agreements 
concluded between the two sides of industry at lower level.’  Where there is ‘no statutory system’ for such 
agreements, or where there are such systems and it is lawful, then it is permissible for derogations to be 
negotiated “at the appropriate collective level” (Article 18 of the 2003 Directive). 
1190Jaeger, 2003, op cit, paras 94 and 97 (cited by Barnard in EC Employment Law,  2006, p594). 
1191 See above. It will be recalled in that instance that the Government was able to misrepresent the reason for the 
protection. That the Jaeger exception applies only to ‘exceptional cases’ where ‘objective reasons’ for a failure to 
provide compensatory rest are raised would not be likely to trouble the Government. A plausible argument is 
sufficient. 
1192
 ‘Rest breaks at work’ and Maximum weekly working hours’. 
1193
 EU C-206/874 6 November 2018.  The court held that workers are able to carry annual leave entitlement over 
from one year to the next if the employer has failed ‘diligently’ to give the worker the opportunity to take that 
leave in the year it should have been taken. 
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as the right to leave in the WTD is incorporated in the Charter (Article 31(2)), 
derived from the 1989 Community Charter on the Fundamental Social Rights of 
Workers and the European Social Charter, mentioned in TFEU Article 151,1194  
protected by ILO C132 (which, as we have seen, the 2003 directive requires 
account to be take of by states),1195it  is ‘an essential principle of EU social law’.1196 
As such the court held it, in effect, to be directly horizontally effective between 
private parties, as well as directly vertically effective against public authorities. If 
the relevant domestic law cannot be read in a way which is consistent with the 
directive it must be disapplied.1197 
 
While failures to provide compensatory rest, or to keep records of workplace 
agreements are criminal offences, prosecutions are unheard of. Even if aware of 
the regulations, the individual worker, very likely seeing restrictions on working 
time as restrictions on earnings, would tend not to be disposed towards reporting 
their employer. Besides, esoteric matters like, for example, the requirement to 
provide compensatory rest for workers undertaking five 12 hour night shifts every 
week are unlikely to be widely understood at Acas (which is where workers with 
unresolved concerns about working time are directed by the on line government 
advice), let alone by the workers concerned. An employer unlucky enough to hear 
from Acas will receive only advice, and if that is ignored the employer may be 
subject to a conciliatory approach from the HSE or local authority. As a 
consequence many employers who do not recognise a trade union see no need 
for Workplace Agreements. 
The European Commission, referring to research undertaken on their behalf by 
Barnard, Deakin and Hobbs which was published at the end of 2002, 1198 stated 
that Workforce Agreements were ‘rarely used’ in the UK.  I would suggest that the 
reality is that such agreements were commonly relied upon before it had become 
                                               
1194Ibid, para 70. 
1195Ibid 
1196Ibid para 69. 
1197Ibid, para 81. See also Wuppertal v Bauer and Willmeroth BroBonn (C -208:871 also 6 November 2018).  That 
case saw a similar approach taken in respect of the unused leave of a deceased worker held to have been owed to 
his estate. 
1198
 EU Commission communication p7, citing Barnard et al, The use and necessity of Article 18.1(b)(i) of the 
Working Time Directive in the United Kingdom, Final Report, December 2002, p.114. 
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generally understood that the Regulations were subject only to notional 
enforcement.  A subsequent ILJ journal article, based upon the Commission 
paper, refers to a 2001 study of 20 selected employers,1199  three of which had 
used Workplace Agreements to exploit the derogations, and to The Warwick Pay 
and Working Time Survey, which found that Workplace Agreements were relied 
on by a significant number of the 300 employers who were questioned.1200 
Crucially, however, it appears that after 2000 interest in formal avoidance of the 
regulations faded,1201  and the 40 interviews conducted on behalf of Barnard et al 
in the last half of 2002, three years after the regulations came into force, indicate 
that by where there was no collective agreement in place employers were relying 
almost exclusively on the individual opt out. Yet, as already mentioned, the opt 
out is supposedly an informed choice made by independently by the individual. A 
blanket imposition of the individual opt out is clear evidence of employer 
interference. Moreover, collective agreement is what is required when collective 
variations on the application of the regulations are imposed. 
Nevertheless, the use of the individual opt out in this way is exactly what one 
would expect in the circumstances. Even where five day shifts of 12 hours 
duration (common in warehouses and factories which run 24 hours a day) are 
worked as a matter of routine, the use of the opt-out would suffice as gesture 
sufficient to convince the workforce in a non unionised workplace that their 
employer is doing it ‘by the book.’  No need, of course, under the regulations, to 
keep a record of breaks taken and hours worked, although, as we have seen, that 
is requirement of the Directive. Keeping a record of the opt-out signed by each 
worker would likely be sufficient to convince the local authority or HSE, of the 
absence of Miles style ‘culpable default’ of the breach in the unlikely event of 
their taking an interest in the hours worked in a particular firm. 
That this laissez faire attitude to the Working Time Regulations was a calculated 
government policy appeared to be confirmed when the working time regime was 
extended to the transport sector by the 2002 Road Transport Working Time 
                                               
1199
 Neathey and Arrowsmith, ‘Implementation of the Working Time Regulations’, EMAR Series 11 (DTI,2001). 
1200
 Ibid, p.230. 
1201 Ibid, p.231. 
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Directive,1202and the 2005 Road Transport (Working Time Regulations). Just as 
cash strapped local authorities and the beleaguered  HSE were given 
responsibility for enforcing the general Working Time regime, what is now known 
as the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency – a public sector body that was being 
cut to the bone long before ‘austerity’ kicked in - were given responsibility for 
enforcement of the 2005 regulations.1203 
 
 Lorry drivers’ working time has long been governed by the ‘tachograph (the 
digital ‘spy in the cab’) rules’ – the Drivers’ Hours Regulations.1204 A driver can 
work up to six consecutive days, putting in up to 13 hours a day for four of those 
days, and between 13 and 15 hours on two of those days, a maximum of 82 
hours.1205 Weekly rest requirements will then allow no more than 5 days’ work 
the following week. It is the driver, not the employer, who is risking a fine or 
imprisonment if caught out on the road breaching the regulations.1206 
 
That was the case up until 2005. Now the tachograph rules are must operate 
within the overarching more restrictive limits on working time imposed by the 
Working Time Regulations, effectively relegating the ‘tacho’ rules to the 
governing of driving hours and daily work.  The WTR impose an absolute cap of 60 
hours on a week’s work, and require that the driver works no more than an 
average of 48 hours per week, calculated over a 17 week, or 26 week reference 
period. The directive does not allow individual opt-outs or negotiated variations. 
A breach of the WTR is, of course, a criminal offence. However, unlike the general 
WT regulations which provide sanctions only against the employer, both the 
employer and the driver may be prosecuted.1207 Nevertheless, the absolute cap is 
routinely broken in the road haulage industry. Many employers ignore it because 
the WTRs are very rarely enforced. 1208 
                                               
1202
  Directive2002/15/EC 
1203
 The other specialist agencies given responsibility for the enforcement of  WTRs in a particular industry are the 
Civil Aviation Authority, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Office for Nuclear Regulation and Office of Rail and 
Road (for the rail industry). 
1204 Currently governed by Regulation (EC) No. 561/2006. 
1205 Driving time is subsumed by these working time limits. Essentially they are permitted to drive for up to 9 hours 
a day. On two days a week they can extend driving time to 10 hours. After 4 and a half hours driving they must 
take a 45 minute break. 
1206 Although an employer’s connivance with such breaches can result in a prosecution. 
1207 Schedule 2, reg 17(1). 
1208
 Reg. 10 requires employers to inform employees of the requirements of the regulations. I have many years 
experience of driving vans and LGVs for many different employers and, other during the period that the transport 
WTRs were announced and introduced - before the industry realised that the regulations were not enforced - they 
were scarcely mentioned. 
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More remarkably still, the government connived with the Road Haulage firms to 
create the ‘period of availability’ [‘POA’] permitting employers to deduct inactive 
time when the driver’s working time is calculated. The driver, although being paid, 
and responsible for many hundreds of thousands of pounds worth of vehicle and 
freight – who may have ‘clocked on’ only half an hour earlier - is deemed to be no 
longer working. Employers unprepared to run the – albeit minimal – risk of 
ignoring the WTR while demanding long hours of their drivers will often now 
press drivers to record every significant  period when vehicles are not being 
driven or unloaded  as a ‘period of availability.’ There is a switch on the 
tachograph which, when activated, records a POA on the driver’s ‘digicard’. 
Working time is thus reduced considerably. 
 
The POA scheme offends against common sense.1209 More significantly, it is at 
odds with the interpretation of the 2003 general WT directive by the ECJ in 
Dellas.1210 In that case the court held that there was no intermediate category 
between rest and working time - ‘The fact that on-call duty includes some period 
of inactivity is thus completely irrelevant...’1211 The Court of Appeal in Gallagher v 
Alpha Catering Services [2005],1212 a case concerning airport lorry drivers who, 
their employers claimed, when waiting in their vehicle for fresh instructions were 
taking rest breaks, held that even if retrospect the workers had enjoyed an 
uninterrupted period without being required to work it did not amount to a rest 
break, and was work time, unless they knew at the start of the period that it they 
would not be required to work for a specified period. 
 
The 2002 Directive requires penalties for breaches of the WTR to be ‘effective, 
proportional and dissuasive,’1213 yet the Secretary of State for Transport chose 
instead to implement a regime of improvement and prohibition notices to be 
issued by the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency to recalcitrant employers 
before a prosecution is contemplated.  No prosecutions against employers have 
been brought under the regulations. Drivers found to be breaching the 
regulations are, in theory, subject to a system of penalties, although prosecutions 
are vanishingly rare, occasionally taking place following very serious road 
                                               
1209Even business lunches are deemed to be working time under the 2003 WTRs (See Gov.UK ‘Maximum weekly 
working hours’ 2: ‘Calculating your working hours.’ 
1210
 2005, op cit. 
1211
Ibid, para 47 [see Barnard, EC Employment Law, above, p588]. 
1212
 IRLR 102 
1213 Article 11, Directive 2002/15/EC (above). 
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accidents when working hours are subject to close scrutiny. There is little new in 
this approach. Drivers of vehicles under 3.5 tonnes have long been subject to the 
little known GB Domestic Drivers’ rules which are similar to the tachograph rules 
LGV drivers are compelled to observe. The rules are not enforced. 
 
This potential liability ensures that drivers are discouraged from drawing 
attention to breaches of the regulations by employers, and the fact that they are 
unable to enforce the 2005 regulations against their employer in the employment 
tribunal serves to make doubly sure that the wheels keep turning uninhibited by 
the Road Transport Working Time Directive. 1214 While Reg. 32 of the 1998 WTR 
provide that a worker dismissed for refusing to work in breach of the regulations 
is to be regarded as unfairly dismissed, no such protection is afforded to drivers. 
Instead, in such circumstances, they are obliged to report their employer (and, in 
effect, themselves) to the DVSA.1215  If dismissed or subject to some other 
detriment as a consequence, they must avail themselves at tribunal to the 
‘whistle blowing’ protections afforded by the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 
and the Employment Rights Act 1996.1216An attempt was made by a trade union 
to challenge what they politely described as this ‘legislative oversight’ through 
judicial review.1217  The Court of Appeal, presided over by Lord Justice Elias,1218 
held in essence that the Directive had given the Government sufficient leeway to 
allow it to neutralise the intended effect of the Directive, and to permit it to treat 
the restrictions on working time wholly as duties imposed on drivers rather than 
as entitlements. 1219 
 
                                               
1214 Reg.30. 
1215
 The DVSA, formerly VOSA, has effectively usurped the role of the police where the monitoring of driving time, 
work time, driver qualification and vehicle loading road worthiness is concerned. Understandably drivers prefer to 
keep contact with the DVSA to a minimum. 
1216
 See para 26 of the URTU case (below), and Underwood v Wincanton plc [2016] UKEAT/0163/15/RN. In this case 
the EAT ruled that the ‘whistle blowing’ provisions protected drivers thought by management to be unduly 
particular about the roadworthiness of their vehicles, and who were denied the opportunity to work overtime as a 
consequence. 
1217 Unite Road Transport Union v Secretary of State for Transport [2013] EWCA Civ 962. 
1218 See particularly para 45. The Union’s barrister, John Hendy, had referred to the failure in the implementation 
of the Drivers’ Hours Regulations to allow access to tribunal where breaches of the regulations occurred. This 
appears to have encouraged Elias to muddy the waters by drawing the ‘tachograph rules’ into his analysis of the 
WTR, and his judgment makes it clear that he doesn’t understand how the two sets of regulations are supposed to 
interact. 
1219
 The case was an unsuccessful attempt by URTU to apply for a judicial review of the implementation of the EU 
Directive, focusing on the failure, in the subsequent regulations, to permit drivers to bring a complaint that their 
rights under the directive had been breached. The wider breaches of the directive I have referred to were not 
raised in the case. 
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Where working time is concerned, UK regulation and practice can then, without 
risk of lapsing into hyperbole, be said to be a travesty of EU law.  The UK’s record 
can also be said to amount to a breach of Article 2 of the European Social Charter. 
 
In a recent complaint to the ECSR provoked by the labour law ‘reforms’ imposed 
on Greece by the Troika, Greek General Confederation of Labour (GSEE) v Greece 
[2017],1220  the lack of effective regulation in the wake of the enforced retreat 
from sectoral bargaining was held to be a breach of Article 2. Conformity with the 
Charter requires working time regulations ‘to prevent daily or weekly working 
hours from being unreasonable’ by ‘providing for adequate safeguards’ and 
‘reference periods of a reasonable duration for the calculation of the average 
working time.’ Noting the terms of the WTD (Directive 2003/88/EC), the 
Committee observed that employees in Greece ‘could be required to work up to 
78 hours per week [13 hours x 6 days]…clearly too long to qualify as reasonable 
within the meaning of Article 2(1) of the 1961 Charter.’1221 The Committee also 
held that compliance with the Charter requires that 
 
‘the maximum duration of work must also operate within a precise legal 
framework which clearly delimits the scope left to employers and 
employees to modify, by collective agreement, working time.’ 
 
 The 1998 Statement of Interpretation on Article 2 states that compliance 
requires ‘supervision by an appropriate authority,’ to ensure that ‘maximum daily 
and weekly limits…must not be exceeded, in any event.’ 
 
The chaotic position in the UK outlined in previous paragraphs is arguably a more 
blatant breach of Article 2(1) – or it would be if the UK had ratified that 
paragraph. As we saw in chapter 3, UK commitment to voluntarism meant that 
back in 1962 the Macmillan Government felt that it could not ratify 2(1). 
 
Nevertheless, Article 7(d) UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
demands, as I have shown above, much the same clarity and certainty in similarly 
requiring states (and drawing on the plethora of ILO working time conventions in 
doing so) to impose ‘reasonable limitation of working hours,’ and   ‘to set 
                                               
1220
 Complaint  No.111/2014 (see www.coe.int ‘Processed complaints’). 
1221
 Para 154. CGT v France, Complaint No.55/2009 [2010] (see www.coe.int ‘Processed complaints’) was cited as 
authority for the breach of the WTD to be seen as a breach of 2(1).The Committee noted the findings by the OECD 
on the unsuitability of work intensification as an anti-crisis measure (paras 155 and 156).  
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minimum standards that must be respected and cannot be denied or reduced on 
the basis of economic or productivity arguments,’ so the fact that 2(1) of the 
Charter has not been ratified is arguably of little consequence.  
 
Indeed, such is the enormity of the calculated failure of the UK government to 
limit working time that the UK can arguably be saidto breach the Article 3(2) 
Charter requirement for ‘the enforcement of’ OSH ‘regulations by measures of 
supervision,’ the half century long commitment to the provision of ‘just 
conditions of work,’ and ‘safe and healthy working conditions,’ as aims of policy 
on those grounds alone.1222 
 
Significantly for the UK’s famously flexible workforce the ECSR holds that flexible 
working practices require more, rather than less, rigorous labour inspection 
regimes,1223and the UK might also arguably be said to be in breach of the 
obligations examined in the first section of this chapter imposed by ILO 
Convention No.81 on Labour Inspection. In its monumental efforts to make the 
WTD ‘employer friendly’ it appears to have breached Articles 3, 10, 12 and 17 of 
C81 
 
Such, however, are the limitations of the 1961 Charter’s reporting system, and, 
perhaps, the disinclination of British trade unionists to present pertinent 
comments on the government reports presented to the committee, or to make 
complaints to the ILO Committee of Experts,1224 that these are matters which 
have yet to be commented upon by either the ECSR or the ILO. Conclusions XX-3 
in 2014 was the last point in the reporting cycle when working time breaches 
were identified by the ECSR:  
 
Article 2(2): There is no legal right to paid public holidays in the UK – they are 
included in the 5.6 weeks (28 days) required by the Working Time Directive. This 
is a breach of the Charter (see also Conclusions XIX-3 2010, XVI-2 2006 & XVIII-2 
2002). ‘Adequate compensation’  for those obliged to work on a bank holiday 
manifested as extra time off in lieu or enhanced pay might secure compliance, but 
the Government has yet to show that ‘the great majority’ of workers are allowed 
                                               
1222
European Social Charter 1961, Part 1, paras 2 and 3. 
1223
 Conclusions XIV-2, 1998. 
1224
That said, the TUC are careful about choosing the cases they present to the ILO committees, and they are not 
short of grounds for complaint. 
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to enjoy these holidays or receive adequate compensation if they do not.1225 This 
failure is, of course, also a breach of the parallel requirements of Article 7 of the 
UN Covenant.1226 
 
The Government attempted to explain itself to the ECSR in its December2017 
report for Cycle XXI-3 (2018), arguing that ‘inevitably some people are required to 
work on bank and pubic holidays…they will still be entitled to 5.6 weeks leave.’ As 
for adequate compensation:  
‘the rate of pay and circumstances in which work may be performed is a matter 
for individual contracts.’ 
Article 2(3): In Conclusions XIX-3 (2010), and XVIII-2 (2007) it was found that 
British workers who were ill or injured during their holiday were not entitled to 
compensatory leave.  In a statement of interpretation on 2(3) in 1989-1990 it had 
been established that this was a breach of the Charter. 1227However, although the 
Working Time Regulations have not been amended, the recent cases NHS Leeds v 
Larner [2012] and Sood Enterprises v Healy [2013],1228 have established that 
employers must provide compensatory leave in such circumstances,1229and that 
the law therefore conforms with both EU Working Time Directive (2003/88/EC) 
and Article 2(3) in this regard. 
Article 2(5): In Conclusions XIX-3 (2010), and XVIII-2 (2007) the ECSR found that 
the UK was not in conformity with 2(5), on the grounds that in many 
circumstances it is possible to postpone weekly rest periods and to work in excess 
of 12 days consecutively - also a prima facie breach of Article 7 of the UN 
Covenant. The most recent Government report essentially argues that 
uninterrupted 12 day work periods are exceptional, and that Article 17 of the 
                                               
1225 Article 33(1) of the Charter permits Article 2 to be implemented by collective agreement, with implementation 
‘treated as effective if their provisions are applied through such agreements or other means to the great majority 
of the workers concerned, and 33(2) similarly pemits the use of legislation ‘if the provisions are applied by law to 
the great majority of the workers concerned.’ 
1226 General Comment on Article 7, para 45.  ‘Adequate compensation’ is less under the Covenant: Workers 
required to work should receive at least their normal remuneration plus compensatory leave of the same duration.   
1227
 Conclusions XII-2. 
1228
IRLR 825 CA and IRLR 825 CA 
1229 Following Stringer v HMRC [2009] C-520/06 ECR I -179 and Pereda v Movilidad SA [2009] C-277/08 ECR I-8405. 
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WTD permits them where they are necessary for business continuity or where 
unforeseen circumstances have arisen. It cites the recent CJEU case, Marques Da 
Rosa,1230 to argue that when 12 work days are sandwiched between two 48 hour 
rest periods then that amounts to two six day work periods with one rest day 
each, rather than one 12 day period of work, and that the UK – where some 84% 
of workers enjoy Sunday as a rest day - is therefore compliant.1231 This argument 
misses the point. As the Statement of Interpretation in Conclusions XIV-2 states, 
while two days rest after 12 consecutive days work is within the bounds of 2(5), it 
is the maximum, and when 12 days are exceeded the Charter is breached. 
__________________________________ 
We can therefore conclude from the evidence presented above that the UK 
government has connived with employers to evade the rights conferred by the 
Directives and the Regulations. Legislation emptied of substance cannot be said to 
provide the clear regulation that supranational treaty obligation requires, and 
therefore the required re-regulation must at least ensure that: 
 
 Fixed minimum standards which must be respected and cannot be reduced 
on the basis of economic or productivity arguments are set in place.  
 The detail of working time regulation is agreed by collective agreement at 
establishment, sectoral or national level. 
 The individual opt out cannot be imposed on work forces as a substitute for 
genuine collective agreement 
 ‘Workforce agreements’ are withdrawn. 
 Employers are not permitted to require new recruits to opt out as a 
condition of service. 
 The 48 hour week is enforced by HSE, local authorities and DVSA. 
 Individual workers, including mobile workers, are able to enforce their 
rights easily and inexpensively. 
 In the absence of the power to grant injunctive relief at tribunal and the 
reluctance of judges to do so in the higher courts, powers sufficient in 
practice to compel employers to adhere to the 48 hour week should be 
                                               
1230
 [2017] Case C-306/16 ECR  
1231 Cycle XXI-3 (2018) 
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conferred, and punitive awards meted out to persuade employers that it 
would be uneconomic to break the law.   
 Employers are required to make a record of working time all breaks taken 
by workers 
 Public holidays are guaranteed and not ‘rolled up’ as part of the 5.6 weeks 
per year, and that when they are worked premium compensatory rates are 
paid. 
 
 
3: Wages  
Not only is a ‘living wage,’ providing a decent standard of living in the region 
where the worker and the worker’s family resides, necessary, but a ‘fair wage’ 
must be paid one which compensates adequately for the difficulty, skill, 
insecurity, ‘residual risk’, and other relevant factors inherent in the work 
undertaken: Equal remuneration should be provided for work of equal value. 
 A minimum wage of 60% of the net average is required. However, if the 
minimum wage is between 50% and 60% of the average, and if it can shown that 
the wage secures a decent standard of living, then that minimum can be 
considered adequate. 
The minimum wages of 16 to 18 year olds must not be more than 20% less than 
the 60% of the net average adult wage. 
Overtime work must be paid at a premium by law, not merely practice. 
Deductions from wages must not be permitted where workers are on low wages. 
Deductions cannot be sanctioned by the contract of employment alone. They 
should be governed either by law or by collective agreement, and must not be 
permitted to reduce the net wage below that which is required to secure an 
adequate standard of living for the worker and the worker’s family.  
__________________________________ 
Compliance with the European Social Charter Article 4(1) requirement for ‘Decent 
Remuneration’ demands ‘remuneration such as will give workers and their 
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families a decent standard of living.’ States must ‘recognise the right to 
remuneration such as will give them and their families a decent standard of 
living.’  
Similarly the UNICESCR requires, by Article 7(a) (ii), that workers be assured ‘A 
decent living for themselves and their families.’ The UN Committee interprets 
remuneration to include allowances, and benefits in kind like health insurance 
and child care facilities.1232 The minimum wage is a ‘core obligation’ of the 
Covenant.1233 It should be ‘indexed at least to the cost of living.’1234 Arguments 
that minima must be pitched low to ensure high levels of employment cannot 
justify  an NMW pitched below the ‘decency threshold,’ and ‘freezes’ in times of 
economic crisis must be temporary and subject to frequent review.1235 
 
Obviously minimum wage levels should be pitched at a level which provides a 
decent living for the worker and the worker’s family within a particular region. 
Housing costs are particularly variable and, of course, the availability of affordable 
housing is crucially important to those on low wages. It is also the case that a 
minimum hourly rate does not set a minimum income, and that even an income 
which provides a decent living may not be a ‘fair wage’  reflecting the skill, 
danger, difficulty, training, or job insecurity implicit in that work. 
 The UN Covenant, by Article 7 (a)(i), requires ‘fair wages’  for workers.  The UN 
Committee’s 2016 General Comment on Article 7 states that ‘For the clear 
majority of workers, fair wages are above the minimum wage,’1236  and arguably 
the principal of ‘equal pay for work of equal value’ not only applies to 
undervalued work undertaken by women, but embraces a broader obligation to 
secure a fair wage.1237 
                                               
1232 Ibid para 7. 
1233 Ibid, para 65. 
1234
 Ibid, para 21. 
1235
 Ibid,para 21. 
1236
 Ibid,para 10. 
1237 Ibid para 11. 
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 From 1930 until 1985 the UK was obliged by ILO Convention No.26 to establish 
sectoral bargaining machinery in badly paid poorly organised sectors:  
‘Each member which ratifies this Convention shall take the necessary 
measures, by way of a system of supervision and sanctions, to ensure that 
the employers and workers concerned are informed of the minimum rates 
of wages in force and that wages are not paid at less than these rates in 
cases where they are applicable.’1238 
The UN Committee holds that Article 7 requires that minima ‘should apply 
systematically, protecting as much as possible the fullest range of workers’ and it 
is suggested that it might ‘differ across sectors regions, zones and professional 
categories,’1239  effectively advertised, implemented and enforced ‘with penal or 
other sanctions.’1240 The provision of fair wages arguably inevitably requires 
collective bargaining, and it will be recalled that sectoral collective bargaining is 
about the provision of minimum levels of remuneration in the manner described 
by the UN Committee. 
Given the reliance on the market in the UK it is unsurprising that, since 
Conclusions XII-I (1991), the European Social Charter’s European Committee on 
Social Rights has consistently found that the UK fails to conform to the 
requirements of Article 4 (1). The provision of the statutory NMW in 1998 failed 
to secure compliance. In 2014 (Conclusions XX-3), it noted that the NMW remains 
below 50% of the gross average wage and is ‘manifestly unfair’, failing to ‘secure a 
decent standard of living.’ Citing the EUROSTAT 2012 data the ECSR noted that 
average earnings were £35,883.09 (gross); £26,934.10 (net), while the NMW for 
those over 21 was £12,048 (gross), some 39.4% of the average gross.  
The hourly minimum wages for young people are unequivocally inadequate. The 
Government is in breach of Article 7(5):  Right of children and young persons to 
protection – Fair pay. The ECSR concluded in 2014, as it had in Conclusions XIX-4 
                                               
1238
 Article 4,Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery Convention, 1928. Ratified by the UK in 1929, it came into force in 
1930. 
1239
 Ibid, para 23. 
1240 Ibid, para 24. 
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2011, that the ‘minimum wage of young workers is not fair.’ As of April 2018 
those rates are: 
 
Under 18: £4.20. 
18-20: £5.90. 
21 – 24, the National Minimum Wage: £7.38.  
 25 + ‘The National Living Wage’: £7.83. 
The difference between the NMW for adults and 16 to 18 year olds should not 
exceed 20%,1241 calculated, of course, with the base reference taken as an adult 
minimum which is compliant with Article 4(1).1242 Although it is not a question 
that the Committee has considered, it is certainly arguable that the lower rates 
for 18 to 24 year olds are completely unjustified discriminatory breaches of both 
Article 4(1) and 7(5).  
In 2011 the Committee had considered the apprentices’ NMW,1243then £2.68 per 
hour compared with an adult NMW of £6.31 to be ‘acceptable.’  However, the 
Conclusions II (1971) Statement of Interpretation on 7(5) requires a minimum of 
one third of the NMW, or the particular adult ‘starting rate’ for the job, which  
means that, paradoxically, in almost every instance that the required figure can 
either be very substantially higher than the minimum or substantially lower. The 
rate should rise to two thirds in the last year of the apprenticeship. 
UK Apprentices younger than 19, or in the first year of their apprenticeship, are 
entitled to a minimum of £3.70 per hour. Those who are 19 or over and have 
completed the first year of their apprenticeship are entitled to the NMW for their 
age. In 2015 the ECSR requested information on the terms of apprenticeships ‘and 
requests confirmation that the allowance is gradually increased during the 
apprenticeship period…In the meantime, the Committee reserves its position on 
this point.’ However, if one takes the view that the UK rates should be no less 
                                               
1241
 Conclusions XVIII-1, 2006, Albania 
1242
 Conclusions XII-2, 1989, Malta. For the hourly rate required to secure compliance see below. 
1243 For what constitutes an apprenticeship in this context see Reg.5 of the NMW Regulations 2015. 
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than a third of the rate of the fully qualified adult tradesman, incremental 
increases in hourly pay based on the NMW are an irrelevance, and the Committee 
appears to be muddled about the application of 4(1) and 7(5) to apprentices. 
Those younger workers aged over 18 not in an apprenticeship must be paid an 
hourly wage of not be less than four fifths of the adult rate. Consequently, as a 
first step towards securing for younger workers the hourly rates they are entitled 
to (setting aside the argument that we ought to be discussing overall 
remuneration rather than hourly pay) the Government must set an adequate 
minimum wage. 
The government report (for the period 2009-12 to which conclusions XX-3 2014 
relates) stated that according to the Low Pay Commission the gross NMW was 
52.8% of the gross median wage and 41.1% of the gross average wage. The 
Governmental Committee had been told by its UK representative   
 
‘that the Government sought to ensure that the NMW remained around 
51% of gross median earnings and that, as it was not designed as a living 
wage, it had to be considered in the context of the state benefits available.’  
 
Rather undermining that argument, in 2016 the minimum wage for those over 25 
was rebranded as the National Living Wage. Referring to the obligation of the 
government to provide ‘full information’ on the changes in the reference period, 
seemingly nettled by what looks very like obfuscation in the report and in the 
information offered by the representative of HM government, the ECSR asked the 
government for information on ‘net values of both minimum and average wages 
and, where applicable, direct taxation, social security contributions, the costs of 
living and earnings related benefits.’ 
 
The ECSR recalled that 4(1) compliance ‘a decent standard of living… requires a 
wage at or above half of the net average,’ and where the NMW is between 50 and 
60% of that figure governments must provide the ECSR with evidence that that 
wage does provided such a standard of living.1244 The net wage, calculated after 
                                               
1244
 In Greek General Confederation of Labour (GSEE) v Greece, 2017, op cit,the Committee recalled ‘ that to be 
considered fair within the meaning of Article 4(1), the minimum or lowest net remuneration or wage paid in the 
labour market must not fall below 60% of the net average wage…after deduction of taxes and social security 
contributions’ (para 187). ‘Fair’ in this context must be taken to mean ‘compliant. 
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tax and NI deductions, but not other types of insurance or pension schemes, 
includes bonuses and gratuities, and, ‘in principle’, payments in kind.1245 
Unfortunately, in its 2018 report the Government declined to give the committee 
what was asked for, preferring to fill the report with a great many only 
tandengentially relevant statistics, charts and graphs. The NLW was said to be 
56.4% of the gross median hourly rate, the figure for April 2016,1246  and the 
Committee was told that the Government ‘has an established policy to set the 
NLW rate such that it reaches 60% of median earnings by 2020.’1247   
 
As the ONS cited a median figure of 58% in March 2018, they at least appeared to 
be on target. Nevertheless the median is the wrong figure – the Government have 
selected the wrong target. 60% of the mean average is what is required for 
unequivocal compliance.   
 
The recently published provisional results from the 2017 Office for National 
Statistics Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings give a mean weekly gross for full 
time workers of £662.50, and a median of £550.40.1248 For the basic wage the 
mean gross is £631.60 and the median £517.50.1249 The mean hourly pay rate 
excluding overtime is £16.97, while the median £13.94.1250 The mean of the basic 
hours worked was 38.1, while the median was 37.5.1251 
 
The NLW, for a 38 hour week pays a net £7.03 per hour after tax (£267.38 a 
week),1252 while the average basic wage for an average 38 hour week pays £13.25 
per hour after tax (£503.56 a week). The NLW is 53% of the net average wage. 
 
Calculated on the basis of 38 hours worked a week, the NLW, 53% of the average 
net wage, provides a take home of approximately £267.38. 
 
                                               
1245 In the UK gratuities cannot be included in the calculation to assess whether a wage complies with the 
minimum, nor can payments in kind. ‘Overtime’ pay can.  
1246 37th National Report on the implementation of the European Social Charter, Cycle XXI-3 (2018), December 
2017. The report states that the Low Pay Commission provided the percentage. 
1247Ibid, p9 & p10. 
1248 Total Table 1.1a. 
1249 Total Table 1.3a 
1250
 Total Table 1.6a 
1251
 Total Table 1.10a 
1252
 Lke all subsequent tax calculations in this section this figure has been reached by using the on line HMRC tax 
calculator and the tax code 1185L. 
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The next step is to assess whether £267.38per week is sufficient to provide a 
decent living.  
 
 The Joseph Rowntree Foundation holds that the Minimum Income Standard is a 
gross salary of £17,934 for single people, while a couple with two children require 
between them at least £40,762. A single parent with one child requires 
£29,601.1253 By comparison, the NLW provides an annual gross of £15,879.24. 
 
If each of the couple earns half of the £40,762 then their total net pay will be 
£663.14 each week. The single parent on £29,601 will take home £452.14. The 
parents in these scenarios are assumed to be supported by tax credits which will 
pay each of the households ‘up to £2,010’ per year. 1254 This will amount to a little 
less than £39 extra each week, so in essence the foundation is saying that the 
decency threshold requires a net income of £700 each week for a couple with two 
children and £500 for a single parent with one child. The net MIS for a single 
person on the gross of £17,934 PA, is £299.56 each week, so we can say that£300 
per week is the decency threshold for a single person. 
 
The ONS tells us that in 2017 the average outgoings for a family of four, including 
housing, was £741, and that the average outgoings for a single householder with 
no children was £347 each week. Reflecting the comparative poverty of single 
parent families, where the household contained one adult and one child average 
outgoings were £336. In households where there were one adult and two 
children, that sum was £421 per week.1255 
 
So, we can safely say that the NLW is not sufficient to provide a decent standard 
of living. 60% of the net average wage, as required by the European Social 
Charter, expressed as an hourly rate as it would appear in an advertisement for a 
job, is: 
 
£10.18 per hour before tax and NI is deducted. The minimum hourly rate for 
young adults should therefore be £8.14. 
                                               
1253 See, A Minimum Income Standard for the UK in 2017, by Matt Padley and Donald Hirsch, Joseph Roundtree 
Foundation, 2017, p.12. The research on which the authors rely was conducted by the Centre for Research in Social 
Policy at Loughborough University and the Family Budget Unit at the University of York. 
1254
 See GOV.UK ‘Working Tax Credit.’ 
1255
 Office for National Statistics: National Living Wage earners fall short of average family spending, 28 March 
2018. 
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In terms of weekly take home pay, and therefore as minimum wage for a 38 hour 
week the National Living Wage should be: 
 
£328.11. 
 
The yearly take home pay would be just over £17,000. Expressed as a yearly gross 
the NLW would be: 
 
£20,115.68  
 
Whether that is sufficient to provide a decent standard of living, and the Joseph 
Roundtree Foundation and ONS averages suggest that it is not, is questionable.   
 
The key figure for the purposes of the Charter used to be 68% of the gross 
average wage, which would have seen the required hourly rate pitched at £11.54 
and hour and a yearly gross £22,803.04. In the statement of interpretation in 
Conclusions XIII-3(1992-1993) it had noted that the ‘poverty threshold’ for the 
OECD was pegged at 66% of average disposable income per head and a Council of 
Europe study pitched the ‘decency threshold’ at 68%.1256  
In 1984, as the Government contemplated the legality of the abolition of the 
Wages Councils, a Department of Employment brief noted that there was  
‘nothing new about allegations that we are breaching the Charter’s fair 
remuneration provisions. The LPU [Low Pay Unit] often allege that the UK is 
in breach of these provisions because many workers receive less than two-
thirds of average pay.’1257 
This changed in 1998, with the statement of Interpretation on Article 4(1) in 
Conclusions XIV-2 (1998), which justified the revision of the benchmark average 
primarily on the grounds that the old figure was selected in an era when each 
family would normally have just the one ‘bread winner,’ and  when the Charter 
states were comparatively homogenous. The impression given was that ‘take 
                                               
1256
 Studies on the appropriation of resources (OECD) July 1976 and ‘Methods of Defining Decent Remuneration’, 
JP Daloz, Council of Europe (1977). 
1257 TNA LAB 13/2969. 
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home’ pay must now provide a decent living for the individual worker, but not 
necessarily the family. Subsequent statements by the Committee however have 
firmly stuck to the requirement for the individual wage to provide a decent living 
for the worker and family, and arguably the better view is that in very rich states 
like the UK it may be that one wage may not extend to cover what some may 
regard as essentials for a family while still falling within the bounds of 4(1). 
Nevertheless, it rather looks as if the burgeoning numbers of single parents have 
been forgotten, and a fresh statement of interpretation would be welcome. 
 
Minimums of £11.54, and perhaps as much as £15 per hour in London and the 
south east,1258 would be of particular help to the average single parents cited by 
the ONS (above), the more so if they are permitted by genuine tax credits to keep 
more of their income. Benefits, whether in cash or in kind, even when 
disingenuously described as ‘tax credits,’ cannot be said to be an element of pay 
for those in work, and cannot be taken into account when assessing compliance 
with 4(1).1259 
 
Of course, an unenforced minimum wage, whether high or low, is worthless. The 
Government has taken pains to reassure the Committee that the national minima 
are ‘enforced by the Government who have the power to inspect employers,’ and 
oblige those evading their responsibilities to pay arrears ‘and to pay a further 
financial penalty.’ It stated it was committed to an enforcement programme, was 
running a ‘name and shaming’ scheme, and doubling the maximum fines ‘from 
100% to 200% of the arrears owed to the worker, up to a maximum of £20,000 
per worker.’  
 
The latest list of  179 ‘shamed’  employers found by HMRC to have been paying 
less than the minimum wage reflects some 9,200 workers reimbursed £1.1 million 
in underpaid wages, and fines of £1.3 million handed down to their employers. 
The press release accompanying the list boasts that the scheme has ‘Since 
2013…identified more than £9 million in back pay for around 67,000 workers, 
                                               
1258 The Living Wage Foundation campaigns for a ‘real living wage’ of £10.20 in London, and £8.75 elsewhere,  
modest demands that can be seen as an attempt to start to wean employers off the effective subsidies they have 
long received from Government in the form of benefits paid to those in poorly paid full time work.  
 
1259
 Had tax credits actually been credits which meant less or no liability for tax and NI and reduced PAYE 
deductions at source then they arguably could have been. 
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with more than 1,700 workers fined a total of £6.3 million.’1260 Citing a figure the 
Government provided in its report to the ESRC, the press release states that the 
‘government has also committed £25.3 million for minimum wage enforcement in 
2017 to 2018.’ 
 
Unfortunately all this is very far from the triumph it is presented as. The 179 
employers issued with a ‘notice of underpayment’ are a very small proportion of 
the many thousands of employers who  pay less than the minimum hourly rate, 
and the figures disguise both the size of the problem and the inadequacy of the 
Government’s  response. 
 
 In 2016/17 some £10,999,647 worth of underpayments relating to 98,594 
workers were identified, the vast bulk of the employers being permitted to ‘self 
correct,’ and to promise to repay their workers without being issued with a notice 
of underpayment, or  having to pay any sanction – or being named and shamed. 
In 2014-15 £3,291,300 in underpayments were identified, involving 26,318 
workers, and in 2015-16 the figures were £10,281,200 and 58,080.  
 
These increases do, however, reflect the increasing amount of money being spent 
on detection. The Low Pay Commission were told by HMRC that funding rose 
from £8 million in 2013/14, to 13 million in 2015/16, then to £20 million in 
2016/17, ‘and will rise again to £25 million for the three years from 2017/18 
onwards…There are now 399 enforcement officers, up from 237 in 2015/16.’1261 
HMRC have to monitor the wages of 2.3 million workers and it estimated that it 
will be required to deal with 3.3 million workers by 2020 if the minimum rises to 
60% of the median as is proposed,1262so these officials face a considerable task.  
 
Another manifestation of this increasing interest in labour inspection was the 
appointment of a Director of Labour Market Enforcement in 2017.1263  This man, 
David Metcalfe, is now responsible for coordinating the efforts of the Gangmaster 
and Labour Abuse Authority, the Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate, the 
                                               
1260 9 March 2018: Nearly 200 employers named and shamed for underpaying thousands of minimum wage 
workers, Press Release GOV.UK.. 
1261
Low Pay Commission: Non-compliance and enforcement of the National Minimum Wage, September 2017, 
paras 3.3 and 3.4. 
1262
Ibid,,para 1.6. 
1263 Low Pay Commission Non-compliance and enforcement of NMW, (above), para 3.5. 
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Health and Safety Executive and the HMRC National Minimum Wage and Living 
Wage enforcement team. 
 
Metcalf is also obliged to present an ‘annual strategy’ to government, and 
Business Secretary Greg Clark boasted in December 2018, in response to Metcalf’s 
May 2018 proposals, that the budget for minimum wage enforcement will be 
£26.3 million in 2018-19. He announced that ‘We have accepted the case for the 
state taking responsibility for enforcing a basic set of core rights (including holiday 
pay) for the most vulnerable workers.’ This is a remarkable step for any post 1979 
government to have taken. Clark also promised to ‘consider the case for a single 
enforcement body.’1264 Having evidently done some very quick thinking, the 
government stated in its December 2018 Good Work Plan that an enforcement 
agency is to be established early in 2019.1265 
 
The new agency will have a lot to do. The Low Pay Commission published a report 
in September 2017 citing the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings which 
estimated that between 305,000 and 579,000 workers are underpaid.1266 Even 
without considering the ‘invisible’ workers in the black economy, this is almost 
certainly a considerable underestimate. The Commission noted, for example, that 
70,867 of the 98,594 underpaid workers who came to the attention of HMRC in 
2016-17 worked in the retail sector, which according to the ASHE survey ‘accounts 
for just 15 per cent of underpaid workers.’1267  The LPC states that:  
 
‘We estimate that there may be over 100,000 underpaid workers across the 
education, professional, scientific and technical activities, manufacturing 
construction and the arts. And yet there have been just 3,000 [such] workers 
identified in these sectors in HMRC’s cases in 2016/17.’1268 
 
                                               
1264  UK Labour Market Enforcement Strategy 2018/19: Government Reponse by the Department of Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy and the Home Office Dec 2018, Ministerial Foreword. 
1265Good Work Plan, HM Government December 2018, pages10, 39 & 42. 
1266Low Pay Commission: Non-compliance and enforcement of the National Minimum Wage, (above).  That very 
approximate figure is thought to fall by up to 50% 3 to 6 months after new minima are set. The figures were 
provided by the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings which is based on 1% of PAYE records in April of each year. 
The ASHE survey, which provides a snap shot of workers in the formal economy was compared with the Labour 
Force Survey household figures. Self reported through the whole year, they have ‘value as an indicator of trends’ 
and reveal the ‘seasonal’ variation.  The diagram makes the position clear. 
1267
Ibid, para 3.3. 
1268Ibid, para 3.14. 
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Closely related to the failure to pay the minimum wage is the failure of employers 
to pay premium overtime rates. This, however, is due to the absence of a legal 
obligation to make such payments, and it is the Government which is culpable. 
 
Article 4(2) of the European Social Charter requires increased remuneration for 
overtime work. In conclusions XIX-3 (2010), and in XX-3 (2014), the ECSR found 
that the UK is not in conformity with 4(2) because such premiums are not 
guaranteed in law. The statements of interpretation on Articles 2(1) on working 
time, and on 4(2) in Conclusions XIV-2 of 1998, also require overtime to be either 
paid at a higher rate, or for ‘additional time off to replace increased 
remuneration.’ 1269 
 
It is very common in the UK for overtime to be paid at the same rate as the 
contracted hours, blurring the divide between the hours the worker is 
contractually bound to work and consequently the question of whether the 
worker is required to work extra hours. During the years of post war voluntarism 
collective agreement  invariably secured increased remuneration in such 
circumstances, usually ‘time and a half’, before and after the contractual core 
hours during the week and on Saturdays - ‘double time’ on Sundays and bank 
holidays. Those employers which did not recognise a union usually found 
themselves obliged to do the same, but as the numbers of workers covered by 
collective agreement have dwindled overtime premiums have tended to be 
reduced or phased out. Yet enhanced overtime rates can make a vast difference 
to take home pay, and, moreover, flat rates leave employers reliant on threats, 
less favorable treatment, and inadequate basic pay to motivate their staff to work 
– the carrot is replaced with a stick.  
 
Legislation, labour inspection and sufficiently dissuasive penalties are required, 
and if the Government is serious about cracking down on failures to pay the 
minimum wage then, at no extra cost to the taxpayer they can require employers 
to pay overtime rates and oblige them to repay premiums that have not been 
paid. 
 
Civil penalties, as advertised by the naming and shaming initiative, are one means 
of imposing a sanction quickly and cheaply and ensuring that workers are paid 
                                               
1269
 The leave must be longer than the time worked: see European Council of Police Trade Unions (CESP) v France, 
Complaint no. 57/2009, [2010]. See also CFE – CGC v France, 2000, op.cit. 
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what they are owed,  while ‘leaning on’ employers to provoke self correction 
cheaper still, but criminal prosecutions very likely lead to unprompted self 
correction. The Director of Labour Enforcement recommended in May 2018 that 
all workers be provided with a right to a pay slip detailing, for hourly paid 
workers, the hours worked, the hourly rate, and information on the NMW.1270 
While the right of all workers to a pay slip is to be implemented into law in April 
2019, when the Employment Rights Act 1996 (Itemised Pay Statement) 
(Amendment) Order 2018 comes into force, there will be no obligation to include 
information on employment rights which is unfortunate.1271Such a pay slip would 
be likely to prove invaluable in promoting self correction. Moreover, all the 
employer will be obliged to do for hourly paid workers is to state the number of 
hours worked, and the aggregate pay, so some awkward questions about 
overtime rates may be avoided.1272  The Gov.UK guidance does, however, point 
out to employers that: ‘Alternatively, to increase transparency the employer may 
show the hours broken down by the different pay rates…Either option is 
permissible.’1273 
 
 The Low Pay Commission noted that only 13 successful criminal prosecutions for 
non payment of the statutory minimum wage have been mounted since 2007. 
Acknowledging that they are expensive, and can disrupt repayments, the 
Commission argues that 
 
‘prosecutions that are well publicised could have a powerful deterrent 
effect. We recommend that the Government looks to increase the number 
of prosecutions and publicise those that take place.’1274 
                                               
1270
 Currently s.8 of the Employment Rights Act requires only that employees be furnished with ‘an itemised pay 
statement’ showing the gross, net, the particular deductions made (see s.9), and ‘where different parts of the net 
amount are paid in different ways, the amount and method of payment of each part-payment.’ 
1271
United Kingdom Labour Market Enforcement Strategy 2018 to 2019, Government response,  Department for 
Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy and Home Office December 2018, paras 29 and 30. 
1272
Oddly the government states that it accepts the recommendation for all workers to be entitled to payslips and 
accepts both that the total hours and the hourly rate should go on the slip (ibid, para 29), but defends the absence 
of a demand for an hourly rate in the regulations ‘because providing a breakdown of hours according to different 
rates of pay would have only a minimum impact in driving National Minimum Wage Compliance’ (para 30). The 
government also rejected Metcalf’s long term recommendation that employers be required to provide HMRC with 
information on ‘hours and hourly earnings...in Real Time Information data returns’ (para 31). 
1273Payslips: Guidance on legislation in force from April 2019 requiring employers to include additional information 
on payslips, Department of Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy December 2018, p6. The government claims that 
‘up to 300,000 workers who are currently not receiving a payslip will now receive one and up to 1.6 million 
employees who are not receiving hours on their pay slip will now receive this information.’ 
1274
Low Pay Commission: Non-compliance and enforcement of the National Minimum Wage, September 2017, para 
5.11. 
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Business Minister Andrew Griffiths considers the list of the 179 businesses 
‘shamed’ for failing to pay the minimum wage to be a powerful deterrent in itself, 
‘a sharp reminder to employers to get their house in order.’ Certainly the 
reputations of the nationally known firms listed were tarnished. Apparently less 
brazen than smaller firms when it comes to exploiting vulnerable workers, all the 
breaches by the big employers took the form of some sort of deduction from 
wages. Some were occasional deductions, like the cost of the uniform, others 
made more regular deductions - the Marriot Hotel chain was found to have 
routinely taken money from low paid workers on late shifts to cover 
accommodation and taxis home.1275 
 
Yet, remarkably, not all deductions which bring wages below the statutory 
minimum in this manner are unlawful. The NMW Regulations 2015 permit 
deductions for accommodation (which must be provided for a whole 24 hours) of 
up to £5.08 per day.1276 Unlimited deductions made to repay advances on wages, 
accidental overpayment, ‘purchase of shares and securities’ and goods and 
services are not classed as ‘reductions’ and are permitted by the Regulations. 
More remarkably still, as long they are sanctioned by contract, deductions for 
‘misconduct’ are also not classed as reductions, and can be made regardless of 
whether the effect is to reduce the hourly rate to below that required by the 
Regulations. 1277 
 
 This requirement for contractual authorisation is in accord with the basis of the 
right of workers ‘not to suffer unauthorised deductions’ (s13& 14 ERA 1996),1278 
which governs deductions which are not classed as ‘reductions’ for the purposes 
of the calculation of the NMW.1279 Deductions for cash and stock shortages where 
‘retail transactions’ are undertaken can be made simply because there is a cash or 
stock shortfall if the contract permits it,1280 regardless of the culpability or 
innocence of the worker (s.17 & 19). Regulation 12 (2) (a) of the NMW 
                                               
1275See The Guardian, 9 March 2018&Low Pay Commission: Non-compliance and enforcement of the National 
Minimum Wage, September 2017., See the chart at para 2.11, figure 6. 
1276 Reg.16. 
1277 These are not treated as deductions - see Reg. 12 (2) NMW Regs 2015. With regard to goods and services they 
are deductions if purchased ‘to comply with a requirement imposed by the employer in connection with the 
worker’s employment.’ 
1278 Which also authorises deductions to rectify overpayment and recoup advances, and  deductions authorised by 
public authorities like the Child Support Agency 
1279
 By s13 (5) ‘a variation of the contract does not operate to authorize the making of a deduction.’   
1280
 A ‘retail transaction’ is far more than the sale of an item in a shop. Among other matter, it covers the provision 
of financial services and transactions conducted between workers in an undertaking. 
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Regulations specifically states that such deductions are not treated as reductions 
for the purposes of the NMW. They are at least limited to 10% of the payment on 
any ‘pay day (s18(1) & 19 (4)),’ although this can be significant sum, particularly 
for those paid on a monthly basis. The employer has 12 months from the time any 
shortfall is discovered to make a deduction and, most worryingly, s22 permits an 
employer to deduct from the final installment of wages to make good retail 
transaction shortfalls without the application of the 10% 18(1) restriction. 
 
In 2014 the ECSR found that in the UK ‘situations may exist in which the wage left 
after all authorized deductions is not sufficient to ensure the workers’ and their 
dependents’ subsistence,’ a breach of Article 4(5) – ‘limits to wage deductions’. 
Under the Charter deductions must not be left to individual ‘negotiation’ but to 
legal instruments.1281 They can only be made ‘in circumstances which are well 
defined in a legal instrument – by law, regulation, collective agreement or 
arbitration award (see Conclusions V, relating to 1974-75). Any such deductions 
must be subject to reasonable limits and should not per se result in depriving 
workers and their dependents of their means of subsistence.’1282  
The most recent conclusions followed an invitation by the Committee of 
Ministers’ Deputies for the UK to report by October 2015 on repeated findings of 
non compliance for lack of information since 1998. Sufficient information was 
provided to permit the Committee (Conclusions XXI-1, 2016), to find that the UK 
was not in conformity with 4(5).1283 
Even where wages are not reduced to below the NMW level the reliance on 
contract and written agreement rather than collective agreement or legal 
instrument amounts to a breach of the Charter:   
‘Article 4(5) of the Charter implies that the determination of deduction 
from wages should not be left at the disposal of the parties to the 
                                               
1281 See Conc.XIV-2(1998) and XVI-2(2003) XVIII-2(2007), XX-3 (2014) &XXI-1 (2016). 
1282 Conclusions XI-1(1991), Greece. 
1283 Although not mentioned last set of Conclusions, the Deductions from Wages Regulations 2014 sit uneasily with 
Charter and Covenant rights to fair remuneration. These limit the recovery of under paid wages to the past two 
years (see also chapter 7 on domestic servitude), in an unsuccessful (see King v Sash Windows Workshop C-214/16) 
attempt to limit the money which will be recoverable as more worker challenge self employed status and reclaim 
unpaid WTD holiday money (see chapter 7, section 3)  
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employment relationship...possibilities to forfeit, assign or attach the wage 
are often too extended, and could deprive workers paid the lowest wages 
and their dependents of their means of subsistence.’  
The current UK regime was introduced in the Wages Act 1986 which replaced the 
Truck Act 1896. It was classic piece of Thatcherism: it made it easier for employers 
to lawfully deduct from wages; it removed the threat of criminal liability for 
unlawful deductions, and it made workers responsible for enforcing the law.1284_ 
_________________________________________ 
So, we can conclude that not only should a wage providing a decent standard of 
living for that worker and the worker’s family be guaranteed, but a ‘fair wage’ is 
required. It is difficult to see how this can be achieved without the reintroduction 
of sectoral collective bargaining, and the provision of Wages Council style minima, 
so we must conclude therefore that: 
 Sectoral minimum wages are required, with minimums set for each 
category of job based on an 8 hour day, and a 40 hour week, rather than an 
hourly rate. 
 The minimum wage should be at least 60% of the mean net wage. 
 The wages of 16 to 18 year olds must not be more than 20% less than the 
adult minimum. 
 Overtime work must be paid at a premium by law, not merely practice. 
 Deductions should  be sanctioned by law or collective agreement, and not 
left to the supposed ‘individual negotiation’ which – the 10% limit on 
deductions for cash and stock shortages during employment aside - is 
essentially what Sections 13 – 22 ERA 1996 permits.  
 Deductions must not reduce the net wage below the level of 60% of the 
average net wage. 
 
 
                                               
1284
The relevant ILO Convention had been denounced when the 10 year ‘window of opportunity’ presented itself 
during the first Thatcher government. The Protection of Wages Convention 1949, No.95, came into force in 
September 1952 and after the due notice (one year) was denounced in September 1983 (see chapter 3). 
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4: Rights on the Termination of Employment  
Workers should be given ‘reasonable notice’ on the termination of the contract of 
employment. 
Protection against arbitrary or unfair dismissal is required: ‘The employment of a 
worker shall not be terminated unless there is a valid reason for such termination 
connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the operational 
requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service.’ 
Workers should have their terms and conditions of employment protected on the 
transfer of an undertaking from one employer to another. 
_______________________________ 
The European Social Charter Statement of Interpretation in Conclusions IV, 1972-
1974 states that compliance with Article 4(4) requires  employers to be obliged to 
provide reasonable notice of termination and established that the question of 
whether notice was reasonable or not hinged largely on length of service. In every 
reporting cycle since Conclusions VI (1979) the UK has not been held not to be in 
conformity with the Charter.  The minimum notice requirements are inadequate 
for those workers who have been employed for less than 3 years. 
In the UK at least one week of notice is required after one month of employment. 
After two years of continuous employment with an employer one week is added 
to this minimum. Thereafter, for every year of continuous employment, another 
week is added to the required notice period, until, after 12 years, the ceiling of 12 
weeks is reached.1285Compliance with 4(4), ‘reasonable notice’ is achieved after 
three years of employment when 3 weeks’ notice of termination is required.   
 
In the absence of adequate statutory minima, negotiated minima may secure 
compliance, and in Conclusions XIX-3(2010) the Committee had requested 
‘negotiated’ examples of minimum notice periods in employment contracts. In 
response the UK Government merely noted (in its 2009-12 Report) that there had 
been no change in the legislation during that period, that the ERA 2006 had 
                                               
1285 Employment Rights Act 1996 S. 86(1). 
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‘strengthened’ notice rights for both full and part timers, and that 86(1) of the 
ERA 1996 provides a minimum of 1 week for each year of service. Very likely the 
Government preferred not to draw the Committee’s attention either to the 
comparative absence of collectively negotiated notice periods, or to the very large 
payments made in lieu of notice negotiated by the very well paid in ‘individual 
contracts of employment,’ and to the statutory minima relied on when such 
contracts are imposed upon those effectively denied the right to negotiate 
collectively. 
 In Conclusions XX-3 2014 the Committee reminded the Government of the detail 
of the obligations imposed by 4(4), directing it to Conclusions XIII-4(1996) relating 
to Belgium.  As ever, when faced with obfuscation and evasion the Committee 
started ‘digging,’ requesting potentially compromising information on notice 
periods for those working a ‘probationary period’, workers on fixed term 
contracts, and notice periods for civil servants. A more pertinent enquiry could be 
made into the absence of statutory notice rights for those in an employment 
relationship who accorded only ‘worker’ status, a matter that the Committee has 
yet to raise with the Government. 
With regard to the ILO standards, the Termination of Employment 
Recommendation (No.119) of 1963 can arguably be said to have marked the start 
of serious contemplation of the question of the implementation of unfair 
dismissal protection in the UK, which led to the Industrial Relations Act 1971 
protections.  
However, the recommendation was not adopted by the UK, and the ILO 
Convention No.158 of 1982 (accompanied by recommendation No.166 which 
replaced No.119) on the Termination of Employment has not been ratified.1286 
Nevertheless, the ILO Governing Body’s ‘Working Party on Policy Regarding the 
Revision of Standards’ found in 2001 that ‘legislation in the United Kingdom was 
generally in conformity with the provisions examined of Convention No.158. In 
the consultations, however, the United Kingdom reported on obstacles to 
                                               
1286
 The accompanying Recommendation, No.166, while a valuable guide to best practice, is of rather lesser 
influence on the interpretation of Article 6. 
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ratification with reference to Article 2 (scope of applications and exclusions), 
Article 4 (valid reasons for dismissal), and Articles 11-12 (due notice and income 
protections).’1287  However, the relevant survey had tackled the ‘general 
obstacles’ to 11 and 12 together and the UK had cited problems only with the 
requirement for ‘a reasonable period of notice.’1288  Income protection was 
evidently not seen as a barrier to ratification. 
Of course, in UK law, a dismissal made in breach of notice requirements, is 
deemed ‘wrongful dismissal,’ and those denied the correct period of notice by 
their employer can secure compensation at tribunal to restore them to the 
position they would have been in had the employer complied with the terms of 
contract, whether express or implied by statute. Rarely, however, are the sums of 
money involved significant for ordinary workers.  Of considerably more 
significance for the great majority of workers is the statutory protection against 
arbitrary or unfair dismissal. 
Yet New Labour saw Article 4 as a problem. That requires no more than that 
‘The employment of a worker shall not be terminated unless there is a 
valid reason for such termination connected with the capacity or conduct of 
the worker or based on the operational requirements of the undertaking, 
establishment or service.’   
That a New Labour Government should baulk at a commitment to retain the 
unfair dismissal protections, and regard something so easily achievable, and 
reasonable, as the provision of adequate notice as unpalatable might be 
considered remarkable. 
Its objection to Article 2 makes more sense however. That Article delineates those 
who may be excluded from protection, and its rejection suggests that the 
unstated concern of the Government was that Article 2 and Article 4 would 
require the  provision of those with worker status the right not to be unfairly 
dismissed, and ratification of Article 11 require those workers the right to 
                                               
1287
 280
th
 Session, March 2001, Short Survey on the Termination of Employment Convention 1982 (No.158) para 
78. 
1288 Ibid, para 27 and note 46. 
362 
 
reasonable notice. The desire to retain the UK workforce’s famous ‘flexibility’ 
appears to have had a powerful influence on New Labour’s stance on the 
Convention. 
Article 2(1) of C158 states that the Convention ‘applies to all branches of 
economic activity and to all employed persons,’ but permits the exclusion of 
workers under fixed term contracts of employment,1289 or those employed to 
carry out a specific task of uncertain duration, as well as those who have not 
completed a qualifying period or an employer’s probationary period, and workers 
‘engaged on a casual basis for a short period’ [Article 2 (2)(a) –(c)].  Other 
categories workers may be excluded following consultation with the organisations 
of the relevant employers and workers if adequate compensatory measures ‘at 
least equivalent to the protection afforded under the Convention’ are provided 
[Article 2 (4)&)(5)]. The exclusion in the UK of agency workers, of many of those 
on ‘zero hours contracts’,1290 and, indeed, all of those with ‘worker’ status, other 
than genuine entrepreneurs, from unfair dismissal protection would undoubtedly 
be a breach of Article 2. Bound as most of these workers are by contracts 
intended to secure their personal services over the long term, none of the 
workers in these categories can reasonably be said to be ‘casuals.’ While states 
are given opportunity to exclude such workers from protection, this requires 
collective agreement, and the provision of compensatory rights, matters which, as 
we have seen, have never been to the taste of those in Government since 1979. 
While the UK has not ratified the Convention, the UN Covenant on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights can be said to be an explicit conduit for its provisions. 
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights holds that Article 6 - 
the ‘right to work’ guarantee -  requires states  to take appropriate steps to 
safeguard the right to work, a duty which includes the provision of workers with  
‘the right not to be deprived of work unfairly.’1291 C158 is explicitly said by the 
Committee to provide to delineate Article 6 – the Convention ‘defines the 
lawfulness of dismissal in its article 4 and in particular imposes the requirement to 
                                               
1289
 See chapter 7. 
1290
  See chapter 7.. 
1291 UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights General Comment on Article 6, 2006, para 4. 
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provide valid grounds for dismissal as well as the right to legal and other redress 
in the cases of unjustified dismissal.’1292 
 
A breach of the Convention can consequently be seen to be a breach of the 
Covenant. It can therefore confidently be argued that the Government is obliged 
to extend employee protections, including the right not to be unfairly dismissed 
and to receive redundancy pay, to those of worker status.  
The use, since 1998, of worker status to exclude an increasingly large section of 
the workforce which, but for a supposed lack of mutual obligation would be seen 
to be unequivocally engaged under a contract of employment , from various 
significant workplace protections, notably unfair dismissal, is considered in the 
next chapter.  
 
‘TUPE’ protections 
 
Prior to the implementation of the first incarnation of the Acquired Rights 
Directive (‘ARD’), in 1977, 1293 as the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of 
Employment) Regulations 1981,1294 the transfer of a business, or part of a 
business (as opposed to a transfer of effective ownership through the purchase of 
a majority shareholding in a limited company), from one employer to another 
meant that the transferor terminated the contract of employment. The transferee 
was only a potential new employer. If sufficient notice was given there could be 
no claim for wrongful dismissal. If a claim for unfair dismissal was brought then 
very likely a tribunal would find that the dismissal was fair by reason of 
redundancy, or ‘some other substantial reason.’ Any workers subsequently taken 
on by the new employer had no statutory guarantee that the terms and 
conditions of employment they enjoyed in their old job would be respected.1295 
 
The ARD altered completely the position under the common law. It requires 
states to protect the terms and conditions of employment (Article 6(1)) ‘where 
there is a transfer of an economic entity which retains its identity,’ a definition 
which embraces any public or private ‘organised grouping of resources’ whether 
                                               
1292
Ibid, para 11. 
1293
Directive 77/187. 
1294
 The directive was one of the progeny of the 1974 Social Action Programme (see chapter 4). 
1295 See Barnard, EC employment Law, 2006 pp 620-621. 
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operating for gain or not ( Article 1(b) & (c)). 1296 While the domestic regulations 
were for a long time confined to commercial undertakings, following enforcement 
action by the Commission in 1994,1297 TUPE rights were extended to transfers of 
undertakings of a non commercial nature, although public authority 
administrative reorganisations, continue to remain outside the scope of both the 
ARD and the TUPE regulations. Contractual variations which breach the 
regulations are held by the TUPE regulations to be void, while dismissals are held 
to be automatically unfair. 
 
The Directive was revised in 1998,1298and consolidated in 2001.1299In 2006 New 
Labour, obliged to replace the 1981 Regulations to accommodate the changes, 
took the opportunity to clarify the position where ‘outsourcing’ took place,1300 
ensuring that most business transfers unarguably engaged TUPE protection. The 
clarification provided employees with more than the minimum level of protection 
required by the new Directive.1301 In 2013 a BIS TUPE Consultation took place, a 
manifestation of the then current Tory preoccupation with the alleged ‘gold 
plating’ of EU rights. However, while the regulations were subsequently amended, 
the changes were not as radical as some had anticipated.1302 
 
Full advantage, however, was taken of recent CJEU rulings in Werhof v Freeway 
Traffic Systems and Alemo Herron v Parkwood Leisure,1303 which had concerned 
the post tranfer influence of collective agreements on workers’ contracts.  
 
 
                                               
1296 Those without employee status can be denied TUPE protection (see ADR Article 1(d) and 2). 
1297
 Commission v UK [1994], following Dr. Sophe Redmond Stichting v Bartol [1992] IRLR which concerned the 
transfer of a drug rehabilitation unit. 
1298
 Directive 98/59/EC. TUPE had also been amended in 1994 in response to Commission v UK [1994], the case 
brought by the Commission which obliged the UK to breach the gap in information and consultation arrangements 
where employers did not recognise trade unions. This was the origin of the ‘worker representatives’ encountered 
in relation to collective redundancies, I&C consultation, working time consultation and TUPE consultation (see 
chapter four). 
1299 Directive 2001/23/EC.  
1300 Where for example, a catering firm contracts with a manufacturing firm to take over the factory canteen, or a 
specialist ‘logistics’ firm takes responsibility for the work formerly undertaken by the firm’s ‘in house’ transport 
department. Since 2006 such transfers have been called Service Provision Changes [‘SPCs’]. For more detail see J. 
McMullen, ‘Service Provision Change under TUPE: Not quite what we thought’ (2012) 41 ILJ 471, and ‘The 
Developing Case Law on TUPE and Service Provision Change’ (2016) 45 ILJ 220. 
1301
 Article 8 permits member states to ‘introduce laws, regulations or administrative provisions which are more 
favourable to employees.’  
1302
 See chapter 2. 
1303 C-499/04; ECR I -2397 and C-426/11; EU:C:2013:521 
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Under the terms of the ARD  
 
‘the transferee shall continue to observe the terms and conditions agreed 
in any collective agreement on the same terms applicable to the transferor 
under that agreement, until the date of termination or expiry…’1304   
 
While implicitly assuming that such agreements are legally binding, which is very 
seldom the case in the UK, the provision nevertheless ensures that the terms of 
collective agreements must transfer over. Consequently, whether or not the new 
employer subsequently decides to disregard that agreement, it ensures that the 
transferee will be bound to continue to honour those terms apt for incorporation 
in the individual contracts of employment of the transferred staff.1305 
 
 However, Werhof, and Almo Herron, saw the effective reinterpretation by the 
court of the ARD to accommodate Article 16 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, a provision which reflects the right of businesses to autonomy under the 
Acquis.1306  This was something of a surprise, because the uncomplicated Directive 
is very clearly concerned solely with conferring rights on employees. By virtue of 
these cases transferees may now insist on adhering to the collectively agreed 
terms as they were immediately before the transfer, and to refuse to follow 
changes negotiated after the transfer, despite the fact that the Directive requires 
observance ‘on the same terms.’ 
 
The 2014 TUPE Amendment Regulations reflected these rulings, adopted this 
‘static’ approach, 1307 in addition allowing the transferee to initiate 
‘harmonisation’ negotiations after one year after the transfer.This accords with 
Article 3 (1) of the Directive which allows states to limit protection for collective 
agreements to one year.  The right to renegotiate relates only to terms and 
conditions derived from the collective agreement, and the revised terms must be 
no less favourable overall than those which were enjoyed before the transfer. 
                                               
1304 Article 3(3) ADR. 
1305 See Ford Motor Company v AUEFW 2 QB 302 [1969], and s179 TULR(C)A 1992 for the legal position of 
collective agreements in the UK.. 
1306Werhof v Freeway Traffic Systems Gmbh [2006]C-499/04, was a German case in which the CJEU invoked A11 
ECHR to hold that requiring the transferee to adhere to a collective agreement to which had not been party to 
breached its right to negative freedom of association. Alemo Herron v Parkwood Leisure [2013] C-426/11 saw the 
court apply the same reasoning to deny UK ex local authority workers transferred to Parkwood Leisure to benefit 
from changes to terms and conditions of employment effected by collective negotiation between their union and 
the local authority under the terms of the collective agreement in force when they were transferred. 
1307 See Whent v Cartledge [1997] IRLR 153(EAT) for the previous ‘dynamic’ approach taken by the tribunals. 
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Nevertheless, in such circumstances an employer is likely to offer inducements to 
withdraw from collective bargaining which may infringe a worker’s Article 11 
ECHR right to freedom of association, falling foul of the ECHR’s ruling in Wilson 
and Palmer, and s.145B of TULRCA.1308 
 
The Amendment Regulations 2014 have also it more difficult for a worker to bring 
a successful claim for unfair dismissal or prevent an unauthorised contractual 
variation from being imposed .These revisions are prima facie breaches of the 
terms of the ARD.  
 
Permissible dismissals for an ‘economic, technical or organizational [ETO] reason 
entailing changes in the workforce,’ related to any transfer (essentially equivalent 
to redundancy dismissals or dismissals ‘for some other substantial reason’ under 
the unfair dismissal regime) had previously been strictly restricted to 
circumstances where a change was made in the numbers employed, or to the 
roles of employees.  The ARD, by Article 4 (1) stipulates that  
‘The transfer of the undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or 
business shall not in itself constitute grounds for dismissal…this provision 
will not stand in the way of dismissals that may take place for economic, 
technical or organizational reasons entailing changes in the workforce.’ 
The 2014 amendments have  widened the ETO exception to embrace 
circumstances where there is a change to where the work is performed [Reg.7(2)], 
wholly changing  the character of the ETO exception - shifting the location of the 
workplace might affect the workforce but it is not a change to the workforce itself. 
This breaches the terms of the Directive. 
Moreover, Article 4(1) makes it clear that ETO exceptions apply only to dismissals 
not to contractual variations. Despite this, the TUPE regulations have always 
applied the ETO exceptions to variations, and the 2014 amendments extend the 
wider ETO exceptions to contractual variations. TUPE specialist solicitor Richard 
Arthur argues that the view of the Government appears to be that as the ARD 
                                               
1308
 Richard Arthur, TUPE 2014, IER, 2014,p 46-7. It might of course be argued that if the static approach is taken 
then a withdrawal from collective bargaining has already taken place and the inducements are merely to agree to 
change the terms of the contract. 
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expressly permits the ETO exceptions for dismissals it must implicitly permit it for 
variations, a qualification ‘to the apparent rigid policy statement of the rule in 
[the leading precedent] Daddy’s Dance Hall,’ that has never been discussed, let 
alone endorsed, by the European Court.  
This too is a prima facie breach of the terms of the Directive. 
Following this key 2014 TUPE revision, in the absence of a pre-existing mobility 
clause, or the reservation of a Bateman v ASDA contractual right to make 
unilateral variations,1309 a fresh requirement connected with the transfer for an 
employee to work in a different location, which would previously have been held 
to be void will very likely be held to be enforceable. Similarly a dismissal for a 
refusal to change workplace will not be automatically unfair, but very likely held 
instead to be an ETO dismissal. 
Constructive dismissal is arguably explicitly endorsed by the Directive as a remedy 
where such a substantial change in working conditions is imposed. Article 4(2) of 
the Directive provides that: 
‘If the contract of employment or the employment relationship is 
terminated because the transfer involves a substantial change in working 
conditions to the detriment of the employee, the employer shall be 
regarded as having been responsible for termination of the contract of 
employment or the of the employment relationship.’ 
 Dismissal and contractual variation are thus closely linked – a variation may result 
in a dismissal. 
However, showing that a dismissal, express or constructive has been made in 
breach of the regulations has been made more difficult. Since the 2014 
amendments, the TUPE Regulations have required a dismissed worker who has 
not been shown by the employer to have been dismissed for an ETO reason to 
persuade a tribunal that, on the balance of probabilities, the transfer is ‘the sole 
or principal reason for the dismissal.’ Previously it merely required that the sole or 
                                               
1309 See F Reynold QC and J Hendy QC, ‘Reserving the Right to Change Terms and Conditions: How Far Can the 
Employer Go?’ (2012) 41 ILJ 79. 
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principal reason for dismissal be ‘connected with’ the transfer - a subtle but 
hugely important, difference (Reg.7).  
 
Similarly, in relation to variations of the contract, the 2014 amendments have 
revised the 2006 Regulations so that the worker must now show that the transfer 
is the sole or principle reason for the variation. Previously the variation was void if 
‘the sole or principal reason for the variation is  connected with the transfer’ (Reg 
4). Variations which would have previously been held to have been void as in 
breach of the regulations are now permissible. Yet Richard Arthur has pointed out 
that the CJEU has never ‘viewed it as essential that the transfer be the sole or 
main reason for the variation in order for the variation to be void,’ and that the 
court refers variously to a mere ‘connection with’ a transfer, or the transfer being 
‘the reason’ for a variation.1310 Given that a claim for constructive unfair dismissal 
is expressly endorsed as a remedy, this view of the nature of the relationship 
required between the transfer and the variation must arguably apply equally to 
the relationship between a dismissal and the transfer.  
These revisions were justified by the Government on the grounds that it brought 
the UK regime closer to the ARD, but instead appear to contradict the European 
Court’s interpretation of the Directive. Article 8 of the Acquired Rights Directive 
permits member states to ‘introduce laws, regulations or administrative 
provisions which are more favourable to employees.’ It does not permit 
restrictions of the ARD rights. While the stripping of legislative ‘gold plate’ is 
permissible, the Government, apparently emboldened by the approach of the 
European Court in Werhof and Almo Herron, have ground away at the substance 
of the right conferred by the Directive. 
______________________________________ 
In the light of the above the Government is therefore required to: 
 Extend the minimum period of notice guaranteed workers with between 
one month and three years’ service to three weeks. 
                                               
1310
 Arthur (above) p42-3. He cites the very well known precedent, Foreningen AF Arbjdsledere I Danmark v 
Daddy’s Dance Hall [1988] C-324/86  and Martin v South Bank University [2004] C-04/01. 
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 Confer the right to statutory notice on those with ‘worker’ status. 
 Confer a right not to be unfairly dismissed on those with ‘worker’ status.  
It is also required to amend the TUPE Regulations 2006: 
 to ensure that inducements to withdraw from collective bargaining 
breaching Article 11 ECHR cannot be made where employers attempt to 
negotiate ‘harmonisation’ measures after a relevant transfer. 
Solely in terms of EU law the government can also be said to be required to 
amend the TUPE regulations to: 
 Withdraw the extension of the ETO exception to dismissals made in relation 
to a change in where work is carried out. 
 Withdraw the application of the ETO exceptions to cases of contractual 
variation which have not resulted in a dismissal. 
 Engage the TUPE protections in cases where principal reason for any 
variation or dismissal is connected with the transfer. 
We saw in chapter five that the approach taken by Governments since 1979 with 
regard to collective rights and freedoms has been largely one of non compliance 
with regional and international standards. Freedom of association has brazenly 
been restricted in breach of supranational obligation. Instead of promoting 
collective bargaining and representation as they are required to do, successive 
administrations have sought to isolate workers.  
Where individual rights are concerned the picture is, as I have shown in this 
chapter, one of apparent compliance undermined by a failure to implement rights 
effectively, or, where state intervention is required, a failure to enforce the law. 
Labour and workplace inspection programmes have been wound down to the 
extent that employers are able to breach the law with relative impunity.  
In the unlikely event of an employer being called to account, penalties for those 
found to be breaking the law are insufficiently dissuasive, and remedies for 
workers weak, or non existent. Ostensible compliance masks a failure by the state 
to enforce the law, and where the state has passed responsibility for enforcement 
370 
 
on to the individual worker by means of litigation, ‘commodification’ has 
permitted employers to pay the worker off with an inadequate settlement or 
award and to continue to breach the law. So, while those individual rights are on 
the statute book, the protection they confer can be said to be largely illusory. 
Membership of the European Union has, I argue, both obliged, and permitted, the 
Government to adopt this strategy. While the Thatcher and Major administrations 
of 1979 – 1997 overtly resisted European ‘interference’ as best they could, New 
Labour, arguably just as hostile to effective employment protections, took the 
more subtle approach of welcoming the European employment rights they had 
committed to in their 1997 manifesto while taking care to drain those rights of 
substance. This approach, (although the Tories during 2010-2016 were overtly 
hostile to employment protection) has been maintained ever since. As I have 
emphasised in previous chapters, while the Commission and the CJEU are 
rigorous in requiring the implementation of EU legislation into black letter 
domestic law, in practice member states are permitted a very considerable 
margin of appreciation in making those rights effective. This has, in effect, seen a 
tacit endorsement of the UK policy of non-enforcement, and has meant that it has 
fallen to others to remind the Government of its obligations to workers under the 
EU treaties, and legislative instruments. Trade unionists have played a key role, 
while the supervisory bodies of the UN instruments, the European Social Charter, 
and – especially - the ILO, have been instrumental in drawing attention to the 
arguably calculated ineffectiveness of UK employment rights. Government policy 
of attrition and emasculation might arguably be said to have reached its peak 
with the unlawful imposition in 2013-17 of the tribunal fees regime. That it was 
UNISON which brought the case once again shows us the close relationship of 
collective and individual rights. A swathe of individual rights were effectively 
withdrawn from a vast section of the workforce, and it was left to a trade union to 
win them back, the claim of the collective being rejected at the High Court and 
Court of Appeal before its appeal was allowed by the Supreme Court.1311 Those 
seeking justice for discriminatory treatment at work particularly affected by the 
unlawful fees regime, and it is the protections for those workers that I now turn. 
                                               
1311R( on the application of UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51 
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Chapter Seven: 
Benchmarking: Rights to Equal Treatment 
In this chapter I consider the position of the government in relation to obligations 
to eliminate discriminatory treatment in the workplace. 
1: EQUALITY – Civil rights in the workplace. 
Again we encounter rights which might be more satisfactorily seen as collective 
rights - as civil rights demanded by sections of the population - but which have 
been conferred by the government as individually exercisable rights. 
This area of the law is dominated by the directly effective Article 157(1) of the 
Treaty of the European Union, and by the associated Directives which provide the 
substantive detail of the requirements of the EU principle of non-discrimination. 
The demands of EU membership are mirrored, reinforced, and occasionally 
augmented, by parallel obligations deriving from the entire ‘spectrum’ of rights 
instruments: 
‘Non discrimination is at the heart of all work on human rights. It is a cross 
cutting human rights norm that is invoked in all the human rights 
treaties.’1312 
The key principle is that of equal treatment, and that equal remuneration is 
required for work of equal value.  
Broadly speaking, less favourable treatment in the course of recruitment, in the 
workplace, and even after the termination of employment, connected with race, 
ethnicity,  class, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, social origin, 
age, or disability,  is prohibited other than in instances where there is a genuine  
requirement for discrimination.  
                                               
1312
Human Rights Indicators A Guide to Measurement and Implementation, UN Human Rights, Office of the High 
Commissioner, 2012, p13. 
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Where a seemingly neutral workplace policy indirectly disadvantages a protected 
category of workers, then, unless this indirect discrimination can be objectively 
justified, it is prohibited.1313 
 The state is required to provide effective legal mechanisms to oblige employers 
to take a non discriminatory approach to recruitment, remuneration and 
promotion, and to determine of the difficult questions which arise when workers 
make allegations of unlawful discrimination, and to secure adequate redress. 
As with occupational safety and health, there is what might best be seen as a 
collective right to the provision of information on progress. While the obligation 
to protect against discrimination is immediate, in practice protection ‘kicks in’ 
over time, driven by promotion – including positive discrimination programmes – 
education, and enforcement. Progress, and, by implication the efficacy of the 
mechanisms to secure substantive rights, must be measured and reported. 
______________________________ 
 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights presents an uncomplicated, seemingly 
‘open ended’, picture of the protections supposedly demanded by membership of 
the European Union. Article 21(1)  states that discrimination on grounds ‘such as 
sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origins, genetic features, language, religion or 
belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, 
birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.’  However, not all of 
these characteristics have been protected by European law, and the use of the 
phrase ‘such as’ indicates that Article 21 arguably does no more than signal EU 
approval of anti discrimination protections which are not demanded elsewhere in 
the acquis to provide a ‘lynch pin’ for those seeking protection for characteristics 
not specifically identified in EU law.  
 
 That Article 23, which emphasises the significance of gender equality to the EU, 
states ‘[e]quality between men and women must be ensured in all areas including 
employment, work and pay,’ makes apparent the difference between extensive 
protection in the treaties and the directives and mere inclusion in the 21(1) list. 
                                               
1313 On which see S Fredman ‘Recent Cases: The Reason Why: Unravelling Indirect Discrimination’ (2016) 45 ILJ 
231. 
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The demands of the acquis, and the heavy hand of the European Court have now, 
however, arguably largely eclipsed domestic initiatives, and the UN and Council of 
Europe in the sphere of workplace equality.  
 
Even the ECtHR has largely been relegated to the fine tuning of law based on the 
requirements of EU membership in the few employment anti-discrimination cases 
which, UK domestic remedies having been exhausted, have gone on to be 
considered in Strasbourg. ECHR Article 14 and Article 2(1) ICCPR merely prohibit 
discrimination in the protection of the rights and freedoms they require states to 
guarantee, which, of course, include the rights to freedom of expression, 
conscience and religion, and the right to a private and family life, matters 
occasionally falling to be considered as employment cases.1314 
 
 Protocol 12 of the ECHR, drafted specifically to address the limitations of Article 
14 and adopted in 2000,1315has yet to be ratified by the UK. Article 1 of the 
protocol guarantees citizens that: ‘The enjoyment of any right set forth by law 
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as….’ before setting 
out a list clearly based on Article 23 of the EU Charter.1316 Ratification would 
arguably add substance to the requirements of the EU regime, and eclipse the 
role of the very easily satisfied Commission in relation to infringement. Gaps in 
both the acquis and UK law would very likely rapidly be filled in response to, or 
merely the threat of, a pillorying at Strasbourg. 
 
We have seen in previous chapters that equal pay for equal work was initially 
demanded by the EEC by Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, protection 
subsequently augmented by the Equal Treatment Directive of 1975. That Directive 
interpreted Article 119 to embrace the terms of the ILO Equal Treatment 
Convention No.100 (1952) which espouses ‘the principle of equal remuneration 
for men and women workers for work of equal value,’1317 and European Social 
                                               
1314 Two early UK cases, Ahmad [1982] 4 EHRR and Stedman [1997] 23 EHRR, saw the ECtHR convey the message 
that it saw those complaints about workers being obliged to work on religious days of rest as contractual matters, 
and the court has taken an only slightly less sceptical approach in more recent religious discrimination cases - see 
Eweida,Chaplin, Ladele and McFarlane v UK [2013] ECHR 37. In Redfearn v UK [2013] ECHR 1878 (see below), 
however, it took a serious view of UK failures to address workplace discrimination on grounds of political opinion, 
and the government was obliged to change the law. 
1315CETS No.177 
1316
Protocol 12 to the ECHR, Article 1. 
1317
  See Articles 1 and 3 of C100, and also the ILO Equal Remuneration Recommendation 1951 (No.90), paras 4-5.  
Bob Hepple in Race Jobs and the Law in Britain in 1968 (see chapter 3) stated (p.26 n.2) that  in 1966 a government 
TUC-CBI working party had been set up to examine the possible ratification of Convention No.100: ‘The CBI prefer 
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Charter Article 4(3), which requires states to undertake ‘to recognise the right…to 
equal pay of equal value.’1318 This is now the substance of Article 157(1) TFEU. 
 
The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam permitted the EU to legislate on discrimination 
more generally,1319 much as the Single European Act had given competence for 
health and safety legislation,  and two anti-discrimination directives were 
subsequently adopted, one on race and ethnic origin,1320 the other a ‘Framework 
Directive’ on equal treatment in employment and occupation. 1321 These 
complemented the seminal mid 1970s directives to oblige member states to 
legislate to protect against discrimination in the workplace on grounds of religion 
and belief, sexual orientation, disability and age. Of course, the UK had long had 
protections against discrimination related to race in place, and, unusually, the 
Major government had, of its own initiative, passed laws conferring an element of 
protection for disabled workers.1322 
 
Existing UK protections against discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, skin 
colour, ethnicity, sex and disability were consequently augmented by regulations 
adopted in 2003 on discrimination on grounds of religion and belief and sexual 
orientation, revised disability regulations, and, in 2006, by the Age Discrimination 
Regulations. The adoption of the 2006 Recast Directive on the implementation of 
the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in 
matters of employment and occupation coincided with the 2006 Equality Act and 
the imposition of a public authority duty to promote gender equality.1323 
 
The 2010 Equality Act consolidated the various Acts of Parliament and the 
associated regulations, and closed the perceived gaps between the domestic 
                                                                                                                                                       
the more limited provisions of the Treaty of Rome which require equal pay for the same work, to those in the ILO 
Convention which insist on equal pay for work of equal value.’ in 1967 the government announced that although it 
accepted the principle of equal pay for equal work it could not yet ratify Convention No.100 because ‘the present 
position of the UK is not full in accordance with the detailed requirements of the instrument’ (725 HL Debs, cols 
178-9). 
1318Article 4(3) has yet to be ratified by the UK. 
1319 Currently Article 21(1) TFEU. 
1320 Directive 2000/43/EC 
1321 Directive 2000/78/EC ‘establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation.’ 
1322The result of years of domestic lobbying - see Mike Oliver, ‘Rewriting history: the case of the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995’ (2016) 31(7) Journal of Disability and Society.  
1323
 S.84 of the 2006 Act. While the Directive was ostensibly a consolidation  of existing requirements, and was 
treated as such by the UK government (see Burri and Prechai:  The Transposition of Recast Directive 2006/54/EC, 
EU Commission,2009, particularly A McColgan’s section on the UK) the preamble of the directive placed 
considerable emphasis on  the importance of state led promotion.  
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regime and the requirements of the EU, and while inevitably imperfect, UK 
equality protections can arguably be said to be broadly compliant with the EU 
regime. As noted in previous chapters, broad compliance is all that is required by 
the Commission, and it is notable that even the imposition of tribunal fees and 
the ‘cliff edge’ reduction in discrimination claims during 2013-17 did not provoke 
the Commission into taking action. 
 
 Member states are, in practice, afforded a very wide margin of appreciation, and 
the invocation of infringement proceedings sees liberal administrations risking 
being cast as illiberal, while nationalist administrations risk being perceived of as 
weak, and in thrall to Brussels. Moreover, if penalty payment and lump sums 
become payable, governments stand accused of throwing huge amounts of tax 
payers’ money away. The political calculation is a simple one and, as a 
consequence, the required legislation is on the statute books. Indeed, so 
ostensibly comprehensive are UK protections that, as we have seen, the Blair and 
Brown New Labour governments were confident enough to sign up to the 
Optional Protocols to permit individual complaints to be submitted to the 
supervisory committees of the UNCEDAW the UNICRPD. 
The problem, however, is arguably with the ineffectiveness of imposing equality 
through the provision of individually exercisable rights. For example, the House of 
Commons Women and Equalities Committee recently published a report on 
‘Older people and employment.’1324 Evidence presented to the Committee made 
it apparent that despite the government’s boast of ‘strong protection’ against 
discrimination both Acas and the EHRC had found that despite high levels of 
discrimination against older people, individual rights were not being exercised.1325 
Similarly, we saw in chapter two, that while the Race Relations Act 1968 had 
implemented the protections required by the UN Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, by the early 1970s it was realised that that 
those measures were not proving effective. As a consequence, after the Race 
Relations Act 1976, claims were brought against employers by the individual 
worker at industrial tribunals. Yet, forty years on, workplace racism is rife. In the 
                                               
1324
 House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee Fourth Report of Session 2017-19. 
1325 Ibid, paras 23-30.  
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2017 TUC report Is racism real?,1326 a survey of more than 1,000 black or minority 
ethnic workers, 37% of those surveyed reported that they had ‘been bullied, 
abused, or experienced racial discrimination’ at work, 19% believed themselves to 
have been denied training or promotion on discriminatory grounds, and 43% had 
felt unable to report these matters to their employer. Remarkably, ‘[d]irect 
managers were most likely to be the main perpetrators…’1327 
It would appear that the provision of individually exercisable employment rights 
has been insufficient to impose equal treatment in the workplace. 
Among the key recommendations to the government in the TUC report, which 
included prohibiting ‘regular use’ by employers of the atypical work arrangements 
I consider in this chapter, it was proposed that the government ‘legislate to 
ensure that companies and businesses employing more than 50 people publish a 
breakdown of employees by race and pay band.’1328 
 This, and much more, is required of the UK government by Article 7 of the UN 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
In contrast with the relaxed approach of the Commission, the familiar sounding 
requirements of the UN Covenant for governments ‘to ensure the equal right of 
men and women to the enjoyment’ of all the Covenant rights,1329 and to secure 
the Article 7 ‘right of everyone to…Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of 
equal value without distinction of any kind,’1330 are augmented by other 
requirements. 
 
The text of Article 7(b)states that only ‘seniority and competence’ can be taken 
into account when promotion is considered, while the 2016 General comment by 
the UN Committee of Economic Social and Cultural Rights on Article 7 refers to 
‘equal opportunity for merit based promotion,’ the committee holding that this 
‘requires the analysis of direct and indirect obstacles to promotion’ and 
                                               
1326‘A report about the experiences of black and minority ethnic workers-polling findings’, available at 
publications@tuc.org.uk 
1327Ibid, p4. See Table 3 on p16. 
1328
Ibid, p28. 
1329
Article 3. 
1330
 The 2016 ‘General Comment’ by the UN CttESCR on Article 7 states that non-discrimination is a ‘core 
obligation’ under the Covenant (para 65).   
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‘initiatives to reconcile work and family responsibilities, including affordable day 
care facilities for children and dependent adults’ backed by ‘appropriate sanctions 
applied in the event of non-compliance’ by employers.1331 
 
Crucially this entails ‘reporting requirements designed to assess whether targets 
have been met,’ the results of which should show ‘progressive decreases in the 
differentials between rates of remuneration for men and women for work of 
equal value.’1332  States are obliged 
 
‘to introduce quotas or other temporary special measures to enable women 
and other members of groups that have experienced discrimination to reach 
high level posts and provide incentives for the private sector do so...as well 
as mechanisms to assess systematically the level of the minimum wage, fair 
wages and the gender pay gap...’ 
 
Such initiatives are said to be ‘specific legal obligations,’ to be implemented and 
monitored through gender pay gap mechanisms, and complemented by dialogue - 
information and consultation mechanisms.1333 
 
‘Particular attention is needed to address occupational segregation by 
sex...States parties must take measures to address traditional gender roles 
and other structural obstacles that perpetuate gender inequality.’1334 
 
Arguably this is, in effect, a requirement for sectoral intervention by the 
government to promote equal treatment. 
 
Direct Requests have been made by the ILO’s Committee of Experts for reports on 
progress towards the equal remuneration pledged by the Government in Articles 
1 and 2 of C100 an almost annual basis since 2003. By 2009 these were focusing 
on the provisions of the Equality Bill in 2009, while the related Observations were 
usually based on comments on the application of the Convention made by the 
TUC.  
                                               
1331 Ibid, para 32. Para 62 emphasises that such initiatives are ‘specific legal obligations’ to implemented and 
monitored through gender pay gap mechanisms and complemented with dialogue I&C mechanisms. 
1332
 Ibid, para 15.   
1333
 Ibid, para 62. 
1334 Ibid, para 47. 
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Ultimately, as we have seen, the 2006 Equality Act imposed a Public Sector 
Equality Duty, and the  Section 149 revision of the duty in the Equality Act 2010 
required (by the EA 2010 (Specific Duties) Regulations 2011) Government 
departments to set equality objectives and publish information on progress.  
In the ‘List of issues with regard to the consideration of the periodic reports,’ 
compiled in 2012, but considered by the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women in 2013, information on voluntary gender equality 
reporting and ‘on measures undertaken to reduce the gender pay gap in both the 
public and private sectors was requested.1335 In reply the government claimed 
that ‘good progress’ was being made, and boasted that s 159 of the Equality Act 
had served to permit positive action in certain, albeit very restricted, 
circumstances, and that it was in the process of giving tribunals the power to 
request equal pay audits. It also stated that the voluntary ‘Think, Act, Report’ 
initiative on workplace inequality covered one million workers. 1336 
 
While S139A of the EA 2010 did give tribunals the power to order equal pay audits 
following a successful equal pay claim, and the EA 2010 (Equal Pay Audits) 
Regulations 2014 did subsequently come into force, very little appears to have 
been achieved, or published, as a result of any of these measures.  The ‘Think, Act 
Report’ scheme has largely been forgotten.  
 
In 2016 the Government received yet another ILO Direct Request, 1337 the 
Committee of Experts on this occasion seeking information on these measures 
and on other efforts to narrow the gender pay gap as measured by the Office of 
National Statistics during April 2015-April 2016.  
 
Section78 of the 2010 Equality Act, had provided that ‘Regulations may require’ 
those employing 250 or more employees to provide ‘gender pay gap information,’ 
and it was finally brought into force until August 2016. The Equality Act 2010 
(Gender Pay Gap Information) Regulations followed in April 2017. 
 
                                               
1335 CEDAW/C/GBR/Q/7 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,  25 October 2012, 
considered at the 57
th
 Session 8-26 July 2013, para 16. 
1336
 CEDAW/C/GBR/Q/7/Add 1 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 5 February 2013, 
considered at the 57
th
 Session 8-26 July 2013.Paras 130-132. 
1337  Adopted by the CEACR in 2016, published 2017. 
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 Employers are now required to report gender specific overall mean and median 
levels of hourly pay and bonuses, and the proportion of females and males in 
each ‘quartile’ (25%), of their pay hierarchy. The figures, and any gender pay gap 
they reveal, are published both on the employer’s own web site and the Gov.UK 
site. Employers are encouraged to submit narratives, and ‘action plans’ setting 
out proposals to close any GP gap that the statistics reveal.  
 
Although there are no sanctions for failing to submit a report (despite s.78 
allowing for fines of up to £5,000), it has been argued that the potential damage 
to the employer’s reputation should serve to ensure that all but the most 
recalcitrant of employers will co-operate, and that, where unions are recognised 
by the employer, the s 181 TULR(C)A 1992, right to secure information for 
negotiating purposes and the right of recourse to the CAC, should secure 
compliance.1338 However, ostensible compliance is very different from the 
provision of accurate figures.  Labour has called for the ‘GPR’ regime to be backed 
by an effective bespoke enforcement regime, and the current Prime Minister, has 
taken pains to ensure that she is perceived to be personally committed to closing 
the ‘GPG,’ a wholly uncharacteristic step for a Tory leader. Such is tremendous 
publicity generated by the reporting scheme, it seems likely that it will be 
extended and given ‘teeth.’  
 
Many believe that having surveyed and rectified gender inequalities, and very 
likely reaped the benefit, employers will likely be better disposed towards to 
applying a similar analytical approach to other protected characteristics. While 
that may be over optimistic, there can be little doubt that the figures will serve to 
assist unions in collective bargaining negotiations, and that collective negotiation 
at sectoral and enterprise level arguably offers the best means by which pay 
inequality can be tackled, perhaps bolstering the political case for a return to the 
use of the collective agreement as the primary means for setting the terms and 
conditions of employment.  Certainly the figures bolster the political case for 
positive gender discrimination. 
 
We have seen that the UN Covenant on Economic, Social Rights  demands positive 
action to eliminate gender inequality, Article 2 UNICCPR requires states to 
‘respect and to ensure’ the rights in the Covenant ‘without distinction.’ While 
                                               
1338 Thanks to Caroline Underhill of Thompsons Solicitors  
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positive steps, by virtue of the definition of ‘ensure,’ are clearly required,1339  
positive discrimination would appear to unambiguously breach those simple 
terms; temporarily favouring long disadvantaged groups in recruitment and 
promotion and, at the level of the individual, treating one less favourably than the 
other purely because of a protected characteristic, is to ensure equality in the 
long term by guaranteeing rights with distinction.  
However, where gender equality is concerned the position is different. Manfred 
Nowak, in his CCPR Commentary, points out that Article 3 on gender equality goes 
further than the negative anti-discriminatory provisions of Article 2, to require 
states ‘to ensure the equal rights of men and women.’ Although Nowak fails to 
discuss positive discrimination or - to use the American phrase - ‘affirmative 
action’, he cites the Human Rights Committee as emphasising in 1981 that 
compliance requires positive steps in the form of ‘affirmative action designed to 
ensure the positive enjoyment of rights. This cannot be done simply by enacting 
laws.’1340 
Proportionate infringements of both Articles may be made to facilitate progress 
towards a legitimate goal, and it is certainly arguable that the Covenant sanctions 
such policies in the furtherance of gender equality. Where other protected 
characteristics are concerned the position is less clear. 
The European Committee on Social Rights, in considering the gender equality 
provisions of Article 1(2) of the European Social Charter, ‘has further 
recommended that contracting parties encourage employers to recruit and train 
women for jobs hitherto pre-dominantly occupied by men and to introduce 
positive action to rectify unsatisfactory employment situations.’1341 In an early 
interpretation of 4(3) the Committee took the view that its role was to determine 
whether a state had ‘taken adequate steps’ towards guaranteeing equality ‘the 
nature of which is left to the State’s own judgement.’1342 
                                               
1339
 Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights CCPR Commentary, 2005, pp37-39. 
1340
 Nowak p.80. Human Rights Committee General Comment 4/13.2.  
1341
 Conclusions XII-5 1994-1995 Statement of Interpretation Article 1-2 and 4-3. 
1342 Conclusions III Statement of Interpretation Article 4(3) 1970-1971 
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The chief barrier to the use of positive discrimination schemes in the UK is, 
paradoxically, commonly perceived to be the EU principle of non-
discrimination.1343 This is wrong. The chief barrier is the UK government.  Positive 
sex equality initiatives have been accommodated by the EU, and two key cases 
illustrate the retreat from a comparatively strict stance to the recognition of the 
necessity to permit proportionate promotional measures: Kalanke [1995],1344 and 
Lommers [2002].1345 
 
Positive action is permitted to alleviate the disadvantage experienced by those 
with other protected characteristics. Article 5 of the equal treatment directive of 
2000 specifically states that the principle of equal treatment does not prevent 
states from ‘maintaining or adopting specific measures to prevent or compensate 
for disadvantages linked to racial or ethnic origin,’ and the framework directive 
adopted in the same year, states ‘that the principle of equal treatment shall not 
prevent’ positive action to secure ‘full equality in practice’ for those 
disadvantaged on grounds of “religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation as regards employment and occupation.”1346 
 
Despite these ‘green lights’ the approach of the government has been cautious. 
 
S.69 of the Equality Act 2010 effectively allows for positive gender discrimination 
policies in relation to the ‘defence of material factor’ in direct and indirect 
discrimination, providing that ‘the long term objective of reducing inequality 
between men and women’s terms of work is always to be regarded as a 
legitimate aim.’ Therefore, arguably, as long as any measure to that end is held to 
be proportionate, then it will be held to be objectively justified. 
 
                                               
1343
Equality clauses and requirements for contractors to employ a certain proportion of disadvantaged minorities 
under procurement conditions in government or local authority contracts, are also perceived to potentially engage 
EU competition law. While such clauses are not prima facie unlawful, there is arguably  a belief that the application 
of such provisions will be seen to favour domestic firms, and public authorities appear to prefer not to risk a 
potential legal challenge – which is why they are almost unknown in the UK. See C Barnard, ‘To Boldly Go: Social 
clauses in Public Procurement’ (2016) 46 ILJ 208, 213-215. 
1344 Case C-450/93 ECR I-3051. 
1345 Case C-476/99 ECR I-2891. For an examination of this complex area  embracing both ECHR and CJEU cases, see 
pp 38-50 of The Concepts of Equality and Non-Discrimination in Europe: A Practical Approach, by C. McCrudden 
and S. Prechal, European Network of Legal Experts in the Field of Gender Equality, European Commission, 
November 2009. 
1346Articles 7 & 1. 
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Sections 158 and 159 of the Equality Act 2010 permit limited positive 
discrimination where an employer reasonably considers that persons with a 
protected characteristic are at a disadvantage or that such people are under-
represented in a particular role.  S.158 permits ‘encouraging’ and ‘enabling’ 
applications in such circumstances.  
Section 159 deals specifically with recruitment and promotion, permitting ‘tie 
breaker’ discrimination in favour of otherwise equally matched candidates, only if 
the employer does not have a policy of favouring individuals with the particular 
protected characteristic, and where the ‘action in question’ is a proportionate 
means of achieving the desired result. Should these requirements not be fulfilled 
then the employer will be vulnerable to a claim for unlawful discrimination. The 
exception here is positive action taken in relation to disability, age, and social 
status or origin. Being able bodied is not a protected characteristic and employers 
are free to choose to adopt a policy requiring all recruits and applicants for 
promotion be disabled, and section 13(3) of the Equality Act 2010 specifically 
permits more favorable treatment of a disabled person. A directly discriminatory 
policy in a fixed term contract scheme aimed at providing career opportunities for 
young people, as considered by the European Court in Abercrombie and Fitch 
Italia v Bordarno [2017], was found to be proportionate and therefore 
permissible, and as we have seen, social origin is not a protected characteristic. As 
a consequence there is, in law at least, arguably nothing to stop employers from 
choosing to recruit only from among, for example, the suitably qualified alumni of 
inner city comprehensive schools.1347 
The absence of European protections for discrimination because of social class or 
origin is, however, not a matter to be celebrated, and can arguably be held to 
account for the inadequacies of UK protections afforded victims of domestic 
servitude. 
 
                                               
1347
 Overtly recruiting only those educated at public schools would very likely be deemed indirect racial or religious 
discrimination. 
383 
 
Domestic servitude  
 
As I have shown in chapter four, the government will almost certainly have no 
option but to retain the workers’ rights demanded of EU members, whatever the 
future relationship of the UK with the EU. 
 
Such is the resilience and comparative power of EU obligation, that we find what I 
argue is the most significant instance of a failure to confer the anti discrimination 
protections required by supranational obligation in what is effectively the EU’s 
equality and human rights ‘blind spot.’ 
 
Despite the inclusion of ‘national minority’ in Article 21(1) of the EU Charter, 
there is a gap in the acquis where protection against discrimination on grounds of 
nationality is concerned. The requirement for states to guarantee the free 
movement of workers forbids discrimination against citizens from other EU 
states,1348 obviating the necessity for further protections for foreign nationals to 
protect the single market, and state arrangements for permitting non EU 
nationals to work are beyond the competence of the EU.  21(2) states that ‘within 
the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any of their 
specific provisions, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be 
prohibited,’ and although the Charter states that discrimination on grounds of 
social origin and birth ‘shall be prohibited’ no directives have been adopted to 
that end. 
 
The lack of EU obligation has arguably permitted the UK government fail to 
protect adequately those working under conditions of domestic servitude.  The 
victims in these cases have almost invariably been singled out for discriminatory 
treatment because of their nationality and social class.1349Compliance has thus 
not been seen to have been inevitable - the prospect of being forced into 
legislating by the Commission and the ECJ in a blaze of unflattering publicity has 
not been raised, and therefore the government has not acted. There are not yet 
                                               
1348 The free movement of workers, one of the sacrosanct four freedoms, forbids discrimination against citizens 
from other EU states, and although anti-discrimination measures to protect non EU nationals in employment exist 
they  apply only to long term residents and certain categories of highly qualified worker (see Craig & De Burca, The 
Evolution of EU Law, 201, p621- 622). 
1349
Working as a volunteer in North Kensington Law Centre in the Employment Unit during 2011-12 I interviewed a 
number of such victims. Employers routinely kept the passports of their employees and told them that if the police 
found them on the street without ID they would be arrested. 
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any EU directives prescribing how the problem of domestic servitude should be 
tackled.   
 
 Article 5 of the EU Charter, reflecting Article 4 ECHR, prohibits slavery, servitude, 
and trafficking, but it is not the lack of state prohibition that is the problem, it is 
the inadequacy of positive protections. 
 
The government is nevertheless required by other treaty obligations to extend 
specific protection to these unfortunate workers, who, whether ‘trafficked’ or 
not, have found themselves isolated in a foreign land, denied the collective 
safeguards of adequate state protection and the support of a trade union.1350 
 
The UK has not ratified the ILO Domestic Workers Convention 2011 (No.189), and 
despite highly publicised legislative initiatives like the Modern Slavery Act 2010, 
and the new offences (noted by the ECSR in 2012), s41 of the Asylum and 
Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) 2004, and the Coroners and Justice Act 
2009 s713. In 2016 it ratified the 2014 protocol to the Forced Labour Convention 
No. 29 of 1930, but neither instrument is particularly relevant to domestic 
servants,1351and the Home Office Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority, 
empowered by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to investigate instances 
of modern slavery, show little interest in domestic servitude.1352 There are only 36 
fully trained Labour Abuse Prevention Officers in the UK, and they conducted 
approximately 180 operations in 2017-18.1353 The GLAA employs only 104 full 
time staff in total.1354 
                                               
1350
 A good account of domestic labour and international labour standards is to be found in  V Mantouvalou, 
‘Servitude and Forced Labour in the 21
st
 Century: The Human Rights of domestic Workers’ (2006) 35 ILJ 395 
1351
The protocol is declaratory and very general while the Convention (ratified by the UK in 1931) is concerned 
almost exclusively with the use of compulsory labour by the state. 
1352The Home Office class domestic servitude, sexual exploitation and labour exploitation as modern slavery, 
estimating between 10,000 and 13,000 victims, but seem primarily concerned with the latter and in issuing 
licenses to labour providers in agriculture, horticulture, shellfish gathering, food processing and packaging (see HM 
Govt. United Kingdom Labour Market Enforcement Strategy 2018/10, Director of Labour Market Enforcement 
David Metcalf, Presented to Parliament pursuant to Section 5(1) of the Immigration Act 2016, May 2018, pages 4 & 
6.  
1353United Kingdom Labour Market Enforcement strategy 2018to 2019: Government Response, Dept. Of Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy and Home Office, December 2018, paras 97-100. 
1354
HM Govt. United Kingdom Labour Market Enforcement Strategy 2018/10, Director of Labour Market 
Enforcement David Metcalf, Presented to Parliament pursuant to Section 5(1) of the Immigration Act 2016, May 
2018, p6 of the Executive Summary. 
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Protection must be extended to victims whether or not they are in the UK 
legally.1355In March 2017 the UN CttESCR made a statement on the ‘Duties of 
States towards refugees and migrants under the UN Covenant on Economic Social 
and Cultural Rights making it clear that ‘irregular migrants’ must also enjoy the 
protections of the Covenant rights. Different treatment must be justified as 
lawful, proportionate and as made towards a legitimate end.1356 
According to the Committee’s General Comment No.20 (2009) on non-
discrimination, particular attention must be directed to the difficulties of asylum 
seekers and undocumented workers in securing their rights,1357 and General 
Comment No.23 (2016) on Article 7 ‘just and favourable conditions of work’ 
emphasised the vulnerability of migrant workers to adverse working 
conditions.1358 
The ‘right to work’ guaranteed by the UK government under the terms of the 
European Social Charter and UN Covenant embraces a prohibition on forced 
labour as well as placing an obligation on the government to ensure that workers 
with ‘protected characteristics’ are not subject to less favourable treatment.  The 
Charter thus obliges the UK government to tackle domestic servitude. 
Unfortunately the government has not been entirely frank with the ECSR. In 
Conclusions XX-1 2012 in relation to Article 1(2), the committee noted that they 
had been reassured by the Government that: 
 
‘In the United Kingdom foreign national domestic workers are entitled to 
change employers in the event of abuse. If they notify the competent 
authorities, victim assistance and support will be granted to them. The 
government also plans to undertake a study to find ways to prevent 
modern slavery among this group of workers.’ 
 
The terms of the Domestic Workers’ Visa were changed in 2012 preventing 
migrant domestic workers from changing employers when in the UK. Previously 
domestic workers could switch employers without breaching the terms of the visa 
                                               
1355See Hounga v Allen [2014] below. 
1356
 Duties of States towards refugees and migrants under the International Covenant on Economic and Cultural 
Rights, para 3. 
1357
 Ibid, para 7. 
1358 Para 13, and para 47(e) of the 2016 General comment. 
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– after 2012 they could not. The permission to work is awarded the employer not 
the worker, and any prospective new employer has to seek a new visa, making it 
far more difficult in practice for vulnerable workers brought in from overseas to 
escape from abusive employers.1359 This caused a storm of protest,1360 and as of 
April 2016 domestic workers who had accompanied their employer into the UK 
were permitted to change employers without a fresh application being made. 
However, those who entered the UK before 2012 were given 12 month visas; now 
they are given 6 months, serving as a disincentive for a new employer to take 
them on. Although overseas domestic workers ‘found to be the victim of slavery 
or human trafficking can apply for an extension of stay on that basis,’1361 there 
can be little doubt that those with abusive employers remain in a parlous 
position.1362 
We saw in chapter six that domestic workers in the UK do not have the benefit of 
the occupational health and safety protection afforded other employees. The case 
for a comprehensive inspection system to safeguard not only the health and 
safety of such workers, but to ensure that their terms and conditions of 
employment are lawful, is, however, irrefutable. The government is obliged to 
act. In its 2016 general comment on Article 7 UNICESCR the UN CttESCR stated 
that it obliged states to protect ‘against abuse, harassment and violence,’  to 
provide 
                                               
1359
 The well respected UK refuge organisation KALAYAAN which specialises in domestic servitude cases made a 
submission in collaboration with Anti-Slavery International to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women, stating that as a consequence the UK had regressed from its previous position and was therefore 
in breach of the recommendations in the CEDAW 2008 concluding observations (14 September 2012, pre-session 
submission for the 55th session). The 2013 concluding observations failed, however, to mention the matter.                                                                                                                                                                        
1360 See V Mantouvalou, ‘A Right to change Employer for Overseas Domestic Workers,’ Oxford Human Rights Hub, 
18 January 2016 ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/a-right-to-change-employer-for-overseas-domestic-workers/; see also, House 
of Commons Briefing Paper No.4786, 13 May 2016 ‘Calls to change overseas domestic worker visa conditions’ by 
Melanie Gower. 
1361 See the Home Office guidance for immigration staff: Domestic workers in private households, 24 March 2017. 
1362 On the vulnerability of these workers and the great dangers they face see V Mantouvalou, ‘Am I Free Now? 
Overseas  Domestic Workers in Slavery,’ (2015) 42 Journal of Law and Society 329. 
387 
 
‘decent working conditions...and ensure adequate means of monitoring 
domestic work, including through labour inspection, and the ability of 
domestic workers to complain and seek remedies for violations.’1363 
Unfortunately the only realistic chance of a remedy for workers in most instances 
is an employment tribunal claim.1364 However, no more than two years of unpaid 
wages can be recovered at tribunal,1365 and claims must be brought within 3 
months of act or breach complained of, a requirement which traumatised victims, 
often wholly unaware of their rights, unable to speak English and initially even 
unaware that their erstwhile employer has broken the law, may sometimes 
struggle to comply with. While tribunals have the discretion to extend this period 
it would be uncontroversial to argue that the time limits should be automatically 
extended to claimants alleging to have been employed under conditions of 
domestic servitude.  
There has been a discernable judicial reluctance to acknowledge the often 
exceptional nature of these cases,1366and there can be little doubt that the 
existing legal mechanisms are inadequate. The criminal nature of the treatment 
meted out to these workers cannot readily be compensated for through claims to 
recover unpaid wages, for breaches of the Working Time Regulations, and the 
failure to provide a written statement of the particulars of employment, although 
uncapped awards for discrimination have arguably proved effective as 
recompense and as a means of punishing and deterring perpetrators. Claims of 
unfair dismissal are also quite usual in such cases, but their use underlines the 
‘stop gap’ nature of employment protection rights in such circumstances: 
Absurdly, having escaped from domestic servitude, a victim seeking to claim 
                                               
1363 Para 47. 
1364 Civil litigation at the County or High Court, or a compensation order following the criminal conviction of the 
employer are the alternatives. Evidential difficulties mean that the police are notoriously reluctant to investigate 
domestic servitude cases, and while legal aid for civil litigation is available, it is not readily obtainable. 
1365Following the Deduction from Wages (Limitation) Regulations 2014. 
1366. The Court of Appeal in Hounga (a particularly unpleasant domestic servitude case) found for the employer 
after she had raised the defence of illegality (Ms Hounga had been ‘trafficked’ into the UK as an illegal immigrant 
and was aware that she had no right to work). Fortunately, however, the Supreme Court overturned that ruling on 
grounds both of the only peripheral relevance of the illegality to the case and public policy (Hounga v Allen [2014] 
UKSC 47). See A Bogg and S Green, ‘Rights Are Not Just for the Virtuous: What Hounga Means for the Illegality 
Defence in the Discrimination Torts,’ (2015) 44 ILJ 101. 
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constructive unfair dismissal must show that she has been employed by their 
abuser for the two year qualifying period before a tribunal will consider her claim. 
In Conclusions XX-2 2013 the ECSR stated that:  
‘In its last conclusion (Conclusions XIX-2) the Committee reiterated the fact 
that domestic workers are excluded from any type of inspection of the 
labour inspectorate is a matter of concern as they are considered a 
vulnerable category of workers. Therefore, and having also regard to the 
Siliadin v France judgment of the ECtHR [the 2005 trafficking and domestic 
servitude case which arguably first drew widespread attention to the 
problem]   the Committee asked whether any supervision of this category 
of workers by the public authorities is foreseen.’1367 
There is not, and the UK justifies inaction on the grounds that the extension of 
OSH protection to these workers would be an intrusion into the privacy of the 
employer – not ‘proportionate or practical’ - so there is little prospect of any 
domestic inspection regime, OSH related or otherwise, being implemented under 
a Tory government, despite the fact that the ECSR considers the absence of OSH 
protection including the absence of inspections to be an unequivocal breach of 
the European Social Charter.1368 
 However, the prospect of an occasional unannounced visit from a labour 
inspectorate is a small sacrifice of individual freedom, one very likely to improve 
the working conditions of thousands of these isolated workers, and, moreover, 
save hundreds from the threat of physical harm.1369 
Social Class and Political Opinion 
We have seen that the problem of domestic servitude is essentially one of 
employers singling out workers for exploitation on the basis of their social class as 
well as their nationality and that the weakness of British protections, in the face 
of multiple treaty obligations requiring effective intervention, can arguably be 
                                               
1367
 See OSH in section 1 of chapter 6. 
1368
Conclusions XXI-2, December 2017, published January 2018. 
1369As domestic servants staff are not embraced by OSH ILO C81 on Labour Inspection would not appear to have 
been breached. 
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attributed to the failure of the EU to require states to legislate to prohibit such 
discrimination. That gap in the acquis has also, of course, meant that less overtly 
criminal discriminatory workplace practices relating to social origin and social 
class are permitted in the UK.  
 
No specific protection for workers against arbitrary discrimination because of 
political opinion was provided in the UK until the Religion and Belief Regulations 
2003 were amended by the Equality Act 2006 to ensure compliance with the 
equal treatment Directive 2000/78/EC (above) which requires non religious 
beliefs to be protected. 
 
The ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention No.111 of 
1958, which effectively extended C100’s gender based requirements  ‘without 
distinction’ to embrace all protected characteristics, and was ratified by New 
Labour in 1999,1370 requires the Government to implement protection against 
discrimination on the basis of social origin or political opinion.1371 In 2005 the 
Committee of Experts referred to the draft Equality Bill (which became the 2006 
Act), and requested that the government ‘keep it informed on the progress of the 
draft law and whether it will include social origin as a prohibited ground’ of 
discrimination. 1372  In 2006 the Committee again asked about legal remedies for 
those experiencing such discrimination, characteristically pushing its effective 
demands further – ‘not simply with regard to unfair dismissal but also with regard 
to access to employment and vocational training.’1373 It reiterated that request in 
2009, this time specifically urging the government to include appropriate 
measures in the Equality Bill.  
 
                                               
1370
 Adopted 1958, came into force in 1960, ratified by the UK in 1999. ‘Discrimination’ under the Convention is 
‘any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national 
extraction or social origin which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in 
employment or occupation’. Article 1(2): ‘Any distinction, exclusion or preference in respect of a particular job 
based on inherent requirements therof shall not be deemed discrimination.’  Article 2 States must ‘declare and 
pursue a national policy designed to promote by methods appropriate to national conditions and practice, equality 
of opportunity...with a view to eliminating any discrimination...” Article 3 (b) educational programmes. Article 3(c) 
“...repeal any statutory provisions and modify any administrative instructions or practices which are inconsistent 
with the policy.’ 
1371
 Article 1(1)(a). 
1372
 Direct Request adopted 2005, published 95
th
 session (2006), para 4. 
1373
 Direct Request adopted 2006, published 96
th
 session (2007), para 4. Article 1(3) specifically refers to the 
application of the Convention to such training. 
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Section 1 of the Equality Act 2010 subsequently required public authorities to 
have ‘due regard’ for addressing and reducing socio-economic disadvantage when 
making policy decisions. Unfortunately, ‘Section One’, as it has become known, 
has yet to come into force.1374 Nor have the closely related provisions in s.9 of the 
Act permitting a minister to introduce secondary legislation address the ‘caste’ 
discrimination encountered in some South Asian communities.1375 .  
 
 In 2011 the ILO Committee of Experts, noting that the UN Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination had raised the matter of caste discrimination 
in employment in the UK,1376 asked the government to ‘invoke section 9(5)(a) of 
the Equality Act so that caste based discrimination, which is a manifestation of 
discrimination based on social origin, and also to take steps to ensure effective 
protection against discrimination based on political opinion.’1377 
 
 By s.97 the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act of 2013 the responsible 
Minister was obliged to amend the Equality Act to address caste discrimination 
within the race provisions; to deem it unlawful, unlawful in certain circumstances, 
or formally to decide not to include it from the anti-discrimination regime. 
Previously the position was that the minister ‘may’ take such steps.1378 The matter 
remained unresolved until July 2018, when the decision was taken by the 
government not to make caste status a protected characteristic. Very likely it was 
decided that on balance legislating on this sensitive issue would damage the 
electoral prospects of the Conservative Party, although the case of Chandhok v 
Tirkey [2014],1379in which discrimination on grounds of caste was held to 
potentially fall within the ambit of less favourable treatment on the grounds of 
                                               
1374 See chapter two. 
1375
 See para 49 of the Explanatory Notes, which state that the caste system is closely related to the traditional 
occupations of endogamous groups. 
1376 CERD/C/GBR/CO/18-20, 14 September 2011. 
1377 Direct Request adopted 2011, published 101st session (2012). 
 
1378 The relevant provisions are at s.9(5) of the Act both in the original and in the post 2013 version. The decision to 
address the matter in the race provisions of the Act is an interesting one because it is unquestionably a form of 
socio-economic discrimination. It is notable that the government excludes teachers in Northern Ireland from 
protection against religious discrimination, which might similarly be seen to be a blind eye turned to discrimination 
for pragmatic reasons – an intervention would be likely to cause too much political trouble ( See Observation 2014, 
published 104
th
 ILC session 2015). 
1379
UKEAT/ 0190/14/KN. See ‘Different Routes for Protecting Caste Discrimination: Chandok v Tirkey (2017) 46 ILJ 
406. 
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ethnic origin, was the basis of the government’s argument that there was no need 
to legislate.1380 
 
Tirkey was however, a typical domestic servitude case. The claimant, who spoke 
very little English, had worked at least 18 hours a day, seven days a week for four 
and half years.1381She was not allowed out on her own, or to talk to other 
people.1382 She earned £1340 in her best paid year, nothing at all in her 
worst.1383Uneducated, and from a low caste, she was selected in India by her 
employers for the purpose of exploitation. As is usual in such cases, the central 
claim was one of discrimination because of race, which, of course embraces 
nationality and ethnicity. 
 
The question of caste was only raised because it was unnecessarily, included in 
the statement of claim, and the respondents had sought to have it struck 
out.1384When the respondents appealed to the EAT the EHRC intervened, taking 
the opportunity to seek a definitive answer, doubtless with a view to the 
possibility of the case going on the Court of Appeal. The judge, the President of 
the EAT, however, having been ‘taken to seven Treaties, Conventions and UN 
reports,’ and invited to interpret the Equality Act in the light of those instruments, 
refused ‘to resolve academic disputes.’1385 
 
                                               
1380Caste in Great Britain and equality law: a public consultation. Government consultation response, July 2018: 
“Given the EAT judgment in Tirkey v Chandhok, we consider that it is likely that anyone who believes that they 
have been discriminated against because of caste could bring a race discrimination claim under the existing ethnic 
origins provisions in the Equality Act 2010...we will keep any new cases of caste discrimination that come before 
the courts under review to ensure that the principles established by the Tirkey v Chandhok judgment are upheld. 
Should there be any question that the established case law is under challenge...we will consider whether 
government should intervene (pp14-15). 
1381
Tirkey v Chandhok (ET) Case No. 340074/2013 Paras 57 – 59, 
1382
 Ibid, paras 111-122. 
1383Ibid; see the ‘Schedule of Amounts Underpaid under National Minimum Wage Act 1998’ attached to the 
tribunal report. 
1384Unusually, the UN ICERD was referred to in the amended version of the claim (para 6 of the EAT judgment). 
That instrument requires states to prohibit discrimination on grounds of ‘descent,’ and it was argued that as the 
framework directive on which the 2010 Act drew was based on the principles of the Convention and that therefore 
‘s13 EA 2010 must be taken to prohibit caste discrimination.’ This inclusion of ICERD seems to have led to its 
inclusion in section three of Doug Pyper’s House of Commons Library Briefing Paper No.06862, 3 August 2018 ‘The 
Equality Act 2010: caste discrimination,’ where he states that the CEDAW provisions oblige the government to 
prohibit caste discrimination.  No regional or international instrument are mentioned in the government’s 
consultation response. 
1385 From the TirkeyEAT judgment ‘Post Script.’ 
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Presciently noting ‘that there may yet be no formal introduction of ‘caste’ as a 
separate, and separately defined species of the genus which is race,’1386the judge 
was prepared to rule only that if Ms. Tirkey ‘proves facts which – whether 
colloquially or accurately – could be described as ‘caste considerations’ come 
within the heading ‘ethnic or national origins’ in 9(1)(c) she will succeed in her 
claim.’1387 
 
However, while caste status may in specific cases be said to equate with ethnicity, 
in most instances caste discrimination is arguably simply discrimination because 
of social class, wholly unrelated to ethnic origin. Tirkey changed nothing at all. For 
years most domestic servitude cases have routinely, if unsatisfactorily, been 
based on a claim of race discrimination, claims which, while they should succeed 
even when the employer is of the same race and nationality of the victim (as is 
usually the case, although judges have occasionally failed to uphold such claims), 
would be considerably strengthened if it could be augmented with a claim of 
discrimination because of social class.  
 
Arguably, Tirkey was a spurious justification for politically motivated inaction. 
There is no logical reason why social origin should not be deemed a protected 
characteristic,1388 but political realities, social attitudes, and the complexity of the 
British class system arguably make it very unlikely that it will take its place along 
with the other characteristics protected in the Equality Act. Discrimination on 
grounds of social class is perhaps so rife in the UK that, like age discrimination 
(direct age discrimination is still permissible if it can be said to be a proportionate 
means to a legitimate end), discriminatory treatment of the disabled (employers 
are only required to come to a ‘reasonable accommodation’ with their needs),1389 
and race and sex discrimination in the 1950s and 1960s, it might almost be said to 
be considered acceptable. 
 
The implementation of Section One of the Equality Act would at least be a step in 
the right direction. Moreover, it would be politically acceptable to a government 
sensitive to accusations of ‘political correctness’ and to electorally compromising 
criticism - it would have the virtue of allowing the Government to claim, if not 
                                               
1386Ibid, para 52. 
1387
Ibid para 53. 
1388
 See the work of Prof. Sonia Blandford of UCL on this, and her book Born to Fail? Social Mobility: A Working 
Class View (Melton, Woodbridge, 2017). 
1389Because these are permitted by Directive 2000/78/EC. 
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wholly convincingly, that it has complied with C111 ‘by methods appropriate to 
national conditions and practice.’ 
 
The implementation of Section One is, however, unlikely to have little real impact 
on arbitrary discrimination in the workplace - it must be borne in mind that 
Section One was drafted under New Labour, past masters at producing legislative 
gestures empty of substance. And an individual would not, of course, be able to 
bring a claim against a public authority for a breach of the Section One 
requirement.  An application for judicial review would be the only available 
course of action. 
 
In terms of impact on employment law, other than perhaps encouraging public 
authorities to extend section 158 and 159 style ‘positive action’ (see above) to 
social class,1390 it would have little effect. Too much depends on the attitude of 
central Government:  The Explanatory Notes on Section 1 in the Act refer to the 
need for departmental partnership with local authorities and NHS bodies to 
formulate ‘the sustainable community strategy for an area’ (para 23), and require 
that public authorities will be obliged to ‘take into account guidance by a Minister 
of the Crown when deciding how to fulfill the duty’ (para 25). Section 2 of the Act, 
however, places much power with the devolved governments, with Welsh and 
Scottish Ministers free to remove the para 25 requirement (para 29).  
 
Arguably a truly progressive government would simply legislate to outlaw 
discrimination on the grounds of social class, and any administration relying on 
cautious provisions of Section One would be equally cautious in the provision of 
the paragraph 25 guidance. 
 
In 2014 the government was asked by the ILO’s Committee of Experts for 
information on the progress it was making in combating workplace discrimination 
based on social class and political opinion. The committee also specifically asked 
about measures implemented to tackle caste discrimination.  
While noting the adjustments to the unfair dismissal rules following the decision 
of the ECtHR in Redfearn v UK,1391 and the scope for recognizing a political opinion 
                                               
1390
 Despite the fact that, if implemented, s1 will not make social origin a protected characteristic. 
1391
Op cit. The ECtHR found that the qualifying period for unfair dismissal breached the government’s Article 11 
obligations to protect workers from discrimination on grounds of political opinion. The court effectively held that 
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as a philosophical belief under the provisions of the 2010 Act, the Committee 
asked for reassurance that discrimination on the basis of social origin and political 
opinion was being adequately monitored, and information on how protection 
against such discrimination ‘is ensured in practice.’1392 
The practical reach of protection is simple enough to grasp; an individual 
dismissed because of political opinion can bring a ‘day one’ claim for unfair 
dismissal, while one dismissed because of social origin would have to have to 
have had worked for that employer for two years before having the opportunity 
to bring a claim. In both cases discrimination manifesting itself as less favourable 
treatment short of dismissal would not be actionable unless social origin could be 
presented as ethnicity,1393 or political affiliation be presented as philosophical 
belief, engaging Article 9 ECHR,1394 and the Religion or Belief Regulations.1395 
While the Government has yet to reply, it would be uncontroversial to argue that 
this restricted standing for those discriminated against for their political opinions 
or their social origins, or  social status, falls short of what is demanded by C111. 
______________________________ 
We can conclude that the UK is broadly compliant with substantive regional and 
international standards on anti-discrimination. The failure to promote and 
enforce effectively are the chief weakness of the UK anti-discrimination regime, 
and although that weakness cannot be plausibly be said to be a breach of treaty 
obligations incumbent upon the government, I have shown that:  
                                                                                                                                                       
this breach would be resolved by a ‘day one right’ to bring a claim of unfair dismissal on political grounds or a free 
standing law against discrimination on such grounds (para 57). The government settled for the former alternative 
and inserted s108(4) in the ERA 1996 removing the qualifying period if the reason or principal reason ‘for the 
dismissal is or relates to the employee’s political opinions or affiliations.’ 
1392 Direct Request adopted 2014, published 104th session (2015). 
1393 As was the case in Chandok v Tirkey (above). 
1394 As was arguably the case in Grainger v Nicholson [2010] EAT IRLR 4 where a fervent advocate of action against 
climate change was held to have a belief which passed the tests of being one worthy of respect in a democratic 
society; and which embraced a substantial aspect of human life while attaining a certain level of cogency, 
seriousness and importance. 
1395
 The 2003 regulations were amended by the Equality Act 2006 to ensure compliance with the Equal Treatment 
Directive 2000/78 which, unlike the 2003 regs, required non religious beliefs to be protected. 
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 Gender pay gap reporting should be extended to cover those with other 
protected characteristics. 
 Positive discrimination initiatives, as far as they are compatible with the EU 
principle of non-discrimination, should be implemented. 
 Explicit and effective protections against discrimination on the basis of 
social origin, and political opinion should be implemented. 
 The problem of domestic servitude should be addressed by specific 
legislation. 
And that 
 The homes of those employing domestic servants should be subject to 
inspection to confirm that the terms and conditions of employment, and 
living and working conditions are, adequate.   
2:‘Family Friendly’ Rights: Maternity, Paternity, Parental 
Leave, and Flexible Working Arrangements. 
There are a mass of international and regional rights provisions related to family 
rights and work. Most relate to working time, permitting parents to take time off, 
or to initiate a re-negotiation of their contract of employment in order to fulfill 
parenting duties or to care for disabled or elderly family members without being 
disadvantaged.  
States must provide all workers, including the self employed, with a total of least 
14 weeks of paid continuous maternity leave, at least 6 weeks of which should be 
taken after the birth. Pay should be pitched at a level which ensures that a 
mother or primary adopter ‘can maintain herself and her child in proper 
conditions of health and with a suitable standard of living.’ When past pay is 
taken into account she must be paid at least two thirds of her previous income. 
 
States must provide protection against dismissal for a reason connected to 
pregnancy and maternity,1396and any dismissal for unrelated reasons should be 
suspended during the period of leave. 
                                               
1396 Article 10. 
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States must ensure that the worker can return to work in the same role.  
 
_________________________________ 
 
While rights to maternity and nursing leave can arguably best be seen as civil 
rights, as fundamental human rights in the context of labour relations, wider 
entitlements to take parental leave might best be described as social rights.      
The Preamble of the UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women: 
‘The state parties to the present convention, 
Bearing in mind the great contribution of women to the welfare of the 
family and to the development of society, so far not fully recognised, the 
social significance of maternity and the role of both parents in the family 
and in the upbringing of children, and aware that the role of women in 
procreation should not be a basis for discrimination but that the upbringing 
of children requires a sharing of responsibility between men and women 
and society as a whole,  
Aware that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of 
women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality 
between men and women…’ 
Although maternity and nursing rights are grounded in gender equality, and, 
arguably more so than other working time rights, also grounded in occupational 
health and safety, the societal changes referred to in this 1979 text have started 
to see them outgrow their origins, as more men elect to take the lead role in child 
care.   
In the UK up to 52 weeks of maternity leave can be taken. The right to take that 
leave is well protected. Claims of unlawful detriment and unfair dismissal can be 
made against employers who disadvantage or dismiss a worker for a reason 
connected with her pregnancy, which, if successful, will attract a financial award. 
In theory, if not in practice, reinstatement or re-employment is available as a 
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remedy for unfair dismissal.1397 Sex discrimination claims, both direct and indirect, 
as well as claims for direct pregnancy or maternity discrimination, attracting, 
thanks to membership of the EU ‘uncapped’ awards (see chapter 2), may be made 
against employers in such circumstances.  
 
Maternity and nursing leave 
 
The 39 weeks of paid Statutory Maternity Leave – the first 6 weeks of which is 
‘earnings related Statutory Maternity Pay’ [SMP], and pays eligible individuals 
90% of their previous average net pay - can be shared with a partner, and deemed 
‘Statutory Shared Parental Pay’[StSPP] under the Shared Parental Leave [SPL] 
regime.1398 SPL is restricted to two partners during the year following the birth or 
adoption,1399 and is not, for example, available to a single parent to share with the 
child’s grandmother. Earnings related SMP cannot be passed over to the non 
nursing partner, so, although after the first two weeks following the birth  
(covered in any case by ‘ordinary paternity leave’ which allows both partners to 
be absent from work without sharing SML or SMP), all available leave can 
theoretically be shared, the remaining four weeks covered by earnings related 
SMP will only be likely to be shared if the husband is paid an enhanced parental 
leave rate by his employer, and earns a similar sum to the wife. The weekly sum 
of SMP after the first six weeks reverts to the statutory £140.93 (which is also the 
rate for paternity pay). A further 13 weeks of unpaid leave can be taken, bringing 
the available ‘shareable’ leave up to 50 weeks.  
  
That there is considerable opportunity for employees to take maternal and 
parental leave is beyond question.1400 The opportunity to take leave that is 
                                               
1397
Very few of those who seek reinstatement or re-engagement are successful, see pp 24-26 of Access to Justice: 
Exposing the Myths, by Andrew Moretta, 2016. 
1398
 Following the Children and Families Act 2014 paternity and adoptive leave, other than the one or two weeks of 
paternity leave available to the non nursing partner, were effectively subsumed into the shared parental leave 
system and governed by the Statutory Shared Parental Pay Regulations, permitting the nursing partner to pass on 
50 weeks of the 52 weeks maternity or adoptive leave available. See G. Mitchell ‘Encouraging Fathers to Care: The 
Children and Families Act 2014 and Shared Parental Leave’ (2015) 44 ILJ 123. 
1399 Adoptive parent are protected by the Paternity and Adoptive Leave Regulations 2002, and the available 52 
weeks (50 of which can be shared) of adoptive leave has the same pay structure, comes within the ambit of the 
Shared Parental Leave scheme, and is similarly protected by rights not to suffer an unlawful detriment or be 
unfairly dismissed for taking that leave. 
 
1400 On SMP and SPL generally see 479-486 of G James ‘Family –friendly Employment Laws (Re)assessed: The 
Potential of Care Ethics’ (2016) 45 ILJ 477. 
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adequately paid, however, is restricted to those mothers and male primary 
adopters who take first six weeks of maternity leave. Those 6 weeks apart, only 
employees of firms which ‘enhance’ the statutory entitlements, 1401or choose to 
pay those electing to take what would otherwise be unpaid parental leave can 
expect to receive adequate pay during these periods of leave.  
 
Those on SMP have to make do with the £140.98 mentioned above, or 90% of 
their average weekly net pay if that sum is less than £140.98. The shared ‘StSPP’ 
pays slightly more - £153.98 per week.  The 13 weeks’ additional maternity leave 
attracts no SMP or StSPP.  
Workers treated by HMRC as self employed fare even less well. Although Article 7 
of the UNCESCR requires that ‘[s]elf employed female workers should benefit 
from maternity insurance on an equal basis, with other workers,’1402 in the UK 
Maternity Allowance is available for the self employed or those who were not 
employed for sufficient time before the birth/adoption to be eligible for SMP. The 
allowance pays the usual £140.98. If the individual has earned insufficient money 
or has worked for less than 6 months in the previous 66 weeks they are eligible 
for only £27 per week. The Shared Parental Leave regime is similarly less 
accommodating to atypical workers. Where both partners have been employed 
for 6 months, and have satisfied the earnings requirements, both are entitled to 
SPL and to Statutory Shared Parental Pay. However, if one of the partners is not 
employed – is self employed,  or of ‘worker’ status  - an agency or casual worker - 
or unemployed, then the couple may take advantage of SPL and Statutory Shared 
Parental Pay only if certain hurdles relating to PAYE work undertaken by that 
worker in the last year can be surmounted. If not, then SPL is not available, nor is 
it if both partners are not employed. The unemployed and ‘genuinely’ self 
employed  who do not provide personal service apart, all workers should have 
equal opportunity to take adequately paid parental leave, and a distinction based 
on the payment of Class II National Insurance contributions should not be made. 
                                               
1401 SMP and OPL is paid for by the state; small firms receive a full reimbursement and larger firms receive 92% of 
what they pay employees.. 
1402
 2016 General comment by UN CttESCR para 47. The committee cited the Committee on the Elimination of 
discrimination against Women, communication No.36/2012, Blok et al.v. The Netherlands, views adopted 17 
February 2014. 
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It is the inadequacy of ordinary SMP, paternity pay, and StSPP which is the 
‘sticking point’ when the compliance of the UK regime with international and 
regional standards is considered.  
 UK law does not appear to accord with the Directive. Article 8 of the Pregnant 
Workers Directive requires workers to be paid at least the rate that they would 
receive should they be off work through sickness. The default position for sick pay 
in the UK is the £89.35 per week employers can currently recoup from the 
government under the statutory sick pay scheme after 4 days’ sickness,1403 a sum 
held to be ‘manifestly inadequate’ by the European Committee of Social Rights. 
Nevertheless, this ‘floor’ appears to be have been taken by the Government as 
license to guarantee pregnant and nursing workers only marginally less derisory 
sums.  
Where an employer is contractually bound to pay an employee their full basic 
wage during a period of absence due to ill health, it could be legitimately 
expected that under the terms of the Directive the same would apply to 
pregnancy and maternity absences. However, unless the contract says otherwise, 
there is no legal requirement for an employer who continues to pay the employee 
normally during sick leave to enhance the statutory sum during maternity leave. 
This is arguably an inadequate implementation of the directive. 
To go beyond EU standards: the requirements of CEDAW are very general, and, 
most obviously in relation to the requirement merely to ‘encourage’ social 
services to provide childcare, the bar is set remarkably low, presumably to 
accommodate less developed countries.1404 
Article 10(2) UNICESCR is more specific and requires the government to ensure 
workers receive ‘paid leave or leave with adequate social security benefits’ for a 
‘reasonable period before and after childbirth.’ Given the close attention paid to 
ILO standards by the ECSR, we arguably must look to the ILO Conventions and 
recommendation for an indication of what is adequate and reasonable.  
                                               
1403
 For employees who gross £113 or more per week. 
1404 CEDAW Article 11 (2). 
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The UK failed to ratify the ILO Maternity Protection Convention (No. 3) of 1919, 
and the 1952 revised version of that Convention (No.103). It did, however, ratify 
the Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention (No.102) of 1952, which, 
where maternity leave is concerned,1405 binds the UK to the provision of at least 
12 weeks maternity leave. Pay ‘in respect of suspension of earnings resulting from 
pregnancy and confinement’[Article 50] is subject to less exact, rather complex, 
antiquated guidance, with Article 65 telling us that ‘the persons protected, or 
their breadwinners, are arranged in classes according to their earnings, their 
previous earnings may be calculated from the basic earnings of the classes to 
which they belonged.’ Essentially the payment rates for UK maternity benefits 
would, in the 1950s, 60s, 70s and early 1980s, have had to have been a minimum 
of either 45% of the wage average skilled manual male employee engaged in non 
electrical machine manufacturing (Article 65), or 45% of the average unskilled 
male labourer engaged in the same business (Article 66), depending on past 
earnings of the husband, or if unmarried, the mother.  Although the Convention 
attaches a UN Economic and Social Rights Committee list of employment sectors 
(dating from 2006) from which it might in some instances be possible to derive 
regional averages, the modern benchmark applicable to the UK might better be 
sought elsewhere. 
Article 4(1) of the Maternity Protection Convention (No. 183), of 2000, requires 
states to provide maternity leave of not less than 14 weeks, and for that period to 
include a period of 6 weeks compulsory leave after the birth of the child (4(4)).  
All leave should be paid ‘at a level which ensures that the woman can maintain 
herself and her child in proper conditions of health and with a suitable standard 
of living’ (6(2)). Where past earnings are taken into account in calculating the sum 
to be paid, then the mother should receive at least two thirds of her previous 
income (6(3)). The accompanying Recommendation (No.191) requires states to 
‘endeavour to extend’ the 14 weeks in Article 4 to 18 weeks. 
Unfortunately the UK government has yet to ratify the Convention, and the 
Recommendation remains unadopted. 
                                               
1405 Part VIII Articles 46-52. 
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A Statement of Interpretation on Article 8 of the European Social Charter which 
followed the state reports for 1970-71 held that Article 8(1) requires states to 
provide at least 12 weeks maternity leave to mothers in paid employment, and be 
‘adequately compensated’ during that period, entitlements considered by the 
Committee to be ‘of such capital importance’ that they ‘ought to be guaranteed 
by law.’1406 Any steps to effect dismissal during this period are suspended, a 
breach of Article 8(2) although where fixed term contracts are used it has been 
acknowledged that the contract may expire ‘during the period from the time she 
notifies her employer…until the end of her maternity leave,’ and misconduct may 
justify dismissal.1407The 12 weeks required by 8(1) relates to leave before and 
after birth – 6 weeks is the post natal minimum. 
Earnings related pay or benefit must be  at least 70% of salary, while non earnings 
related benefit must be at least  ‘50% of median equivalised income calculated on 
the basis of the Eurostat at-risk-of-poverty threshold value,’1408which, according 
to the ‘At-risk-of-poverty threshold-EU-SILC Survey’ was a very modest disposable 
income of  9,022 Euros in 2017,1409 or about £7, 794. Specifically assessing UK 
compliance, the Committee, in Conclusions XX-4 2015 Article 8(1) held that: 
‘The situation in the United Kingdom is not in conformity with Article 8(1) 
of the 1961 Charter on the ground that the standard rates of Statutory 
Maternity Pay, after six weeks, and Maternity Allowance are 
inadequate.’1410 
Noting the statistics on the ‘take up’ of maternity leave – as we have seen, 
mothers can choose to take up to 52 weeks ‘SML’ - the ECSR has asked whether 
discriminatory pressure is applied to persuade mothers to return to work early. 
                                               
1406 Conclusions III1970-1971 Statement of Interpretation Article 8(1).. 
1407 2018 Digest of the Case Law of the European Committee of Social Right, Council of Europe 2018, p117 
1408 Ibid, p 116. The Digest wrongly cites the statement of interpretation on 8(1) in Conclusions XX-4 2015 – the 
70% and 50% figures are cited in the UK 2015 Conclusions. 
1409Eurostat: ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tessi014&plugin=1 No 
2018 figures are available. 
1410  See also p114, European Social Rights Committee, Activity Report 2015. Although the ECSR was obliged to ask 
the Government ‘whether the minimum rate of maternity benefits’ reached the 50% poverty threshold, it had 
drawn the same negative conclusion in XIX-4 2010, and XVII-2 2006. However, the Committee has long held that it 
is ‘inadvisable to make any absolute definition’ of what is or is not adequate (see, for example, Conclusions I, 1965-
1967, Statement of Interpretation, Article 8(1)). 
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Questions were raised in Conclusions XIX-4 2010 after it had been noted that 
leave was compulsory only for two weeks after the birth of the child (4 weeks for 
factory workers). The government had informed the ECSR that in practice almost 
all workers took the six weeks leave – the leave covered by the earnings related 
SMP referred to above.  
Parental leave & family friendly flexibility 
Despite the statutory protections, it does appear that discriminatory pressures 
are applied. While it is well understood that there is a right to paid maternity 
leave for 6 weeks, workers are often ignorant of the opportunity to take or to 
share up to one year of maternity leave, and of their right to take paternity and 
parental leave. 
 
Very likely this is due to the fact that these rights are of comparatively recent 
origin, and after that after an initial flurry of publicity, because only the well paid 
could take such leave their existence failed to lodge in the public consciousness. 
The first post nursery age initiative was the Parental Leave Directive of 1996 
which was incorporated by New Labour into the Maternity and Parental Leave 
Regulations 1999.1411 
 
New Labour were generous with unpaid leave entitlement, going beyond what is 
required by the Directive. The Employment Act 2002 extended maternity leave, 
introduced paternity and adoption leave, and all leave entitlements were 
subsequently extended by the Work and Families Act 2006.  
 
The Tory dominated Coalition grudgingly implemented the pointedly named 
Parental Leave (EU Directive) Regulations 2013,1412 which permit employees to 
take up to 18 weeks of unpaid parental leave for each child under 18, up to a 
maximum of four weeks in any year. That is the current position. The usual 
detriment and dismissal provisions to protect those exercising the right apply. 
However, those wishing to take the time off must either be prepared to live off 
their savings for the duration, or have an employer who is willing - or 
contractually bound - to pay them during their absence. Those in low paid work 
                                               
1411
  The directive was adopted under the Social Protocol and was subject to John Major’s social chapter ‘opt out.’ 
1412Implementing Directive 2010/18/EU. 
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are thus effectively denied these rights, and those of worker status are denied the 
right to request unpaid parental leave.1413 
 
Moreover, many of those employees aware of the existence of these rights, 
believe that their employer would respond negatively and disadvantage them in 
some way if they chose to take the available leave.  A 2017 TUC survey of low paid 
parents examining attitudes to flexible work, maternity and paternity leave and 
pay, and unpaid parental leave,1414 found that very many ‘employers take a 
punitive rather than a supportive approach to workers who need time off or 
adjustments for family reasons.’1415 
 
The so called family friendly rights were found to have had little beneficial impact 
on the lives of these workers, the report on the survey finding that ‘workplace 
culture…does not reflect the modern attitudes of young parents,’1416 with men 
facing particular employer hostility when they attempted to reconcile work and 
parenting commitments.1417Of those surveyed, 58% felt that ‘they know little or 
nothing about what rights they have at work to help them balance work with 
childcare.’1418  This lack of awareness is not restricted to those in low paid work. In 
a 2017 poll of 1,500 working parents undertaken by a law firm, it was found that 
45% did not know of the amount of unpaid parental leave they could take, 49% of 
the fathers, and 32% of the mothers had not heard of unpaid parental leave. Take 
up of such leave was 25%, and only 6% had taken shared parental leave.1419 
 
                                               
1413Which would arguably appear to be an inadequate implementation of the directive. In the ‘purpose and scope’ 
of the Framework Agreement on Parental Leave (Revised) it is said to apply ’to all workers...who have an 
employment contract or employment relationship, ’and states are not permitted to exclude workers ‘solely’ 
because they ‘are persons with a contract of employment or employment relationship with a temporary agency’ 
(Cl.1(2) &(3)). 
1414
Better jobs for mums and dads, TUC, 2017. 
1415
 Ibid, p4; an example was cited of a ‘line manager deliberately making last minute shift changes making 
childcare more difficult’ in response to a request for help with managing hours for that purpose (p8). See 
‘Vindicative behaviour from employers’ p23-24, also p 26-27; p39. 
1416 Ibid. 
1417 Ibid, ‘Employers are not keeping up with the changing attitudes of young fathers’, p24-25. 
1418 Ibid, p9. See ‘Lack of Awareness of employment rights and concerns around exercising their rights,’ p26-27. 
Also p34-35. 
1419www.crosslandsolicitors.com/site/hr-hub/unpaid-parental-leave-employee-ignirance-and-cost-to-parents. The 
TUC paper proposed that awareness of the existence of such rights be raised by initiatives aimed variously at 
businesses and workers, arguing that workplace culture had to change, emphasis being laid upon the role of trade 
unions, in particular the need for them to negotiate family friendly workplace policies with employers Better jobs 
for mums and dads,  p15, and ’What are trade unions doing to support young parents?’ p28-29, (also p46-47). 
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However, employer hostility and ignorance are arguably eclipsed by low pay. 
Information about the right to leave isn’t ‘getting around’ because the right is, in 
effect illusory. Taking unpaid leave was found by the TUC to be ‘unfeasible’ for the 
low paid.1420 Their report proposed that unpaid parental leave be paid and 
renamed ‘childcare leave’, with the right to paid leave extended to those with 
adult dependent relatives.1421 Although the TUC failed to address the question of 
the adequacy of ordinary SMP and StSPP, the proposal that the unpaid leave at 
least be paid at the rate of the national wage can be assumed to extend to the 
pay of those taking leave during the first year of parenthood.  
 
These financial limitations would, of course, be less of an issue if parents were 
able to access cheap child care and employers were required to permit workers 
with young children to adapt their hours and shift patterns to accommodate 
those responsibilities. In the last ‘List of issues’ raised in response to the most 
recently published UK state report the UN Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women asked for ‘detailed information about measures in 
place to ensure a high rate of employment for women while addressing the 
reported gap between the demand for and supply of affordable high-quality 
childcare.’ 1422 
The government reply placed emphasis on the increased numbers of women in 
employment, and on ‘extending the right to request flexible working to all 
employees …developing a new system of shared parental leave so that parents 
can choose how best to share caring responsibilities.’1423  Where child care was 
concerned, however, all the government was able to tell the Committee was that 
there was a new entitlement to ‘15 hours of free education and care per week for 
3 and 4 year olds (which is being extended to cover around 40% of 2 year olds),’ 
and there was now a right to ‘extended help with childcare costs to those working 
under 16 hours for the first time.’1424 
                                               
1420 Ibid, p10. See also p38. 
1421 Ibid, p13 -14 & 44-46. 
1422 CEDAW/C/GBR/Q/7 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 25 October 2012, 
considered at the 57
th
 Session 8-26 July 2013, para 16. See Article 11 CEDAW above, particularly (3). 
1423
 CEDAW/C/GBR/Q/7/Add 1 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 5 February 2013, 
considered at the 57
th
 Session 8-26 July 2013, para 138. 
1424 Para 140. 
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The opportunities to agree to work arrangements which will help workers to cope 
with family responsibilities – so called ‘flexible working’ – are equally limited in 
the UK, matters not helped by the seeming  willingness of politicians and 
employers to conflate working arrangements suitable for students with the 
requirements of family ‘bread winners.’ The TUC, in the 2017 report referred to 
above, found that rather than allowing workers to schedule work around family 
responsibilities, flexible working for the low paid tended to manifest itself as 
agency and zero hour which disrupted lives as changed hours, assignments and 
shift patterns at short notice.1425  The UK Government  has recently [February 
2018] chosen to reveal that it ‘recognises the real issues that one sided flexibility 
can cause for working people and their families,’ and claimed to be ‘committing 
to provide a right to request a more predictable contract for all workers, including 
those on zero hours contracts and agency workers.’ 1426 While a ‘right to request’ 
has, in such circumstances, the potential  to be of considerable value, 1427so far all 
such initiatives have offered no more than a very modest protection against 
victimization for those who make such requests. 
 
Family friendly flexible working is arguably the polar opposite of agency, or zero 
hours work.1428  While it is, to a degree, about matters like employers being 
prepared to accommodate workers obliged to leave work early to take a child to 
the dentist,  it is essentially about providing certainty or worker choice as to when 
work starts and finishes, and a willingness to negotiate changes in fixed hours of 
work when family responsibilities change. The UN CttESCR hold that: ‘Flexible 
working arrangements must meet the needs of both workers and employers, and 
in no case should they be used to undermine the rights to just and favourable 
conditions of work,’1429  a statement which might  arguably best be said to sum up 
Government obligations in respect of workers with family responsibilities. 
                                               
1425
 Ironically the right to request flexible working is restricted to employees, and this excludes agency workers, 
and very many zero hours workers. Even for employees qualifying periods for rights are a barrier to accessing 
rights when they are in low paying roles with a high ‘churn.’ 
1426 HM Government Industrial Strategy: Good Work, A response to the Taylor Review of Modern Working 
Practices, February 2018,p.16. Emphasis added. 
1427 See the Zero Hours Bill 2014, below. 
1428 Although no doubt many of those working under such contracts come to amicable arrangements with agencies 
and employers, agencies are not under any formal obligation to consider flexible working arrangements.  Although 
they pay their temporary staff wages they are able to claim that they are not the employer. Firms engaging 
workers on zero hours contracts similarly ‘demutualise’ the employment relationship to the extent that it can also 
be argued the workers are not employed and that consequently the ‘employer’ is under no obligation to consider 
requests for flexible working. This ambivalent status potentially excludes the host of rights which are denied those 
without employee status. 
1429 General Comment on Article 7 (2016), para 46. 
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Well paid individuals, valued by their employer, are far better placed to negotiate 
flexible working arrangements. The less well paid – the negotiation of their 
individual contract of employment a fiction - are very likely to be told that if they 
don’t like the work they can go elsewhere. These rights, negotiated as they were 
by the social partners, were intended to be negotiated collectively, not by the 
individual, and arguably the failure of the Government to protect freedom of 
association examined in the previous chapter has effectively served to undermine 
the right to request genuinely family friendly flexible working. 
 
The Part Time Workers’ Directive, considered it greater detail at the start of the 
next section, was adopted in 1997,1430 and as well as a measure to protect those 
workers from less favourable treatment, has been said to have been intended as a 
first step in a campaign to promote flexible work, 1431 focusing principally on the 
removal of administrative and legal barriers to part time arrangements.  
As far as giving workers the right to work reduced hours the  Social Partners’ 
Framework Agreement, which the Directive implements,1432 requires only that 
‘employers give full consideration’ to requests to transfer ‘to part time work that 
becomes available in the establishment.’1433  The 2010 Parental Leave Directive – 
which also implements a Framework Agreement - is similarly equivocal requiring 
only states ensure ‘that workers, when returning from parental leave, may 
request changes to their working hours and/or patterns for a set period of time. 
Employers shall consider and respond to such requests, taking into account both 
employers’ and workers’ needs.’1434 
                                               
1430
 Directive 97/81/ EC, issued to the UK as Directive 98/23 /EC. 
1431
 See Mark Bell, ‘Achieving the Objectives of the Part-Time Work Directive? Re-visiting the Part-Time Workers 
Regulations’, (2011) 40 ILJ 254. A more accurate assessment would be that the Framework Agreement was to be 
the first of a series on flexible working. Para 12 of the preamble to the Part Time Directive states that: ‘Whereas 
the social partners wised to give particular attention to part-time work, while at the same time indicating that it 
was their intention to consider the need for similar agreements for other flexible forms of work.’  However, the 
Framework Agreement which the directive implemented   goes no further than apply the principle of non 
discrimination to the treatment of part timers, and to “assist the development of opportunities for part time 
working on a basis acceptable to employers and workers” by merely guiding member states towards requiring 
employers to accommodate workers who wished to work on a part time basis (see the preamble to the Framework 
Agreement). 
1432 The Directive essentially enacts the Agreement. 
1433
Clause 5(3)(a). Similarly a request for extra hours or full time work is only required to be considered   ‘should 
the opportunity arise’ (Cl..5(b)). 
1434
 Clause 6(1). The Parental Leave Directive also implements a Framework Agreement concluded by the Social 
Partners. 
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These provisions were clearly drafted with western European levels of collective 
agreement in mind, where such requests will usually either be made on the 
worker’s behalf by a recognised trade union, or with the support of that union. In 
the UK, in the context of an industrial relations landscape dominated by the 
individual contract of employment, and individual rights enforceable through 
litigation rather than negotiation, substantive rights are required to achieve the 
same end.  
 
The Employment Act 2002 introduced the right to request flexible working 
arrangements into domestic law – embracing requests for part time hours - for 
the employed parents of young or disabled children. The right was extended to 
those caring for adult disabled people in 2007, and to all children up to the age of 
17, following the Work and Families Act 2006. Since the Flexible Working 
Regulations 2014, implemented by the Coalition, all employees have the right to 
request flexible working arrangements. Employers may refuse requests for such 
arrangements on grounds that include cost, or the impracticability of recruiting 
additional staff or undertaking a reorganisation, or on any plausible grounds 
whatsoever.1435 It is no more than a right to ask for different hours or to work 
elsewhere – perhaps to a workplace near a school, nursery, hospital, or to work 
from home. The difference between an ordinary request and a formal written 
request under the legislation is that the employer must deal with the request in a 
reasonable manner, and respond within 3 months.1436 If the request is turned 
down, then an alternative to a tribunal claim, if both parties agree is to go to Acas 
arbitration. In either case, if the employee is successful, the consequences are 
limited to the employer being obliged to reconsider the request and pay a 
maximum of 8 weeks’ pay (subject to the ERA 1996 s227 cap).  
 
In 2002 these provisions were memorably dismissed as ‘sound bite 
legislation,’1437and the phrase remains apt 16 years on. 1438 Female workers have 
sometimes successfully claimed that a post natal refusal by an employer to permit 
a shift to part time hours amounted to indirect sex discrimination, but tribunals 
                                               
1435Employment Rights Act 1996 s. 80(G)(1)(b) 
1436 Oddly the request must be for a permanent change, and the TUC proposes that a request for a temporary 
change should be permitted (‘Better jobs’, op cit, p14). 
1437
 In particular by Lucy Anderson in ‘Sound Bite Legislation: The Employment Act 2002 and New Flexible Working 
‘Rights’ for Parents,’ (2003)  32(1) ILJ 37. 
1438 See p40 of ‘Better jobs’ (op cit), for some opinions of the weakness of the right from low paid workers. 
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have tended to take the view that it is for the employer to decide whether or not 
a post is suited to a part time or ‘job share’ approach, 1439 making the supposed 
objective justification for an insistence on full time hours an essentially subjective 
one. However, this approach, even if successful, will not secure a part time 
contract, merely an award which is unlikely to be adequate compensation, and 
will not, in any case, be an option for a male worker. 
 
Whether or not these inconsequential rights accord with EU requirements is 
questionable – although not a question likely ever to be considered by the ECJ. 
The Part Time Work Framework Agreement requires that employers should, ‘as 
far as possible,’ institute ‘measures to facilitate access to part time work at all 
levels of the enterprise.’1440 While UK law can – at a push - perhaps plausibly be 
said to oblige employers to consider requests from employees for part time 
hours, there is no requirement for employers to take the active and wide ranging 
positive measures this phrase appears to demand.  
_____________________________________ 
 
To conclude: The UK is largely compliant in the provision of maternity and 
parental leave required by regional and international rights instruments.  
However: 
 
 Statutory Maternity Pay and the Maternity Allowance are inadequate.   
 
 14 weeks paid leave should be provided, with 6 weeks as the post natal 
minimum. The earnings related Statutory Maternity Pay should continue 
beyond the existing 6 weeks, paid at either 70% of previous net average 
wages,  or whatever sum provides a disposable income of approximately 
£10,000 per year, or other sum required to maintain a mother and child in 
good health when housing, food and heating costs have been covered.  
 
 All workers: employees, ‘workers,’ and the ‘genuinely’ self employed 
providing personal service, should have equal opportunity to take 
                                               
1439
See AC Davies, Employment Law, (Harlow, Pearson, 2015) p282. 
1440 Clause 5 (3)(d) Directive 97/81/EC. 
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adequately paid parental leave. A distinction based on the payment of 
Class II National Insurance contributions should not be made. 
 
 The right to request ‘flexible’ working hours should be extended to those 
with worker status. 
 
 All such requests should be made through a trade union as part of the 
collective bargaining process. 
 
3: Rights for Workers with ‘Atypical’ Working Arrangements: 
Part Time, Zero Hours Contracts Fixed Term, and Agency 
Contracts. 
 
‘Flexible working arrangements must meet the needs of both workers and 
employers, and in no case should they be used to undermine the rights to just and 
favourable conditions of work.’1441 
 
Part time work 
Those engaged in part time work are frequently not afforded the terms and 
conditions of employment pro rata temporis enjoyed by their full time colleagues. 
This is a problem that both the EU and the ILO have attempted to address. 
We saw in the last section that the Social Partners, at the instigation of the 
European Commission, negotiated a Framework Agreement on Part Time Work in 
a bid to make it more likely that workers in member states would be able to elect 
to work on a part time basis, confident that they would not lose acquired rights. 
This was intended as a first step towards the implementation of wider, genuinely 
flexible, working arrangements in member states,1442one taken shortly after the 
ILO had adopted Convention 175 and Recommendation 182 on Part Time Work.  
 
                                               
1441 UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment on Article 7 (2016), para 46. On the 
need for the law to keep up with these increasingly typical new forms of employment relationships see MJ Walton, 
‘The Shifting Nature of Work and its Implications’ (2016) 45 ILJ 111, and Sir Brian Langstaff, ‘Changing Times, 
Changing Relationships At Work…Changing Law?’ (2016)  45 ILJ 131. 
1442
 Council Directive 97/81/ EC, issued to the UK as Council Directive 98/23 /EC. See Jeffery ‘Not Really going to 
work? Of the Directive on Part time Work, ‘Atypical Work’ and Attempts to Regulate It,’ (1998) 27 ILJ 193, 1998. 
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The Part Time Workers’ Directive was the first of the Directives to be negotiated 
by the Social Partners under the social protocol, (the second of the social chapter 
Directives implemented by New Labour), and although neither the Framework 
Agreement, nor any other part of the Directive mentions the ILO, the text of the 
agreement makes it apparent that the Social Partners had paid close attention to 
ILO Convention No.175 on Part Time Work, and to the accompanying 
Recommendation No.182, particularly Article 9 of the former, and Articles 17 and 
18 of the latter. 
 
 All three instruments place considerable emphasis on promoting a voluntary shift 
towards to flexibility, with the preamble of C175 expressly referring to ‘the 
relevance for part time workers of the provisions of the Equal Remuneration 
Convention 1951, the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention 
1958, and the Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention and 
Recommendation 1981.’  
 
However, the Directive confers few substantive rights, and, in essence, C175 
obliges signatory states to initiate a programme of protection, with the phrase 
‘measures shall be taken’ serving as the principal imperative, and Article 18 
indicating that a subsequent ‘revising’ Convention will supersede C175.  
 
The Directive was adopted in 1998, and Convention No.175 came into force the 
same year, perfectly timed, one might suppose, to assist New Labour in realising 
its rather vague policy aim of securing ‘flexicurity’ for Britain’s workers.  
 C175 however, remains unratified and the first Blair administration, in drafting 
what became the Part Time Workers (Prevention of less Favourable Treatment) 
Regulations 2000, achieved only what has been described as a ‘partial and 
incomplete implementation’ of the directive.1443 The Department of Trade and 
Industry’s Regulatory Impact Assessment estimated that fewer than 7% of all 
part-time workers would benefit directly from the regulations.1444 
                                               
1443
 Mark Bell, ‘Achieving the Objectives of the Part-Time Work Directive? Re-visiting the Part-Time Workers 
Regulations,’ (2011) 40 ILJ 254. 
1444
 According to Aileen McColgan in“Missing the point? The Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable 
Treatment) Regulations (2000) 29 ILJ 260. 
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In most circumstances, claimants relying on the regulations require a real and 
closely comparable full time colleague, an often insurmountable obstacle to a 
successful claim.1445 Discrimination is, in any case, permitted where the employer 
can show an ‘objective justification’ for the imposition of less favourable terms 
and conditions of employment of part time workers.1446 
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the regulations were deliberately 
intended to be of little use.  However the Directive, little more a guide to what 
employers and trade unions should aim at when facilitating part time work, and 
leaves so much discretion to the member state that it cannot be claimed that the 
implementation was inadequate. No complaints were raised by the TUC, the 
Commission did not instigate infringements proceedings of its own volition, or in 
response to any other complaint, and the regulations remain as they were when 
they entered into force in 2000. 
The Directive was meant as one element of a drive towards the provision of more 
flexible work by employers and trade unions rather than as an instruction from 
Brussels to confer individual rights on individual workers. Had the UK ratified 
C175,1447 a step which would have accorded with New Labour’s ostensible 
enthusiasm for protecting atypical workers, and its initial interest in ratifying ILO 
Conventions after the hiatus of the Thatcher and Major years,  then there can be 
no doubt that the ILO’s Committee of Experts would have pressed the 
government to revise the Regulations on many occasions during the past 18 
years, and if trade unions had, in 1997, wielded the influence that they possessed 
20 years before there can be little doubt that the regulations would have taken a 
different form. 
                                               
1445 Reg.2(4). Unless the claimant shifted from full to part-time working arrangements, or has returned to the same 
job following a brief absence. See below for the need for a real comparator as an obstacle to justice in equality 
cases. 
1446 Reg. 5. Although the House of Lords introduced a more generous approach in Matthews v Kent and Medway 
towns Fire Authority [2006] 2 AER 171. ‘Objective justification’ for a denial of PT status drew the interest of the 
CEACR and it asked the government to provide examples of such justifications and asked how  the UK ‘addresses 
indirect discrimination against part time workers’ (Direct Request  adopted 2002, published 91
st
 ILC session 2003). 
1447It came into force in 1998. 
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The government is, however, required by Part 1(4) of the 1961 European Social 
Charter to ensure as an aim of policy that ‘All workers have the right to a fair 
remuneration sufficient for a decent standard of living,’ and by Article 4(1) to 
‘recognise’ that right. Additionally, Article 7 the UN Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights requires the government to ensure for workers ‘fair wages’ 
and ‘A decent living for themselves and their families.’  
This arguably means that part time workers should be given parity with the terms 
and conditions of employment as their full time colleagues.  
As shall become apparent, these requirements are effectively the basis of my 
arguments that the government is required to confer protections for atypical 
workers. Atypical work contracts, by no means unknown in the 1970s, were used 
much more after 1979, as the unions became weaker. Working families started to 
require two incomes, and it became easier for employers to hire workers on 
exploitative terms. Although the ILO responded, the UK was no longer signing up 
the supranational protections, so the obligations incumbent on the government 
are limited. 
 The sparse nature of specific obligation in this area means that the obligations 
can realistically be considered no more than a ‘political springboard’ – as a 
justification for enacting effective legislative protection.  
Worker status 
Calculated ineffectiveness was arguably one element of New Labour’s strategy to 
render the new EU employment rights as ‘employer friendly’ as possible. The 
other key element of that strategy had been set in place within months of New 
Labour’s May 1997 election victory – ‘worker’ status.  
The new intermediate status limited the reach of the social chapter. Rather than 
simply extending the legal definition of an employee to align with the EU 
definition of a ‘worker,’1448 to give all those undertaking work personally 
                                               
1448
It must be emphasised that EU law recognises only a binary divide between workers (a term synonymous with 
‘employee’) and the self employed. The self employed ‘offer goods or services on the market, workers merely offer 
their labour to one (or, on rare occasions, more) particular employer(s)’ (para 46 AG’s Opinion in the Dutch 
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employee protection, a new category of employment status was created – that of 
a ‘worker.’ The new category embraced employees, and those in an employment 
relationship denied employee status on grounds of lack of mutual obligation but 
excluded those who, while providing a personal service, were deemed to be self 
employed under the common law tests:1449 
Section 230(3) Employment rights Act 1996: 
‘In this Act ‘worker’…means an individual who has entered into or works 
under….(a) a contract of employment (b) any other contract…whereby the 
individual undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services for 
another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of the contract 
that of client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried 
on by the individual.’ 
Now there were three tiers of employment status: employee, worker and self 
employed. 
 This new intermediate status ensured that existing domestic protections were 
not extended to those workers not deemed to be employees and that, where the 
notoriously vaguely drafted EU protections could plausibly be said to embrace 
only employees, ‘workers’ could also be denied their benefit along with those 
workers taxed as self employed whose de facto employer are able to claim that 
the individual in question is ‘genuinely self employed’.  
As well as limiting the reach of employment protections, ‘worker’ status provided 
a new legal foundation for previously ambivalent variations on the employment 
relationship. Those employed under the ‘precarious’ work arrangements which 
had become increasingly popular with employers during the previous 15 or so 
years prior to 1997, principally agency and zero hours contracts, arrangements 
                                                                                                                                                       
Musicians Case [2014] C-413/13). The ‘false self employed’ (like the Dutch Musicians) fall into the category of 
worker, along with employees, and the question as to whether an individual is a worker or is self employed must 
assessed on a case by case basis (ibid, para 84). On the Dutch case see pp 193-196  V. de Stefano, ‘Non –Standard 
Work and Limits on Freedom of Association: A Human rights Based Approach’ (2017) 46 ILJ 185. 
1449
The classic common law tests of control, whether tools are supplied etc, were laid down in Readymix Concrete v 
Ministry of Pensions and NI [1968] 2 QB 497, and applied recently by the Supreme Court in Pimlico Plumbers v 
Smith [2018] UKSC 29 where it was confirmed that Mr Smith was a worker.  
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which laid claim to the lack of mutual obligation inherent in genuine casual work, 
continued to be denied the key protections afforded employees but could now be 
said to have ‘worker’ status. 
Although I would argue that it is questionable as to whether the British three tier 
approach to the categorising workplace relations should have excluded self 
employed workers providing a personal service to a small pool of 
clients/employers from the EU protections,1450 it cannot realistically be claimed 
that British manipulation of worker status to minimize the impact of the social 
chapter is a breach of EU law.  
Nevertheless, it is arguable that the creation of this ‘twilight’ intermediate status 
has upset the effective delineation of self employment and employment for the 
purposes of employment protection, given exploitative arrangements a spurious 
legitimacy, and consequently undermined the provision of just and favourable 
conditions of work, and to fair remuneration sufficient for a decent standard of 
living.  The most notorious of these arrangements is the ‘zero hours contract.’ 
Zero hours contracts 
Employers generally use such contracts to enable them to dispense with labour 
quickly and at minimum cost during quiet periods, to summon additional labour 
at busy times at very short notice, and to avoid paying over time rates to their 
core retinue of conventionally employed staff.1451  Many such workers, paying tax 
and NI on a PAYE basis and working hours, often indistinguishable from 
colleagues working contractually agreed full time hours, are denied full time or 
part time contracts of employment on, I would argue, the almost invariably 
artificial premise that their relationship with the employer is not one of mutual 
obligation. Others are paid a gross sum, without tax and National Insurance 
deductions, on the pretence that they are self employed. 
                                               
1450In the Dutch Musicians Case [2014], op cit, ‘self employed’ musicians working for small pool of employers were 
held to be workers entitled to bargain collectively, and, of course, to the EU employment rights (cf the Deliveroo 
application for union recognition, considered below). 
1451 On the characteristics of such contracts see Z Adams and S Deakin, Re-regulating Zero Hours Contracts 
(Liverpool, IER, 2014) pp3-24. 
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‘Reduced hours contracts’ [RHCs], closely related to ZHCs, similar in effect, and 
often called ZHCs, guarantee a core of hours. In such circumstances, whatever the 
terms of that contract may say, there will arguably always be mutual obligation 
and employee status. These arrangements are, I would suggest , potentially more 
abusive than ‘true’ zero hours contracts, with workers finding themselves obliged, 
whether contractually or otherwise, to work when and wherever the employer 
requires, the bounds of obligation tested only by those unafraid of losing a 
regular, if minimal, core income. 
 
These contracts are undoubtedly a form of part time work, although the necessity 
for a ‘comparable full time’ employee or worker for a successful claim to be made 
under the Part Time Regulations means that few employed under such contracts 
are able to enjoy the protection conferred by the Regulations. But to describe 
such arrangements as ‘part time’ would be to give them an undeserved 
legitimacy.  
 
‘Labour is not a commodity’ is the cornerstone principle of the ILO, but these 
contracts unequivocally treat workers as such. Yet, as Keith Ewing has pointed 
out, while these contracts are clearly inconsistent with the most fundamental of 
ILO principles, ‘there is no international standard dealing expressly with ZHCs.’ 1452 
Ewing does, however, argue that the ILO Decent Work Agenda of 1999, and the 
Declaration on Social Justice and a Fair Globalisation of 2008, commit the UK not 
only to protection from the obligation to work excessive hours, but to tackle these 
‘new problems about shortage of hours, allocation of hours and regularity of 
hours.’  
 
Similarly, the general ‘aim of policy’ in Part I of the 1961 European Social Charter 
to ensure, inter alia, that ‘All workers have the right to a fair remuneration 
sufficient for a decent standard of living,’ expanded upon, as we have seen, in 
Article 4(1),1453 prohibits states from sanctioning contracts of employment which 
do not guarantee a decent basic wage.  The policy aim to ensure ‘just conditions 
of work’ would also appear to demand minimum hours, as well as a curb on 
excessive hours.  
 
                                               
1452
 KD Ewing, John Lovett Memorial Lecture, University of Limerick 3 March 2016: ‘Decent Work, Effective Labour 
Law and Zero Hours Contracts.’ 
1453Ibid. Ewing cited 4(1) in his speech. 
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The same can be said of the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
We have seen that UNICESCR requires by Article 7 ‘fair wages’ and ‘A decent living 
for themselves and their families,’ and that Article (d) requires that states 
guarantee ‘reasonable limitation of working hours,’ which can be said to demand 
government ensures for workers reasonable certainty as to when shifts will start 
and finish, and reasonable notice of changes. The UN Committee’s most recent 
set of Concluding Observations expressed concern about the ‘negative impact’ on 
workers’ Article 7 rights of ‘the high incidence of part time work, precarious self 
employment, temporary employment and the use of “zero hour contracts”’ in the 
UK, which, it noted ‘particularly affect women.’1454 
 
The Zero Hours Contracts Bill 2014, sought a politically acceptable solution to the 
problem, and showed that it was possible to reconcile the need for flexibility with 
the need of the workers for reasonable certainty, and thus fulfill the fundamental 
requirements of the Covenant and Charter.  
 
It defined ZHCs as contracts which fail to give guaranteed working hours, or by 
which the worker is expected to be available for work for a period of time which 
amounts to 20% or more of any guaranteed working time. Written notice was to 
be given of any minimum hours, and of the times they were to be worked, before 
the worker was hired. When non guaranteed hours were to be worked 72 hour 
notice was required, with the same notice period required for cancellation. Work 
undertaken with less notice would entitle the worker to 150% of the normal rate, 
while a cancellation would have entitled the worker to be paid as if the work had 
been undertaken. In all other respects  ZHC workers were to be treated equally 
with workers on regular contracts, with ZHC workers entitled to request ‘fixed 
and regular’ employment,  and employers able only to refuse  ‘where there are 
compelling business reasons to do so.’ Where ZHC workers had been employed 
continuously for 12 weeks employers would have been obliged to take them on; 
where discontinuously, if employed for at least 12 weeks in a reference period of 
26 weeks, then they would also have been required to hire them on a 
‘permanent’, full time basis. The weekly hours under the new contract would be 
equal to the week when they worked most hours under the ZHC. The usual 
detriment and dismissal protections for such requests aside, ZHC workers would 
also have enjoyed the full protection of the unfair dismissal legislation, with 
continuity of employment maintained despite weeks when no work is provided. 
                                               
1454Concluding Observations on the 6th Periodic Report, 2016, para 32. 
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Nevertheless, as is the invariable fate of a Private Member’s Bill which does not 
enjoy the support of the Government, it failed to make it on to the statute book. 
However, superbly drafted as the Bill was, I would argue that the comparatively 
complex rights in the Bill are incompatible with low paid work. Moreover, while 
the provision of individual rights may be apolitically acceptable solution, they are 
not likely to be an effective solution, given the reluctance of workers to exercise 
those rights. It seems likely that ZHC workers will, for obvious reasons, generally 
be more reluctant than other workers to fall out of favour with their employer, be 
therefore less likely to litigate, and to prefer to tolerate insecurity until a better 
job presents itself. 
 
The government has been guided on the use of ZHCs by the findings of the 
anodyne Taylor Good Work Report of 2017,1455and its response to Taylor, the 
White Paper Good Work was predictably cautious. 1456 The paper indicated that 
little was likely to change, but in contrast to the irrelevant prohibition of 
‘exclusivity clauses’ in ZHCs, by the Coalition in 2013,1457 it at least signaled an 
awareness on the part of the May Government that it had to curb the worst 
excesses of these contracts. 
 
Good Work revealed that the Government was planning to give ‘all workers a 
right to request a contract with more predictable and secure working 
conditions.’1458  While this could have portended the provision of the robust ‘right 
to request’ incorporated into the ZHC Bill, the government’s December 2018 
Good Work Plan, has revealed that the right will amount to no more than the 
provision of the protection currently afforded those requesting flexible working 
arrangements, and will be subject to a 26 weeks qualifying period .1459 
 
                                               
1455The Taylor Review of Modern working Practices, July 2017. On the Taylor Review see K Bales, A Bogg, and T 
Novitz ‘”Voice” and “Choice” in Modern Working Practices: Problems With the Taylor Review,’ (2017) 47 ILJ 46. 
1456 HM Government Industrial Strategy: Good Work, A response to the Taylor Review of Modern Working 
Practices, February 2018.    
1457 S.139 Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2013 inserting s.27A into ERA 1996. Exclusivity clauses 
were arguably unenforceable before s.139, and, perhaps more significantly, they are irrelevant to situations where 
the worker is either offered work, or the worker is not offered work at all. Few workers or employers would be 
inclined to litigate over such an arrangement even if ostensibly bound by an overarching contract. 
1458
Good Work, 2018, op cit, p16. 
1459Good Work Plan, HM Government December 2018, p7 & p13. 
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The Government had asked ‘the Low Pay Commission to consider the use of 
higher minimum wage rates for workers on zero hour contracts,’1460but in Good 
Work Plan it reported that the Commission ‘does not endorse the 
proposal.’1461The one firm pledge the Government made in Good Work, to confer 
on all workers the right to request a written statement of contractual terms, and 
for employers to be obliged to provide all workers with pay slips, the hourly paid 
being provided with detail on the hours worked,1462has however been fulfilled. 
 
The Employment Rights Act 1996 (Itemised Pay Statement) (Amendment) Order 
2018 and the Employment Rights (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2019 
were duly laid before Parliament in February 2018 and December 2018 
respectively. From April 2020 all workers will have the right to a pay slip,1463and to 
a written statement of the particulars of employment - rights currently only 
afforded employees. 
 
On the same date the Employment Rights (Employment Particulars and Paid 
Annual Leave) (Amendment) Regulations 2018 that right will make the written 
statement a ‘day one’ entitlement, additionally requiring employers to setout 
‘normal working hours, the days of the week the worker is expected work and 
whether or not such hours or days may be variable, and if they may be how they 
vary or how that variation is to be determined.’1464 Contractual rights to leave, 
pay, and sick pay are also required, and workers must be given details of any 
‘probationary period’ or training entitlement.1465 
 
 The same statutory instrument will extend the ‘holiday pay reference period’ 
mooted in Good Work ‘to help ensure atypical workers receive the holiday pay 
they are entitled to,’ from 12 weeks to 52.The government also announced that it 
intends to ‘extend the time required to break a period of continuous service’ to 
four weeks to allow more employees to access employment rights, although the 
                                               
1460 Press release 7 February 2018: Millions to benefit from enhanced rights as government responds to Taylor 
review of modern working practices. From the Department for Business, Energy and industrial Strategy, Prime 
Ministers’ Office, 10 Downing Street, The Rt Hon Greg Clark MP and the Rt Hon Theresa May MP. 
1461Good Work Plan 2018, op cit, p16. 
1462Good Work 2018, op cit,, p32. 
1463
See Chapter 6 for detail on payslips.  
1464
Section 3(c)(i),(ii) and (ii). 
1465
 See the gov.uk Press release, 17 December 2018: ‘Largest upgrade in a generation to workplace rights – getting 
work right for British workers and businesses.’  
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required SI has yet to be laid before Parliament. Remarkably, we now see a Tory 
government ‘gold plating’ EU employment rights.  
 
Unfortunately these legislative gestures, while welcome, and perhaps likely to 
make it less easy for employers to exploit those in precarious employment, are 
arguably insufficient to clear the government of the charge of breaching the 
European Social Charter and UN Covenant. 
 
In contrast, the Labour Party envisages taking a less piecemeal approach to 
tackling the problem, one which will unquestionably secure such compliance.  In 
points one and two of its ‘20-point plan for security and equality at work’ in its 
2017 manifesto, it proposes to: 
 
‘1.Give all workers equal rights from day one, whether part-time or full 
time, temporary or permanent…2. Ban zero hours contracts – so that every 
worker gets a guaranteed number of hours each week.’ 
 
 Restricted hours contracts are to be tackled by giving workers the right, after 12 
weeks of work, to a contract guaranteeing them “reflecting the hours” actually 
worked during that period,1466 a proposal taken from the 2014 Bill. 
 
Dependent entrepreneurs& bogus self employment 
 
If Labour’s proposals are implemented then worker status would, of course, be 
abolished at a stroke. Such a return to a binary divide for employment protection 
purposes, would have the virtue of giving so called ‘dependent entrepreneurs,’ 
victims of the ill defined delineation between ‘workers’ and the ‘genuinely self 
employed,’ the employment protections currently restricted to employees, and 
bring an end to the succession of cases where such workers have had to wrest 
recognition of worker status from a reluctant de facto employer. The government 
pledged to address this problem in its 2017 White Paper Good Work, but has so 
far done nothing. 
. 
The two principal protections those of worker status enjoy are the right to a 
minimum wage and the right to 28 days paid holiday each year. Consequently 
exploitative de facto employers will usually prefer staff taxed as if they were self 
                                               
1466For the Many Not the Few, Labour Party Manifesto 2017, pp.47-48. 
420 
 
employed (as many workers are) to believe themselves to be ‘genuinely self 
employed’ for the purposes of employment protection, and thus resist ceding 
worker status.  
 
We are not discussing the proprietors of back street ‘sweat shops’ here. Multiple 
and individual claims brought by Uber taxi drivers,1467 and by couriers working for 
Addison Lee,1468 Hermes,1469Excel,1470City Sprint,1471 and Royal Mail subsidiary 
eCourier,1472 all saw the firms concerned having, in effect, to concede worker 
status to the claimants.  
 
Deliveroo came to a ‘six figure’ financial settlement with 50 of its former couriers 
who claimed that they had been paid less than the minimum wage and denied 
paid holidays in breach of the Minimum Wage and Working Time Regulations.1473 
Another courier firm, DPD, gave its 6,000 franchisees worker status, and settled 
with those who, backed by the GMB, had brought claims for unpaid holidays, as 
part of its public relations efforts following the death of one its franchisees.1474 
 
Deliveroo, however, having paid off those of their riders who had sought worker 
status, continue to insist that their couriers are genuinely self employed, 
apparently encouraged by their successful resistance to a bid by the Independent 
                                               
1467 See Uber v Aslam and others UK EAT/0056/17/DA, upheld by the Court of Appeal 19 December 2018 [2018] 
EWCA Civ 2748. 
1468
Gascoigne v Addison Lee Case No 2200436/2016 [2017] (See also the Guardian, 2 August 2017); Lange and 
others v Addison Lee Case No. 2208029/2016 [2017]; Evans v Addison Lee Case No: 2206003/2017[2017]; Brennan 
v Addison Lee Case No 3328857/2017 [2018].  
1469
  ‘Revealed: delivery giant Hermes pays some couriers less than living wage. Investigation by the Guardian finds 
some self employed contractors taking home less than £6 per hour’, the Guardian, 18 July 2016. Employment 
tribunal cases followed: Churchill v Hermes Case No.1401782/2016 [2017]; Leyland and Others v Hermes, Case 
No.1800575/2017 [2018] (see also The Guardian 25 June 2018); Docherty v Hermes Case No.2302053/207 [2017]; 
Marsh v Hermes Case No. 1801288/2017 [2017]; Gold v Hermes Case No. 3327034/2017 [2017].  
1470  Boxer v Excel Group Services Ltd, Case No: 3200365/2016 [2017] (See also theGuardian 24 March 2017). 
1471  Dewhurst v City Sprint, Case No. 2202512/2016. (See also the Guardian 6 January 2017). 
1472Royal Mail settled the case, pledging to review its classification of its ‘eCouriers’ as self employed (the 
Guardian, 12 May 2017). 
1473The Guardian 28 June 2018  
1474
The Guardian, 26 March 2018. The firm would fine drivers who failed either to report to work or to send a 
substitute van and driver. As a result Mr. Don Lane missed a series of hospital appointments to monitor his 
diabetes, and he collapsed while at work (see the Guardian, 5 February 2018). The £150 per day fine, would, of 
course, be ‘on top’ of the income forfeited.   
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Workers’ Union of Great Britain for recognition under the statutory recognition 
procedures, discussed in chapter five.1475 
 
Labour proposes to change the law so that a worker is presumed to be an 
employee unless the employer can show otherwise, and to impose ‘punitive fines 
on employers not meeting their responsibilities,’1476so recalcitrant firms like 
Deliveroo will be obliged to conform. 
 
Interestingly, sectoral bargaining is cited as another measure which will assist the 
self employed, suggesting a widening off the embrace of employment status 
beyond the present intermediate worker status and into ‘genuine’ self 
employment where the individual in question is providing a personal service. 
Labour has, however, been careful to leave its options open where atypical 
employment is concerned: 
 
‘Labour recognizes that the law often struggles to keep up with the ever-
changing new forms of employment and work, so we will set up a 
dedicated commission to modernize the law around employment 
status.’1477 
 
The party’s specific and unequivocal pledges to abolish worker status and ZHC 
would nevertheless see the UK unquestionably compliant with the EU definition 
of employment, and compliant too with the ILO, European Social Charter, and UN 
Covenant obligations listed above to ensure that ‘flexible working arrangements’ 
‘meet the needs of both workers and employers,’ and meet the requirement that 
‘in no case should they be used to undermine the right to just and favourable 
conditions of work.’1478 
 
I would argue that the Labour Party is adopting the correct policy, although I 
suggest that a simple prohibition of RHCs would be more effective than 
permitting an application after 12 weeks for a contract reflecting the hours 
worked. 
                                               
1475The cases are the CAC hearing, IWUGB and Roofoods T/A DeliverooTUR 1/985(2016) 14 November 2017, and 
the judicial review of that decision, R (On the Application of the IWUGB) v CAC and Roofoods Ltd, t/a Deliveroo 
[2018] EWHC 3342 (Admin). 
1476 Presumably they mean to fine those firms which continue to insist their staff are self employed. 
1477
For the Many not the Few, The Labour Manifesto 2017, p51. 
1478 Article 7 UNICESCR General  Comment No.23 on the right to just and favourable conditions of work, para 46. 
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Fixed Term Contracts 
 
Fixed term employment contracts are generally used by employers to avoid 
employment protections, and hence can arguably be said to undermine ‘just and 
favourable conditions of work.’  
 
Employment for a series of contractually limited terms could theoretically permit 
an employer to extend any probationary period indefinitely, which, as the ILO 
Committee of Experts puts it, is ‘a period of insecurity which should not be unduly 
prolonged.’ 1479 However, in the UK, with the failure to renew such a contract 
amounting to a dismissal for the purposes of a claim for unfair dismissal, that 
insecurity can be overstated - just as the security of tenure provided by a so called 
‘permanent contract’ can be overstated. 
 
Nevertheless those employed on such contracts have frequently been subject to 
discriminatory treatment on other grounds, a problem addressed by EU Directive 
99/70/EC, another directive based on a framework agreement reached by the 
social partners under the social protocol. The Directive was implemented by New 
Labour as the Fixed Term Contracts (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) 
Regulations in 2002.  
 
As well as prohibiting less favourable treatment, the regulations make any fixed 
term arrangement which extends beyond four years ‘permanent’, unless the 
employer is able to cite ‘objective grounds’ for the denial of such status, a caveat 
which has limited the effectiveness of what would otherwise arguably have been 
a very robust safeguard, successfully balancing ‘flexibility’ with the employee’s 
need for security.1480  It is uncontroversial to argue that the regulations fail to 
provide the minimum demanded by the Directive.  Protection is restricted to 
employees - yet the directive applies to the wider class of workers who have an 
‘employment relationship.’ As with the part time regulations ‘live’ comparators 
are required where discrimination is alleged. Aileen McColgan has argued that 
this is inconsistent with the Directive,1481 which states that if a suitable 
                                               
1479
 ILO General Survey by the Committee of Experts on Convention No.158 and Recommendation No.166: 
Protection Against Unjustified Dismissal , International Labour Conference 82
nd
 Session 1995, para 38.  
1480
 Regulation 8. 
1481In ‘Fiddling While Rome Burns?’ (2003) 32 ILJ 194. 
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comparator cannot be found then recourse will be made to ‘national law, 
collective agreement or practice.’ In 2003 she argued that the use of hypothetical 
comparators is well established in English law, and S.71 of the Equality Act 2010, 
although working on a fixed term contract is, of course, not a protected 
characteristic, makes this argument still more persuasive. 
Employees who no longer work for the employer in question cannot be used as 
comparators.1482 McColgan tells us that the Regulatory Impact Assessment took 
the view that the Regulations will benefit only 1%-3% of fixed term employees 
according to the TUC’s figures, and an only marginally more generous 2%-5% by 
the DTI’s figures.  
 Such is the calculated ineffectiveness of the regulations that in Webley v 
Department of Work and Pensions,1483 fixed term 51 week contracts,1484 
calculated to prevent the workers qualifying (it was just one year between 1998 
and 2011) for unfair dismissal protection, were held not to be a breach. Of course, 
after four years of 51 week contracts the regulations merely require the employer 
to show ‘objective grounds’ for refusing to take the workers fully on to the 
books.1485 The regulations do, however, give fixed term workers the right to 
receive notice of any ‘permanent’ vacancies1486 arising – so workers stand to be 
awarded an inconsequential sum should they be brave or foolhardy enough to 
bring a claim against an employer who failed to advertise a vacancy on the staff 
notice board. 
Arguably, in order to comply with the stand off between ‘just and favourable’ 
terms and flexibility, the correct compromise would be for workers to be required 
                                               
1482
Reg 2(2) McColgan points out that this is in conflict with the ECJ decision in Macarthys v Smith
1482
 where a 
woman claiming to have been discriminated against on the grounds of her sex was permitted just such a 
comparison and suggests that:’If the purpose of the Regulations is to avoid discrimination against fixed-term 
workers they ought, it might be thought, to apply in the case where an employer chooses to replace permanent 
workers with fixed-term workers employed on lesser terms and conditions.’ 
1483 [2005] IRLR 288. 
1484
 The UFD qualifying period was one year, and by s.95 ERA 1996 a failure to renew a fixed term contract is a 
dismissal within the meaning of s.98. 
1485
 Regulation 8. 
1486 Regulation 3(6). 
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to be offered a ‘permanent’ contract after a year, with no scope for ‘objective 
grounds’ for refusal. 
Agency Contracts 
In contrast to the other ‘social chapter’ directives, the last of the EU instruments 
protecting those in atypical work, the Temporary Agency Work Directive, 1487was a 
comparatively anodyne compromise adopted after the social partners, and, 
subsequently, the Council of Ministers had failed to come to agree on effective 
protection for workers.1488As such it was less of a challenge to New Labour’s 
drafting team. The Agency Workers Regulations 2010 came into force in 2011 
under the Coalition government, and while perhaps less brazenly undermined 
than the fixed term and part time regulations they nevertheless arguably fell 
short of the requirements of the Directive. While none of the social chapter 
regulations issued by New Labour were challenged by the unions, the 2010 
Regulations were the subject of a complaint, lodged by the TUC with the 
Commission in 2013.1489 
 
That complaint was about the use of the ‘Swedish Derogation’ in the UK 
regulations to deny agency workers parity with conventionally employed 
colleagues.1490However, in December 2018 legislation was placed before 
Parliament, which will, as we have seen, not only confer on all workers, including 
agency workers, rights to pay slips, and to a written statement of the particulars 
of employment, but will abolish the Swedish Derogation as of 6 April 2020.1491 
 
The TUC’s complaint did not, however, question the failure of the government to 
require agencies to treat their workers as employees. Something of a ‘doubled 
edged sword’ in terms of worker protection, not only does the Directive seek to 
protect agency workers from discriminatory treatment, it obliges states which had 
                                               
1487  Directive 2008/104/EC 
1488 For comment on the Directive seeCountouris and Horton, 2009, op cit. 
1489 See ‘www.eurofound.europa.eu/fr/publications/article/2013/trade-unions-in-tussle-over-agency-work-
directive. 
1490 See, the TUC 2018 Report on the Swedish Derogation: Ending the Undercutters’ Charter; Why agency workers 
deserve better jobs. 
1491
Agency Workers (Amendment) Regulations 2019. This is of particular interest in relation both to the 
Commission’s cautious approach to invoking infringement proceedings where labour matters are at issue and 
‘Brexit’ - for while complaints normally take no more than a year to be investigated by the Commission the TUC’s 
complaint is still pending some five years after it was first lodged. 
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previously prohibited ‘temping’ agencies to embrace their use, thus, in theory, 
providing benign and comparatively secure flexible working opportunities, and 
scope for employers to reap the benefits of access to a ‘stand by’ workforce 
which it could draw on in busy periods and discard when not required. Article 2 of 
the Directive attempts to do oblige states to achieve this very delicate ‘flexicurity’ 
balance ‘by recognising temporary agencies as employers.’  
 
The UK Regulations fail to do this. Agency staff remain of indeterminate status, 
neither employed by the agency nor by the agency’s client, and consequently 
enjoying, like many engaged under ZHCs, only those protections afforded 
‘workers.’ 
 
It also appears that the Regulations are being ignored by many agencies and 
agency workers are simply not making tribunal claims to enforce their rights. The 
lack of claims is very likely due to a combination of a lack of awareness of the 
legal position, and the fact that it is considerably easier simply for an agency 
worker to ‘move on’ than to bring a tribunal claim in order to win an award of a 
few hundred pounds. During the tribunal fees regime of 2013-2017 claims under 
the Agency Workers’ Regulations were almost non existent. The government has, 
however, pledged that it will legislate to oblige that agencies will have to issue 
workers with a ‘key facts page’ setting out rates of pay and what is expected of 
them, and what they can expect of the agency.1492 
 
In addition, the government promises to ‘increase state enforcement protections 
for agency workers where they have pay with held or unclear deductions made by 
an umbrella company,’ so the numbers of the Employment Agency Standards 
Inspectorate inspectors will be increased, and EASI’s brief will be extended to 
cover umbrella companies.1493 
 
                                               
1492 See Good Work Plan p32. 
1493  See p10 of Good Work Plan. Umbrella companies are book keeping firms which purport to be the agency 
worker’s employer.  They invoice the agency for the worker’s time, and take a cut of the worker’s gross pay. The 
reminder is paid to the worker on a PAYE basis, with tax and NI going to HMRC. The worker sends the umbrella 
company all possible receipts for work related expenses, which the company then sets against their own 
corporation tax liabilities.  The firm then passes the saving back to the worker. Better paid workers, often engaged 
in agency work with NHS Trusts, will use such companies as employers and will use more sophisticated, more 
dubious avoidance measures. The firm will invoice the agency and the money will go to an off shore trust which 
will pay no corporation tax and which will pass on the worker’s salary, minus commission, disguised as a never to 
be repaid loan. 
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Despite these long overdue employment protections and the very welcome 
expansion of state intervention by the EASI (in 2017-18 EASI made only 145 visits 
detecting 636 infringements),1494 there is still the outstanding question of the 
provision of the extraordinarily 12 week long qualification period before workers 
can rely on the protection of the regulations. The three month wait for protection 
relates to each ‘assignment’ so, of course, it is very easy for agencies to simply 
shift them to another assignment to ensure that they are never able to claim 
parity. 
__________________________________ 
 
Therefore, to ensure government compliance with the European Social Charter, 
the UN Covenant and the EU Fixed Term and Agency Directives: 
 
 Part time workers should be afforded genuine parity with full time 
colleagues 
 ZHC& RHC contracts should be prohibited. 
 Worker status should be abolished. 
 A clear statutory delineation between self employed and employed status 
should be supplied. 
 The protection of the Fixed Term Contract Regulations should be extended 
to all but the genuinely self employed (which of course would be the result 
of abolishing worker status). 
 After a one year the worker should automatically be deemed to be on 
a‘permanent’ contract. 
 Hypothetical and ‘ex-worker’ comparators should be permitted for the 
purposes of fixed term protection claims 
 Agency workers should be acknowledged to be the employees of the 
agency. 
 Parity of wages and working conditions under the Agency Workers’ 
Regulations should be ‘day one’ rights. 
________________________________ 
 
50 years of individually enforced rights have arguably done surprisingly little to 
address inequalities. Workplace inequality is arguably rife because of the manner 
in which anti discrimination rights fall to be enforced. Tackling inequality on a case 
                                               
1494Employment Agency Standards (EAS) Inspectorate Annual Report 2017-2018. 
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by case basis is arguably to deliberately fail to address the issue effectively, much 
as employer by employer recognition agreement is a glacially slow way of 
securing collective bargaining for all workers. The sectoral bargaining mechanisms 
which must be set up to promote and facilitate collective bargaining would 
appear ideally suited to the collation of pay gap information and for the 
implementation of the appropriate positive action to address 
underrepresentation of workers with protected characteristics – with the ‘fine 
tuning’ achieved by establishment level bargaining backed by individual rights 
tailored so as not to undermine the role of the trade unions. 
Initiatives like the reducing the implicit evidential hurdles in discrimination cases 
and ‘uncapped’, and therefore potentially punitive and dissuasive awards, are 
important, but individual claims arguably merely treat the symptoms of inequality 
as they flare up rather than imposing equality. The approach is, I suggest, 
inappropriately individual and adversarial. While individual workers must be 
permitted to bring discrimination claims, protection for workers sharing protected 
characteristics arguably calls out for an overarching collective approach.  
Equality rights are suited to enforcement by the state and by trade unions on 
behalf of those workers affected. In Sweden, for example, cases are reported to 
the Discrimination Ombudman, and settled by the Ombudsman, by the relevant 
trade union, or interested NGOs on behalf of the worker or workers affected, if 
necessary by taking the employer to court. Inequality is thus more readily and 
more frequently challenged. Nevertheless, individual workers have the option of 
bringing their own claim.1495 
It appears that in the UK, where the equality regime only started properly to 
evolve in 1975, that successive governments have been at pains to ensure that it 
developed almost purely individualistic construct. Bereft of the requisite 
collectivist element it has consistently failed to deliver the society of equals we 
have been promised for the past 50 years. 
                                               
1495See the section on Sweden (p98) by A Numhauser-Henning in The Transposition of Recast Directive 2006/54/EC 
by the ‘European Network of Legal Experts in the Field of Gender Equality,’ compiled by S Burri and S Prechal, 
2009. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
In this chapter I draw together the key shortfalls in UK collective labour law and 
practice identified in previous chapters, and the principal arguments presented in 
those instances where it has been necessary to make a case that there has been a 
failure to protect workers in accord with supranational obligation. 
 
I show what must be done by the UK government to ensure compliance with 
international law to ensure that workers are able to exercise their right to have 
their terms and conditions of employment negotiated by their trade union, and to 
ensure that the required floor of individual employment rights on which that 
collective bargaining may build are in place. 
 
I show too what could be done by a future government, within the limits of 
international and regional obligation, to secure protections for the individual, to 
extend and entrench protection for the full freedom of association, and for the 
raft of individual employment rights, that the government is bound to guarantee. 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Full freedom of association and the individual human rights 
paradigm 
 
In previous chapters I have shown that the key jurisprudential pillar on which the 
justification for the denial of workers the opportunity to bargain collectively 
relies, the individualistic human rights paradigm, is an artificial, unsatisfactory and 
discredited approach to interpreting the embrace of the right to freedom of 
association. 
 
For hundreds of years the ruling classes ensured that they were able to bargain as 
they pleased, while those they employed were liable to be punished by law if they 
attempted to negotiate with their masters. 
 
They justified their use of legislation and the manipulation of the common law to 
defend themselves against the claims of their servants on the grounds that the 
law had to defend the individual against the tyranny of the majority. The ‘tyranny 
of the state’ was conflated with the demands of the working classes for the 
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opportunity to bargain as a collective to provide the rationale for the effective 
entrenchment of the protection for the interests of employers in English law. 
 
When, in the late 19th Century and early 20th Century, after a series of 
confrontations, crises, and adjustments, employers were forced to permit the 
working classes to bargain with them, trade unions and industrial action were 
decriminalized. Continuing judicial resistance to ceding workers the opportunity 
to bargain collectively saw Parliament extend the supposed privilege of certain 
immunities in respect of civil liabilities. Workers were not, however, given any 
‘positive’ legal right to bargain and the new freedom conferred by these statutory 
immunities remained highly vulnerable. Indeed so fragile was the freedom that 
had been conferred, workers can be said to have  enjoyed full freedom of 
association for only a few of the years between the seminal Trade Disputes Act of 
1906 and the end of World War Two. 
 
The post Second World War era however, saw the apparent ‘entrenchment’ of 
the newly restored freedom to bargain collectively in the United Kingdom by 
means of a series of treaties which effectively obliged states to recognise that the 
right to bargain collectively was a fundamental human right. The key ILO, Council 
of Europe and United Nations texts acknowledged that the protection by states of 
freedom of association necessarily entailed the maintenance of conditions under 
which workers are able to negotiate as a collective with their employers, and with 
their governments.  No primacy was afforded the rights of the individual in 
relation the protection of freedom of association. The UN Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights both utilised the 
provisions of ILO Convention 87 on freedom of association and the right to 
organise as a ‘floor’ to the protections conferred on workers. Both instruments 
must, therefore, be said to require states to secure the full freedom of 
associationdemanded by Convention No.87. 
 
This was not a case of obligation being imposed on the United Kingdom. On the 
contrary, the British government played a central role in negotiating and drafting 
these texts, and collective bargaining under conditions of full freedom of 
association became the ‘lynch pin’ of the post war recovery, not just in the UK, 
but across the whole of Western Europe. Arguably the UK sought in effect to 
impose the basis of the British industrial relations on the ‘free world’ by ensuring 
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as best it could, that it bound itself only to protect existing British labour 
standards. 
 
As citizens of a dualist state, British workers were given positive rights only in the 
sense that the government was, and remains, obliged under international law to 
respect the terms of these treaties. Because the UK government was, in almost all 
circumstances, ratifying instruments with which the UK was broadly compliant, 
British workers were given no more than the legitimate expectation that their 
government adhere to the full freedom of association conceded them in the post 
war era, as well as to any evolution of the protections conceded through the 
changing interpretation of these ‘living instruments’ by the various supervisory 
bodies.   
 
Unfortunately workers rely in such circumstances on government for the rule of 
law. While that was sufficient in the 1940s, 50s, 60s and 70s, following the 
assumption of the leadership of the Conservative Party in 1975 by a libertarian 
cabal, and the election of the first of a series of ‘neoliberal’ Tory governments in 
1979, the British government set about not merely abandoning their obligation to 
promote and protect collective bargaining, but actively legislating to reduce the 
incidence of collective bargaining. The principal architect of the post war 
compromise was now seen to be seeking, wherever and whenever it was 
possible, to isolate British workers and return them to a reliance on the terms of 
the individual contract of employment.  
 
The British government had since 1973 been obliged by virtue of membership of 
the European Union to implement a series of employment protection directives, 
and although this stream of largely anti gender discrimination law was at odds 
with the deregulatory programme of the 1980s, implemented as they were as 
individually exercisable rights enforceable at tribunal, they came to characterise 
the new individual approach to industrial relations. However, the emergence of 
the EU Social Protocol marked the limit of Tory forbearance. John Major’s 
government fought tooth and nail to avoid being obliged to implement the 
Working Time Directive as a health and safety measure, and negotiated the 
famous UK ‘opt out’ of the raft of collectively negotiated employment directives 
popularly known as the ‘Social Chapter.’ 
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Following this Tory ‘neoliberal revolution’ of 1980 – 1993, the dust was allowed to 
settle over the debris of British voluntarism and the collective bargaining 
mechanisms. The election of New Labour in 1997 saw British acceptance of the 
Social Chapter, but the new regulations were pared down to – at best - the bare 
minimum required by the directives. The rights that were provided were 
enforceable - if they were enforceable at all - almost exclusively by the individual, 
and the heavily compromised role of the state in enforcing the Working Time 
Regulations was undermined further by the progressive financial starvation of the 
Health and Safety Executive and Local Authorities.  
 
While neoliberal antipathy to the trade unions was largely held in check during 
the New Labour years, and the Liberal Democrats served to stay the hands of 
their Tory coalition partners 2010 – 2015, by failing to restore full freedom of 
association the leading figures in these centrist parties were as culpable as the 
neoliberals of the Thatcher and Major eras. 
 
Following the working majority achieved by the Tories in the 2015 election the 
Tories returned to fray in 2015-2016 with what became the Trade Union Act 
2016. This savage opening salvo in what appeared to be a renewed assault on 
collective bargaining, the intention being said to have been to finish the work of 
destroying the trade unions, was not, however, followed up.  
 
The Act passed into law in May 2016, and came into force in 2017 (although the 
principal provisions of the Act have effectively been rejected by the devolved 
Welsh Assembly), but the Tories have said little or nothing about the trade unions 
since David Cameron’s resignation in the aftermath of the catastrophically ill 
judged Referendum on EU Membership of June 2016.  
 
The nationalist wing  of the Tory Party, having first been delighted to find that 
they had got what they wished for, have isolated themselves as Parliament, and 
the majority of Tory MPs, have become conscious of the fact that, realistically, in 
the wake of the 2016 vote they have a choice of two alternatives:  
 
Staying in the EU (if that can be sanctioned by a fresh referendum), or striking a 
deal with the EU 27 (possibly as a member of EFTA and the European Economic 
Area) which entails the continued observance of EU regulation, including the 
employment rights which Cameron had pledged to ‘repatriate.’  
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As the vast majority of Parliamentarians, and the majority of Tory MPs, cannot 
countenance taking a very hazardous economic gamble and ‘crashing out’ of the 
EU without a deal to escape EU regulation and the reach of the CJEU without a 
deal that the ‘hard core’ neoliberals are in favour of, Tory dreams of Britain as an 
‘off shore sweat shop,’ able to negotiate free trade deals on whatever terms it 
chooses with the likes of the US and China, have faded away. A ‘no deal’ exit from 
the EU to trade on WTO terms now seems a very unlikely prospect. 
 
The significance of this to workers’ rights is that Tories are engaged in a civil war, 
and the government is teetering on the verge of collapse, while the Labour Party, 
ready to assume power, or to take the leading role in a coalition, is pledged to 
restoring full freedom of association denied British workers since the mid 1980s.  
 
With that freedom, and respect for the rule of law restored, all else arguably falls 
into place: 
 
 Collective bargaining coverage can be rebuilt, and individual statutory 
employment rights can be allowed to once again become the floor to collectively 
negotiated employment protection that they were intended to be when 
implemented by Tory and Labour governments during 1963 - 1975.   
 
Inadequately implemented EU rights can be revitalised by the ‘social partners’ – 
the employers and trade unions who negotiated them at European level had been 
expected to implement them into domestic law and practice. Previously blunted 
and commodified as individually exercisable entitlements, anti-discrimination civil 
rights can be enforced collectively, by trade unions or by the state, while sectoral 
bargaining mechanisms can provide the opportunity to close gender and race pay 
gaps comparatively rapidly and effectively. In the long term, however, this 
requires the effective ‘entrenchment’ of those rights and freedoms, and by a 
return to the broad cross party consensus on the value to society of collective 
bargaining seen during 1945 – 1975. Whether the UK ultimately leaves the EU or 
not, the Conservative Party now seems irrevocably split, with the libertarian right 
likely to become marginalised and discredited, and the pragmatic rump of the 
party coming to an accommodation with the shift of the political centre ground to 
the left. Broad agreement on the value of collective bargaining by the old liberal 
elements at Westminster, the moderate Tories, the Liberal Democrats and the 
433 
 
vestiges of New Labour in the revitalised socialist Parliamentary Labour Party, 
seems more likely than it has ever been since the late 1970s. 
 
Benchmarking: Secondary & Solidarity Action and Collective 
Bargaining 
 
It has been argued that the prohibition of secondary action is the distinguishing 
characteristic of a modern liberal democratic government, while in a social 
democracy secondary or sympathy action will almost inevitably be protected.1496 
This might be said to go some way towards accounting for the seemingly 
gratuitous inclusion of such ban in the Industrial Relations Act 1971 by the Heath 
government which proved so damaging to the attempted post Donovan, 1969 - 
1973 adjustment of the reconciliation of labour and capital.   
 
Nevertheless, the antipathy of the right for secondary action can scarcely be said 
to be an insurmountable obstacle to cross party agreement. It will be recalled that 
the Churchill, Eden, Macmillan and Home administrations of 1951 – 1964 were 
able to govern without giving in to the temptation to butcher the Siamese Twins 
of freedom of association in that particular fashion.   
 
The opportunity for workers to take lawful secondary, sympathy or solidarity 
action, whether in the form of a ‘blacking’ or ‘boycott’, or strike, is an 
indispensible element of full freedom of association. Secondary action cannot be 
separated from industrial action taken against an identifiable immediate 
employer any more than the individual elements of freedom of association can be 
separated from the collective elements.  
 
When workers enjoy full freedom of association all else falls into place:  
Not only does secondary action allow workers to apply extra bargaining leverage 
in trade disputes, it provides the necessary solidarity to bargain effectively across 
national borders, to influence government policy on economic and social matters, 
and to oblige employers to recognize trade unions for the purposes of collective 
bargaining. When workers in the UK were deprived of the opportunity to take 
                                               
1496
By Nicola Countouris of University College London at the conference held in honour of Keith Ewing at King’s 
College London in September 2018.  
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lawful secondary action voluntarism collapsed.1497 The ability for workers to take 
secondary action secures voluntary trade union recognition rather than legally 
imposed recognition - the freely negotiated collective agreement demanded by 
the ILO jurisprudence, the European Social Charter and UNICESCR. Without the 
opportunity to take lawful secondary action reaching freely negotiated collective 
agreement becomes much more difficult, and maintaining employer compliance 
with what is almost invariably an otherwise unenforceable agreement is similarly 
difficult.  
 
 Secondary action is arguably the primary tool with workers secure the solidarity 
necessary for effective collective bargaining with their immediate employer. It is 
for that reason that the Trade Disputes Act 1906 carved out immunity in tort for 
all industrial action in all disputes ‘between employers and workmen or between 
workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-
employment, or the terms of employment, or with the conditions of labour, of 
any person.’1498 
 
The protection by a state of the freedom for workers to engage in secondary 
action to oblige a recalcitrant restaurant owner to come to collective agreement 
(which took the form of a boycott by trade unionists employed by suppliers) with 
a trade union was endorsed by the European Court of Human Rights even before 
the court had been able to bring itself to acknowledge that the freedom to 
bargain collectively was an essential element of freedom of association, and was 
still largely fixated with the primacy of the individual, in Gustafsson v Sweden 
[1996].  
 
The limit to the protection afforded secondary action is arguably reached, both in 
terms of the ILO jurisprudence, and broad political acceptability, when trade 
unionists ‘black’ or ‘boycott’ the work of third parties in an effort to oblige those 
employers to require their staff to join that particular union, as was the practice 
of SLADE in the late 1970s. That does not, of course, mean that such action must 
be prohibited. 
                                               
1497Following the Trade Disputes Act 1927 employers abandoned collective agreements during the great 
depression and the high unemployment that characterised the early and mid 1930s; following the Industrial 
Relations Act 1971 industrial chaos reigned. The imposition of the second, and most major of the three stage 
prohibition of secondary action, in 1984 (following the Employment Act 1982) was of crucial importance in 
bringing the Miners’ Strike to an end in 1985. The defeat of the miners was a watershed moment for the neo 
liberal revolution of 1980 – 1993 – the period during which voluntarism was destroyed in the UK. 
1498 Trade Disputes Act 1906 S 5(3). 
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Laws prohibiting industrial action in aid of securing union membership can today 
plausibly be defended by governments on the grounds that such laws are 
necessary to ensure state compliance with the line of ECtHR Article 11 cases 
which followed Young James and Webster, and the re-interpretation of Article 5 
of the European Social Charter to embrace a right of non-association.1499 
 
It nevertheless remains the case that compulsory trade union membership can 
still be a permissible 11(2) infringement of the individual right of non-association 
(see Sorensen and Rasmussen v Denmark). It will be recalled that 11(2) was the 
basis of case prepared by the Callaghan government against the claims of Young 
James and Webster, a defence subsequently to be dropped by Thatcher’s Solicitor 
General in a bid to oblige the court to consider the supposed negative right of 
disassociation, and arguably one made all the more persuasive given that the ILO 
jurisprudence permits compulsory membership which is not imposed by law.1500 
 
 Agency or union shops, however, imposed either by law or through agreement 
are a wholly legitimate means of promoting collective bargaining which require 
no one to associate against their will. 
 
Unfortunately such arrangements have been explicitly prohibited in the UK since 
1984. It is also the case that, while employers are prohibited from offering 
inducements to workers to persuade them to abandon collective bargaining, 
governments and employers may deny non members certain privileges granted 
members. Governments are required to promote collective bargaining, 
permitting, for example, tax incentives for members, and for employers who 
themselves promote trade union membership, and employers may legitimately 
deny non members privileges negotiated by a union for its members. 
 
 Macmillan’s Tories embraced collective bargaining. The last Macmillan 
administration was the first of the Council of Europe governments to ratify the 
European Social Charter in 1962, to accept as ‘the aim of their policy, to be 
pursued by all appropriate means both national and international in character, 
the attainment of conditions in which the following rights and principles may be 
effectively realised...’  
                                               
1499
But not with the ILO jurisprudence which prohibits only compulsory trade union membership imposed by law. 
1500
It is also the case that British Rail then employed around 225,000 workers, and it was arguable that restricting 
them to a choice of one of 3 unions was not unreasonable in the circumstances. 
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What followed included a requirement for the government to secure for workers 
the rights to just conditions of work, health and safety, and to join unions ‘for the 
protection of their economic and social interests.’  More specifically the Tories 
pledged to aim to ensure that:  
 
 ‘All workers have the right to remuneration sufficient for a decent standard of 
living for themselves and their families,’ and that 
 
‘All workers and employers have the right to bargain collectively,’ reiterating the 
requirements of ILO Convention 87, the UN and Council of Europe civil and 
political instruments, and, of course, ILO Convention 98 on the right to organise 
and the right to bargain collectively. 
 This is a clear requirement for all workers and employers, both collectively and 
individually, to be guaranteed the unequivocal right to bargain collectively. That 
was part one of the Charter, the programmatic element. Fifty six years on that 
pledge has arguably crystallised into an immediate requirement. 
Part two of the Charter saw the UK government agreeing to be bound ‘to 
promote, where necessary and appropriate, machinery for voluntary negotiations 
between employers or employers’ organisations and workers’ organisations, with 
a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means of 
collective agreement,’ and to ‘recognise’ a right to strike.  
That right to strike can only be restricted by ‘obligations that might arise out of 
collective agreements previously entered into,’ a qualification which would 
permit the compulsory arbitration Order 1305 ‘strike ban’ of 1945 – 1951,1501 
(which like its successor Order 1376, can be said to have obliged recalcitrant 
employers to bargain), but which does not permit the current prohibition of 
secondary action imposed by stages in 1980, 1982 and 1990, or  the procedural  
‘trips and hurdles’ erected during 1984- 1993, and augmented in 2016. 
 
The Macmillan government committed the UK to maintain the then current 
standards of UK protection for freedom of association. Similarly, the Wilson 
government ratified the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
                                               
1501
It was in place after 1945 on the understanding that if either the TUC or the employers’ groups wished for it to 
be rescinded the government would oblige. 
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1976 - arguably the high point of such protection – to pledge successive British 
governments to ‘undertake to ensure...The right of trade unions to function 
freely,’ explicitly employing the evolving terms of ILO Convention 87 as a floor to 
those rights. Consequently when we talk of UK non compliance we are not talking 
of a failure to reach standards, whatever was agreed about ‘aims of policy’ and 
‘progressive realisation’ half a century ago. We are talking of a retreat, and a 
withdrawal of protection is more than a mere prima facie breach of the treaties, 
and of international law. It is effectively an automatic breach.  
 
The compliance of the UK with most of the Articles of the European Social Charter 
was secured through voluntarily negotiated collective agreements at 
establishment and sectoral level, and by the provision of collectively agreed 
minima by the tri-partite Wages Councils. When collective agreement ceased to 
secure those rights for the ‘great majority’ of workers, the UK ceased protect a 
swathe of the employment rights allegedly guaranteed by the ratification of the 
Charter, and retreated from the provision of workers with the ‘fair wages,’ 
‘decent living,’ and ‘safe and healthy working conditions’ required by Article 7 of 
the UN Covenant. 
 
The Wages Councils, and the Joint Industrial Councils established by employers 
and unions in better organised sectors, were complemented by the Macmillan 
government’s 1959 erga omnes legislation which allowed the customary terms of 
collective agreements in industries not covered by a Wages Council to be 
extended to workers employed on inferior terms.1502 This, along with the Tory 
statutory recognition procedures of 1971 – 1974, and the Labour procedures 
which were in place during 1975 – 1980, was the collective bargaining machinery 
which promoted establishment level bargaining in the UK. 
 
The post 1979 Tory administrations destroyed these mechanisms. The first 
Thatcher Government repealed the erga omnes legislation and repealed the Fair 
Wages Resolution of 1946 which required firms contracting with the government 
come to collective agreement with their employees and abolished the statutory 
recognition procedures. They then clipped the wings of the Wages Councils, 
narrowing the range of the minimum terms and conditions of employment they 
                                               
1502S8 of the Terms and Conditions of Employment Act 1959, replacing Order 1376 compulsory arbitration which 
had been withdrawn in 1958. 
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imposed, and abolishing them in sectors they deemed to no longer to require 
them. 
They withdrew from collective negotiation with those employed directly by the 
Government, and ensured with a series of laws against strikes that lawful and 
effective industrial action to secure recognition for the purposes of collective 
bargaining, to permit effective negotiation, and to dissuade an employer from 
breaching a collective agreement is either difficult or impossible.   
Legislative interference with the freedom of trade unions to bargain and strike is 
potentially justifiable where the workers affected are providing essential services, 
and effective compensatory pay review mechanisms are set in place, or where the 
intervention promotes trade union democracy. But British restrictions on trade 
union autonomy are not restricted to essential services, and have little to do with 
democracy. 
 
The basic requirement for a strike ballot apart, these restrictions have 
unequivocally been imposed in order to provide employers with comparatively 
firm grounds on which to base an application for a labour injunction to halt an 
impending action, and to give the employer time to take legal advice and make 
practical preparations - should such an application be unfeasible or unsuccessful, 
they delay, and therefore weaken the effectiveness of the proposed industrial 
action. Almost all applications for injunctions hinge now on whether the union 
has successfully negotiated the procedures. Only very rarely do courts hear 
arguments about the reach of the economic torts, and judges have long ceased 
‘discovering’ fresh tortious liability.   
 
Trade union democracy had arguably ceased to be any concern of the 
Government in 1988 when it became unlawful for trade unions to expel or 
discipline members for failing to participate in industrial action - itself an illegal 
restriction of union autonomy. This had effectively been the administration of the 
coup de grace to the basis of British collective industrial relations. Post-entry 
union membership agreements ceased to operable that same year, while fresh 
post entry union membership and union shop agreements had effectively been 
prohibited in 1984. Membership and employability were now wholly separate 
matters. Workers could no longer be dismissed for refusing to join a union or to 
refusing to pay the equivalent of the subscription to a charitable fund. Whatever 
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the outcome of a strike ballot, workers could, if they chose to cross a picket line, 
report for work without risking formal sanction. The solidarity necessary for 
collective action had been fatally undermined by the provision of a series of 
individual rights. 
 
Nevertheless the Tories continued to insist that they were making lawful 
interventions in order to promote trade union democracy, and pressed on with 
their attack on collectivism. Fresh legislative assaults were made on trade union 
freedom in 1990. The removal of Acas’s duty to promote collective bargaining in 
TULRA 1993 made it very clear that the individual rights conferred in that Act to 
permit members to challenge decisions taken by their union were intended to 
undermine collective bargaining rather than promote trade union democracy.  
 
2016, of course, saw the Cameron government’s valedictory Trade Union Act 
imposing the balloting thresholds; tighter procedural balloting and notice rules; 
fresh restrictions on the freedom to picket; restrictions on trade union funding 
and campaigning, as well as sweeping new powers for the investigation of union 
affairs by the Certification Officer, with the trade unions being obliged to fund the 
newly expanded office of the CO. 
 
 
 
Benchmarking: ‘Individual’ Employment Rights 
 
Where occupational health and safety is concerned, a matter, like the rights to 
bargain and to strike, more readily defined as a human or civil right than as an 
economic or social right, the picture is of less brazen, but no less deliberate 
attacks on workplace rights. The approach here has been to withdraw collective 
supervision by the state and by trade unions and to isolate the individual worker. 
Ostensible compliance disguises what closer examination reveals to be legislation 
deliberately drafted so that it is ineffective - a dilution of the standards, a failure 
by the state to enforce the law, and a reluctance to permit those individual 
workers obliged to enforce their rights by means of litigation to do so easily and 
effectively. The withdrawal of legal aid, restrictions on the opportunity for 
litigants in industrial injury cases to recover the costs of legal advice and 
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representation, and the necessity now for workers to show that the employer has 
been negligent for damages for workplace injuries to be secured have served to 
protect the interests of the employer and undermine the rights of the worker. 
The very comprehensive substantive European Union OSH requirements are 
backed by similarly detailed European Social Charter standards, and by the 
UNESCR core requirement for states to provide a ‘comprehensive national policy 
on occupational safety and health.’ Nevertheless, labour and workplace 
inspection programmes are inadequate, remedies for OSH breaches weak or non 
existent, and penalties are insufficiently dissuasive rendering much of this 
protection illusory. Sick pay and the relevant benefits are inadequate, workers 
engaged in inherently hazardous work are not given the compensatory leave they 
are entitled to, and self employed and domestic workers are excluded from 
protection.  
Successive governments have been careful to avoid the scrutiny of the ILO 
Committee of Experts by largely avoiding ratifying ILO OSH Conventions. Crucially 
however, the Attlee government ratified the ‘priority’ Labour Inspection 
Convention No.81 of 1947, and the Committee of Experts has, since government 
policy was first drawn to its attention by the TUC in the late 1980s, been able to 
harry the government over withdrawal of preventative inspection, the habitual 
under reporting of work related accident and disease, and the questionable 
independence of the HSE. The political spring board to a recognition that the 
problems of workplace health and safety require collective solutions – state 
intervention and collective negotiation rather than individual litigation - arguably 
lies with reminding Parliament of the obligations of ILO Convention No. 81, of the 
real extent and cost of work related injury and disease, and of the case for a 
programme of ratification of the raft of ILO OSH Conventions. 
ILO obligations to manage working time have also been avoided. While this has 
allowed the government to escape the direct attention of the Committee of 
Experts, the EU Working Time Directives, requiring states to take account of the 
relevant ILO Conventions, and the reliance of the UN Committee on the 
Conventions in the interpretation of Article 7 of the Covenant, has meant that ILO 
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influence in this sphere has proved inescapable. The Covenant and the 
Conventions arguably provide a ‘backstop,’ independent of that proposed in the 
EU withdrawal, sufficient to prohibit any post Brexit legislative challenge to 
existing UK provisions, and arguably the basis of a case for revising the 
inadequately implemented and only notionally enforced working time regulations 
– the product of what I show to be a calculated government policy to neutralise 
the directives.  
Less covert denials of working time entitlements – the refusal of the government 
to ensure that workers have the right to paid public holidays or to adequate 
compensation if they are not, and permitting workers to postpone weekly rest so 
that more than 12 consecutive days are worked – are, while less scandalous than 
New Labour’s deliberate sabotage of the WTDs, evidence of the brazen refusal of 
the government to accept the binding supra national obligation of the ECSR 
where the more ordinary contractual terms are at issue. 
 There is an extreme, very likely politically led, reluctance to accept ‘foreign’ 
intervention into the ordinary contract of employment. This becomes more overt 
in relation to working time when holidays and rest days, rather than working 
hours are at issue, and very likely accounts for the vehemence of Tory loathing for 
the Working Time Directives. European Social Charter and UN Covenant 
requirements to ensure that overtime work must be paid at a premium by law, 
and for a worker to be guaranteed a decent standard of living and a ‘fair wage’ 
have been ignored along with the benchmark calculations for the provision of the 
minimum hourly rates for the last 40 years. These matters were the province of 
the Wages Councils, and remain eminently suitable for sectoral collective 
bargaining mechanisms; to return to the tri-partite negotiation of these matters 
would be to overturn the cornerstone of the neo-liberal revolution.   
Similarly, rights to equal treatment, arguably better seen as a civil rights to be 
enforced collectively by the state or by NGOs, have been blunted by being 
conferred by individually exercisable economic or social entitlements. Adequately 
advised employers know approximately what a breach will cost them, and will pay 
the worker off accordingly – one by one, rather than being called to account once 
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by the state or a trade union and forced to mend their ways. Tribunal fees as well 
as a failure to oblige employers to pay any compensation awarded served to 
advance this commodification of rights, and, to secure the effective withdrawal of 
those rights for the majority of the workforce.  
The protection of civil rights requires collective solutions, and sectoral 
arrangements arguably hold out the best hope for employing the information 
garnered by the Equality Pay Audits and Gender Pay Gap Reporting. State 
intervention in the form “ of temporary special measures” to permit states ‘to 
address traditional gender roles and other structural obstacles that perpetuate 
gender inequality,’ recommended by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, the UN Human Right Committee and the European Committee of 
Social Rights can best be achieved through sectoral tri-partite bargaining 
arrangements. Although these bodied tend to be preoccupied by gender 
inequality, there is no reason why the ‘structural obstacles’ to those sharing other 
protected characteristics cannot be overcome by positive discrimination, 
particularly now that the bounds of the EU anti discrimination regime, previously 
cited as the chief barrier to such a programme, are loosening.  While the principal 
gap in the comparatively robust UK anti- discrimination regime is the failure to 
adequately protect discrimination on grounds of political belief, social origin and 
social status, it is questionable as to whether addressing those shortfalls of 
protection through existing anti-discrimination mechanisms would be politically 
feasible. 
The glaring inadequacies of the ‘social chapter’ protections for fixed term and 
agency workers, reliant as they are on the terms of the relevant EU directives, 
rather than on other supra national standards, arguably can perhaps no longer be 
said to fall short of the benchmark standards of the Directives. The TUC was 
complicit in New Labour’s programme of their implementation, and consequently 
only the Agency Workers’ Regulations, on which the unions and the New Labour 
government were unable to come to agreement,  and which ultimately came into 
force under the Coalition government, have been the subject of a complaint 
presented by the TUC to the Commission.  
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While that matter is still pending, it can safely be argued that there is no prospect 
of enforcement action being brought by the Commission, still less of a ruling by 
the ECJ.  States have been afforded a very wide margin of appreciation in 
implementing EU employment rights, and the Commission appears loathe to call 
states to account for even very obvious failures of regulation. If that bird did not 
fly with the massive expansion of the EU in the first decade of this century, it has 
certainly flown now. 
The questionable introduction of ‘worker’ status by New Labour in 1997 to limit 
the impact of the EU ‘social chapter’ employment protections can similarly be said 
now to be beyond any challenge through the EU mechanisms. 
Addressing what is effectively a mechanism to permit de facto employers to 
evade tax and the embrace of workplace protections through ‘disguised 
employment’ or ‘bogus self employment,’ and the provision of adequate 
protection against discriminatory treatment of atypical workers, including those 
on abusive zero or restricted hours contracts, arguably requires fresh legislation 
and unqualified legal rights to equal treatment, collective agreement and an 
effective system of labour inspection. While there is cross party consensus that 
something needs to be done, and the Tories have recently made a few legislative 
gestures towards reining in the use of these abusive contracts, only the Labour 
Party has pledged to prohibit them.  Arguably, however, there can be said 
supranational obligation sufficient to provide the requisite political springboard 
for consensus. While the ILO Labour Inspection Convention No.81 cannot be said 
to require the UK to monitor the terms and conditions of employment through an 
inspection regime, the European Social Charter and UN Covenants do oblige 
governments to ensure fair remuneration, just conditions of work, and a decent 
standard of living, Article 7 of the UN Covenant additionally requiring states to 
guarantee the ‘reasonable limitation of working hours.’ Moreover it has been 
convincingly argued that the ILO Decent Work Agenda and the Declaration on 
Social Justice and a Fair Globalisation signed up for by New Labour require the 
government to tackle these ‘new problems about shortage of hours, allocation of 
hours and regularity of hours.’ 
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The Calculated Abandonment of The Rule of Law 
The full significance of the UK government’s record of breach, abandonment, 
obfuscation and evasion in relation to supra national labour standards and 
supervision should not be underestimated. It is a deliberate breach of the Rule of 
Law. For a state that demands the adherence of its citizens, and other states, to 
the rule of law its position is wholly and unarguably untenable. 
 
Lord Bingham, that most famous of Supreme Court judges observed in his 
posthumously published 2011 book The Rule of Law that  
‘international law comprises a distinct and recognisable body of law with its 
own rules and institutions, it is a body of law complementary to the 
national laws of individual states, and in no way antagonistic to them; it is 
not a thing apart; it rests on similar principles and pursues similar ends; and 
observance of the rule of law is quite as important on the international 
plane as on the national, perhaps even more so. Consistently with this, the 
current Ministerial code, binding on British ministers, requires them as an 
overarching duty to ‘comply with the law including international law and 
treaty obligations.’1503 
The rule in international law is pacta sunt servanda, reiterated in Article 26 of the 
1969 Vienna Convention on International Treaties:   
‘Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by 
them in good faith.’ The UK is in breach of that fundamental rule. In the seminal 
Strasbourg case Golder v United Kingdom [1975] it was accepted by the 
Government,1504 the Court, and the dissenting judges, that the terms of the 1969 
Vienna Convention reflected the generally accepted principles of international 
law.1505  The 1969 Convention is not retrospective,1506 and did not come into force 
until 1980, but nevertheless the UK Government acknowledged, as it had when it 
                                               
1503
 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law, 2010 (Penguin Books Edition 2011), p110. 
1504
 ECHR 1. 
1505
Ibid, para 29.  
1506 Article 4 & 28. 
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had signed it in 1970, and ratified it in 1971,1507 that it laid down state obligations 
in customary international law on states party to the European Convention, and 
to other treaties which predated the Vienna Convention.  
That this post 1979 abandonment of the rule of law has been ideologically led is 
not disputed. Successive administrations have cited their commitment to a 
‘flexible labour market,’ and to ‘jobs’ – to emasculated trade unions, to the 
supposedly individually negotiated contract of employment, to low levels of 
statutory regulation, and to low pay.  
 
Economic research has long confirmed that employment protection, whether 
provided by collective solidarity or statute, does not impact upon levels of 
employment. Although evidence supporting the government’s case is available, 
most of the evidence points the other way. Daniel and Stilgoe’s The Impact of 
Employment Protection Laws, a very comprehensive survey published in 
1978,1508concluded:  
 
‘There was very little sign in our findings that employment protection 
legislation was inhibiting industrial recovery or contributing to the high 
level of unemployment by taking on new people...there was no sign of 
employment protection legislation having had a greater tendency to inhibit 
smaller firms from decreasing or increasing the size of their workforce...’ 
 
Andrew Glyn, Dean Baker, David Howell and John Schmitt in their 2003 paper, 
Labour Market Institutions and Unemployment: A Critical Assessment of the Cross-
Country Evidence stated that  
 
‘Our results suggest a yawning gap between the confidence with which the 
case for labour market deregulation has been asserted and the evidence 
that the regulating institutions are the culprits. It is even less evident that 
                                               
1507 Article 2 (b) of the 1969 Convention states that ‘ratification,’ ‘acceptance,’ ‘approval,’ and ‘accession,’ mean in 
each case the international act so named whereby a state establishes on the international plane its consent to be 
bound by a treaty,’ and by 2(f) a ‘contracting state’ is defined as ‘a State which has consented to be bound by the 
treaty, whether or not the treaty has entered into force’, the term ‘party’ being substituted when the treaty has 
come into force ( Article 2(g)). Similarly Article 11 states that consent to be bound ‘may be expressed by 
signature... ratification” etc. Articles 11 -17 cover this. Article 18 obliges states from defeating ‘the object and 
purpose of the treaty before it enters into force.’ 
1508Policy Studies Institute, June 1978. 
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further weakening of social and collective protections for workers will have 
significant impacts on employment prospects.’1509 
 
Simon Deakin and Prabirjit Sarkar, in a research paper published in 2008 
concluded that stronger dismissal laws had impacted positively on employment 
and productivity in France and Germany. In the USA, slightly stronger protections 
had a marginally negative impact on employment rates but boosted productivity, 
while they found ‘No relationship, either positive or negative between 
employment or productivity and employment regulation in the UK.’1510 
 
One might ask why, if the Government wished – whether out of misguided but 
genuine concern for ‘flexibility’ and ‘jobs,’ or in order to return the wealth re-
distributed since 1945 back into the hands of the owners of capital - to pursue 
industrial policies contrary to its regional and international treaty obligations, it 
did not simply lawfully denounce, abrogate or otherwise withdraw from those 
commitments. The obvious answer is that, on balance, it was considered 
disadvantageous to take such a step: 
Following a handful of Strasbourg rulings adverse to the United Kingdom in the 
early 1970s, as the Commission and the Court assumed more power the Heath 
Government had contemplated withdrawing the right of individual petition 
(Article 25), and ceasing to accept the ‘compulsory jurisdiction’ of the Court 
(Article 46). These then ‘optional articles’ fell to be renewed in January 1974. In 
the face of considerable domestic pressure to renew, a senior civil servant in the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office had reflected the consensus in Government 
when he had suggested that ‘our best course would be to renew for the shortest 
period which is compatible with the maintenance of our international good name 
and which would be defensible in the country,’1511 an argument which 
encapsulates not only the approach taken to the evolution of the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence until 1998, when the optional articles ceased to be optional, but 
also to that taken to international and regional treaty obligations relating to 
                                               
1509
 Oxford University Discussion Paper Series No.68, August 2003. 
1510
Assessing the Long-Run Economic Impact of Labour Law Systems: A Theoretical Reappraisal and Analysis of New 
Time Series Data, CLPE Research Paper 30/2008, Vol. 4 No.6. 
1511 TNA FCO 41/1110, note by an official in the Western European Department 23 October 1973. 
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industrial relations more generally after 1979. The neoliberal administrations of 
the past 40 years elected to comply with those obligations only as far they were 
considered to be compatible with the maintenance of the UK’s international 
prestige and influence, and with their grip on power. 
 
While in November 1980 Thatcher’s cabinet had noted of the evolving Strasbourg 
jurisprudence that ‘the time might come when a judgment was so damaging to 
the Government as to be unacceptable,’ it decided to renew acceptance of 
individual petition and compulsory jurisdiction for a further five year period.1512  
Non renewal was said to be incompatible with a cautious manifesto commitment 
to ‘discuss a possible Bill of Rights,’ but of more significance was the threat to the 
UK’s international and regional standing. The cabinet felt that it would be seen as 
an implicit acknowledgement that the UK was breaching human rights in 
Northern Ireland, and would lose them the ‘tactical advantage’ they considered 
that they held over the Soviet Bloc in the sphere of human rights. 
 They would also be out of step with the rest of Western Europe. 15 of the 20 
Convention signatories recognised the right to individual petition, and 17 
accepted ‘compulsory jurisdiction,’ and of the member states of the European 
Community all but France accepted Article 25, and every state accepted Article 
46. Consequently the cabinet believed that to fail to renew UK acceptance would 
draw criticism from the other states, and undermine the UK’s position in the 
Community.1513 
The cabinet believed too that evading the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court 
would make it difficult to defend the UK’s failure to ratify the optional protocol of 
the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
So, while the Government could lawfully have renounced these often politically 
inconvenient obligations, to have done so would have had collateral effects which 
it wished to avoid.   
                                               
1512
 In 1972 the Heath Government had renewed for two years, and in 1974 it renewed for a further two years. In 
1976  the Wilson Government had renewed for five years. 
1513
 TNA CAB 128/68/17,Cabinet meeting 13 November 1980. They were discussing a memorandum notionally 
written by the Home Secretary (Whitelaw) and the Foreign Secretary (Carrington) (TNA, CAB 129/210/16). 
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In 1982 the Department of Employment had stated the Tory government’s 
‘General Policy on Denunciation of International Treaties’: 
‘Governments are always reluctant to denounce International Treaties in 
part or whole, because they are solemn and binding commitments which 
are entered into in circumstances which at the time are thought unlikely to 
change, and the consequences in terms of both domestic and international 
publicity are almost inevitably adverse.’1514 
 
This summed up the plight of the Tories, albeit in the careful terms of the 
professional civil servant: The UK government had unequivocally bound itself to 
promote and protect at least the right of workers to the freedom to bargain 
collectively and arguably to confer on workers the right to bargain collectively.  
But this first Thatcher government wanted to stop workers from bargaining 
collectively, and denunciation carried with it a political penalty.  
 
The question was, therefore, should they simply just break these commitments 
and hope to ‘get away with it’?  
 
We have seen that sometimes denunciation was considered appropriate, while on 
other occasions the government might simply elect to ignore a particular 
obligation, and, when upbraided, argue that it believed itself to be compliant. The 
approach taken depended, and continues to depend, on the nature of the 
obligation, the strength of the enforcement regime of the instrument imposing 
the obligation and the extent of the breach.  
When the Thatcher government had been preparing to restrict the powers of the 
Wages Councils it had contrasted the weakness of the European Social Charter 
supervisory system with the more robust and politically significant ILO regime and 
adjusted its approach accordingly. 
 
 As shown in chapter 3, officials at the Department of Employment in 1982 had 
‘assumed’ that the European Social Charter requirements for either collective 
bargaining or wage fixing machinery to cover overtime, equal pay, deductions 
                                               
1514 TNA LAB 10/2969, February 1982. 
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from wages, and notice periods ‘would not have the same force as the [ILO] 
Convention’ No.26  on minimum wage machinery.1515 
 
Of course, the level of obligation was equal; it was merely that the political 
consequences of a breach of the Charter were thought likely to be less significant 
than a breach of the Convention. The civil servants were ultimately proved to 
have been correct. 
 
In 1984 it was argued that the government could breach the ILO Convention and 
get away with it: 
 
‘there are grounds for thinking that we should be unlikely to incur serious 
criticism....The TUC might well lodge a complaint with the ILO but we would 
have good counter arguments.’1516 
 
However, 1984 was the year in which the Government overstepped the mark to 
brazenly require that staff at GCHQ Cheltenham either renounce union 
membership or be dismissed. The bruising and humiliating encounters with the 
Committee on Freedom of Association and the International Labour Conference 
that followed made it apparent that where the ILO was concerned the Tories had 
pushed non compliance to the limit. While the government did not back down, 
and the civil servants were not permitted to join a union again until New Labour 
came to power in 1997, the Tories knew now that they could neither denounce 
the fundamental Conventions, nor could they ignore the obligations they 
imposed. 
 
 Ideologically pleasing as it might have been for the Thatcher Government to have 
stopped those civil servants from bargaining collectively, and as happy as the US 
government were with the new arrangements, it had made a seriously politically 
damaging misjudgment. 
 
The confidence of the Department of Employment that the government could clip 
the wings of the Wages Councils and argue its way out of a breach ILO Convention 
No.26 appeared to evaporate. The Convention was denounced in July 1985. By 
contrast, Article 4(1) of the European Social Charter was simply ignored. 
                                               
1515
 TNA LAB 10/2969, 1982, op cit. 
1516Ibid. 
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We saw that in 1988 that officials in the Department of Employment government 
was preparing to abolish the Works Councils had stated that  
‘I think we might have to concede (privately at any rate) that a finding by 
the Committee of Experts [now the European Social Rights Committee] that 
by abolishing Wages Councils we were in breach of our obligations under 
Article 4:2 would be well founded.’ 
 The key question was ‘How seriously should it be regarded?’ 
Their conclusion was that the Charter supervisory procedures, unlike those of the 
ILO, did not involve the participation of Eastern Bloc member states or worker 
representatives keen to make the most of any opportunity to condemn the British 
government. As a consequence, sanction for breaches amounted to no more than 
embarrassment. Denunciation on the other hand  
‘would certainly not be well received in the Council of Europe, and it might 
be preferable for us to bear with the criticism of infringement rather than 
incur the odium of further denunciation.’1517 
So the government simply went ahead and broke international law.  
Unfortunately the record starts to become rather sparse at around the 30 year 
mark, but it would be uncontroversial to argue that the Tories stuck to this cynical 
policy in subsequent years.  
 
All the Wage Councils except for the Agricultural Wages Board were abolished in 
1993. The ILO Agricultural Wage Fixing Machinery Convention was denounced in 
1994,1518 and the Agricultural Wages Board was abolished in 2012. 
 
The Failure of Rights Instruments  
                                               
1517Ibid,WRB Robinson, Department of Employment, 29 February 1988. Articles 8.4(a) of the European Social 
Charter on night work for women, and 8.4(b) on underground work for women had been denounced in 1985, 
ostensibly to align UK obligations under the Charter with EU anti discrimination obligations, and it was considered 
that a “further tranche of denunciations” would be a step too far. 
1518
 ILO Convention No.99, Minimum Wage Machinery (Agriculture) 1951, which had been ratified by the Churchill 
Government in 1953. 
451 
 
 
International and regional rights instruments are the tools of political persuasion 
and entrenchment to be employed when the Conservative Party has lost power. 
They are not a panacea. As the eminent jurist DN Pritt put it: 
 
‘In capitalist states, where any concession of Human Rights is made with 
reluctance by minority ruling classes to working class pressure, the ruling 
class seeks always to treat the formal proclamation of the rights as 
sufficient realisation of them, so that in practice the right often fails to 
become a reality.’1519 
 
The first Thatcher administration had been prepared, if need be, to ignore ECtHR 
rulings deemed to be unacceptably damaging to its domestic policies. That 
defensive attitude was to change in the wake of Young James and Webster and 
subsequent individualistic decisions on compulsory trade union membership. 
These were of very considerable value to the neo liberals, who were able to claim 
that the European Court of Human Rights was on their side. The 1988 
endorsement at Strasbourg of the Government’s argument that the denial of 
freedom of association in the GCHQ Case had been a necessary and proportionate 
step taken in the interests of national security was an extraordinary vindication of 
the Thatcherite war on trade unions. 1520 
 
Subsequently all legislation was required to be ‘Strasbourg Proofed’ to ensure 
that conflicts with the Court were kept to a minimum, and although there have 
been occasional displays of Tory defiance (notably absent since the June 2016 
Referendum), the court’s decisions have invariably, if sometimes reluctantly and 
inadequately, been implemented by the British Government. While one might 
plausibly argue that the political damage which would be inflicted on any 
government defying the court ensures UK compliance, it is also the case that the 
respect accorded the rulings of the court by the government has served to 
undermine the adverse rulings of the supervisory bodies of other supranational 
instruments. 
 
                                               
1519
DN Pritt, Employers, Workers and Trade Unions, Book One of Law, Class and Society, 1970, p148.  
1520
Council for Civil Service Unions v UK 10 EHRR 269. It was an extraordinary decision. The civil servants had been 
encouraged to join the appropriate union since the late 1940s. Trade union rights were restored in 1997 and no 
subsequent administration has felt the need to re-impose them. 
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 Although the days of the court’s unwavering adherence to the individualistic 
human rights paragdigm, when the Tories and New Labour could rely on it to 
refuse to acknowledge the collective aspect of freedom of association, have 
passed, and it has adopted a wide, comparatively trade union friendly, 
interpretation of Article 11 ECHR since the 2008 Demir and Baykara case, there is 
no reason to suppose that, were the GCHQ case heard in 2018 by the ECtHR, it 
would take a different view.  
 
The court is still apparently an ally of the British neo liberals. 
 
In 2009 Keith Ewing and John Hendy were contemplating what appeared to be 
The Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baykara - the potential influence of that 
watershed  Article 11 ECtHR case both on the European acquis, and on domestic 
law.1521 
 
 The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights explicitly incorporates Article 11 and the 
ILO Conventions as a ‘floor of rights,’1522 and the Convention has, of course, been 
incorporated into UK law since 2000. In effect, the Luxembourg and domestic 
judiciaries had been presented with the opportunity to impose an industrial 
relations sea change just as the EU hit the rocks of the economic crisis. 
 
The court had apparently broken with the human rights paradigm to hold that   
‘the right to bargain collectively with the employer has, in principle, become one 
of the essential elements of ‘the right to form and join trade unions for the 
protection of [one’s] interests’ set forth in art.11 of the Convention,’1523 to accord 
with the long forgotten incorporation of the terms of ILO Convention No.87 as a 
floor to the Article 11 protections. 
 
Protection for the right to strike can be seen to implicit in any guarantee of a right 
to bargain collectively, not least one reliant upon Convention No.87, and this 
appeared to be confirmed in Enerji Yappi Yol the following year.1524 
 
In the UK trade unionists sought unsuccessfully to rely on the Demir jurisprudence 
in a series of cases.1525  These cumulated in the RM Tv UK Strasbourg challenge to 
                                               
1521
 ‘The Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baykara’ (2010), 39 ILJ 2. 
1522
 See chapter 1. 
1523
Ibid, para 154. 
1524[2009] ECHR 2251. Unfortunately the report is available only in French. 
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the statutory trips and hurdles and the ban on secondary strike action,1526 and in 
Unite the Union v UK, an attempt to call the UK to account for dispensing with the 
Agricultural Wages Board, the last of the Wages Councils in breach of the ILO and 
European Social Charter obligations to promote and encourage collective 
bargaining and to provide appropriate mechanisms to facilitate such bargaining.  
 
 As if to emphasise that fine words do not necessarily effective rights make, the 
court confirmed that Article 11 protected the right to strike,1527 but found the ban 
on secondary action to be within the margin of appreciation,1528 and the challenge 
to the ‘trips and hurdles’ that unions had to surmount before strike action could 
be deemed to be lawful to be inadmissible on procedural grounds.1529 
 
The case was a missed opportunity for the court to align itself explicitly with the 
international and regional norms on which its interpretation of Article 11 has 
relied since Demir. The decision was arguably a retreat, rather than a failure to 
advance, a ruling arguably explicable by the pressure placed on the court by Tory 
threats to denounce the Convention, the retirement of a highly respected British 
judge, and by the more formal attempts to rein in the rapidly evolving Article 11 
jurisprudence initiated by the Tory dominated Coalition government, which led to 
the Brighton Declaration of 2012. 
 
Had the court ruled the UK ban to be a breach of Article 11 it would have been a 
huge embarrassment for the Tories, who were already finding the ‘votes for 
prisoners’ ruling hard enough to swallow, and by effectively finding for the 
government in the RMT case a confrontation was avoided.1530 Alan Bogg and Keith 
Ewing blamed ‘the crude politics of power’ for the Strasbourg judgment, with ‘the 
Court stepping back in the light of the political onslaught to which it had been 
subjected by the British government…’1531 
                                                                                                                                                       
1525
  Notably in Metrobus  v Unite the Union [2010] ICR 173. In Serco v RMT [2011] EWCA Civ 226, however, the 
Court of Appeal did rule that as a consequence ‘the time honoured view that the immunities...had to be narrowly 
construed, as they were an affront to the common law’ be dispensed with and cases ‘construed in the normal way, 
without presumptions one way or the other’  and so lifted the labour injunction( Bogg and Ewing, The Implications 
of the RMT Case (2014) 43(1)ILJ 221, (pp222-3) 
1526RMT v UK [2014] ECHR 366. 
1527 Without considering whether it was an ‘essential element’ of freedom of association. 
1528 Permitted by A11(2). 
1529
The parties had settled the dispute, and the matter was supposedly therefore inadmissible. 
1530
That case also concerned a ‘blanket ban,’ and all that was required of the government was a subtle adjustment 
to permit some prisoners the right to vote, which is what ultimately happened. 
1531 P 223 The Implications of the RMT Case, 2014, op cit 
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 Arguably, just as Young, James and Webster in 1981 was taken as the ‘green light’ 
for the Employment Act 1982, the case was taken by the Tories as permission 
from Strasbourg to forge ahead with what became the Trade Union Act 2016.1532 
 
The disappointment of the British labour movement was compounded by the 
ECtHR in Unite V UK [2014], which revealed the right to collective bargaining, that 
‘essential element’ of Article 11, to be no more than a right to the freedom to 
bargain collectively, little more than a negative right not to be actively prevented 
by the state from engaging in voluntary bargaining.  
 
Remarkably the court cited with apparent approval the claim in the government’s 
‘impact statement’ on the abolition of the last Wages Council, the Agricultural 
Wages Board, that the fact that the majority of farm workers in the UK received 
more than the minimum wage, was ‘an indication that a number of agricultural 
workers were already negotiating their own agreements.’1533 The application was 
held to inadmissible. 
 
The court chose to refer back to the individualistic narrow interpretation that had, 
in the first freedom of association cases heard at Strasbourg, the Belgian Police 
Trilogy of 1975 and 1976, led the court to hold for years that Article 11 protected 
little more than a right to organise. That departure from Demir, and from the line 
of cases which had followed, seemingly to avoid giving Cameron’s Tories a bloody 
nose, was a display of judicial partiality which would have been laughable were 
the court less influential.  
 
It was held that the union was free to attempt to negotiate, and for the court, the 
mere existence of New Labour’s inadequate statutory procedures, which it 
acknowledged were of use to ‘almost none’ of the 600,000 workers previously 
covered by the AWB, ‘represents a measure intended to encourage and promote 
collective bargaining across industry in general.’1534 Consequently the court 
professed to believe that the UK could not be said to have failed to comply with 
its ILO C98 and European Social charter obligations to actively promote 
bargaining.  
                                               
1532
  See Michael Ford and Tonia Novitz, ‘Legislating for Control: The Trade Union Act 2016’, (2016) 45  ILJ 282. Ford 
and Novitz referred only to the RMT case and the 2016 Act.  
1533Unite the Union v the United Kingdom [2016], op cit, para 64. 
1534Ibid, para 65. 
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Meanwhile, at the European Court of Justice, the influence of Demir and Baykara, 
after the Viking and Laval cases had seen the court obliged to acknowledge that 
the rights to bargain collectively and to strike (as enshrined in Article 28 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU which incorporates Article 11 ECHR as 
well as ILO Conventions 87 and 98 to flesh out the protection ‘guaranteed’) were 
fundamental rights of the European Union, while ruling that for practical purposes 
they were subservient to the economic freedoms, has been undetectable. The 
four business freedoms, the central pillars of the 1957 Treaty of Rome and the 
cornerstone of jurisprudence of the ECJ, arguably rival the common law in the UK 
as effective ‘built in’ protections for the perceived interests of capital.  
The Luxembourg court stood by in the wake of the ‘Eurozone crisis’ as The Troika 
presided over an unprecedented attack on freedom of association in southern 
and eastern EU States, and in Ireland, the protection of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights  seemingly now only accorded to employers. It appears now 
that judges are again deriving laws against combinations from a rights 
instrument, much as Article 11 ECHR and the European Social Charter were 
employed at Strasbourg to deny workers the right to bargain collectively in the 
Belgian Police Trilogy. 
 Marx understood that the protection of rights and freedoms depended on 
political consensus, and that the ruling classes accorded individual rights primacy 
in order to protect their own interests. By the time he had written On the Jewish 
Question he had realised that the post feudal evolution of law and society was not 
ultimately destined to be shaped by rights, whether divine or human, but by 
rational responses to economic and social circumstances, and in ithe had 
expressed surprise that in the immediate aftermath of the 1789 revolution in 
France the collective political rights of the citizen came to be regarded as 
subservient to individual rights.1535  What for him were merely steps taken 
towards social progress had become the end, while the vital vehicles of further 
social progress were seen merely as the means by which those individual rights 
were maintained. However, he noted that when those supposedly sacrosanct 
                                               
1535
Marx, 1844, op cit, p13. Those rights were no more than freedom of assembly and association in the Diceyean 
sense and the right to vote: “The aim of all political association is the preservation of the natural and 
imprescriptible rights of man.”  Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen 1791, Article 2. 
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individual rights conflicted with real political powerthose rights were either 
ignored or laws were passed which went beyond mere infringement to wholly 
contradict those rights: ‘The right of man to liberty ceases to be a right as soon as 
it comes into conflict with political life.’1536 These rights were no match for 
economic and political power and black letter law. 
 
In Capital Marx, by this time more attuned to the demands of organised labour, 
had observed that collective labour rights initially secured by the workers had 
been perceived to conflict with the individual rights of the bourgeoisie, and 
withdrawn: 
 
‘During the very first storms of the revolution, the French bourgeoisie 
dared to take away from the workers the right of association but just 
acquired. By a decree of June 14, 1791, they declared all coalition of the 
workers as “an attempt against liberty and the declaration of the rights of 
man.”’ 
 
  Freedom of association, as freedom to organise and bargain collectively, had 
been steamrollered in the name of individual liberty – or the right to property - in 
what Marx called a bourgeois coup d’etats.1537 
 
 Dicey had scoffed at the conceit of rights instruments which purported to 
‘guarantee’ the rights they purported to protect,1538 and even his beloved 
common law, that unwritten and infinitely flexible individualistic rights 
instrument, so long successful in defending the economic privileges accorded his 
class, had to yield when citizenship was ceded to the working classes. As we have 
seen, Dicey was unable to reconcile the legal recognition of economic and social 
rights, and the carving of fundamental labour rights out of the common law, with 
his belief in the primacy of the individual, condemning the statutory immunities 
                                               
1536 Individual liberty was being sacrificed by the state ostensibly in the public interest. Marx noted that although 
there was a constitutional right to press freedom the press was censored in the interests of protecting ‘public 
liberty’, and that despite the right to security private correspondence was opened as a matter of routine. 
‘Revolutionary practice is in flagrant contradiction with its theory…The right of man to liberty ceases to be a right 
as soon as it comes into conflict with political life, whereas in theory political life is only the guarantee of human 
rights, the rights of an individual, and therefore must be abandoned as soon as it comes into contradiction with its 
aim, with these rights of man. But practice is merely the exception, theory is the rule.’ (Marx, 1844, op cit, p13).  
1537
 Capital, vol I, Part 8, chapter 28 (p519 Wordsworth Classic Literature edition 1987). The French Revolution was 
a people’s revolution usurped by the Bourgeoisie.   
1538
 ‘We can hardly say that one right is more guaranteed than the other’. AV Dicey, Introduction to the Law of the 
Constitution, 1915, p. 119  
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for permitting ‘legalised wrong doing,’1539 and peaceful picketing as ‘peaceful 
war.’  
 
Dicey’s reputation would perhaps have been better served had he acknowledged 
that, whether collective or individual, written or unwritten, rights are of little 
consequence when they are at odds with political power. 
 
Entrenchment & A Fresh Compromise 
 
Effective entrenchment and approximate political consensus are therefore crucial 
to protect labour and employment rights from the tyranny of the majority – or, 
more accurately, from the Westminster dictatorships that result when an 
administration hostile to those rights has a working majority in the House of 
Commons. 
During the first 35 years following WWII it was understood by all governments 
that supra national labour rights instruments must either be adhered to or 
denounced through formal procedures, and that collective bargaining was 
essential to the orderly functioning both of the economy and society. Respect for 
the rule of law, the acknowledgement of the value of collective negotiation to 
liberal and social democracies, and, arguably the knowledge that any withdrawal 
of freedom of association would have unacceptable domestic and international 
repercussions, ensured the protection of workers’ rights. 
 
De facto respect for freedom of association was of immense value.  In 1958 a 
group of Tory lawyers wrote a famous pamphlet called A Giant’s Strength.1540 
They presented a radical view the right to strike, arguing that “the law’s original 
declaration that strikes were illegal is of the same kind as its subsequent 
declaration that they were permissible: neither involve any fundamental principle 
of right or liberty like the individual’s right to withdraw is own labour: in each case 
it is a question of the law responding to the political climate or to economic 
expediency. The issue is not whether the strike is on balance moral or immoral, 
but whether it is a useful or necessary expedient.”  
 
                                               
1539
 Ibid, p. lviii.  
1540By the ‘Committee of Members of the Inns of Court Conservative and Unionist Society,’ 1958, op cit . 
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As is so often the case in right wing circles, labour rights were not considered as 
human rights, yet the proposals in A Giant’s Strength led to the Industrial 
Relations Act 1971,1541 which for all its considerable faults, was a bold attempt, as 
voluntarism faltered, to stabilize industrial relations by the provision of a raft of 
collective labour rights – a step not taken by any UK government before or since. 
The Tories acknowledged the importance of collective bargaining, and theirs was 
a genuine, if outstandingly clumsy and insensitive, attempt to accommodate the 
individualism that is part of the libertarian baggage of the Conservative Party with 
the need of the trade unions for solidarity. 
 
Had an accommodation been reached then the UK would arguably have seen the 
adoption of something close to the Scandinavian and German industrial relations 
models, a fresh reconciliation of the individual and collective interest, offering the 
prospect, to judge by the post war and 21st Century experience in northern 
Europe, long term prosperity and stability. However, instead of the fresh 
compromise proposed by Heath’s Tories a wholly uncompromising abandonment 
of the post war reconciliation was introduced using the ‘stepping stones’ 
approach agreed upon by the Tory leadership during 1975-1978. 
 
The motives of the Heath and the Thatcher administrations differed where the 
protection of the individual was concerned. The Heath government was primarily 
catering for the traditional libertarian concerns for the individual voiced by large 
sections of his core supporters, typified by stories in the right wing press on the 
tiny number of ‘closed shop martyrs.’ As DN Pritt was moved to observe in 1970; 
 
‘freedom’ is a ‘much overworked word,’ which ‘always comes in as a sort of 
‘blackleg’ whenever anything in legislation or Court decisions seems likely 
to weaken trade unionism or to help those few trade unionists who want, 
or are persuaded, to act against the general interest of their class.’1542 
 
The Thatcherites, however, didn’t merely wish to weaken trade unionism – their 
uncharacteristic concern for these dissident workers disguised a long term 
ambition to deny all workers the opportunity to bargain collectively.  
 
                                               
1541
 For an account of the events leading to the passing of the Act and the response to the Act see Michael Moran’s 
book The Politics of Industrial Relations, 1977, which is almost wholly devoted to the events of 1970-74.  
1542
Pritt was commenting on Bonsor v Musicians Union [1952] in Book 1 of Law, Class and Society: Employers, 
Workers and Trade Unions (1970) p. 101. 
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The Heath government prohibited the closed shop as, in almost all circumstances, 
‘an unfair industrial practice,’ but permitted agency shops (albeit open to 
challenge by individual workers), which in practice maintained membership at 90-
95%, and permitted dissident workers to disobey a strike call should they so 
choose.  Montgomery Woodhouse, junior minister for employment had told the 
Commons when discussing the proposals for agency shops: 
 
‘Collective bargaining inevitably at some stages impinges on the rights of 
the individual and it is necessary to make a careful balance between the 
interests of the individual and the collective interest.’1543 
 
A few months later Wedderburn, in criticizing the Act, had argued that:  
‘Individuals must be protected... by the law against unfair treatment by 
employers or unions. But the duty of a labour law system is first to the 
individuals in the collective majority; and only second – not to be forgotten, 
but second – to individuals who wish to opt out of collective labour 
relations.’1544 
 
With hindsight it is little short of a tragedy that the two sides were not able to 
come to a workable compromise. In contrast to the polarised politics of the 
1980s, the Tories and the trade unions were not far apart. When the Thatcherites 
came to power – directly attributable to the failure of the attempts at a fresh 
compromise during 1969- 1973 - they used individual employment rights 
attracting very large awards to make closed shops unworkable, and legislated to 
prohibit industrial action to enforce trade union membership. Agency shops were 
outlawed. There was no question of a compromise.  
 
In 2019, however, there is every promise of a fresh compromise being reached. 
The 2017 Tory manifesto stated that:  
 
‘We reject the cult of selfish individualism...We know that our responsibility 
to one another is greater than the rights we hold as individuals. We know 
                                               
1543
TNA, LAB 10/3644, House of Commons, Motion for the Adjournment Wednesday, 21 April, Mr Woodhouse, 
‘Operation of the Closed Shop by British Rail’ Notes for Reply, para 8.  
1544
‘Labour Law and Labour Relations in Britain’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 1972, p290, emphasis 
supplied. 
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that we all have obligations to one another, because that is what 
community and nation demands.’1545 
 
 While it would be naive to read much into a vague pre election statement made 
as part of a failed strategy to persuade Labour supporters that the Tories were 
now the workers’ party, this modest political gesture became much more 
significant when in the subsequent election the healthy support for the 
unequivocally collectivist policies of the Labour Party revealed that the centre 
ground of British politics had shifted far more markedly to the left than May’s 
advisors had envisaged. It became more significant still as the minority 
government became mired in the Brexit disaster, dividing the nationalist and 
pragmatist Tories, raising the prospect of a socialist Labour government, or 
Labour dominated coalition, being returned to power in 2019. 
 
The search has been on for years for signs of a ‘post – Fordist’ reconciliation of 
capital and labour, often with particular emphasis placed on the role of human 
rights instruments.1546While the recognition of the necessity for full freedom of 
association demanded by these of instruments is unquestionably of great 
importance, the lessons of the past 40 years tell us that even if we are able to 
restore the rough consensus on which compromise depends, multiple protections 
are required.  
 
Employment rights of EU origin have proved to have an extraordinary resilience. 
Wide as the margin of appreciation afforded by the EU principle of subsidiarity is, 
and feeble and diluted as the rights implemented into domestic law are, the 
threat the infringement procedure being invoked by the Commission, and the 
cross party perception that access to the single market depends on compliance, 
has ensured that what is transposed into both primary and secondary legislation 
remains intact. Despite the ‘sabre rattling’ of the Tory dominated Coalition in 
2010 – 2015, and the delusional promises of the short lived Cameron 
administration of 2015-2016 that it would ‘repatriate’ employment rights, not 
                                               
1545 The Tory Manifesto 2017, Forward Together, p9.  
1546
 For an upbeat piece placing particular faith in the ILO Declaration of Fundamental rights at Work (an 
admittedly brilliant initiative – see chapter 4), the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and capability theory 
published just before the Eurozone disaster, see Judy Fudge ‘The New Discourse of Labour Rights: From Social to 
Fundamental Rights’(2007) 29 Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal, 29. 
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only do they remain intact, but to the fury of the right wing of the Tory party, it is 
very likely that they will continue be seen as inviolate even when (or if) the UK 
leaves the European Union. Thus not only does Brexit provide us with an object 
lesson in the effective entrenchment of employment rights, but also of the power 
of broad political consensus, both regionally and domestically, and UK citizens 
now seem set to have at least a backstop to protect employment rights of EU 
origin. 
 For years the Tories threatened to denounce the ECHR, largely, it would appear, 
to appease Eurosceptics within and without the party. If it was bluster then, it is 
unthinkable now, although in the event of a second referendum and a decision to 
remain in the EU, or to join EFTA, and therefore remain in the European Economic 
Area with the EU 27, membership, confused threats to perform that particular 
pointless act of self harm will no doubt once more be heard at Westminster. For 
all the faults of the Strasbourg Court, the Convention, and the ECtHR 
jurisprudence, can be said to provide longstop protection for a heavily 
compromised freedom to bargain collectively and to strike. 
Senior Labour Party politicians have expressed an interest in retaining the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights post Brexit - an interesting, if ultimately absurd 
proposition. The Charter reflects the acquis. While it draws on the UN, ILO and 
Council of Europe instruments examined in previous chapters to identify the 
fundamental rights conferred by European law, it is legitimately engaged in the 
domestic courts only when EU law is relied upon. It is a Charter for EU member 
states. Moreover, where labour law is concerned the apparent negation of Article 
28 by Article 16 has fatally undermined its value to trade unionists.  
 
As a tool of entrenchment it is important insofar as that it showcases the 
fundamental rights and freedoms that must be respected by EU states. 
Nevertheless, if the UK does leave the EU, the Charter goes too.  
 
Of much more value, and what any future Minister of Labour must be 
contemplating, would be a new comprehensive British Bill of Labour Rights which 
included unequivocal protection for the right for all workers to bargain 
collectively and to take strike action to further their economic and social 
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interests.1547 Such an instrument, entrenched along the lines of the US Bill of 
Rights would see labour and employment rights properly recognised as 
constitutional rights, rather than treated as appendages to a free trade 
agreement, or as disposable treaty obligations by rogue governments prepared to 
operate outside of the law. The US instrument requires the sanction of two thirds 
of Congress and three quarters of States before it can be amended, and it 
requires their Supreme Court to ‘strike out’ laws which breach the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed.  
 
Beyond the reach of the ECJ, the effective primacy afforded the business 
freedoms over labour rights, the toxic legacy of Viking and Laval and the 
‘trumping’ of Article 28 of the EU Charter by Article 16, and escaping the 
gravitational pull of the common law individualistic human rights paradigm, 
freedom of association in the context of industrial relations could be accorded its 
proper status as a fundamental human right. 
 
The political and constitutional difficulties implicit in what could be argued to be 
Parliament limiting its own sovereignty by placing excessive power in the hands of 
unelected members of the judiciary might justifiably be considered too great an 
obstacle to taking such a step.1548 However, the Factortame style ‘disapplication’ 
of legislation under the European Communities Act can be said to have placed 
similar power in the hands of the judges and, at the risk of lapsing into conjecture, 
Parliament could establish an elected court at Westminster to rule on such 
matters to provide the requisite element of democracy.  
 
Of course, a ‘strike out’ under the provisions of a British Bill of Rights would have 
the political virtue of not requiring a reference to a foreign court, although the 
government could, by these means, comply with the demands of the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to implement the provisions 
of the UN Covenant into domestic law. 
 
 There are, of course, alternative, rather less radical approaches which would 
augment current protections, rather than embed or entrench, suitable for 
coalition governments or minority administrations with ‘confidence and supply 
                                               
1547 See for example, KD Ewing and J Hendy, A Charter of Workers’ Rights (Liverpool, IER, 2002).  
1548 See ‘The Bill of Rights Debate: Democracy or Juristocracy in Britain?’ in KD Ewing, C A Gearty and B A Hepple 
(Eds), Human Rights and Labour Law: Essays for Paul O’Higgins (London, Mansell, 1994). 
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agreements.’ One, which would involve accepting the very limited jurisdiction of a 
supra national quasi judicial body, would be to accede to the Optional Protocol to 
the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by which 
individual ‘communications’ can be presented for consideration by the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. States which have acceded to 
the protocol may further assent to the Committee’s special ‘Inquiry procedure,’ 
whereby ‘grave and systematic violations’ of the Covenant may be investigated. 
1549Until 2008 the UNICESCR had no mechanism by which complaints against 
signatory states could be pursued, although the equivalent Optional Protocol to 
the UNICCPR – complaints are addressed to the Human Rights Committee - has 
existed since 1966.  
 
As the government has been required to adhere to the provisions of the Covenant 
1976 (and subject to monitoring by the UN Committee since it was established in 
1985), ratifying the ‘OP’ would, like the ratification of the EU Charter in 2000, 
confer no fresh substantive rights. States found to be violating the Covenant are 
advised of the ‘recommendations’ adopted by the Committee, and are required in 
subsequent government reports as part of the normal reporting cycle to detail the 
measures taken to secure compliance. Unfortunately, not only are the 
determinations of the Committee under the procedure not regarded as legally 
binding, but any communication to the UN Committee regarding a matter which 
‘has been or is being examined under another procedure of international 
investigation or settlement,’ will be held to be inadmissible, and denunciation 
requires only six months’ notice.1550 
 
The UN procedures could augment the Collective Complaints ‘Additional Protocol’ 
to the European Social Charter, adopted in 1995 by the Council of Europe, as a 
backstop to domestic protections. While that procedure can be restricted to 
handle only complaints of breaches of the 1961 Charter, it is unlikely that any 
government willing to accede to the protocol would not ratify the 1988 Additional 
Protocol and the Revised European Social Charter, which while arguably not 
conferring any new labour and employment rights can be said to have revitalised 
the 1961 text. 
 
                                               
1549
 See Articles 1 – 10 of the OP for the handling of communications and the issue of recommendations, and 
Article 11-13 on the Inquiry procedure, the follow up to the inquiry procedure and ‘protection measures.’ 
1550Article 3. 
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 Based as it is on the ILO procedure permitting unions and employers’ 
organizations to present complaints to the Freedom of Association Committee, 
the Charter procedure is well suited to complement the right of British citizens to 
petition the ECSR’s sister body the Strasbourg Court (whether individually or 
collectively), and for collective complaints be made to the ILO.  
 
Crucially, the ECSR may declare a complaint admissible even when another supra 
national body has considered, or is considering, the same matter, and just as the 
provisions of Part II of the Charter are legally binding, the decisions of the 
European Committee of Social Rights are binding on states party to the Additional 
Protocol. Like the Conclusions adopted by the Committee states are required to 
give them effect in domestic law, and a failure to do so a breach of international 
law. Having declared a complaint admissible the Committee may require a state 
to take immediate measures to limit potential harm. If the ECSR rules that a state 
is in violation of the Charter the Committee of Ministers is informed, and the 
state is required to explain to the Ministers how it will rectify the matter. The 
Ministers may then adopt by a majority vote a resolution taking into account of 
the state’s proposals. If the state makes no such proposals, or the position 
remains unsatisfactory, then, with a two thirds majority, the Committee may 
make a recommendation. Thereafter, the state is required to inform the ECSR of 
the measures taken, or being taken, to secure conformity with the Charter in 
every report submitted as part of the normal reporting cycle. 
 
Cap that with the ratification of Protocol 12 of the ECHR, described in chapter 7, 
and any UK government would be placed under extreme supranational pressure 
when tempted to infringe workers’ rights. 
 
However, such measures are no substitutes for black letter law backed by a British 
Bill of Labour Rights. They are backstops which will promote consensus by 
changing the political climate, pressing home the message that the right to 
bargain collectively is a fundamental human right, ‘feeding into’ the positive legal 
rights to bargain, and to fresh British constitutional guarantees for freedom of 
association. 
 
Real freedom for British workers requires full freedom of association, actually 
existing freedom, and a government which adheres to the rule of law. 
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